

THE COMMUNIST
PARTY
of the
SOVIET UNION
A SHORT HISTORY

Edited by
W. KNORIN

COMMUNIST PARTY *of the* SOVIET UNION

A SHORT HISTORY

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A SHORT HISTORY

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PREFACE

TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

The history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) is a most important component part of the history of the Communist International. It comprises the experience of the most advanced, the most revolutionary workers' party of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, of the Party of the Bolsheviks, formed and raised to maturity by *Lenin*, the Party which worked under the direct leadership of *Lenin* and *Stalin*. This Party organized the victory of the great socialist October Revolution, established the dictatorship of the proletariat and has led the U.S.S.R. to socialism. Therefore every Communist, every revolutionary worker, every toiler in any capitalist country who seriously approaches the question of struggling for the overthrow of the rule of the exploiting classes, the question of struggling for the dictatorship of the proletariat and for socialism, must study the history of the C.P.S.U.

In comparison with the advanced capitalist countries, pre-revolutionary Russia, the country in which the first socialist revolution occurred, was backward and poorly developed in point of economy, politics and culture.

"The formation of the proletarian party in Russia proceeded in special conditions, which differed from the conditions prevailing in the West at the time the workers' parties were organized there," says Comrade Stalin. "While in the West, in France, in Germany, the workers' parties emerged from the trade unions in conditions in which the trade unions and the parties existed legally, in the conditions that prevailed after a bourgeois revolution, when the bourgeois parliament existed, when the bourgeoisie, having got into power, stood confronting the proletariat, in Russia, on the other hand, the formation of the proletarian party proceeded under the rule of ferocious absolutism, in the expectation of a bourgeois-democratic revolution; when on the one hand the Party organizations were filled to overflowing with bourgeois "legal Marxist" elements which were thirsting to utilize the working class for the bourgeois revolution, and when on the other hand the best Party workers were being torn out of the ranks of the Party by the tsarist gendarmerie at a time when the growing spontaneous revolutionary movement called

for the existence of a steadfast, compact and sufficiently secret fighting unit of revolutionaries that would be able to lead the movement to the overthrow of absolutism."*

In the conditions of the ripening of the revolutionary crisis, Lenin's task, the task of the organizers of the revolutionary proletarian Party in Russia, consisted in organizing cadres of experienced revolutionaries wholeheartedly devoted to the cause of liberating the working class, in arming them with the revolutionary theory of Marxism, the best program and tactics, in organizing a party sufficiently conspirative not to be broken up by the police, but at the same time maintaining sufficient contact with the masses to be able at the proper moment to lead these masses to struggle. Only because the Bolsheviks succeeded under Lenin's leadership in solving this problem at the very beginning of the revolutionary movement of the Russian working class were they able at the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party held in 1903 to form the vanguard of the world labour movement and to achieve tremendous historical victories.

The Bolshevik Party was formed and took shape in the struggle against the parties of the Second International, which arose before the Bolshevik Party but afterwards plunged down to opportunism. Leninism is the continuation and development of Marxism; it is Marxism in the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions; it took form and was created on the firm basis of the doctrine of Marx and Engels, in the struggle against the opportunism of the Second International and against the deviations from the general line of the Bolshevik Party. At the time when Lenin appeared in the historical arena, at the time when the Bolshevik Party was formed, the leaders of the Second International had already cast overboard the dictatorship of the proletariat, the fundamental principle of Marxism. The Social-Democratic parties were transformed more and more into parliamentary election apparatuses. The doctrine of the necessity and inevitability of the victory of socialism was being reduced more and more to an assertion that socialism would inevitably arrive without a struggle for power, as the result of the dialectic development of society, was being reduced to an assertion that this advent of socialism could be assured by struggling for political

* Stalin, *On Lenin*, pp. 9-11

democracy. It the great, the world-historic merit of the Bolsheviks that at the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in 1903, at which bolshevism took final shape as an independent current of political thought, at which the foundation of the Bolshevik Party was laid, they created an *organizational stronghold for the further development of Marxism, for Leninism.*

The Bolshevik Party assimilated the experience of the entire struggle of the world proletariat, the experience of the revolutionary movement of the whole world; it utilized, critically re-assayed and further developed this experience. Under the oppression of "tsarism, brutal and reactionary beyond precedent," the Bolsheviks had learned that "only he is a Marxist who extends the recognition of the class struggle to include the recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat" (*Lenin*). Therefore, the history of the C.P.S.U. is the history of an incessant, stubborn and severe struggle *for the hegemony of the proletariat* in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, inasmuch as this hegemony is the embryo of, and represents the transition to, the dictatorship of the proletariat; a struggle for the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the proletarian revolution, *for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat*, for the consolidation and the victory of this dictatorship, *for the building of classless, socialist society on the basis of this dictatorship.* A knowledge of the history of the C.P.S.U. equips the proletariat of all countries with a powerful weapon in the struggle for socialism. Therefore, there is no better school of revolutionary struggle than a study of the history of the C.P.S.U.

In contrast to all the other parties of the Second International which kept declaring that the proletariat itself would spontaneously become aware of the necessity of gaining political power, Lenin clearly posed the question that socialist class-consciousness must be propagated by a class-conscious vanguard, the party, substantiated the great role which a really revolutionary party must play in the struggle for the liberation of the proletariat. Only such a party can cause the proletariat to become conscious of the necessity of winning political power and setting up its own dictatorship.

In contrast to all the other parties of the Second International,

Lenin as early as the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. incorporated in the program of the Party the thesis concerning the dictatorship of the proletariat, on the ground that the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat was fundamental in Marxism, that "only he was a Marxist who extends the recognition of the class struggle to include the recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

In contrast to all the other parties of the Second International, Lenin built the Party for revolution and not for parliamentary struggle, taking as his orientation not peaceful development, not parliamentary struggle, but the recognition of the fact that the proletariat of Russia was faced with tremendous tasks and that these tasks could find a solution only by means of revolution, when proper ideological and political weapons as well as a real militant revolutionary party will have come into existence.

The Bolshevik Party, created by Lenin from the best sons of the working class, armed with the theory of Marx, Engels and Lenin, proved capable of withstanding the onslaught of the gendarmerie, of winning the majority of the working class for the armed uprising in October 1917, of securing the victory in this armed uprising and in the subsequent Civil War against the Russian and foreign bourgeoisie, in the establishment and victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the building of classless, socialist society.

The great, world-historic victories of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. were achieved as a result of the leadership of the revolutionary Bolshevik Party, composed of the best members of the working class and headed by *Lenin and Stalin*.

The defeat of the proletariat in a number of West European capitalist countries and the creation of fascist dictatorships in these countries was a result of the fact that the Social-Democratic Parties of these countries pursued an opportunist course instead of leading the masses to the overthrow of the exploiting classes, that they took to the course of collaborating with the bourgeoisie, became the main social support of the rule of the exploiting classes among the masses of the population against the revolution.

Communist Parties began to be formed in these countries only after the imperialist war. The belated formation of Communist

Parties in the West European capitalist countries complicated the task of winning the masses for revolutionary struggle, inasmuch as the revolutionary party of the working class had to lead the struggle to win the masses away from the influence of the Social-Democrats and the trade unions, which had become mass organizations led by the reformist Social-Democratic parties.

Despite these important differences between the conditions under which the Communist Party worked in Russia and those under which the various Communist Parties are working in the various capitalist countries, the experience of the Bolshevik Party is of the greatest importance for the Communist Parties of all countries. Experience has shown that the masses can be won over to the cause of overthrowing the exploiting classes only by a party which clearly knows its own aims and makes use of every movement of the masses to organize them for revolutionary struggle and to raise their class-consciousness. Experience has shown that the masses can be led to the decisive struggle against the exploiting classes, to armed uprising, only by a strongly centralized revolutionary party in which the political line, tactics and organizational forms are determined by the party as a whole, but in which at the same time each member unswervingly carries out the instructions, directions and decisions of the leading party organs.

Without such a strongly centralized revolutionary party the proletariat cannot be victorious in its battles against the exploiting classes. Without such a strongly centralized revolutionary party the proletariat cannot expropriate the possessing classes, consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and establish the new, socialist society.

In certain details the tactics of the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries may differ from the tactics of the Bolshevik Party before the October Revolution. Every Communist Party must base its activities not on analogies or historical parallels, not on quotations and formulas, but on life's own experience and the consideration of every circumstance, on a study of all pertinent facts. To map out the ways and means of realizing its aims, in accordance with prevailing conditions, to change these ways and means when conditions change, is the gist of the tactics of every Communist Party. Every Communist Party in its activities

relies on the practical experience of the whole international proletariat, submits every step it takes to the test of experience, learns from its mistakes and teaches others the ways and means of revolutionary struggle. But every Communist Party while utilizing the experience of the entire international movement will always turn primarily to the victorious experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This accounts for the exceptional significance attached to the study of the history of the C.P.S.U.

More than half of the present book is devoted to the post-October period of the socialist revolution in the U.S.S.R. This part of the book shows how the U.S.S.R.—the first socialist state—as a result of the heroic struggle of the working class and the consistent prosecution of the general line of the C.P.S.U., finally entrenches itself on the road to socialism. From a technically and culturally backward agrarian country, the U.S.S.R. has been transformed into an advanced, technically developed industrial country; from a country of peasant farming into a country of collective farming, of the largest-scale farming in the world based upon the most modern technique. The dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R., which has been realized in the form of Soviets, has proved to be a stern rule for the suppression of the resistance of the exploiting classes but at the same time the broadest and only genuine democracy for the toiling masses. The U.S.S.R. during the seventeen years of the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat has shown to the proletarians of the world the ways and forms in which the transition from capitalism to socialism, from state society to stateless society, can be realized. Thanks to the great work performed by the proletarians of the U.S.S.R., the concrete forms of this transition have been discovered. In all probability this transition will be shorter in the advanced capitalist countries whose economic life is more developed. But every country will have to assimilate the substance of the experience of the U.S.S.R. in order to be able to consummate this great historical transition.

The experience of the U.S.S.R. has shown that for the overthrow of the rule of the exploiting classes and for successful socialist construction, there is needed the leadership of a single, homogeneous, closely-knit and disciplined party which knows whither to lead the masses. This is the reason why a resolute

struggle must be waged for unified communist leadership in the decisive class battles, why a resolute struggle must be waged against all deviations and divergences, however slight, from the Bolshevik line of the Party.

The experience of the U.S.S.R. has shown that the resistance of the exploiting classes after their rule has been overthrown does not cease but on the contrary increases, assuming constantly more aggravated forms (sabotage, wrecking, terror, etc.) in proportion as the dictatorship of the proletariat proceeds to attack capitalism at its roots and wages a struggle for the destruction of the causes that give rise to classes and class distinctions, for classless, socialist society. Therefore the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot disappear after the overthrow of the rule of the exploiting classes and cannot be relaxed, but on the contrary the proletarian state power must be constantly reinforced commensurate with the development of the struggle for classless, socialist society. The experience of the U.S.S.R. has shown that the Soviets are the sole organized form which embraces all workers without exception as well as peasants, office employees, soldiers and sailors, the form in which the leadership exercised by the proletariat over all the other sections of the toiling masses can be most easily realized. Therefore the Soviets are the requisite form in which to carry into life the dictatorship of the proletariat in all countries.

The exposition of the history of the C.P.S.U. presented in the present volume closes with the great Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U., the Congress of the Victors. Thanks to the firm leadership of the C.P.S.U. and of Comrade Stalin, the leader of the Party and of the proletariat, the year of development after the Seventeenth Congress has led the U.S.S.R. to new tremendous economic and political successes. Heavy industry in the U.S.S.R. has scored new decisive victories, the proletarian executives have achieved new successes in mastering the country's modern machine technique. The collective farm system in the countryside which has continued its consolidation has led to new successes: the collective farms are becoming bolshevik while the collective farmers are becoming well-to-do. Thanks to the socialist organization of labour, the output of industry and agriculture is growing at a tremendous pace. Under these conditions the C.P.S.U. could proceed to abolish the political departments of the machine and

tractor stations which had accomplished the principal task assigned to them, and for the purpose of further improving the political work of the Party in the countryside, to set the task of further consolidating the district Party committees. On the basis of the powerful economic growth of the entire country and the augmentation of its grain reserves, the U.S.S.R. abolished the bread rationing system and set the task of further developing Soviet trade, trade without capitalists. On the basis of the tremendous successes in the direction of establishing classless, socialist society, the U.S.S.R. decided to further democratize the electoral system of the Soviet state and to introduce equal suffrage in place of unequal suffrage, direct elections in place of indirect elections, secret ballot instead of open ballot. This very important change in the Soviet constitution ensures the extension of Soviet democracy, the sole democracy that leads to the abolition of exploitation and class rule, to socialism and the greatest welfare for all toilers.

But despite all these great successes the class enemy, grown desperate and rendered impotent, has not ceased to carry on his struggle against the Leninist Party and its leadership headed by Stalin. The more hopeless the position of the enemies of the C.P.S.U., the more rapidly they plunge down into the mire of terrorism against the Party and the Soviet government. Under the conditions of stupendous socialist victories the Zinovievist anti-Party group, which in 1924 began its struggle against the Leninist Party as an opposition within the Party and was at once recognized by Comrade Stalin as an expression of new menshevism, has adopted the use of terror against the leadership of the Party. Sergei Mironovich Kirov, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and one of the closest companions-in-arms and disciples of Comrade Stalin, fell victim to the vile dregs of the Zinovievist anti-Party counter-revolutionary group. The proletarian dictatorship with a firm hand laid bare this nest of assassins and their instigators, and the proletarian court imposed stern judgment upon them. The double-dealers and provocateurs who screened their machinations behind Party membership books were cast out of the Party, were dealt with as provocateurs and whiteguards.

The Zinovievist anti-Party group is the only group in the

history of the Bolshevik Party which made a system of duplicity, which concealed its differences with the Party, openly denounced its own platform and pledged allegiance to the Party, so as to gain the confidence of the Party and thus deceive it. The Zinovievist factional group was the most treacherous and the most despicable of all factional groups in the history of the Bolshevik Party; it was in substance a whiteguard organization in disguise, whose members fully merited being treated as whiteguards. The exposure of the heinous offences of the Zinovievist anti-Party and anti-Soviet group stirred the entire Party to action, mobilized still more the vigilance of the entire Party and of the masses of workers and collective farmers to overcome the last remnants of the exploiting classes and the survivals of classes and class distinctions in the minds of people, rallied the entire Party still more closely around the Leninist leadership of Comrade Stalin.

More than thirty years have passed since the Bolshevik Party was formed, eleven years have elapsed since the death of that great man Lenin. The Bolshevik Party under the leadership of Comrade Stalin, Lenin's best disciple, has fulfilled the vow pledged by Comrade Stalin at the bier of Comrade Lenin, *has transformed the Russia of the New Economic Policy into Socialist Russia*. The great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, founded by Lenin and Stalin under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, is the base, the mainstay of the world proletarian revolution and the shock brigade of the world proletariat.

The successes of the Soviet Union, the successes of the C.P. S.U., are rousing the entire working class to struggle and will revolutionize the entire world.

W. KNORIN

PREFACE

TO THE SECOND RUSSIAN EDITION

For many centuries slave-owners, feudal landlords and capitalists held sway throughout the entire world—oppressing, exploiting and robbing the toilers, and for many centuries the oppressed masses fought against their enemies and enslavers.

Many a time did the oppressed rise against their oppressors. But these uprisings were always cruelly suppressed and the toiling masses went down in defeat.

Only in what was formerly tsarist Russia has the yoke of the landlords and capitalists been cast off. There for the first time in the history of the world the old order of society has been swept off the face of the land and a new, a socialist, classless society is being created—the society for which the best protagonists of mankind have fought and died.

This stupendous historical task was accomplished by the Bolsheviks—the Bolshevik Party created by Lenin.

The history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is, throughout, the history of the heroic struggle of the vanguard of the working class against autocracy and capitalism, for the dictatorship of the proletariat and the building of socialism.

The Party trained, organized and rallied the forces of the proletariat for the revolutionary struggle. It showed the proletariat the right path and the necessary means of struggle for socialism; it helped the working class to lead in its wake the wide masses of the peasantry and the oppressed nationalities. The Party thereby paved the way for the victory of the socialist revolution in October 1917 and established the first state of the victorious proletarian dictatorship in the world. The Party also organized the Red Army and assured the victory at the various fronts during the Civil War.

Having developed socialist construction, the Party led the working class to decisive victories on this front, too. The work-

ing class fulfilled the First Five-Year Plan in four years. From a backward country of small peasant holdings such as old Russia was, the U.S.S.R. has been transformed into an advanced industrial country with modern technique, a land economically independent of the countries of capitalism, a land of formidable military prowess. In the U.S.S.R. alone has unemployment been completely abolished, has *kulak** bondage and the ruination of the peasantry been extirpated, has the material welfare of the broad masses of toilers in town and country made rapid progress. In carrying out the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class on the basis of mass collectivization, the Party succeeded in routing the kulaks, in cutting the roots of capitalism in agriculture, and thereby assured the victory of socialism in the countryside. The capitalist elements have been defeated and forced out of industry, agriculture and trade. Thus, as a result of the leadership of the Party, the U.S.S.R. has entered the period of socialism, has definitely entrenched itself on the road to socialism. Socialism has triumphed in the U.S.S.R. finally and irrevocably.

The pre-conditions for building the *first* classless, socialist society in the world during the Second Five-Year Plan period have been established.

These victories which are of world-historic importance have been achieved by the working class solely because its struggle has been led by the C.P.S.U.

The victories of socialism have transformed the U.S.S.R. into an impregnable fortress, into a bulwark of the the world proletarian revolution. The successes of the working class of the U.S.S.R. mobilize the proletarians of the whole world for the struggle against capitalism. They afford clear proof to the toiling masses of the whole world that they can only be victorious if led by the Communist Party.

Decades of struggle and of Party construction under the guidance of the great leaders of the international proletariat, *Lenin* and *Stalin*, the continuators of the cause of Marx and Engels, have transformed the C.P.S.U. into a powerful, victorious force without equal anywhere in the world.

All fraternal parties composing the various sections of the Communist International profit by the experience of the C.P.S.U.

* *Kulak*: rich peasant.—Ed. Eng. ed.

Bolshevism is a model of tactics for all Communist Parties in the world. This circumstance has assigned to the C.P.S.U. the leading role in the Communist International. The leaders of the C.P.S.U.—Lenin and Stalin—are the generally recognized leaders and theoreticians of the whole international proletariat.

The strength of the Bolshevik Party lies in the fact that, armed as it is with the Marxist-Leninist theory, it constitutes the party of the most advanced revolutionary working class, is inseparably bound up with the broad masses of toilers and possesses tried leaders, members of the old Leninist guard, who have been steeled, tested, prepared and schooled by long years of underground work, who have been firmly welded on the basis of Marxism-Leninism.

The finest, the most select and the best tested members of this Leninist guard, headed by Comrade *Stalin*, constitute the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and ensure the practical application of Lenin's behests. In the *Central Committee* the wisdom of the C.P.S.U. is concentrated; it is the *general headquarters of the revolutionary army of the working class*.

The C.P.S.U. has imbibed the experience of the entire struggle of the world proletariat, the experience of the revolutionary movement of the whole world. Therefore every worker, every toiler who wants to be a conscious builder of socialism, a conscious fighter for the proletarian world revolution, must study the experience gained in the struggle of the C.P.S.U. It is the duty of every Bolshevik to master this experience, to assimilate the history of bolshevism, to study the revolutionary theory of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, to be its purveyor to the broad masses.

The study of the history of the Party is an aid to the understanding and solution of all questions which are brought to the fore by the struggle of the world proletariat for communism. The history of the C.P.S.U. is a guide to the construction of socialism and the struggle for the World October.

The theory and practice of socialist construction is inseparably connected with the history of bolshevism. Studying the history of the Party is an aid to the Leninist understanding of all the complex tasks which confront the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. during the Second Five-Year Plan period.

"... There can therefore be no better experience, no better means of educating our youth in the Marxist-Leninist spirit than the history of our Party. ...

"Particularly, must we approach the history of the past in a Bolshevik, Leninist way, approach it in such a way that the history of the past will be linked with the general Party line, with those new tasks which we are facing today and which we will still have to face tomorrow." *

No one can be a member of the C.P.S.U. unless he knows its history, program, rules and principal decisions. By studying the history of the Party and arming himself with the Leninist theory, every member and candidate, every Party sympathizer, becomes ideologically steeled for the struggle to achieve the complete triumph of socialism. Without this no one can be a real Communist.

A knowledge of the history of the Party arms its possessor with a most powerful Leninist weapon in the struggle against all class enemies and their agents—the opportunists of every hue and shade. All practical work of Party members, candidates, sympathizers and Y.C.L. members must be linked up with the raising of their theoretical level. Only a theoretically trained Bolshevik is capable of bringing up the masses in the spirit of bolshevism and of doing justice to his high calling of leader of the toiling masses, to the honourable calling of member of the C.P.S.U.

The present short history of the C.P.S.U. is designed for the use of Party members and candidates as well as active non-Party members who already possess an elementary political education.

It is the immediate object of this book to present a shorter and more popular text-book on the history of the C.P.S.U. than those which have been published hitherto.

It has accordingly been necessary to concentrate attention on the main and crucial problems in the history of the Party. A number of points have been deliberately omitted or only touched upon in a cursory manner.

The present publication represents the first experience in writing a short and popular text-book which at the same time is on a sufficiently high theoretical plane and embraces the history of the Bolshevik Party from its genesis to the completion of the First Five-Year Plan.

* L. M. Kaganovich, "For a Bolshevik Study of the History of the Party," *Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism*, pp. 20 and 22.

This task was very difficult and complicated. Therefore any suggestion which may be made by the reader to improve the book or correct defects in it will be given careful consideration.

Several editorial changes and additions have been incorporated in the second edition.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

A SHORT HISTORY

CHAPTER I

THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA BEFORE THE RISE OF THE C. P. S. U.

Industry and Agriculture at the End of the Nineteenth Century

By the middle of the past century serfdom which existed in Russia at that time had begun greatly to retard the development of the country's entire national economy.

The factories and mills which sprang up in the cities required "free" workers, *i. e.*, workers who would not belong to any landlords and could thus leave the latter and sell their labour power. In the villages some of the landlords, under the influence of the growing trade relation with countries abroad and the development of capitalism in Russia, gradually adopted capitalist methods of economy. They began to use agricultural machines and chemical fertilizers on their farms. They also needed more productive labour, the labour of "free" workers, for the labour of peasant serfs working under the lash was of little productive value.

The development of capitalism caused the exploitation of the peasantry to become more intense. The peasantry was being ruined. However, attached to the soil as they were, the peasants were unable to leave for the towns, for the factories and mills. At the same time peasant revolts against their feudal landlords occurred with increasing frequency in the villages. These revolts steadily grew in extent and often turned into uprisings which held out the menace of a peasant revolution against the government of noblemen and landlords. The tsarist government hastened to carry out a peasant reform to save itself from revolution. Tsar Alexander II openly declared that it was better "to free" the peasants "from above" than wait until they freed themselves "from below."

Finally, one of the causes which accelerated the abolition of serfdom was the defeat of tsarism at the end of the 'fifties in the war against Turkey, England and France. This war revealed the rottenness of the state apparatus and the absolute impotence of feudal Russia.

Serfdom was abolished in 1861. The "emancipation" of the peasants was carried out "from above" by a ukase of the tsar; needless to say, it was carried out in a manner most advantageous to the landlords. The "emancipation" of the peasants was in fact converted into an act of freeing them from their land—of despoiling them.

The best part of the peasants' land was cut away for the benefit of the landlords.* For the land left to them the peasants had to pay compensation. This land was worth no more than 650,000,000 rubles. However, after the "Reform" of 1861, the peasants paid more than 1,500,000,000 rubles, i.e., almost two and a half times its value as compensation for it during the course of forty years.

The Reform of 1861 was a bourgeois reform carried out by the feudal landlords. It only undermined feudalism but did not destroy it. The power of the landlords—tsarism—remained; the tremendous estates of the landlords were preserved. The whole country was entangled in the remnants of serfdom. Thus the Reform of 1861 was only the first step on the road to transforming Russia into a bourgeois monarchy.

After the fall of serfdom the capitalist development of Russia considerably quickened its pace. The number of factories and mills grew and new industrial centres arose, such as the Donetz Basin and Baku. Capital accumulated within the country and flowed in from abroad.

Capitalism strengthened particularly during the period of industrial boom in the second half of the 'nineties. During the decade from 1890 to 1900 the output of pig iron, oil and coal grew tremendously. The textile industry developed and the railway system was enlarged. Russia became a country of large-scale capitalist industry.

The industrial growth was accompanied by a growth of the

* The so-called *otrezki*, a verbal noun from *otrezat*—to cut off.—Ed., Eng. ed.

proletariat. The number of factory, mining and railway workers in Russia rose from 700,000 in 1865 to 2,400,000 at the end of 1890. The bulk of the proletariat was concentrated at the big industrial centres—St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Donetz Basin, Baku, Ivanovo-Voznessensk. More than half of all factory workers in Russia were employed at a small number of large-scale enterprises.

However, in spite of this fact the remnants of serfdom in industry were very powerful for many years after its fall. For instance the Ural factory owners who owned vast stretches of land essentially remained feudal landlords down to the end of the nineteenth century. While allotting tiny patches of land to the workers and permitting the peasants on onerous conditions to pasture their cattle on the common and to get their supply of wood, these Ural factory owning landlords obliged the peasants to work at their factories for a mere pittance. Thus factories were supplied with "their own" cheap workers who were attached to the factory. This explains the extremely low labour productivity, the backward technique and the merciless, enslaving exploitation at the Ural factories. Here disfranchisement, miserably low wages and long working hours reigned supreme.

The general backwardness of technique, the low productivity of labour, the impoverishment of the broad masses and the inadequacy of the domestic market for the sale of industrial commodities were consequences of the feudal survivals and greatly retarded the development of large-scale industry. Thus so important a branch of industry as machinery production was still in its infancy in Russia. The vast majority of machines were imported from abroad.

Capitalism in Russia developed not only in industry but also in all other branches of economy. Capitalism likewise developed in the handicrafts, transforming the bulk of the handicraftsmen more and more into wage workers. It likewise developed in agriculture although the latter remained extremely backward and semi-feudal.

The landlords were exceedingly slow to adopt the use of agricultural machinery, to change to capitalist economy. By the end of the nineteenth century only one-fifteenth of the holdings of the landlords was worked on the basis of higher capitalist

technique. All the remaining holdings of the landlords and of course the lands of the poor and middle peasants were worked by backward, "antediluvian," reckless methods. In Russia the yield was much lower than in other countries of Europe.

Capitalism also made progress in peasant husbandry. A small upper stratum of the peasantry—the kulaks—extended the sown area, hired agricultural workers, changed to the sowing of highly labour-consuming crops, began to use chemical fertilizers. The growth of capitalism in agriculture was accompanied by the differentiation of the peasantry: an agricultural proletariat living by the sale of its labour power took rise and grew in numbers; the rural bourgeoisie—the kulaks—likewise increased and strengthened by employing wage labour. The vast majority of the peasants was transformed into paupers who lived on the verge of starvation.

At the close of the nineteenth century the landlords possessed tremendous stretches of land and forests. The peasant allotments on the other hand were very small. Thirty thousand landlords owned 70,000,000 dessiatines* of land, *i.e.*, as much as that owned by 10,500,000 of the ruined peasant households. On the average more than 2,000 dessiatines fell to the share of one landlord's estate, while the per capita allotment of the ruined peasantry was one and a half dessiatines and in some districts even less. The biggest landlord was the tsar. He alone owned more land than half a million peasant families.

The tremendous compensation payments, the poll tax, the imposts, duties and insurance premiums ruined peasant husbandry more and more.

The government, in its effort to ensure maximum receipts for the public treasury and cheap workers for the landlords, made use of the peasant community which had existed in Russia since time immemorial. The community consisted of all the peasants in one or several villages. Each peasant in the community worked his individual farm but the land was considered the property of the entire community. The community as a whole was responsible for the payments and taxes due from its members. A ruined peasant could not throw up his bit of land

* One dessiatine equals 2.7 acres.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

if he so desired and abandon the village. The community held him back inasmuch as upon the withdrawal of one of its members the assessments due from him were saddled upon the remaining peasants. Thus the community compelled each one of its members to pay his assessments irrespective of whether he derived a profit or a loss from his farm. It retarded the development of the productive forces.

A land-poor peasant was compelled to rent land from the landlord, to use the common to pasture his cattle, while the forests and bodies of water belonged to the landlords. For the use of all this the peasant gratuitously tilled the landlord's land with his own wretched implements and performed a number of services for the landlord which were survivals from the days of serfdom. This so-called labour rent represented the main form in which the semi-feudal exploitation of the peasants found expression. Transcaucasia and the Central Black Soil region were striking examples of the enslavement of the peasantry. Here for a dessiatine of land the peasant not only paid a high rental, not only worked on the landlord's estate, but also had to offer up gifts to the landlord and paid a special tax which enured to his benefit.

Thus "the powerful remnants of medievalism," as Lenin said, held back the economic development of the country. At the end of the nineteenth century all power remained in the hands of the feudal landlords.

The bourgeoisie, while strengthening economically, continued to be divorced from political power. It was but natural that it strove to participate in the government for the purpose of consolidating its position. However, the Russian bourgeoisie did not wage a revolutionary struggle against the autocracy: it had been too much frightened by the revolution of 1848 in the West and by the revolutionary struggle of the Paris Commune in 1871. Besides—and this is especially important—the bourgeoisie sought an agreement with the monarchy because its class interests became more and more intertwined with tsarism. The tsarist government distributed orders among the manufacturers and the factory owners at high prices. By high tariffs it protected home industry against the competition of cheap West-European commodities. The bourgeoisie closely linked up its

interests with those of the large estate owners, inasmuch as a great portion of the land of the nobility had been mortgaged to banks belonging to the bourgeoisie.

The tsarist policy of conquest opened up new markets to the industrialists for the disposal of their commodities and for the purchase of raw materials. Tsarism incessantly seized the territories of neighbouring peoples and transformed them into colonies, fleecing the native population without mercy. The tsarist regime used bayonet and whip to protect the bourgeoisie: it facilitated the monstrous exploitation of the workers, helped the bourgeoisie fight strikes and keep the workers in bondage.

It is therefore no wonder that these grievances roused the workers, peasants and the broad masses of the oppressed nationalities to revolutionary struggle against the feudal landlords, against the autocracy of the tsar.

*Revolutionary Narodism **

In the 'sixties and 'seventies the working class was still weak and numerically small. The vast majority of the population of Russia consisted of peasants who had begun to struggle against the landlords long before serfdom was abolished. After its abolition the struggle of the peasantry for land continued without abatement. This struggle very often assumed the form of isolated revolts, uprisings and the burning of estates. But the peasantry fought sporadically; there was no united movement which might have led to the overthrow of the monarchy, inasmuch as the proletariat which would have led the peasantry in its wake had not yet grown up or become strong, nor was there a proletarian party in existence.

These are the circumstances under which the revolutionary organizations of the 'sixties and 'seventies, known as narodnik organizations, arose.

Chernyshevsky (1828-89) and Herzen (1812-70) were the progenitors of narodism. Bakunin, Lavrov and Tkachev exerted a very powerful influence on narodnik theory and practice.

* Derived from 'narod,' meaning "people."—Ed. Eng. ed.

These theoreticians, despite their different viewpoints, worked out the theory of narodism which Lenin called "Russian, peasant socialism."

The narodnik organization consisted of petty-bourgeois intellectuals and students and of the scions of the ruined nobility, clergy, officials and merchants.

The Narodniks of the 'sixties and 'seventies looked upon the peasantry as the principal motive force of the future revolution, in which the leading role must belong to the revolutionary intelligentsia. In the backward Russian land community and in the production artels they saw the forms of national economic life from which socialism would easily develop. Thus the peasantry in their opinion was the carrier of the socialist ideal.

There were two principal currents among the Narodniks: the Bakunists and the Lavrists. The former (called the "rebels") considered work among the peasantry for the purpose of stirring up a general popular uprising to be their main task, as a result of which the existing government was to be overthrown. The latter (called the propagandists) appealed to the revolutionary intelligentsia to carry on peaceful propaganda of socialist (*i.e.*, *narodnik*) ideas among the peasantry.

For the purpose of realizing their aims, hundreds of Narodniks went from the towns to the countryside in the guise of teachers, physicians, blacksmiths and carpenters. Passing from village to village they carried on revolutionary work among the peasants. For the purpose of preparing agitators for the countryside the Narodniks also did some work among the industrial workers.

In 1876 the various circles of the Narodniks of the Bakunist trend which before had existed separately united in the *Zemlya i Volya* (Land and Freedom) Party.

However, the work of the Narodniks among the masses did not yield the expected results. The Narodniks did not succeed in stirring up an all-Russian revolt among the peasantry. The peasantry turned a deaf ear to the propagation of their views. In addition the government meted out brutal punishment to the Narodniks: most of them were arrested, thrown into jail and sentenced to hard labour.

Under the influence of its lack of success among the peasants and of the cruel police persecutions, the *Zemlya i Volya* Party soon (1879) split into two narodnik organizations: *Narodnaya Volya* (The People's Will) and *Chorny Peredyel* (Black Redistribution).

One section of the Narodniks inaugurated a political struggle against tsarism by means of terror, i.e., the assassination of ministers, police officials and other representatives of the government. This section formed the organization known as *Narodnaya Volya*, which committed many terrorist acts. It created a military organization for work among the soldiers and carried on propaganda among the workers. But *Narodnaya Volya* was very weak in its contacts with the masses. It was an organization few in number and working in absolute secrecy. It consisted of valiant revolutionaries who sacrificed their lives in the struggle against the autocracy. In 1881 *Narodnaya Volya* succeeded in killing Alexander II but this did not shatter the monarchy: in his stead, Alexander III ascended the throne. *Narodnaya Volya* was broken up and its most active members—Zhelyabov, Sofia Perovskaya, Kibalchich and Timothy Mikhailov—were hanged the same year for participating in the killing of the tsar.

In 1887 an unsuccessful attempt to kill Alexander III was made. The organizers of the attempt—A. I. Ulyanov, Lenin's oldest brother, and others—were caught and executed.

The other section of the Narodniks which strove to remain faithful to the principles of *Zemlya i Volya* organized the *Chorny Peredyel* group. This group did not succeed in doing much work, for the government very soon raided its printshop and its main leaders—Plekhanov, Axelrod, Deutsch and others—were compelled to flee abroad.

What is the historical significance of revolutionary narodism? Lenin gave a profound and exhaustive reply to this question. In contradistinction to Plekhanov, Lenin differentiated the two aspects of narodism: the revolutionary and the reactionary aspects.

The revolutionary aspect of narodism consists in the fact that their views on the peasant revolution and on other questions reflected the aspiration of the peasantry to destroy the

landlord estates, overthrow the monarchy and set up a broad democratic order of society. The illegal organizations of the Narodniks with their centralism and discipline, the wholehearted work and struggle of their members against tsarism, represent a new and big step forward in the Russian revolutionary movement.

At the same time there was a pernicious, reactionary side to the views of the Narodniks. As we already know, their point of departure was the view that the peasantry was the only revolutionary force, the only fighter for socialism. They did not regard the proletariat as a class distinct from the peasantry and did not concede its separate historical role as the destroyer of the capitalist order and creator of socialist society in the future. They looked upon the workers as a force that could only be utilized to carry on agitation and propaganda among the peasant masses. In their opinion the peasant community was the basis of the future socialist order and the peasant was an innate socialist. The Narodniks denied the differentiation of the countryside into groups: kulaks, middle peasants and poor peasants, merging them all in the one conception of "toiling peasantry."

The Narodniks denied that the development of capitalism in Russia was inevitable and in every way endeavoured to retard the development of large-scale industry. They assumed that one could arrive at socialism without the development of large-scale industry and without a proletariat.

Thus the revolutionary Narodniks were the representatives of petty-bourgeois "peasant socialism." Lenin revealed and exposed the petty-bourgeois essence of this narodnik "socialism." He proved that the theory of the Narodniks which rejected the doctrine of proletarian socialism was in essence *non-revolutionary and non-socialist*. But at the same time Lenin laid full stress upon the fact that in their revolutionary struggle the Narodniks reflected the revolutionary struggle of the peasantry against the landlords and autocracy. This intermixture of revolutionary and reactionary aspects by the Narodniks reflected the *dual* character of the peasant movement. On the one hand, the Narodniks reflected the revolutionary struggle of the peasantry against tsarism and landlord estate holding and on the

other hand they supported the aspiration of the peasantry to preserve their petty husbandry and to this end retard the development of capitalism which was ruining the countryside.

The narodnik movement, which was not supported by the broad masses of the people, was broken up by tsarism. The collapse of the theory and practice of narodism clearly showed that it was impossible to overthrow tsarism and achieve the liberation of the toiling masses from the yoke of capitalism by means of propaganda of "peasant socialism," by means of organizing sporadic peasant uprisings (*Zemlya i Volya*), or by individual terrorist acts (*Narodnaya Volya*).

First Labour Organizations in Russia

In the 'seventies of last century the struggle of the working class became more and more extensive and the restiveness of the workers began to assume increasingly sharp forms. The strike movement in St. Petersburg (now Leningrad) was particularly strong. Following upon St. Petersburg, strikes broke out in the textile enterprises of Moscow, Shuya, Ivanovo and Yaroslavl, the factories and mines of the Donetz Basin, the railway construction operations and at Rostov, Moscow and Odessa. The main reason for these strikes was the difficult material position of the workers. The working day at that time averaged twelve to fourteen hours. The workers struggled for shorter working hours, for higher wages, for smaller fines and for the establishment of precise wage rates.

In a number of cases the police and the army stepped in, beat up the workers and thus ended the strike. In the beginning the strikes of the workers occurred in an unorganized, sporadic fashion; but gradually the strikers learned to struggle in a more organized manner. In this struggle cadres of advanced workers grew up. Pyotr Alexeyev, a weaver, was a very striking example of these advanced workers. He had taken part in narodnik circles during the 'seventies. Arrested by the police for revolutionary activities and for leading strikes, he fearlessly declared at the bar of the tsarist court that the moment was not far when

"the muscular arms of millions of workers will be raised and the yoke of despotism, that is guarded by soldiers' bayonets, will be smashed to atoms!" *

This speech by a revolutionary worker was evidence of the fact that a new force was growing up in the struggle against tsarism and feudal survivals.

The first revolutionary labour organizations were formed for the purpose of leading the struggle of the workers. These organizations, which gradually freed themselves of narodnik errors, began to work out a proletarian line of struggle.

The South Russian Workers' League which sprang up in Odessa in 1875 was the *first Russian labour organization*. It included as many as eight hundred workers and was in contact with the biggest enterprises of Odessa. From the very inception of its activities it parted ways with the Narodniks, who tried to draw its members to the narodnik path of struggle. The League made it its main task to struggle against autocracy and win political freedom although it could not completely sever itself from narodnik views. After a few months of work the South Russian Workers' League was broken up by the police and all its leaders were arrested. Zaslavsky, the organizer of the League, was sentenced to ten years at hard labour and died in prison in 1878.

Somewhat later, the North Russian Workers' League was founded in St. Petersburg in 1878. Stephen Khalturin, a carpenter, and Victor Obnorsky, a metal worker, were its organizers. The League took a great part in the strike movement of the St. Petersburg workers, thus leading the first independent actions of the Russian working class. The members of the League themselves worked out their revolutionary program. This program placed before the working class the task of overthrowing the autocracy and winning political freedom, at the same time linking up this struggle for political freedom with the struggle for "socialism." Parallel with these absolutely correct theses in the program it contained narodnik errors such as, for instance, the narodnik view of the role of the peasant community. The League repeatedly emphasized the interna-

* Lenin, "The Urgent Tasks of Our Movement," *Selected Works*, Vol. II, p. 14.

tional character of the tasks confronting the Russian working class.

The North Russian Workers' League was broken up in 1881. Khalturin, its leader, who had become a terrorist, made an unsuccessful attempt upon the life of the tsar—the explosion at the Winter Palace in 1880—and took part in other terrorist acts. He was arrested and hanged in 1882.

First Social-Democratic Organizations in Russia

During the 'eighties, the labour movement embraced a number of basic industrial districts of Russia. The strike at Orekhovo-Zuyevo in 1885 at the textile mill of Savva Morozov was of particularly great importance. The occasion of this strike was the arbitrary manner of fining the workers. In 1884 alone Morozov had robbed the workers of 300,000 rubles in fines, which constituted almost half of their wages. An indignant crowd of 8,000 workers began the strike. During the very first day of the walk-out the workers raided the factory store from which they had been receiving low-quality merchandise at inflated prices. The authorities, convinced that it was impossible to break the strike by promises, decided to use force. A regiment of infantry and Cossacks were called out. The leaders were arrested. Thereupon the workers determined to a man to free those under arrest. A clash with the troops developed in which many workers were killed and wounded. The strike was crushed. Several hundred workers were made to go back to their native villages while the leaders of the strike—Moseyenko and Volkov, both workers—were sent into exile. Despite the unsuccessful issue of the strike, it compelled the tsarist government to proclaim a number of factory laws which regulated the position of the workers. This was done with a view to frustrating the growth of the strike movement in other districts.

It became clear that in Russia a revolutionary class capable of becoming the leader and guide of the broad masses of the peasantry was in the making. It was therefore not surprising that under these conditions organizations should spring up which did not at all content themselves with narodnik views. They familiarized themselves with the experience of the West-

European labour movement, with the teachings of Marx, declared their adherence to this teaching and began to propagate Marxism in Russia.

The first Russian Marxist, social-democratic organization was the *Emancipation of Labour* group. It was founded abroad in 1883. Plekhanov, Axelrod, Zasulich, Deutsch and Ignatov, former members of Chorny Peredyel, who had subsequently quit narodism, were its founders. The Emancipation of Labour group did a tremendous amount of work for the propagation of Marxism in Russia. It published a number of Plekhanov's books: *Socialism and the Political Struggle* (1883); *Our Differences* (1884). It translated the works of Marx and Engels into Russian and distributed them in Russia. The Emancipation of Labour group waged a great struggle against narodism. It pointed out the harm of the narodnik theory concerning the self-sufficiency of the economic development of Russia, of the importance of the community, of the denial of the independent revolutionary role of the working class. In figures and facts it proved the development of capitalism in Russia and the disintegration of the community under the influence of capitalism. The Emancipation of Labour group explained that Russia could not arrive at socialism through the peasant community by avoiding capitalism but only through the political class struggle of the proletariat, through the revolutionary overthrow of the rule of the landlords and the bourgeoisie. The Emancipation of Labour group emphasized the revolutionary role of the proletariat and its ability to engage in independent struggle for its own interests.

However, the group committed at the same time a number of opportunist errors in its work. It underestimated the revolutionary forces of the millions of the peasantry and the ability of the proletariat to lead it. It overestimated the revolutionary role of the liberal bourgeoisie in the struggle against tsarism, considering it a revolutionary force.

The Emancipation of Labour group posed the question of creating a social-democratic labour party in Russia. By its work it exerted great influence on developing Marxist views among the members of the social-democratic circles which rapidly spread all over Russia. Unfortunately the Emancipation of La-

bour group was divorced from the masses and its propaganda work was not linked up with organizational work in the various localities. Therefore, the Emancipation of Labour group, said Lenin, founded social-democracy only theoretically and made only the first step toward a labour movement.

By the end of the 'eighties and the beginning of the 'nineties, social-democratic circles had already been formed in all big industrial centres of Russia. In St. Petersburg, in 1884, a circle was organized under the leadership of Blagoyev, a student (subsequently the leader of the Communist Party of Bulgaria). This circle bore the name of the Party of Russian Social-Democrats and existed until 1887. Other circles formed in St. Petersburg were that of Tochissky (in 1886-88) and that of Brusnev (1890-92). Brusnev's organization consisted of as many as twenty workers' circles located in various districts of St. Petersburg. In Kazan Fedoseyev's circle in which also Lenin took part was quite active (1888). Social-democratic circles existed also in Kiev, Kharkov and Samara.

Thus, in the period extending from 1883 to 1894 Marxism and the social-democratic movement rose and spread far and wide throughout Russia. This was the first, the "embryonic," period in the development of social-democracy, when the work of the first Marxist social-democratic organizations consisted almost exclusively of propaganda and they were not yet linked up with a mass labour movement, when the membership of these organizations consisted of only very few individuals who constituted the most class-conscious warriors in the cause of the working class.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL PREPARATION AND GENESIS OF BOLSHEVISM

Russia—the Junction Point of Imperialist Contradictions

At the beginning of the twentieth century the capitalist method of production had become the dominant method in Russia. By that time Russia had become an imperialist country, had entered the coterie of powerful imperialist powers although it remained the most backward among them. It formed part of world economy and one of the links in the single chain of the imperialist system of states.

By the beginning of the twentieth century the contradiction between "advanced industry and finance capital" (*Lenin*) and backward, savage, semi-feudal agriculture had manifested itself in Russia in all its sharpness.

At the same time the oppression of the toiling masses constantly increased in Russia. Capitalist exploitation was intertwined with landlord oppression, with the arbitrary rule of the tsar, the gendarmes and government officials. In Russia the longest working day prevailed (thirteen hours and even longer), a mere pittance was paid as wages and enormous fines were collected. Then there were the outrageous housing and living conditions, the absolutely arbitrary sway of the manufacturers at the enterprises, the yoke of the landlords in the villages, the ignorance and downtroddenness of the peasantry and finally the unexampled bureaucracy in the entire state apparatus.

To this must be added the cruel yoke of tsarism weighing heavily on all non-Russian nationalities. In its colonies—the Caucasus, Turkestan, Poland, the Ukraine, Finland—tsarism mercilessly oppressed the native population, depriving it of all rights: the Russian language was implanted by force, the national schools were closed and the national press prohibited.

Tsarism cruelly suppressed every aspiration to national freedom. Following the principle of "divide and rule" tsarism incited one nationality against the other: it organized pogroms against the Jews, fanned into flame the struggle between the Tyurks and Armenians in the Caucasus and so forth. Tsarism transformed Russia into a veritable "prison of peoples." More than half of the inhabitants of Russia belonged to the oppressed nationalities.

The possibility of unlimited exploitation of the toiling masses, of receiving great profits, attracted foreign capital into Russia. As it enjoyed the full support of the government, foreign capital readily flowed into the most important branches of national economy—the fuel industry, metallurgy and railways. At the close of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, foreign capital totalling 773,000,000 rubles was invested in industry. It owned 342 of the biggest enterprises. In the mining and metallurgical industries alone it possessed 125 enterprises representing a capital of 472,000,000 rubles.

The position of tsarist Russia between the imperialist West and the colonial East assigned to it the role of watchdog of imperialism in the East. Tsarism participated in the partition and enslavement of Turkey, China and Persia. The military forces of the tsar were always ready to render aid to the imperialists in the suppression of the revolutionary labour movement of Europe. It was the obedient and cruel "gendarme of Europe."

All this made Russia a country of "feudal-military imperialism" (*Lenin*), the hearth of capitalist, colonial and military oppression.

"It is for this reason that Russia had to become the junction point of the contradictions of imperialism not only in the sense that these contradictions were exposed more easily in Russia than elsewhere in view of their especially repulsive and intolerable character and not only because Russia was the most important bulwark of Western imperialism, uniting as it did Western finance capital with the Eastern colonies, but also because only in Russia did the real power exist capable of solving the contradictions of imperialism in a revolutionary way." *

* Stalin, "Foundations of Leninism," *Leninism*, Vol. I, p. 18.

Russia—The Centre of the International Revolutionary Movement

The force capable of solving the imperialist contradictions in a revolutionary manner and of delivering a decisive blow to tsarism was the proletariat. In this struggle the proletariat of Russia had a reliable ally—the peasantry and the broad masses of the oppressed nationalities.

"In Russia, a great popular revolution was rising, headed by the most revolutionary proletariat in the world, which could count upon the revolutionary peasantry of Russia." *

The toiling masses in this popular revolution would only be able to smash tsarism if they developed the struggle further, directing it not only against the tsarist government but also against imperialism. The revolution against tsarism was approaching, as Comrade Stalin said, and had to grow into a revolution against imperialism, into a proletarian revolution.

In rising against tsarism which helped to stifle the revolution in the European countries, the proletariat of Russia rallied around itself the proletarians of the West and the oppressed peoples of the East. This moved the Russian proletariat to the most advanced position of the international revolutionary movement. This is the reason why the overthrow of tsarism, as Lenin wrote, would make Russia the centre of the revolutionary movement of the whole world and would make the proletariat of Russia its vanguard.

Under these conditions only a party of a new type could lead the revolutionary battles against imperialism, could lead the proletariat to the proletarian revolution. Therefore it was not accidental that the party of a new type arose in Russia and that *Lenin*, its brilliant leader and theoretician, became the leader of the international proletariat.

Lenin's Generalization of the Experience of the Struggle of the Workers in All Countries

From the very beginning of his revolutionary activity Lenin founded a party which relied on the revolutionary theory of

* *Ibid.*

Marx and Engels and on the experience of the whole preceding revolutionary movement, on the experience of the proletariat in all countries of the world.

Lenin built up a party which was the sole inheritor and perpetuator of that struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for communism, which Marx and Engels waged in the Communist League in Germany and in the First International. The lessons of the heroic revolutionary struggle waged by the English proletarians during the first half of the eighteenth century, of the struggle of the French and German workers who fearlessly battled on the barricades in 1848, their experience during the struggle of the 'sixties and of the subsequent social-democratic movement, were utilized by Lenin to create a party of a new type. Lenin studied and made manifold use of the lessons taught by the struggle of the immortal fighters and martyrs of the Paris Commune (1871).

He assimilated and refashioned all that was best, most useful, in the work of the Second International, but resolutely exposed and cast off its opportunism. Lenin took into account the practical experience of the parties of the Second International in the mass labour organizations (trade unions, co-operative organizations) and in the bourgeois parliament. But in contradistinction to the Second International, which counted upon "peaceful" collaboration with the bourgeoisie, Lenin made use of this experience of the past to fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for communism.

While relying on the labour movement of Western Europe, Lenin likewise took advantage of the lessons to be learned from the entire preceding revolutionary movement in Russia. The struggle of the revolutionary Narodniks against autocracy, their methods of party construction, their wholehearted devotion and heroism were held in high esteem by Lenin who assimilated the experience of the Narodniks on the basis of revolutionary Marxism and interlinked it with the class struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin made use of the work of the Emancipation of Labour group but exposed and cast aside its opportunist errors.

First Works of Lenin and Their World-Historic Importance

Lenin commenced his revolutionary work in the Marxist circles of Kazan and Samara in the late 'eighties. Supporting himself upon the doctrines of Marx and Engels and waging an irreconcilable struggle for their purity, Lenin in the 'nineties began to elaborate the basic problems of the Russian and international labour movement. A number of Lenin's greatest works go back to this period: *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight Against the Social-Democrats*, and *The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book*, written in 1894; *Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*, written in 1897 and *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, written in 1899. All these works laid the foundation of a new, the Leninist, stage of development of Marxism and are of world-historic importance.

From the very beginning of his revolutionary activity, Lenin set the task of struggling for the socialist revolution, for the dictatorship of the proletariat. He specially emphasized the fact that the struggle against tsarism, against the feudal estates, was inseparably intertwined with the struggle for the conquest of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is necessary to destroy tsarism and the landlord estates, so as to effect the transition to the struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, for the proletarian revolution, for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

"... then the Russian workers," wrote Lenin in 1894, "will rise at the head of all the democratic elements, overthrow absolutism and lead the *Russian proletariat* (side by side with the proletariat of all countries) along the straight road of open political struggle towards the victorious communist revolution."*

Lenin taught that it was impossible to overthrow tsarism by peaceful means. Only a victorious armed uprising of the masses can overthrow it.

Lenin laid down an independent political line for the proletariat in the revolutionary struggle. He said that only the working class is a class revolutionary to the end, is a consis-

* Lenin, "What the 'Friends of the People' Are and How They Fight Against the Social-Democrats," *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 455.

tent fighter against tsarism and the bourgeoisie, for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Thus Lenin already in his early works fought for the hegemony of the proletariat, i.e., for the leading role of the proletariat in the revolution, for the necessity of proletarian leadership in the revolutionary struggle of the broad masses of the peasantry and oppressed nationalities. Lenin attributed decisive importance to the struggle for the hegemony of the proletariat inasmuch as the proletariat could fulfil its world-historic task only if it led the broad masses of the people.

Lenin specially stressed the point that the proletariat could fulfil its role of hegemon only if a revolutionary party armed with the Marxist theory, the party of the new type, would lead its struggle.

The old parties of the Second International were not of this type. The Second International (1889-1914) even in its halcyon days was incapable of raising, not to speak of solving, the revolutionary problems of the proletariat. The Second International did not prepare the proletariat for the revolution. The parties of the Second International considered the principal form of their activity to be, not the revolutionary struggle against capitalism, but peaceful work in parliament. Not a single program of the various parties in the Second International contained a demand to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat for the transition to socialism. The treacherous opportunist line to the effect that the working class would come to power by peaceful means, after securing a majority in the national representative body (parliament, congress, etc.), became entrenched more and more firmly within these parties.

The type of the parties of the Second International, as Lenin pointed out, was represented by the "Party which tolerated opportunism in its midst. . . . This type has outlived itself." *

The opportunism of the Second International relied on the labour aristocracy and found expression in its adaptation to the bourgeoisie and the subordination of the interests of the working class to those of the bourgeoisie. The development of opportunism was aided by imperialism, which creates

* Lenin, "And Now What," *Collected Works*, Vol. XVIII, p. 107.

"the economic possibility of corrupting the upper strata of the proletariat, and thereby fosters, gives form to, and strengthens opportunism." *

All this led to the desertion by the old parties of the Second International to the camp of the bourgeoisie and the definite betrayal of the interests of the proletarian revolution. From the very beginning of the world imperialist war the parties of the Second International (the Russian Mensheviks, the English Socialists, the German Social-Democrats, the French Socialists, etc.) openly came out in defence of their bourgeois "fatherland." They incited the toilers of the various countries against each other and aided the bourgeoisie to drive the workers to the front in the interests of imperialism. Having betrayed the working class, these parties became the main social support of the bourgeoisie and launched upon the path of open counter-revolutionary struggle against the U.S.S.R. and the whole world revolutionary movement.

Comrade Stalin gave an exhaustive characterization of the nature of the party of the old type and the need of creating a new party, the party of Leninism:

"In the pre-revolutionary period, in the period of more or less peaceful development, when the parties of the Second International were the predominant force in the labour movement and parliamentary forms of struggle were regarded as the principal forms, conditions were such that the Party neither had nor could have that great and decisive importance which it acquired afterwards in the midst of open revolutionary battles

"The new period," continues Comrade Stalin, "is a period of open collisions between the classes, a period of revolutionary action by the proletariat, a period of proletarian revolution; it is a period of the immediate mustering of forces for the overthrow of imperialism, for the seizure of power by the proletariat. This period confronts the proletariat with new tasks of reorganizing all Party work on new revolutionary lines; of educating the workers in the spirit of the revolutionary struggle for power; of preparing and moving up the reserves; of establishing an alliance with the proletarians of neighbouring countries; of establishing durable contact with the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries, etc., etc. . . ."

In concluding Comrade Stalin said:

* Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," *Selected Works*, Vol. V, p. 95.

"Hence the necessity for a new party, a militant party, a revolutionary party, bold enough to lead the proletarians to the struggle for power, with sufficient experience to be able to orientate itself in the complicated problems that arise in a revolutionary situation, and sufficiently flexible to steer clear of any submerged rocks on the way to its goal.

"Without such a party it is futile to think of overthrowing imperialism and achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat." *

This explains why Lenin as early as the 'nineties began the struggle for the creation of a militant, really revolutionary party which in contradistinction to the old parties of the Second International is the party of the *new type*, the party of the international proletarian revolution. He worked out a program for the party, the tactics and organizational foundations on which this revolutionary party was to be constructed.

Lenin's Struggle in the 'Nineties for Revolutionary Marxism Against Narodism and the Revision of Marxism

In the 'nineties Lenin fought primarily against narodism, because it was one of the main obstacles on the road to creating a proletarian party. In the 'nineties narodism had not yet been overcome and Marxism had not yet been finally victorious in the Russian revolutionary movement.

The Narodniks of the 'nineties were no longer the same as the revolutionary Narodniks. They renounced the revolutionary struggle, did not call upon the people to revolt. The policy of the Narodniks of the 'nineties amounted merely to an endeavour to come to an agreement with tsarism, to get reforms in a peaceful way in the interests of the petty-bourgeoisie. Instead of the revolutionary overthrow of tsarism, which is what the revolutionary Narodniks of the 'seventies wanted, the Narodniks of the 'nineties strove merely to effect a partial amelioration of the then existing social order. In upholding the narodnik theory of the significance of the village community, the Narodniks of the 'nineties sank so low that they even calculated upon receiving the aid of the tsarist government in the interests of preserving the village community.

Thus, the revolutionary feature that was present in the

* Stalin, "Foundations of Leninism," *Leninism*, Vol. I, pp. 87-88.

narodism of the 'seventies vanished with the Narodniks of the 'nineties and the result was a moderate political tendency that was by no means revolutionary. Lenin called them *liberal* Narodniks to differentiate them from the revolutionary Narodniks of the 'seventies and 'eighties. The liberal Narodniks reflected the interests of the upper stratum of the countryside and the petty bourgeoisie.

While mercilessly exposing the reactionary side of the views entertained by the liberal Narodniks, Lenin at the same time noted their democratic, progressive side. This side found expression in the protest against the landlord estates and the feudal survivals, in the endeavour to improve the legal status of the peasants.

Plekhanov also waged a struggle against narodism. However, he differed from Lenin in that he saw only the reactionary side of narodism. He denied the revolutionary-democratic aspect of narodnik ideology. Here his lack of faith in the revolutionary role of the peasantry in the struggle against autocracy manifested itself.

Lenin, taking a stand during the 'nineties against the liberal Narodniks, waged a simultaneous struggle against the so-called "legal Marxists"—Struve, Tugan-Baranovsky, Bulgakov. These were bourgeois intellectuals who developed bourgeois views, screened with Marxist phrases, in the columns of legal magazines, *i.e.*, magazines openly published under the tsarist government.

The wide dissemination of Marxism in Russia, the growth of the mass labour movement, the weakness and incapability of the liberal bourgeoisie to achieve power under their own program, impelled these representatives of the bourgeoisie to flirt with Marxism.

The "legal Marxists" endeavoured to adapt Marxism to the interests of the bourgeoisie by expunging from it its revolutionary content, which was, of course, unacceptable to the bourgeoisie. The "legal Marxists" denied the necessity of the proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship. They held that the contradictions of capitalism—for instance, the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, crises and so forth—would gradually be ironed out in a peaceful manner and in the long run would disappear. They preached the permanence and

impregnability of capitalism. They tried to subordinate the struggle of the proletariat to the interests of the bourgeoisie. They assigned to the proletariat the role of a crude physical force which was only to clear the ground for the rule of the bourgeoisie. They endeavoured to transform the proletariat into the echo of the bourgeoisie, calling upon it "to become apprenticed to capitalism."

The "legal Marxists" criticized the Narodniks who denied the inevitability of the development of capitalism. In the struggle against the Narodniks, Lenin skilfully made use of the "legal Marxists," though waging at the same time a determined struggle against the bourgeois distortion of Marxism on their part.

Lenin pointed out from the very beginning that Struve only screened his bourgeois views with Marxist phrases, that he was a bourgeois democrat who endeavoured to lead the workers by the halter of the bourgeoisie. Lenin proved to be right. As early as the 'nineties, Struve openly became one of the leaders of the bourgeoisie and later on deserted to open counter-revolution together with it.*

Plekhanov adopted a different view towards Struve. He did not discern the bourgeois character of Struve's views but merely thought that the "legal Marxists" were making a few trifling mistakes which they themselves would rectify. Therefore Plekhanov was opposed to Lenin's trenchant criticism of Struvism. Plekhanov pursued a policy of conciliation towards the "legal Marxists." The difference in the attitude of Lenin and that of Plekhanov to the "legal Marxists" and to the Narodniks revealed two different approaches to the liberal bourgeoisie and the peasantry. Lenin disclosed the utter inconsistency, the non-revolutionary character of the bourgeoisie, exposed all its attempts to subordinate the proletariat to its influence. At the same time he pointed to the peasantry as the only firm ally of the proletariat in the struggle against tsarism. Plekhanov on the contrary overestimated the revolutionary role of the bourgeoisie and denied the role of the peasantry as the ally of the proletariat in the impending revolution.

* After the October Revolution Struve and Tugan-Baranovsky were active leaders of the whiteguards, while Bulgakov became a priest even before the Revolution.—*Ed. Russian ed.*

Lenin's struggle against narodism and "legal Marxism" was of the highest international significance, because it was a struggle for revolutionary Marxism, for the hegemony of the proletariat, against bourgeois (Struvist) and petty-bourgeois narodnik attempts to subject the proletariat to hostile influences.

The tremendous significance of this struggle for the entire world revolutionary movement consisted also in the fact that Lenin at the same time mercilessly flayed the opportunism in the Social-Democratic parties of the Second International, whose views were intimately connected with those of "legal Marxism." The opportunism of the Second International was expressed most consistently by the German Social-Democrats—Bernstein, David, Vollmar and others. Bernstein, one of the leaders of the German Social-Democratic Party during the 'nineties, openly demanded a re-examination, a "revision," of all the views of Marx (hence the name *revisionism*). He opposed the clause in the Party program which spoke about the ultimate aim of the struggle of the proletariat, *i.e.*, socialism, proposing to replace it by a peaceful, reformist, only partial rectification of the capitalist system. "The movement is everything, the ultimate goal is nothing," runs the basic slogan under which Bernstein revised Marxism. In this respect he was at once supported by a comparatively great number of adherents—the opportunist Social-Democrats of Germany and other countries. By coming out against the dictatorship of the proletariat, Bernstein took a stand in favour of compromising, in favour of peace with the bourgeoisie. He tried to prove that the working class could arrive at socialism peacefully, claiming that the contradictions of capitalism were becoming less severe and could be eliminated by effecting minor improvements. This was a monstrous, a most flagrant distortion of the entire revolutionary doctrine of Marx and Engels. Bernstein and his followers, though calling themselves Social-Democrats, endeavoured to inculcate bourgeois views upon their party, disintegrated it from within.

At the close of the 'nineties Bernstein was opposed by Kautsky, a prominent theoretician of the Second International. But Kautsky's criticism was not consistent, was conciliatory. Kautsky, for instance, passed in complete silence the fact that Bernstein rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat and the

necessity of a violent revolution in order to overthrow the bourgeoisie.

Lenin alone was consistent to the end in his exposure of the Bernsteinians. Lenin pointed out that the theory of the "legal Marxists" had anticipated the revision of Marxism by the Bernsteinians. In his article entitled *Our Program*, Lenin wrote that Bernstein and his followers preach

"... not the theory of struggle but the theory of complaisance—complaisance towards the worst enemies of the proletariat... who never tire of seeking out new means for baiting the Socialists!" *

Struggle for the Party of the New Type

While fighting irreconcilably against narodism and the revision of Marxism, Lenin during the 'nineties expended great effort on creating a revolutionary militant party capable of leading the working class in the struggle to win the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Having come to St. Petersburg in 1893, Lenin joined a Marxist group which included Krzhizhanovsky (now a member of the Central Committee of the Party), Stepan Ivanovich Radchenko, H. Krassin (brother of the late L. B. Krassin, once People's Commissar of Foreign Trade), Vaneyev, N. K. Krupskaya (Lenin's wife) and others. They all worked in various St. Petersburg circles. Lenin began to work beyond the Nevsky Gate. He read and explained Marx's *Capital* to workers with whom he talked about their work and the conditions in the factories and mills. During these study hours Lenin explained to them the connection between their poverty and the entire existing order, showed the ways and means of destroying it. The close interlinking of theory and practice was the main characteristic feature of Lenin's work in the workers' circles. There he met such advanced workers as Shelgunov** and Babushkin,** whom he drew into active work.

* Lenin, "Our Program," *Collected Works*, Vol. II.

** Shelgunov—born in 1867, social-democratic worker, repeatedly arrested. Lost his sight in prison. Now works in the Society of Old Bolsheviks.—*Ed. Russian ed.*

*** Babushkin—born in 1873, bolshevik revolutionary, active Party worker; in 1906 was shot by a punitive expedition in Siberia.—*Ed. Russian ed.*

Lenin very soon became the head of the Marxist group in St. Petersburg. In 1895 this group, after uniting the Marxist circles in the various districts, took the name of the *League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class*. This was the first social-democratic organization in Russia, created by Lenin on the principles of centralism, i.e., on the principle of leadership derived from a single centre. The leading organ of the League was the Bureau consisting of Lenin, Martov, Vanev, Starkov and Krzhizhanovsky.

At the time the St. Petersburg League of Struggle was organized, the labour movement had grown immensely. The number of strikers increased each year. The workers waged an economic struggle against the employers, striving to secure better conditions of work. During these years of industrial boom, when the demand for workers was exceptionally great, strikes ended successfully in the majority of cases. Of special importance during this period was the strike of 30,000 weavers in St. Petersburg in 1896. This strike was somewhat influential in improving the conditions of the workers: the 13-15 hour working day was replaced by an 11½ hour working day and wages were raised. This strike has shown what a great force the proletariat represents when it takes the path of determined struggle.

The labour movement, which had grown up, demanded that the social-democratic groups adopt new methods of work: that they pass on from the stage of holding study circles with advanced workers to the stage of leading the mass labour movement.

This transition from propaganda to mass agitation Lenin began to carry out at the end of 1894 and the beginning of 1895. As a result of this change made by the St. Petersburg League of Struggle in favour of working among the masses, of leading the mass labour movement, an increasingly intimate and inseparable contact was established between the League and the labour movement.

In a short period of time the St. Petersburg League of Struggle acquired great popularity among the masses of the workers. In 1895-96 almost all strikes in St. Petersburg were carried out at the initiative and under the leadership of the League of Struggle. The League gave out leaflets and manifestoes which

were distributed at the factories and mills. These leaflets correctly expounded in easily understood language the urgent needs and interests of the workers and issued a call to struggle against the autocracy.

At the end of 1895 the League decided to start the publication of a newspaper, the *Rabocheye Dyelo* (*Workers' Cause*). Lenin was to be its head. He already had prepared the first issue of the paper when in December 1895 mass arrests were made among the members of the social-democratic organizations. Lenin, too, was arrested. These arrests quashed the publication of this mass labour newspaper.

The St. Petersburg League of Struggle, the founder and leader of which was Lenin, was the embryo of the truly revolutionary party of the new type. It was the embryo of the Bolshevik Party. Relying on the labour movement, the League led the class struggle of the proletariat, the struggle against tsarism and all exploiters. In this struggle Lenin trained and welded together the revolutionary cadres of his adherents, the builders of the Bolshevik Party.

Almost simultaneously with the organization of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle, workers' leagues sprang up in Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznessensk and somewhat later in Kiev, Nikolayev and Ekaterinoslav. Besides these, social-democratic organizations existed in 1896-97 in Kharkov, Odessa, Nizhni-Novgorod, Samara, Riga, Voronezh, Rostov-on-Don and Tiflis.

The Tiflis social-democratic organization played a very important role in Transcaucasia. In 1898, *Stalin* began his work in this organization. With his active participation the Tiflis organization in 1899-1900 changed from propaganda to mass work, bringing a constantly increasing mass of workers and toiling peasants of the oppressed nationalities under its influence.

National social-democratic organizations arose in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. The General Jewish Labour League of Lithuania, Poland and Russia (the *Bund*) sprang up. It included mainly artisans and other strata of the city petty bourgeoisie. In its work it reflected backward petty-bourgeois sentiments.

At that time the diverse groups of Social-Democrats working in various cities of Russia were confronted with the exceedingly acute problem of uniting in a single party and creating a single

leading centre. Practical steps in this direction were taken. N. K. Krupskaya covered the southern cities of Russia for that purpose.

Lenin's arrest in 1895 and his exile in February 1897 to Eastern Siberia divorced him for some time from direct leadership of the struggle to unite the Social-Democrats in one party. However, even while he was in prison, Lenin did much work to rally the Social-Democrats. He composed leaflets, illegal pamphlets, wrote a draft program for the First Party Congress* and keenly reacted to all issues that arose among the Social-Democrats. Lenin's work prepared the ground for calling the First Congress.

First Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party

The First Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (R.S.D.L.P.) was held in Minsk in March 1898. Nine persons attended—representatives from various Leagues of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class and from the Bund. The Congress did not work out a program for the Party but confined itself to issuing a manifesto.

In this manifesto the formation of the R.S.D.L.P. was announced and the tasks of the Party set forth as follows: the overthrow of autocracy and the struggle against capitalism and the bourgeoisie until the complete victory of socialism has been achieved. The Congress endorsed the right of nations to self-determination. It also passed a resolution on the main principles of the Party's organizational structure and elected a Central Committee consisting of three comrades: Radchenko, Eidelman and Kremer. The *Babochaya Gazeta* (*Workers' Gazette*) published by the Kiev social-democratic group was declared the central organ of the Party.

But the manifesto and the resolution on the organizational structure of the Party did not reflect with sufficient accuracy the tasks of the proletariat during the impending revolution as Lenin, who at that time was in exile, later wrote concerning this point. The greatest defect in the manifesto was its failure to

* This draft program was not submitted to the First Congress.—Ed. Russian ed. ...

make any mention whatever of the *forcible* overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the necessity of struggling for the proletarian revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the resolution on the organizational structure of the Party, the principle of centralism, *i. e.*, leadership by a single centre, was not carried out to its logical conclusion. The local committees could refuse to carry out the decision of the Central Committee.

The great importance of the First Congress consists in the fact that it proclaimed the formation of the R.S.D.L.P. However, the Social-Democrats lacked the strength necessary to make this union effective in practice. The First Congress did not succeed in actually creating the Party. After the Congress the social-democratic movement remained scattered as heretofore; it was not interlinked by unity of program and centralized leadership. Soon after the Congress the Central Committee elected by it, the editorial board and the writers of the *Rabochaya Gazeta* and a considerable number of other Social-Democrats in various cities were put under arrest. Although the Party was bled white for the time being, the organizational work at the various localities did not cease.

Lenin's Struggle Against the Economists

At the end of the 'nineties there was a widespread opportunist tendency within the R.S.D.L.P. itself which was known as economism. The Economists relied on the backward strata of the workers who had not yet freed themselves from petty-bourgeois, peasant sentiments and who had not yet perceived their class interests; also upon the upper stratum of the well-paid workers and upon part of the petty-bourgeois intellectuals. The dissemination of economism was aided by the great influx from the villages of new workers at the factories and mills. This influx was called forth by the particularly rapid development of industry at that time.

The absence of a compact party and the arrest of Lenin and of other revolutionaries were instrumental in bringing to the helm the "young" adherents of economism who had been brought up mainly on the literature of "legal Marxism." They

seized the leadership of the League of Struggle and other social-democratic organizations.

The *Rabochaya Mysl* (*Worker's Thought*), directed by Takh-tarev and Lokhov, and the *Rabocheye Dyelo*, a magazine published abroad, were the ideological purveyors of the views of the Economists. The *Rabocheye Dyelo* was headed by the famous "triumvirate," Krichevsky, Akimov and Martynov.*

The Economists expounded their views at length in a document called the *Credo*. The authors of this document were Kus-kova and Prokopovich, who later openly deserted to the liberal bourgeoisie and ultimately found their way to the camp of the whiteguard émigrés.

According to the Economists, the proletariat could wage only an economic struggle (hence their name—Economists) and must content itself with winning paltry rises in its miserable pay within the framework of the existing order of society.

They held that the struggle to increase wages, to improve housing conditions—in a word, the economic struggle—is the only form of struggle possible for the working class.

Consequently the Economists rejected the struggle to destroy the autocracy; they came out against the dictatorship of the proletariat, against the struggle for the hegemony of the proletariat, and rejected the role of revolutionary theory.

Thus the basic interests of the working class were subordinated by them to the day-to-day interests of the workers.

The Economists renounced the struggle for the basic interests of the working class.

They did not lead the proletariat forward but trailed in the wake of its backward, spontaneous sentiments. They gave precedence to spontaneity, relied upon automatism, rejected the leading and organizational role of the party and its leaders.

All this was of advantage only to the bourgeoisie and made the Economists purveyors of bourgeois influence to the proletariat.

There was the most intimate ideological contact between the Economists and the "legal Marxists." Economism as an oppor-

* Martynov—for many years after 1903 a prominent Menshevik. In 1923 he gave up his menshevik views, subjected them to full and frank criticism and joined the Communist Party.—Ed. Russian ed.

tunist current within Social-Democracy realized in practice the ideas of "legal Marxism," which were reflected in the slogan: "For the workers—economic struggle, for the bourgeoisie—political struggle."

The closest contact existed between the Economists in Russia and the opportunists in the West. The views of the Economists on basic questions coincided with the views of Bernstein. "Economism was the Russian form of international opportunism." (*Lenin.*)

Lenin came out against economism as early as 1895-97 in the St. Petersburg League of Struggle. For instance, he waged a struggle against the Takhtarev group, which already at that time propagated the ideas of economism, though in an undeveloped form. An exile in Siberia, in the village of Shushenskoye, he continued his irreconcilable struggle against this opportunist current. Having familiarized himself in exile with the platform of the Economists—the Credo—Lenin gathered there a group of Social-Democrats—fellow exiles—and in their name wrote a reply entitled *The Protest of the Seventeen*.

This protest exposed the petty-bourgeois views of the adherents of the Credo and called upon the Russian Social-Democrats decidedly to rebuff the Economists. It also expressed the conviction that the Marxist revolutionaries would not deviate from the path of creating a revolutionary labour party which would lead the proletariat to the struggle against autocracy, for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

CHAPTER III

THE ISKRA PERIOD AND THE FORMATIVE STAGE OF BOLSHEVISM

The Class Struggle at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century

At the end of the nineteenth century—in 1899-1900—a severe industrial crisis broke out. While it swept all important countries of Europe, it bore a particularly virulent and protracted character in Russia. Industrial enterprises crashed one after the other, production fell, unemployment and destitution among the masses increased.

The industrial crisis raised the fighting mood of the masses still more. The proletariat began to pass from economic strikes to the political struggle against tsarism. In the workers' centres demonstrations were held and militant action was organized. In this respect the street demonstration in Kharkov on May First, 1900, which stirred up the whole of southern Russia, was very indicative. The street demonstrations frequently ended in bloody clashes with the police.

Enormous importance for that period attaches to the Rostov strike in 1902. As many as 30,000 persons participated in this strike. It started with the railwaymen's demand for a rise in wages, a shorter working day and the abolition of fines. The Minister of Ways of Communication declined these demands. Thereupon the workers transformed the strike into a powerful political demonstration. For seven days numerous mass meetings of workers were held, thousands of Cossacks and much artillery were despatched against the Rostov workers. The entire city was converted into a military camp. A truly heroic fight commenced in which the workers put the Cossacks to flight a score of times. Finally, the workers, overwhelmed by military force, were compelled to call off the strike. Lenin wrote that the Rostov strike

marked the first time that the proletariat as a class opposed all other classes and the tsarist government. The metal workers moved to the forefront of the working class and began to play an increasingly important role in the labour movement.

The general strike of 1903 in the South of Russia, which embraced about 200,000 people, was of even greater importance for the labour movement. It began in the Baku oil-fields and very soon took in all big towns of the South (Baku, Batum, Odessa, Kiev, Ekaterinoslav, Tiflis). In Odessa the workers held numerous meetings and political demonstrations. In Kiev and Ekaterinoslav the authorities in alarm had recourse to military force. Thus, with the aid of troops tsarism crushed the general strike which had lasted more than a month.

The Rostov strike and the strike in the South of Russia were the first menacing harbingers of the Revolution of 1905. They signalized a turn to sharp revolutionary struggle in the entire international labour movement.

At the same time *peasant uprisings* spread far and wide. In 1902 alone there were 340 instances when the peasants took action (as against 100 in 1900 and 1901). In the vast majority of cases, this action was directed against the landlords.

The action taken in 1902 by the Kharkov and Poltava peasants in the Ukraine was of especially great importance. In five days 165 villages comprising 150,000 persons rose in rebellion. In the Poltava and Kharkov uprisings the poor and middle sections of the peasantry were in the lead. The more prosperous peasants often held aloof and the government relied on a section of these peasants when it meted out punishment to those who had participated in the burning and pillaging of the estates of the landlords. This was striking proof of the differentiation that was taking place in the peasantry.

The Poltava and Kharkov uprisings showed that the peasantry was a tremendous revolutionary force in the struggle against tsarism. These uprisings were the precursors of the revolutionary struggle of the peasants in 1905.

Other groups of the population were also drawn into the struggle against autocracy; for instance, the student body. The struggle of the oppressed nationalities against tsarism, for their national liberation, became quite acute.

In order to crush the labour movement, the monarchy applied the system of police provocation. Zubatov, a Moscow gendarme, received instructions to form labour organizations which were to exercise the treacherous role of leading the labour movement away from the revolutionary path, of consolidating tsarism, detecting the most revolutionary-minded workers and of betraying them. Hence the term *Zubatovism*. At first, Zubatov had some show of success in his work in St. Petersburg, Odessa, Moscow, Yaroslavl, Minsk and Vladimir. In the beginning of 1900 he managed to draw some backward strata of workers and artisans into his organizations. However, the revolutionary sentiments which prevailed among the working class penetrated also the workers who had joined Zubatov's organizations. This compelled tsarism to refrain from creating any such organizations in future.

Under these conditions Social-Democracy was confronted now more than ever by the task of leading and organizing the masses for the struggle against the autocracy.

Organization of the Iskra

When Lenin returned from exile in 1900, Social-Democracy in Russia was experiencing a period of "dispersion, dissolution and vacillation" (*Lenin*). The influence of the Economists was spreading to a considerable number of Party organizations. There was no single uniting centre. The best Party workers were constantly being snatched from the midst of the Party by the tsar's gendarmes. A considerable number of bourgeois intellectuals entered the Party organizations. These intellectuals calculated upon using the working class in the struggle against the autocracy but the aims of the proletariat were alien to them. The numerous circles and organizations that existed led lives of mutual isolation. Sometimes several social-democratic organizations worked independently of each other in one city. The attempt to restore the Central Committee elected at the First Congress failed.

Under these conditions the main task consisted in liquidating the ideological and organizational dispersion, in working out a single Party line and in rallying around it the basic strong core of revolutionaries. This task, in the opinion of Lenin, could be fulfilled best by an illegal all-Russian political newspaper. Only

a newspaper which propagated revolutionary Marxism day by day could weld the working class ideologically. Lenin was of the opinion that in that period a newspaper would be best able to unite the Party forces in the various localities; that by creating around this newspaper an entire network of organizations to serve it, it would be easier to weld the existing Party cadres into a militant, ideologically steeled and flexible all-Russian party organization, capable of leading the struggle of the working class for the dictatorship of the proletariat. Such was Lenin's plan which he developed in detail in his epoch-making book *What Is To Be Done* (1902).

Thus, to Lenin's mind the newspaper was to fulfil the role not only of agitator but also of organizer of the Party masses; it was to take upon itself the task of creating a Party organization.

This is precisely the reason why Lenin, immediately upon his return from exile, proceeded to organize an all-Russian political newspaper. He made trips to the big industrial centres and established contact with social-democratic groups and individual social-democratic workers. Lenin drew Martov and Potressov, who were members of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle, into participating in the organization of the newspaper. He also invited Plekhanov, Axelrod and Zasulich, members of the Emancipation of Labour group, who at that time enjoyed great influence among the Social-Democrats, to become active contributors to the newspaper. After this Lenin proceeded to establish the paper. It was decided to publish it abroad, as it was impossible to arrange for a regular appearance of the paper in Russia on account of the political persecution. On December 24, 1900 the first number of this newspaper, the *Iskra* (*Spark*), appeared in Germany.

In his articles in the *Iskra*, Lenin continued his elaboration of the principal questions of Marxism and of the program, tactics and organization of the proletariat and developed the ideas which he had advanced in his first works.

In exposing the policy of tsarism, Lenin wrote that the proletariat of Russia could not attain its aims if it did not overthrow autocracy, did not destroy the rule of the feudal landlords. By noting every strike, every step in the struggle of the working

class against capitalism, the *Iskra* linked up this struggle with the ultimate aims of the movement, with the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for socialism.

The *Iskra* fought for the leading role of the proletariat in the revolution, for an alliance between the working class and the peasantry. At the same time it specially pointed out to the proletariat its duty to the masses of rural labourers and poor peasants: the proletariat is duty-bound to organize the proletarian and semi-proletarian masses of the countryside. In the struggle against the landlords the proletariat must lead the entire peasantry, said the *Iskra*, but in the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie of town and country, the proletariat will fight together with the village poor. Lenin gave this thought particularly full expression in his article entitled *To the Rural Poor* (1903). This was the first mass pamphlet written by Lenin for the peasants.

All articles by Lenin, especially his famous pamphlet *What Is To Be Done* and the entire work of the *Iskra* as a whole hammered away at one point: it is necessary to create the proletarian party of the new type that will lead to the triumph of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In the columns of the *Iskra* Lenin did not tire of repeating that the Party could fulfil its role only when it would be ideologically and organizationally unified, compact, centralized, disciplined, working underground beyond the reach of the government, in close contact with the masses; when it would create for itself a point of support in the factories and mills and would know how to utilize all legal possibilities for the organization of the masses.

Such a party, said Lenin, must be created by *professional revolutionaries*—by Social-Democrats whose entire life and work is devoted to the struggle for the revolution. This work is their profession. Lenin as well as Stalin were themselves professional revolutionaries first and foremost. They were people who devoted themselves completely and whole-heartedly to the cause of the revolution. They were people who for the sake of the revolution, for the cause of the Party, suffered the persecution of the police, underwent arrests, endured incredible privations and spent long years in prison and exile. It was they who under

exceptionally difficult conditions prepared the working class for the decisive struggle against the autocracy and the bourgeoisie. It was they who waged the struggle for the organization of the proletarian party of the new type on the principles which Lenin worked out in *What Is To Be Done*.

Parallel with its ideological struggle the *Iskra* waged an energetic fight to weld together and unite organizationally the local social-democratic committees and the groups abroad. A tremendous amount of work along this line was done in Russia by N. K. Krupskaya, secretary to the editorial board and by N. Bauman, Lengnik, Lepeshinsky, Radchenko, Zemlyachka, Krzhizhanovsky, Stassova, Knipovich, Krassikov and others, who were all agents of the *Iskra*. They set up contacts between the *Iskra* and the social-democratic organizations and were entrusted with the execution of all important instructions given by Lenin.

The *Iskra* acquired tremendous popularity among the masses. This popularity is evidenced by the fact that the ten to fifteen thousand copies, which frequently appeared twice a month, were unable to satisfy the demand of all those who wanted to read the paper. One copy of the *Iskra* had to do for several scores of readers. This made it necessary to have certain issues of the *Iskra* reprinted in Russia. The difficulties of printing and distributing the *Iskra* were very great. It was brought secretly into Russia from abroad, most of the time in double-bottomed trunks, by various persons both Party members and sympathizers who delivered these trunks to the parties agreed upon. Somewhat later special points were organized at the frontier through which considerable shipments of literature were effected with the aid of picked people. To facilitate the shipment of the *Iskra*, the newspaper was published on fine tissue paper. In Russia the *Iskra* was distributed secretly and copies, passing from hand to hand, were read until they were worn to shreds.

The *Iskra* waged an irreconcilable struggle against all enemies of revolutionary Marxism: against the bourgeois liberals (Struve and Co.) who endeavoured to subordinate the interests of the proletariat to those of the bourgeoisie; against the petty-bourgeois narodnik groups, which at that time organized a separate party, that of the Socialist-Revolutionaries (S. R.'s). The *Iskra* exposed the attempts of the Zubatov police officials to divert the labour

movement from the revolutionary path, to distract the workers' attention from the political struggle, to consolidate the autocracy. The *Iskra* explained that the Economists, in rejecting the necessity of an independent political struggle by the working class, considerably facilitated the work of the Zubatov organizations, paved the way to Zubatovism.

Under Lenin's leadership the *Iskra* exposed economism day after day. With the aid of its "agents" it forced the Economists out of the biggest organizations, won the vast majority of social-democratic committees and rallied them around the principles of revolutionary Marxism.

The *Iskra* also waged an active struggle against international opportunism—for instance, against Bernstein; also against a conciliatory attitude towards the bourgeoisie, as revealed in the French party. Millerand, a French "Socialist," entered a bourgeois cabinet one of whose ministers was General Gallifet, the hangman of the Paris Communards. Instead of severely condemning this treacherous move by Millerand, some of the leaders of the Second International—Bernstein, Vandervelde and Auer—fully approved of this move; others headed by Kautsky took a conciliatory stand thereby facilitating and assisting the development of opportunism. Lenin at once occupied an irreconcilable position on this question, stating that "Millerandism is Bernsteinism in practice."

At the same time it was necessary for Lenin to fight even on the editorial board of the *Iskra* for the basic postulates of Marxism, against a conciliatory attitude towards economism and against the opportunism of Plekhanov, Axelrod, Martov and the other members of the editorial board.

A particularly sharp struggle was waged by Lenin against the opportunist waverings of the members of the *Iskra* editorial board in connection with the discussion of the draft program of the Party, the elaboration of which at that time was its most important task.

Lenin subjected the draft program written by Plekhanov to trenchant criticism. Lenin showed plainly that Plekhanov's draft program did not point out to the Party its concrete tasks in the struggle against the autocracy and Russian capitalism. This draft did not expound the program of the proletariat of Russia but

"the program of a *textbook* on economics devoted to capitalism in general" (Lenin).

In this draft program Plekhanov in essence rejected the hegemony of the proletariat and slurred over the difference between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie in the proletarian revolution. Instead of clearly pointing out that the proletariat is the only class revolutionary to the end, Plekhanov effaced the line of demarcation between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie and united these two different classes in one whole under the general name of "toiling and exploited mass." In his second draft program Plekhanov completely omitted the question of the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat,* and endeavoured to convert the Social-Democratic Party from a party of the working class into a party of all the toilers and exploited.

Lenin's sharp criticism forced Plekhanov to make a number of substantial corrections in his draft program.

The question of the *agrarian program* also called forth great differences of opinion on the editorial board of the *Iskra*. The demand that the *otrezki*, i.e., the land that had been sliced off the peasant holdings at the time the "Reform" of 1861 was effected, be returned to the peasants without compensation was included as an immediate demand in the program. This demand did not give rise to any difference of opinion in the *Iskra*. However Lenin viewed this demand for the *otrezki* as only an initial step. He said that with the development of a powerful peasant uprising "at a certain revolutionary moment" the Party would advance the further demand of the *nationalization of the land*, i.e., the abolition of the private ownership of land and its transfer into the possession of a revolutionary government of workers and peasants. The program of the nationalization of the land sponsored by Lenin had the greatest revolutionary significance: it mobilized the peasantry to struggle for the decisive destruction of the autocracy and the landlord estates. Lenin argued that later on, when nationalization would be applied in practice, it would accentuate the struggle of the village poor against the kulaks and would aid the rallying of the poor around the pro-

* This was no accident, since Plekhanov had evaded the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat even before this (for instance, in his pamphlet on anarchism written in 1894).—Ed. Russian ed.

letariat in the *struggle for the socialist revolution*. Plekhanov, Martov and Axelrod came out sharply against Lenin on the question of the nationalization of the land. They rejected the revolutionary role of the peasantry, its alliance with the working class, in the impending revolution and therefore rejected the program of the nationalization of the land. On these questions they shared the views of the Second International.

Finally, differences of opinion arose on the editorial board of the *Iskra* concerning the question of the attitude to be taken toward the liberals. Lenin was in favour of mercilessly exposing the half-heartedness, the cowardice of the liberals, their readiness to compromise with tsarism and turn against the revolution. Plekhanov and Axelrod, however, took a stand against this policy. They advocated a line in favour of compromising with the bourgeoisie and rejecting the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution.

Thus, the entire struggle of Lenin on the editorial board of the *Iskra* was a struggle against the opportunist line referred to, which subsequently took form and became a full-grown political current—menshevism.

World-Historic Importance of the Iskra

In a subsequent appraisal of the line of the *Iskra*, Lenin wrote that with regard to *the trend it pursued the Iskra was wholly Bolshevik*. This was the first newspaper "wholly Bolshevik" in its trend; it acquired international significance thanks to the leading work Lenin did on this newspaper. Lenin was its organizer, leader and inspirer. In the *Iskra* he elaborated the questions of revolutionary Marxism, fought for its purity, maintained and developed contact with Russia. It was he who performed all the editorial and technical work connected with the newspaper, who conducted the voluminous correspondence of the *Iskra*, looked after the ways and means of shipping it to Russia, of improving its technical side and of financing it.

The Iskra worked out the program, the tactics and organizational principles of the construction of the revolutionary party. The Iskra created the "theoretical foundations of the really revolutionary movement of the Russian working class" (Stalin).

Comrade Stalin in his work *Anent the Differences of Opinion in the Party*, which appeared in 1905, explained that the Leninist *Iskra* had achieved the union of scientific socialism with the mass labour movement and of the mass labour movement with revolutionary Marxism. Thus:

"What is scientific socialism without the labour movement? It is a compass which if left unused becomes rusty and must be thrown overboard.

"What is the labour movement without socialism?—A ship without a compass . . .

"But if we combine them we get a ship which rushes along a true course to the other shore and despite all storms reaches the haven."

The *Iskra* shattered economism by unmasking and exposing the utter harmfulness of the theories of "spontaneity," of "tailism"*

The struggle of the *Iskra* against the opportunists in Russia as well as in other countries was of the greatest international significance. The German Bernsteinians, the French Millerandists, the Russian Economists, the English opportunists—all of them distorted revolutionary Marxism and waged a united struggle against it. Therefore Lenin in his book *What Is To Be Done* explained that if formerly the struggle against opportunism in Germany, France, England and Russia remained a national controversy, it today for the first time has "grown from national into international controversies."**

Without such a struggle it was impossible to think of creating a proletarian party that could become the leader and organizer of the revolution.

In this struggle the Leninist line of the *Iskra* was a line pursuing a rupture, a split with opportunism in Russia as well as in the other countries. At the same time Lenin came out with great stringency against those who held to a conciliatory line in this struggle, who were against dissociation from the opportunists, who were inclined to make concessions to them.***

Having dissociated itself from the opportunists, the *Iskra* exposed their views which were hostile to the working class. The

* Following in the wake or at the tail—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

** Lenin, "What Is To Be Done," *Selected Works*, Vol. II, p. 30.

*** *Ibid.*

Iskra worked out a clear revolutionary party line on the basis of which it created the proletarian party.

The *Iskra* was really not only an agitator for the Party but also its organizer. By dint of its tremendous and intensive work the *Iskra* created the Party, became its theoretical and practical centre. It helped to liquidate the period of primitive methods, of wavering and dispersion. It was also a great merit of the *Iskra* that it prepared the convocation of the Second Congress of the Party. In November 1902 it convened a conference in Pskov at which the organizational committee which prepared the Second Congress was set up.

Second Congress of the Party

This Congress was held in July and August 1903 in London.* It was attended by fifty-one delegates who represented twenty-six local committees and had the right to vote; likewise by representatives of the *Iskra*, the Bund and the Economists. Thirty-three delegates having the right to vote belonged to *Iskra* organizations, ten to vacillating and indeterminate organizations who were called the "marsh," while the opponents of the *Iskra*, the anti-*Iskra*-ists, controlled eight votes. Only one of the Economists at the Congress came from Russia. Thus, the majority of the congressional delegates were *Iskra* adherents. This composition of the Congress evidenced the decisive victory of the *Iskra* line in the social-democratic organizations of Russia and the almost complete displacement of the Economists.

The Congress discussed the *program* of the Party worked out by the *Iskra*. The program expounded the basic principles of Marx and Engels concerning the proletarian revolution, the necessity of overthrowing the bourgeoisie and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. Parallel with this, the program pointed out the immediate demands for which the Party was to struggle in order to destroy the feudal survivals as quickly as possible. In this section the program demanded the overthrow of the autocracy, the establishment of a republic, the introduction of freedom of speech, assembly and the press, the realiza-

* The Congress opened in Brussels. However, the constant annoyance by the Belgian police forced the transfer of its sessions to London.—*Ed. Russian ed.*

tion of the eight-hour working day, the return of the *otrezki* to the peasants and the organization of peasant committees.

At the Congress this program was attacked by the Economists and the Bundists. In their speeches both the former and the latter tried to reduce to naught the strikingly revolutionary character of the program and introduced amendments of an opportunist character. Akimov-Makhnovetz alone introduced twenty-two amendments in his endeavour to distort in an opportunist fashion this or that point in the program, but all these amendments were voted down by the Congress.

The clause concerning the dictatorship of the proletariat called forth especially furious attacks. Both the Economists and the Bundists came out in a united front against the clause concerning the dictatorship of the proletariat. They tried to prove that the struggle to win the dictatorship of the proletariat was unnecessary and harmful. These opportunists wanted to confine the tasks of the proletariat to the struggle for a partial improvement of its position within the framework of the existing order. On this basic question—the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat—even some *Iskra*-ists, future Mensheviks, slid down to the position of the opportunists. Thus, Trotsky declared that the dictatorship of the proletariat could be realized only when the working class would constitute a majority of the population and would belong to the Party almost in its entirety, *i.e.*, he virtually rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat. This opportunist distortion of the Marxist doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat was one of the ideological fountainheads of Trotsky's menshevism, which subsequently brought him into the camp of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

Despite the opportunists the Second Congress approved the clause in the program dealing with the dictatorship of the proletariat and unanimously adopted the draft program proposed by the *Iskra* (Akimov alone abstaining from voting).

But the unanimous adoption of the program at the Congress did not yet denote that all those who had voted for it would interpret it alike. Lenin was of the opinion that the program of the Party pointed out the path of struggle for the armed overthrow of the autocracy, for the establishment of the power of the workers and peasants and finally for the conquest of the

dictatorship of the proletariat. But the opportunist section of the Congress viewed the program in an entirely different manner. It claimed that the program spoke only of establishing a constitution, *i.e.*, a bourgeois parliamentary republic. While rejecting in practice the dictatorship of the proletariat, the opportunists (for instance Yegorov, an adherent of Martov) asserted that even after the proletarian revolution the counter-revolutionary classes must retain their electoral rights. Martov even proposed that the press, *i.e.*, the newspapers, magazines and so forth, be left in their hands.

The differences of opinion on the question of the attitude towards the peasantry, towards the oppressed nationalities and towards the liberals were closely connected with the various conceptions of the program of the Party.

Some delegates (Yegorov, Makhov) declared outright that the Party should not occupy itself with the *peasant question*. They held that the peasantry could not act as the ally of the proletariat in the struggle against tsarism. Therefore, they were against the agrarian part of the program. The Congress decisively rejected these opportunist views.

The Congress adopted the Leninist line which placed before the Party the task of utilizing to the utmost the revolutionary energy of the millions of the peasantry in the struggle against the landlords and tsarism and of fanning the flame of the class struggle in the countryside.

On the *national question* the Congress accepted the Leninist demand of the right of nations to self-determination. This demand signifies that each nation has the right to govern itself independently, that no nation ought to be oppressed by any other nation. With particular application to Russia it meant that the Russians cannot hold in forcible subjection tens of millions of people belonging to other nationalities. This Leninist demand unleashed the revolutionary forces of the oppressed nationalities and mobilized them to struggle for the overthrow of tsarism which was a bulwark of national oppression.

In the struggle for this demand Lenin unmasked the opportunist position of the Bundists and the Polish Social-Democrats. The Bundists defended the petty-bourgeois nationalist interests; they endeavoured to disunite the proletarians of the

various nations, to compress them within the framework of exclusively national interests, to divert them from the class struggle. In practice they renounced the struggle for the overthrow of the autocracy. On the other hand the Polish Social-Democrats, who advocated the views of Rosa Luxemburg on the national question, likewise denied the revolutionary importance of the demand for the self-determination of nations. Covering themselves with "Left" phrases to the effect that the proletariat must struggle only for class proletarian interests, that it is not interested in the national question, these "Lefts" diverted the proletariat from the struggle for the abolition of national oppression and severed the proletariat from its ally, the toiling masses of the oppressed nations. Thus they objectively rendered aid to the dominant nation in the enslavement of the oppressed nationalities.

The Second Congress of the Party administered a decisive rebuff to both the Bundists and the Polish opportunists by accepting the Leninist line on the national question.

During the discussion of the attitude to be adopted towards the *liberals*, Potressov* introduced a resolution which in essence demanded a compromise with the liberals and slurred over their treacherous role. Potressov recognized the bourgeoisie as the hegemon in the revolution, while he converted the proletariat into an appendage of the bourgeoisie. At the Congress Potressov's resolution was supported mainly by the delegates who subsequently became Mensheviks.

Plekhanov, backed by the adherents of Lenin, proposed another resolution which demanded the merciless exposure of the anti-revolutionary role of the liberals. It was primarily levelled at Struve, who by that time had definitely entered upon the path of compromising with tsarism.

When the vote on the resolution was taken the delegates were almost evenly split and therefore the Congress passed both resolutions. Subsequently, at the Third Congress, at which only Bolsheviks were present, Potressov's resolution was rescinded.

Thus, on discussing the program of the Party and the tactical resolutions, it became clearly evident that only Lenin and

* One of the editors of the *Iskra*, subsequently a Menshevik.—Ed. Russian ed.

his adherents (Gussev, Zemlyachka, N. Bauman, Krassikov and others) were proletarian revolutionaries while the "soft" *Iskra*-ists (Martov, Potressov and others) against whom Lenin had been waging a struggle long before the Congress on the editorial board of the *Iskra*, wavered on the side of the avowed opportunists—the Economists.

A final line of demarcation was drawn between the delegates when the rules of the Party were discussed. The *organizational question* was of decisive importance in the struggle for the creation of the party of the new type. On discussing this question the "soft" *Iskra*-ists openly and completely veered to the position of the Economists.

On the organizational question a struggle between two radically divergent lines developed at the Congress. One was the line of Lenin, the other line united all opportunists, from Martov, Trotsky and Potressov to the Economists.

Definite organizational principles of Party construction corresponded to Lenin's line for an armed overthrow of the autocracy, for setting up the power of the workers and the peasants and the achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat. These principles were worked out by Lenin in his draft rules which were submitted by him to the Congress and ensured the construction of a militant, disciplined, centralized Party, proletarian in composition with a clear line of demarcation between Party members and non-Party members. Only such a party could lead the proletariat and the peasantry in their revolutionary struggle.

In opposition to the Leninist line, another line was set up in favour of introducing a constitution and setting up a bourgeois parliamentary republic. This line of the opportunists corresponded to their plan of creating a peaceful parliamentary party of the type of the Second International. This was nothing more nor less than opportunism in the organizational question.

Even when discussing the first paragraph of the rules, two points of view with reference to Party construction could be noted at the Congress: on the one hand Lenin's point of view, on the other, that of Martov, Axelrod, Trotsky, Potressov and others.

Lenin's infinitely great, world-historic service consists in the fact that he, the brilliant leader of the proletariat, on discussing

the first paragraph of the rules, revealed the profundity of the differences of opinion expressed, made plain the political meaning and class roots of the opportunism of the Mensheviks on the organizational question.

Lenin in his draft of the first paragraph of the rules pointed out that only those could be Party members who recognize the program of the Party, pay Party dues, enter one of the Party organizations and work actively in the Party. With this formulation of who could be a member of the Party, Lenin consolidated the foundation of the proletarian Party of the new type, created an "organizational bridle" (*Stalin*) to check the influx of petty-bourgeois elements into the Party.

"Our task," said Lenin, "is to safeguard the consistency, the steadfastness, the purity of our Party. We must strive to raise the calling and the significance of a Party member higher, higher and still higher," as "we must not forget that every Party member is responsible for the Party, and that *the Party is responsible for every one of its members.*" *

Martov, however, held to the view that it was not to be expected that a Party member necessarily join a Party organization and work in it. His formulation merely demanded of a Party member that he recognize the program of the Party and render "aid" to the Party. But in those days "aid" was at times rendered to the Party even by elements that were far from revolutionary. Martov thereby opened wide the Party gates of admission to foreign elements inasmuch as anyone who occasionally rendered aid to some Party organization would thus be given the opportunity of becoming a full-fledged member of the Party and influencing its policy. Martov held out to all petty-bourgeois elements the possibility of enrolling themselves as Party members.

If Martov's line had been followed it would have been impossible to build a strong, compact, centralized Party, inasmuch as the individual members of the Party would not necessarily be members of some particular Party organization. Martov effaced the boundary line between Party and non-Party members, between the Party and the class. Martov's formulation of the

* Lenin, "The Second Congress and the Split in the R.S.D.L.P.," *Selected Works*, Vol. II, pp. 361-62.

first paragraph of the rules was in harmony with the principle of constructing a party of the type of the Second International.

At the Congress Axelrod, Trotsky, the Economists and the Bundists strongly supported Martov's formulation because the idea of a party of a new type, the idea of a militant, compact, disciplined party with a proletarian composition and central leadership was alien to them. Plekhanov, who did not attribute decisive significance to the formulation of the first paragraph of the rules, wavered at first, then supported Lenin. However, as was revealed very shortly after the Congress, Plekhanov as a matter of fact was against the Leninist principles of how to build up the proletarian party.

As a result, although the Congress accepted Lenin's rules of the Party as a basis, the decision on the first paragraph of the rules was carried by the opportunists and thus Martov's formulation was adopted. Lenin's formulation was substituted for Martov's at the Third Congress of the Party in 1905.

The Congress rejected the demand of the Bund to be allowed to join the R. S. D. L. P., while remaining at the same time a distinct, independent party of the Jewish proletariat, not subordinate to a single centre. The Congress emphasized that this demand of the Bund was directed against the creation of a unified, strong, compact party, led by a single centre. The Congress pointed out that the demand of the Bund would legitimize dispersion, the period of disunited Party circles and national insularity. A motion was passed that the Bund on entering the Party undertake to carry out all decisions of the Central Committee of the Party, retaining however the right to decide local questions independently.

The Bund representatives refused to submit to this decision of the Congress. As a sign of protest they left the Congress. The representatives of the Economists likewise left the Congress when the latter disbanded their factional organization (the League of Russian Social-Democrats) which existed abroad.

The Congress recognized the direction taken by the *Iskra* as the direction of the Party and ratified the *Iskra* as the Party's central organ. The Congress elected a Central Committee and the members of the *Iskra* editorial board. At the elections to the Central Committee and the Central Organ, the final split between

the delegates of the Congress took place. After the delegates of the Bund and the League of Russian Social-Democrats had left the Congress, Lenin's adherents received a majority, hence their name—Bolsheviks from *bolshinstvo* (majority). The followers of Martov proved to be in the minority, hence their name—Mensheviks, from *menshinstvo* (minority).

The Congress elected Lenin, Plekhanov and Martov to constitute the editorial board of the Central Organ. Martov, however, refused to go on the editorial board of the *Iskra* in view of the Menshevik defeat at the elections to the central bodies. The Congress elected three Bolsheviks to constitute the Central Committee: Lengnik, Krhizhanovsky and Noskov.*

The International Significance of the Second Congress

The Second Congress of the Party was of the greatest international significance. It was the turning point in the development of the world revolutionary movement. In 1903 Lenin created an independent party—the party of the Bolsheviks—on the firm basis of Marxism. This was the proletarian party of the new type—the Leninist Party which became the leader not only of the Russian, but also of the international proletariat. This was the first party in the world which, relying upon the experience of the proletarians of the whole world, continued the work of the Communist League and of the First International created and led by Marx and Engels.

The paramount, world-historic significance of the Second Congress consisted in the fact that Lenin, after forming the Bolshevik Party, created an unshakable bulwark for the further development and triumph of Marxism-Leninism.

The program adopted at the Congress continued the line of Marx and Engels and was the first and only program in the entire Second International which stated straightforwardly that the principal task of the working class was the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The rules of the Party worked out by Lenin represented the only document, besides the rules of the First International,

* After the Congress the composition of the Central Committee was enlarged by the addition of Lenin, Krassin, Zemlyachka and others.—Ed. Russian ed.

which set the task of building a really revolutionary party. These rules reinforced the foundation of the Party along the principles worked out by Lenin in his pamphlet *What Is To Be Done*.

In its decisions the Congress consolidated its complete victory over economism. The split at the Congress confronted the Bolsheviks with the task of struggling mercilessly against the new form of opportunism—menshevism.

The Bolsheviks crystallized into an independent, Bolshevik Party in 1903.

"Bolshevism, as a trend of political thought and as a political party exists since 1903," * wrote Lenin.

However, while waging a merciless struggle against the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks continued to stay in the R.S.D.L.P. Lenin took this course with one aim in view: to expose the Mensheviks in their practical work in the various localities in full view of the workers who still trusted them, to deprive the Mensheviks of all influence among the masses, to win to the bolshevik side those workers who followed the Mensheviks, and, after exposing the leaders of the Mensheviks, to drive them out of the R.S.D.L.P.

At the Second Congress the Bolsheviks, by bringing the struggle against the Mensheviks to a split, showed the international proletariat that a split with opportunism is the only way to consolidate a really revolutionary workers' party.

"The Party is strengthened by purging itself of opportunist elements." Under this watchword Lenin had rallied the firm, consistent *Iskra*-ists long before the Second Congress.

The Bolsheviks, while splitting with the Mensheviks, who represented the Russian form of international opportunism, at the same time pursued a course of breaking with opportunism in the international labour movement. The formation of bolshevism at the Second Congress as that of a party of a new type dealt a hard blow to the opportunism of the Second International. Therefore it was not an accident that immediately after the Congress the leaders of the Second International came out against the Bolsheviks. Kautsky took a stand completely sup-

* Lenin, *"Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, p. 17.

porting the Mensheviks. Rosa Luxemburg—one of the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania and a prominent figure in the Second International, who fought against opportunism in Germany and even demanded the expulsion of Bernstein from the Party—likewise supported the Mensheviks on the basic questions that had led to the split in the R.S.D.L.P. She denied the necessity of bolshevik centralism, of iron discipline in the Party; she was opposed to driving the struggle against opportunism to the point of a split.

The Struggle of the Party of the Bolsheviks Against the Mensheviks and the Conciliators After the Second Congress

After the Congress Lenin waged an irreconcilable struggle against the Mensheviks for the carrying out of the decisions of the Second Congress. The Mensheviks from the very start took an obviously anti-Party line which was directed towards sabotaging these decisions. They, as Martov declared, "revolted against Leninism." The Mensheviks formed their own leading centre—the Bureau of the Minority—and refused to do any work in either the Central Organ or the Central Committee. They sent their own representatives to travel throughout Russia in an endeavour to set the Party committees against the decisions of the Second Congress. At the Congress of the members of the Russian social-democratic groups abroad, which was held after the Second Congress of the Party, they succeeded in carrying a resolution of no confidence in the Central Committee.

Finally, after two months of vacillation, Plekhanov made up his mind to compromise with the Mensheviks and demanded that Lenin take back into the editorial board of the *Iskra* the old pre-Congress members of the board who had not been re-elected by the Party Congress. Lenin considered this a violation of the will of the Party Congress and branded Plekhanov's proposition as capitulation before the Mensheviks. This betrayal by Plekhanov was connected with his opportunist errors in the past—with the position which he had occupied on the editorial board of the *Iskra* during the 'nineties, even before the Second Congress.

As he did not wish to shield the opportunist, disruptive work of the Mensheviks but was anxious to continue the line of split-

ting with them, Lenin on November 1 left the editorial board of the *Iskra*. Left alone on the board, Plekhanov single-handed co-opted a number of Mensheviks—Martov, Axelrod, Potressov, Zasulich. Thus the Mensheviks gained control of the *Iskra* and converted it into an organ of their own party.

In the columns of this new, menshevik *Iskra*, the Mensheviks began openly to pass from opportunism in organizational questions to opportunism in questions of tactics and program, sliding further and further down to economism. The Mensheviks who in practice rejected the hegemony of the proletariat transformed the latter into an appendage of the bourgeoisie. They preached an alliance with the bourgeoisie and rejected the revolutionary role of the peasantry. They came out against the construction of the party on the principles that had been defended by the Leninist *Iskra* before the Congress. Trotsky in a pamphlet entitled *Our Political Tasks*, which he dedicated to his "dear teacher, P. Axelrod," fought against building up a centralized, iron, disciplined party. He defended and tried to prove the legitimacy of the presence of factions and groupings and the coexistence of revolutionaries and opportunists in one party. He incited the masses against the Party apparatus and against Lenin, the leader of the Party.

These views of Trotsky followed from his denial of the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Anyone who rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat did not really need a party constructed on Leninist organizational principles.

The views of the Mensheviks represented a direct renunciation of the revolutionary principles of the old *Iskra*. The Mensheviks themselves emphasized the fact that "an abyss lay between the old and the new *Iskra*." (Trotsky.)

The Mensheviks screened their opportunist line with slanderous cries of "dictatorial methods," of Lenin's "personal ire," of the creation of a "state of siege" in the Party. These same accusations have been levelled many times in history by the opportunists, originally against Marx and Engels, later against Lenin and finally, in the latest period, against Stalin.

As early as the Second Congress of the Party Lenin administered a splendid reproof to such slander against the Party. Lenin said:

"In regard to unstable and wavering elements it is not only our right but our duty to create 'a state of siege,' and the whole of our Party rules, of our centralism now ratified by the Congress, is nothing but a 'state of siege' against these numerous sources of *political diffusiveness*." *

The Bolsheviks decidedly opposed the Mensheviks and their defenders. Lenin in his work, *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, in 1904 gave an annihilating characterization of the factional work of the Mensheviks and showed that the split of the Second Congress was not accidental.

"Economism," wrote Lenin later on, "was transformed into 'Menshevism'. The defence of the revolutionary tactics of the old *Iskra* created 'Bolshevism'!" **

From day to day Lenin, rallying about himself the basic nucleus of devoted Bolsheviks, waged a stubborn fight for the Party masses. He wrote an enormous number of articles and resolutions and sent them to Russia despite the difficulties this entailed. At the same time Lenin worked energetically among the members of the Party who came to him abroad, striving to forge them into staunch Bolsheviks. Sometimes there were people among those who came from Russia who did not know all the causes of the split. They came to the Bolsheviks and to the Mensheviks, heard both sides and then made their decision. Again there were "chance" Mensheviks who had to be won over. There were people who at first could not find their bearings but who afterwards changed their positions.

A few months after the Second Congress the Bolsheviks demanded that a new, a Third Congress, be called stating that the Mensheviks were undermining and sabotaging the decisions of the Second Congress. The Bolsheviks agitated in the Party organizations to have the factional work of the Mensheviks condemned, explaining that they could be left in the united R.S.D.L.P. only if they completely submitted to the decisions of the Party congresses.

In the summer of 1904 unstable, wavering elements which were conciliatory towards the Mensheviks (Krassin, Noskov

* Lenin, "The Second Congress and the Split in the R.S.D.L.P.," *Selected Works*, Vol. II, pp. 364—65.

** Lenin, "Socialism and War," (Chap. IV—"History of the Split and the Present Conditions of Social-Democracy"), *Collected Works*, Vol. XVIII.

and others) gained the upper hand in the Central Committee. Belittling and slurring over the profound differences of opinion, they refused to recognize the Mensheviks as opportunists and agents of the bourgeoisie in the working class. Therefore, they opposed the convocation of the congress and the condemnation of the factional work of the Mensheviks. The lack of principle and conciliatoriness of these Central Committee members rendered yeoman service to the Mensheviks in their anti-Party work. They promoted the disintegration of the Party organizations, split the Bolshevik Party cadres and encouraged the Mensheviks to make moves of a still more disorganizing character. The Mensheviks, on seeing the pliability of the Central Committee demanded that it co-opt some Mensheviks. The Central Committee agreed and added to its membership a number of Mensheviks, including Rozanov-Popov and others. The Mensheviks thus gained control of the Central Committee. This Central Committee in the autumn of 1904 issued a manifesto to the Party in which it declared its reconciliation with the Mensheviks and forbade agitation for the Third Congress, going so far as to call such agitation pernicious. At the same time the Central Committee dissolved a number of Party organizations which did not agree with its latest decisions.

At first Lenin kept within the provisions of the rules in his fight for the convocation of the Congress by demanding that it be called by the Central Committee. However, when the Central Committee passed into the hands of the Mensheviks, Lenin began to mobilize the Party masses to fight for the Congress over the heads of the central Party institutions that had been seized by the Mensheviks contrary to the wishes of the Congress which had given a majority to the Leninists. These new central organs which had been packed with Mensheviks were undermining the consolidation of the Party, were following a disruptive line and flagrantly violating the will of the Second Congress. As a result of this stubborn struggle for the Party masses, the Bolsheviks, under the leadership of Lenin, rallied about themselves the big industrial centres—St. Petersburg, Moscow, etc. Relying upon these, Lenin in August 1904 called a conference of firm Bolsheviks at Geneva, at which twenty-two persons including Gussev, Zemlyachka, Olminsky

and Pavlovich (Krassikov) were present. This conference appealed to the Party to wage an energetic struggle for the convocation of the Third Congress, for a rupture with the Central Committee and the Central Organ, for a condemnation of the factional work of the Mensheviks. The St. Petersburg, Moscow, Odessa and Ekaterinoslav Committees expressed lack of confidence in the conciliatory policy of the Central Committee, severed their relations with the central institutions and categorically demanded that a Third Congress be called.

Comrade *Stalin* played an important part in the struggle for the Third Congress. On his return from exile early in 1904, he worked in Tiflis as a member of the regional organization of Transcaucasia. An irreconcilable opponent of the Mensheviks and conciliators, he developed much agitation for the need of calling a Third Party Congress. Under his leadership the Transcaucasian Committee broke its ties with the Central Committee and likewise demanded the convocation of the Third Congress. In his pamphlet *Anent the Differences of Opinion in the Party*, Comrade *Stalin* brilliantly propagated revolutionary Marxism and fully defended the views of Lenin, the Party's leader.

At three conferences of large industrial districts (the Northern, the Caucasian and the Southern) a Bureau of the Committees of the Majority was created to act as the leading centre for convoking the Third Congress.

Among the members of the Bureau of the Committees of the Majority were Zemlyachka, Gussev and Litvinov. This Bureau did a tremendous amount of work. It helped to rally the majority of the Party committees to the Leninist line. In December 1904 the Bolsheviks under the leadership of Lenin established the newspaper *Vperyod* (*Forward*) which continued the line of the old *Iskra* of preparing the working class for decisive struggles. The editorial board consisted of Olminsky, Vorovsky and Lunacharsky in addition to Lenin.

Lenin continued his determined struggle to call a Third Congress. In his letter of February 1905 to A. Bogdanov and S. I. Gussev, Lenin wrote:

"We have proclaimed a *split*. We are calling to the Congress the adherents of *Vperyod*; we want to organize a *Vperyod* party and are breaking immediately *all and sundry* relations with the dis-

organizers . . . And if we do not want to show the world the revolting example of a dried-up and anæmic old maid, proud of her barren moral purity, we must understand that we need war and a military organization." *

The question of calling the Third Congress assumed particular sharpness in connection with the growing revolutionary movement during the first months of 1905. Finally, after much work had been performed by the Bureau of the Committees of the Majority to organize the Third Congress, the conciliatory Central Committee under the pressure of the Party masses consented to its convocation. The Third Congress was called by an organizational committee consisting of representatives of the Central Committee and of the Bureau of the Committees of the Majority. Thus Lenin by his revolutionary energy and irreconcilability successfully defended and welded the Party. To meet the great revolutionary battles of 1905 he had forged a Bolshevik Party—the leader and organizer of the revolution.

* Lenin, "Letter to A. Bogdanov and S. I. Gussev," *Collected Works*, Vol. VII.

CHAPTER IV

BOLSHEVISM IN THE YEARS OF THE FIRST REVOLUTION (1905-07)

The Struggle of Bolshevism Against the War and the Autocracy for the Development of the Revolution

The intertwining in Russia of all the contradictions of imperialism and the whirlwind growth of the labour and peasant movements rendered a revolution in this country inevitable in the very near future. Its commencement was hastened by the defeat of the autocratic government in the Russo-Japanese war. This conflict began in 1904, i.e., occurred in the epoch of imperialism which had been inaugurated. The main cause of this war was the hunt by tsarism and the bourgeoisie for new colonies and profits in the Far East. Tsarism strove to conquer Korea and consolidate its position in Manchuria. Besides, the tsarist government calculated that a victorious war would divert the attention of the workers and peasants from revolution and raise the shaken authority of the autocracy. However, tsarism made a terrible miscalculation. The war dragged on and led to the defeat of the tsarist army at Liaoyang and Mukden, to the fall in 1904 of Port Arthur, the main fortress in the Far East, and the complete destruction of the Russian fleet at Tsushima in 1905.

The Russo-Japanese war disclosed with still greater force the full depth of the decay of tsarism, the backwardness and venality of the state apparatus. The war disorganized transportation, intensified the ruination of economy and aggravated the poverty of the toiling masses. As a result of all this it laid bare all the class contradictions of the country.

The liberal bourgeoisie on seeing that tsarism was suffering one defeat after another and was unable to overcome the military power of Japan shyly came out with its desires. Its ambition was to strike a bargain with autocracy, to obtain for it-

self a few "liberties" and rights to govern the state. At the end of 1904 the liberal bourgeoisie at numerous meetings and banquets affirmed its unstinted loyalty to the landlord monarchy and merely sponsored the demand for the introduction of a constitution, i.e., limiting the power of the monarchy. The Mensheviks fully associated themselves with this policy of the bourgeoisie and called upon the workers to support the demands advanced by the bourgeoisie.

Only the Bolsheviks, by exposing the conciliatory policy of the bourgeoisie, stirred the toiling masses to wage a decisive struggle against the autocracy. They explained that the defeat of tsarism in the war was weakening it, was intensifying the indignation of the masses and bringing near the hour of revolution. They went to the masses with the slogan of defeating the tsarist government in this war and of overthrowing the autocracy—they went with the slogan of revolution.

Using these slogans the Bolsheviks displayed great activity among the workers, peasants, soldiers and sailors, uniting and preparing them for the approaching revolution.

By the end of 1904 the revolutionary movement of the masses had risen to a still higher plane. The strike movement had grown considerably. In Warsaw the bricklayers' strike (July 1904), which involved more than 10,000 strikers, was transformed into a mass political demonstration with the slogans: "Down with the Autocracy," "Down with the Exploiters," "Long Live Socialism!" In Baku (at the end of 1904) a big strike was held under the slogans of "Down with Autocracy," "The Eight-Hour Working Day," "Freedom of Assembly, of Speech and Association." The ferment in the army and among the sailors increased. The movement among the peasants and the broad masses of the oppressed nationalities developed with still greater force.

In these conditions one jolt sufficed to start a revolution throughout the entire land. The events of January 9 in St. Petersburg gave that jolt.

January 9, 1905

On January 3, 1905 a strike broke out at the Putilov Works in St. Petersburg. The cause of the strike was the discharge

of four workers who had incurred the displeasure of the factory management. The Putilov workers demanded that the discharged workers be taken back. The management refused. Thereupon 12,500 Putilov workers went out on strike. They demanded an improvement in the material conditions of the workers, the introduction of an eight-hour working day and the return of the workers who had been discharged.

In the course of the next two days the Putilov workers were joined by the workers of the other St. Petersburg factories and mills representing a total of about 140,000 strikers. Each day the revolutionary movement took on a broader scope and embraced more and more participants. The police, acting through Gapon, a priest, who was their agent and by this time had succeeded in creating organizations of the Zubatov type among the backward sections of the workers, took alarm. By making use in every way of the prejudices entertained by a relatively great number of workers, by taking advantage of the naive credulity of the masses, their belief in the fact that the tsar could protect them against the arbitrary actions of the manufacturers, the priest Gapon tried to conduct the indignation of the workers into peaceful channels and therefore proposed that a petition be presented to the tsar. On January 9, this petition was to have been handed to the tsar. It began as follows:

"We, the workers of the city of St. Petersburg, our wives, children and helpless old parents, have come to Thee, our Sovereign, to seek truth and protection. We are destitute and oppressed. We are burdened with work exceeding our strength. We are reviled. We are not considered human beings. We are dealt with like enemies . . . We have arrived at the limit of our patience . . . The terrible moment in our lives has come when it is better to die than to continue to suffer these unbearable tortures."

In order to draw the workers to his side, and influenced by the sharp criticism of the Social-Democrats, Gapon was compelled to include in the petition a demand for political freedom and the eight-hour working day.

The Bolsheviks did everything to expose Gapon's move. They explained that one ought not to plead with the tsar for protection but must overthrow the autocracy arms in hand.

None the less on Sunday, January 9, 1905, tens of thousands of proletarians bearing crosses and tsarist portraits made their way to the Winter Palace to ask the tsar to protect them against their oppressors. But as was to have been expected, instead of granting protection and aid, Nicholas II issued an order to fire into this demonstration. More than a thousand workers and children were killed by the sabres and bullets of the tsar's bloodhounds.

These events were of tremendous significance. On January 9 the proletariat was given an object lesson in civil war. On January 9 the last hope of the working class in the tsar was riddled by bullets. The masses were convinced by their own bloody experience that the Bolsheviks were right. Bolshevik influence now grew apace. The leadership of the revolutionary movement passed largely into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

The massacre of January 9 called forth an outburst of indignation throughout the entire land. On January 11 the strike wave spread to the provinces, swept the central industrial region, the Volga district, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, Latvia and Lithuania. In January alone the strike movement embraced half a million persons. In Poland the strikes took on an especially sharp character, becoming transformed into armed uprisings. The ferment among the soldiers and sailors increased. The movement among the peasants and toiling masses of the oppressed nationalities gained strength. January 9 marked the beginning of the revolution.

Bolshevik Appraisal of the Character, the Motive Forces and Tasks of the Revolution

Lenin asserted that the revolution which had begun was bourgeois-democratic in character. This meant that the revolution was not confronted *immediately* by the tasks of destroying capitalism, the seizure of the factories and mills from the bourgeoisie and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The *immediate* tasks of this revolution were—the overthrow of tsarism, the abolition of the landlord estates, the establishment of a republic, the introduction of the eight-hour working day, i.e., bourgeois-democratic tasks, inasmuch as the

realization of these tasks did not yet destroy capitalism and did not cut the roots of the bourgeoisie in town and country.

This was the first bourgeois-democratic revolution in the epoch of imperialism, and it occurred in a country which represented the weakest spot of imperialism, the junction point of imperialist contradictions.

Under these conditions the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia acquired a number of peculiar features in comparison with the West-European bourgeois revolutions of the epoch of ascendant capitalism.

During the Revolution of 1905, in contradistinction to the bourgeois revolutions in the West, the principal motive force and the leader of the masses was the proletariat, the only class consistently revolutionary to the end and the best organized class. It alone was ready for a decisive struggle against the autocracy.

Therefore the Revolution of 1905 while bourgeois-democratic in its character was at the same time proletarian with respect to the leading role of the proletariat and the means of struggle employed against the autocracy (strikes and armed uprisings).

One of the characteristic features of this bourgeois-democratic revolution was the fact that, as Lenin said, it was a *peasant* bourgeois revolution in a period when capitalism was very highly developed throughout the world and comparatively highly developed in Russia. It was a peasant bourgeois revolution primarily because by destroying the landlord estates and other remnants of feudalism it solved the problems which confronted the peasantry. It was a peasant bourgeois revolution for the further reason that the peasantry was one of the *motive forces* of this revolution, was the closest ally of the proletariat. But the peasantry could achieve its liberation from autocracy and the yoke of the landlords only under the leadership of the working class.

By reason of the fact that its interests were interlocked with those of tsarism, and because it was frightened by the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat, the bourgeoisie could not be and was not a motive force of the revolution. This constituted a

further peculiar feature of the Revolution of 1905 when compared with the bourgeois-democratic revolutions of the epoch of ascendant capitalism, in which the bourgeoisie played a great revolutionary part, as for instance in France in 1789.

As the revolutionary movement grew, the Russian bourgeoisie entered into an outright agreement with the landlords against the revolution, passing more and more into the camp of counter-revolution. It attempted to win control over the peasantry and liquidate the revolution by means of an agreement with tsarism. Therefore, it was but natural that the Bolshevik Party should continue to wage a merciless struggle against the liberal bourgeoisie and its party—the Cadets—because without exposing it, it was impossible to fully utilize the revolutionary forces of the peasantry, it was impossible to count upon the victory of the revolution

"The proletariat must carry out to the end the democratic revolution," Lenin taught, *"and in this unite to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush by force the resistance of the autocracy and to paralyse the instability of the bourgeoisie."* *

Lenin said: the workers who have risen and the peasants under their leadership will overthrow the autocracy, will destroy the rule of the feudal landlords and will set up their own power. This will be a firm, unlimited power, i.e., a dictatorship.

It will be a *revolutionary-democratic* dictatorship of the workers and peasants. It will be a *revolutionary-democratic* dictatorship because the measures carried out by it: the destruction of all the remnants of feudalism, the introduction of the eight-hour working day and so forth—not being socialist as yet—will not be able to destroy capitalism.

In the struggle against the dictatorship of the feudal landlords this new power will rely on the fighting alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry led by it.

The slogan of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry implied that if the prole-

* Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution," *Selected Works*, Vol. III, p. 110-11.

tariat leads the peasantry, it is able to destroy the autocracy, attain the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and move the revolution further. This was basic and decisive for Lenin.

However, in speaking of the capture of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, Lenin did not stop at the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. He said:

"Like everything else in the world, the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry has a past and a future. Its past is autocracy, serfdom, monarchy and privileges . . .

"Its future is the struggle against private property, the struggle of the wage worker against his master, the struggle for socialism." *

The Bolsheviks considered that the overthrow of the autocracy and the establishment of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry were the *immediate* tasks of the revolution, the *first* stage of the struggle for the proletarian revolution, for the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Bolshevik Party was a party of the working class whose goal was the armed overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of the *dictatorship of the proletariat* for the purpose of building communism.

Why is it, then, that the Bolsheviks, in pursuing the line of winning the dictatorship of the proletariat, considered it necessary to go through this first stage of destroying the autocracy and establishing the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry? Because the entire development of Russia had made it its immediate task to solve first of all the bourgeois-democratic problems, and this could be done only by utilizing under the leadership of the proletariat all the revolutionary forces of the millions of peasants.

The establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry raises the leading role of the proletariat to a higher plane. At the same time the overthrow of the autocracy and the establishment of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship unleashes all the revolutionary forces of the country and intensifies the class struggle in the countryside. As a result of this the

* *Ibid.*, p. 99.

poor peasants rally around the proletariat and the next stage of the revolution—the stage of struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat—is brought nearer. Therefore, it was necessary for the Bolshevik Party to solve the first and immediate problem of the revolution—to ensure a decisive victory over the autocracy and the seizure of power by the workers and peasants so as to be in a better position to ensure the solution of the main problem—the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Lenin's Idea of the Growing Over of the Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution to the Socialist Revolution

The Bolsheviks regarded the bourgeois-democratic and the socialist revolutions "as two links of one chain" (*Stalin*)

"Without indulging in any adventurism," wrote Lenin, "or betraying our scientific conscience, without striving after cheap popularity, we can and do say *only one thing*: we shall with all our might help the whole of the peasantry to make the democratic revolution *in order that* it may be *easier* for us, the party of the proletariat, to pass on, as soon as possible, to the new and higher task—the socialist revolution." *

The seizure of power by the workers and peasants, said Lenin, will call forth the frantic resistance of not only the landlords but also the liberal bourgeoisie. In the peasantry its entire kulak upper stratum will take the side of the counter-revolution. A considerable number of middle peasants will vacillate. A *new* struggle will be enflamed.

The further revolutionary struggle—for the second stage of the revolution, for the dictatorship of the proletariat—will be continued by the proletariat and the peasant poor. The revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party will as a result of the bitter civil war bring about an alliance between the proletariat and the poor (semi-proletarian) elements of the countryside and together they will make the socialist revolution and establish the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat.

* Lenin, "The Attitude of Social-Democracy Towards the Peasant Movement," *Selected Works*, Vol. III, p. 146.

"The proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolution," Lenin taught, "and in this unite to itself the mass of the semi-proletarian elements of the population in order to crush by force the resistance of the bourgeoisie and to paralyse the instability of the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie."*

Such was the plan of the Bolsheviks in the Revolution of 1905. This plan Lenin began to elaborate even in his first works written in the 1890's and 1900's. He elucidated it with particular fullness in his work entitled *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* (1905).**

Comrade Stalin writes as follows concerning the significance of this plan:

"The merit of this plan was that it frankly and resolutely formulated the class demands of the proletariat in the epoch of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia, facilitated the transition to the socialist revolution, and bore within itself the embryo of the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat." ***

The keynote underlying Lenin's plan consisted in the Marxian idea of continuous (permanent) revolution, propounded by Marx as early as the 'fifties of last century, during the period of the Revolution of 1848. Marx even then confronted the Party with the problem, in the event that the bourgeois-democratic revolution should be victorious, of fighting for the further uninterrupted development of the revolution, for its victorious transition to the socialist revolution.

This idea of the bourgeois-democratic revolution growing over to the socialist revolution was developed by Lenin and applied by him to the conditions obtaining in the epoch of imperialism.

Lenin taught that the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution must proceed in a ceaseless fierce class struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat. In this process of growing over, the proletariat raises its consciousness, its degree of organization and attracts to its side the poor as allies in the struggle against the bourgeoisie of town and country, for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

* Lenin, "Two Tactics, etc.," *Selected Works*, Vol. III, p. 111.

** And in a number of other works, for instance *The Attitude of Social-Democracy toward the Peasant Movement, Socialism and the Peasants*.—Ed. Russian ed.

*** Stalin, *On Lenin*, pp. 19-20.

The Bolshevik Party prepared itself for the immediate transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution, commensurate with the growth of the consciousness and degree of organization of the proletariat and of its union with the village poor.

Lenin asserted that in Russia in 1905 all *internal* conditions were present that guaranteed the successful struggle for the *immediate* growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution. In Russia, as an imperialist country, there were sufficient material preconditions for this, primarily the existence of a large-scale industry. Moreover Russia had the most revolutionary party in the world—the Party of the Bolsheviks. It also had the most revolutionary proletariat in the world.

At the same time exceptional importance attached to the fact that the entire development of Russia set before the proletariat the task of waging, as Lenin put it, two “social wars”: one against the dictatorship of the feudal landlords, to be fought together with the entire peasantry; and a second war to be fought together with the poor peasants against the bourgeoisie including the kulaks.

This second “social war” in Russia had begun already within the framework of the autocratic feudal regime. The overthrow of the autocracy and the establishment of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry would lead to the full development of the second “social war,” would move it to the foreground, would still better organize the proletariat and the poor to struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This explains why the Bolsheviks considered it possible to win the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia with their internal forces even in the event that the proletarian revolution would not succeed in the West at that time.

Ascribing tremendous importance to the support of the proletarians of the West and of the oppressed nations of the East, the Bolshevik Party regarded the Revolution of 1905 as a *prelude* to the *international proletarian revolution*.

The Bolsheviks considered their task to be that of further developing the revolution in Europe. Lenin wrote:

"We must... issue practical slogans not only for the *continuity* of the revolution being carried into Europe, but also for the *purpose* of bringing this about." *

The Bolsheviks assumed that the overthrow of the tsar in Russia would call forth such a sharpening of the struggle throughout the world as would render difficult the armed intervention of the imperialists and would facilitate the conditions of struggle of the proletariat of the West for the proletarian revolution, and of the broad masses of the oppressed nationalities for their liberation.

Third Congress of the Party

The Third Congress of the Party was of great importance in working out the bolshevik appraisal of the character and motive forces of the revolution and in developing the Leninist line in this revolution.

The Third Congress met in London in the spring of 1905. It was attended by representatives from twenty bolshevik committees at big industrial centres. The nine representatives of menshevik committees declined to participate in the Congress. The Mensheviks called a conference of their own in Geneva. Consequently the Third Congress was exclusively bolshevik. The entire Congress was held under the leadership and with the active participation of Lenin.

The Third Congress of the Party, which convened at a time when the mass labour and peasant movement was in the ascendant, adopted resolutions on the most important issues of the revolution.

The Congress noted that the powerful revolutionary wave had made armed uprising a necessity. The Party was duty-bound to head the rising masses. Therefore the Third Congress imposed on all Party organizations the duty of

"a) clarifying to the proletariat by means of propaganda and agitation not only the political importance, but also the practical organizational side of the coming armed uprising;

"b) clarifying in that propaganda and agitation the role of mass political strikes which may have great importance in the beginning and in the very course of the uprising;

* Lenin, "Two Tactics, etc.," *Selected Works*, Vol. III, p. 98.

"c) adopting the most energetic measures to arm the proletariat and also to work out a plan of an armed uprising and of the immediate guidance of same, creating for that purpose, to the extent that this becomes necessary, special groups from among Party workers." *

Thus the Bolsheviks not only developed the question of the *armed uprising*, theoretically, but made practical preparations for it: they supplied the proletariat with arms, created special combatant groups and organized the forces of the proletariat for the victorious armed uprising and overthrow of tsarism.

The distinguishing feature of the bolshevik position consisted in the fact that the Bolsheviks while relying on the spontaneous revolutionary onslaught of the masses, on action "from below," considered it necessary to wage a struggle for the development of the revolution also "from above"—through a provisional revolutionary government. This idea of the necessity of combining action "from below" with action "from above" under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party permeated all decisions of the Third Congress.

With reference to the *peasant movement*, the Congress favoured the full support of all revolutionary measures of the peasantry including the confiscation of all the landlord and church estates. The Congress gave directives to create revolutionary peasant committees for the immediate seizure of the landlord estates by the peasants themselves and proposed that independent organizations of the rural proletariat be formed.

The Third Congress of the Party ordered all Party organizations mercilessly to expose the Socialist-Revolutionaries who were screening their bourgeois-democratic views with socialist phrases, who were casting the proletariat and the peasantry upon one heap and who were substituting single-handed terrorist acts for the struggle of the masses against the autocracy.

At the same time the Congress stressed the revolutionary role of the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the struggle against feudal survivals, inasmuch as they fought for a transfer of the landlord estates into the possession of the peasants without compensation. The Socialist-Revolutionaries enjoyed great influ-

*Lenin, "Resolutions of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.," Section 2, *Collected Works*, Vol. VII.

ence among the peasantry and the intelligentsia. In connection with this the Congress deemed it useful that the Social-Democrats enter into temporary fighting agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionary organizations for the purpose of combating the autocracy. At the same time the Congress pointed out the duty of the Bolsheviks to preserve full independence and a staunch Party line in these agreements.

On the question of their attitude towards the *liberals*, the Congress rescinded the opportunist resolution of Potressov, adopted at the Second Congress. The Third Congress of the Party emphasized the necessity of explaining to the workers the treacherous character of the liberal movement and of decisively struggling against the liberal bourgeoisie which was endeavouring to subject the labour movement to its ideological influence and leadership.

In its resolution on the *Mensheviks*, the Congress condemned their factional, disruptive work after the Second Congress. The Third Congress also pointed out that the Mensheviks could remain in the R.S.D.L.P. only on condition that they recognize the decisions of the Party Congresses and the Party rules and fully submit to Party discipline.

The Congress adopted the *Party rules* containing Lenin's formulation of the first paragraph. The Central Committee was invested with complete power during the interval between congresses and was authorized to appoint the editorial board of the Central Organ. The Third Congress abolished the Party Council which had been created at the Second Congress for the purpose of co-ordinating and unifying the activity of the Central Committee and the Central Organ.

At the Congress Lenin brought to the fore the problem of drawing the workers more extensively into the Party and promoting them to leading Party positions, while at the same time making preparations to carry out the elective principle in the Party organizations as far as possible.

All the questions of the Revolution of 1905 which had been developed in Lenin's works found full reflection in the decisions of the Third Congress. All these decisions had one aim in view—to organize for a decisive victory of the revolution.

*Struggle of the Bolsheviks for the Correct Line of the
Proletariat in the Revolution of 1905*

Throughout the entire course of the Revolution of 1905, the Bolshevik Party first and foremost waged a merciless struggle to work out a correct, proletarian line in the revolution. For this purpose it was necessary to give a truly Marxist appraisal of the character, the motive forces and the objectives of the revolution. The Party revealed and exposed all opportunist currents in the working class and any conciliatory attitude towards them and took the course of a split with the opportunists in international Social-Democracy.

The Bolsheviks combated the menshevik appraisal of the character and motive forces of the Revolution of 1905. The Mensheviks at their Geneva Conference and also in their publications* before this Conference set forth their appraisal of the character, the motive forces and the tasks of the revolution which was radically divergent from the bolshevik appraisal. The Mensheviks regarded the Revolution of 1905 as a bourgeois revolution which must come to pass under the leadership of the bourgeoisie.

In their opinion the revolution was to follow the type of the former bourgeois revolutions in Western Europe, and in case of success was to clear the path for the rule of the bourgeoisie.

The Mensheviks rejected the independent tasks of the proletariat in this revolution. The only task they set before the proletariat was that of supporting the bourgeoisie. They fought against the leading role of the proletariat in the revolution and rejected the tremendous revolutionary role of the peasantry. In practice they were against the armed overthrow of the autocracy.

Thus, the Mensheviks denied that the Revolution of 1905 was a bourgeois-peasant revolution occurring in an imperialist country under the hegemony of the proletariat. They denied that it was necessary for the bourgeois-democratic revolution to grow over to the socialist revolution and separated one revolu-

* For instance, in Martynov's booklet *Two Dictatorships*.—Ed. Russian ed.

tion from the other by interposing a lengthy period during which the capitalist order was to exist. This was exposed by Lenin who proved that the Mensheviks were in fact bourgeois-democrats in the Revolution of 1905.

Trotsky marched shoulder to shoulder with the Mensheviks. The Bolshevik Party unmasked and exposed him as a vile Menshevik who concealed his menshevik positions by "Left" phrases. Only in words did Trotsky recognize the proletariat as a revolutionary class. He rejected the revolutionary role of the peasantry; in fact he regarded the entire peasantry as a reactionary force.

Trotsky's slogan: "No Tsar, but a Workers' Government!" which was "Left" in form and treasonable in content was inseparably connected with this Trotskyist appraisal of the alignment of classes in the revolution. This slogan Trotsky advanced in opposition to the slogan of the Bolsheviks: "For the Revolutionary Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Peasantry" which aimed at a transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat. It follows that Trotsky tried to skip the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

Trotsky figured upon beginning the revolution with the establishment of a workers' government.

But this workers' government after gaining power, said Trotsky, will inevitably come into hostile collision with the broad masses of the peasantry, *i.e.*, a complete rupture is inevitable between the proletariat in power and the peasantry; armed combat between them, civil war, is unavoidable. Trotsky claimed that the revolution in Russia would inevitably be defeated unless the proletariat of other economically advanced countries took power into its own hands. He relied solely on the support to be given to the Russian revolution by the West-European proletariat after the seizure of power by the latter.

In the first place, Trotsky did not believe in the strength of the proletariat in Russia, in its ability to lead the peasantry. He rejected the leading role of the proletariat in the revolution. Second, he "predicted" that after the overthrow of the autocracy the proletariat would inevitably clash with the peasantry, dooming the proletariat to complete isolation and defeat.

His outwardly "Left" revolutionary theory thereby in sub-

stance supported the menshevik line of granting the bourgeoisie the leading role in the revolution.

His slogan "No Tsar, but a Workers' Government!" did not by any means signify the dictatorship of the proletariat, because in essence Trotsky did not impose any socialist tasks upon this workers' government. In practice Trotsky did not struggle even for the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, as he rejected the hegemony of the proletariat in this revolution as well as the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, thereby undermining the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and getting ready like all Mensheviks to strike a bargain with reaction.

Thus, Trotsky completely rejected the doctrine of the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This is the reason why Trotsky's theory, though it was called the theory of the "permanent" revolution, completely distorted Marx's doctrine of the permanent revolution.

In the Revolution of 1905 the Mensheviks in general and the Trotskyists in particular formed the Russian detachment of international opportunism. Therefore the merciless exposure by Lenin of the Mensheviks and Trotskyists inflicted a crushing blow upon the opportunists of the Second International. The international significance of this struggle was especially great because on basic questions there was no essential difference between the Mensheviks and the leaders of the Second International. True enough, Kautsky under the influence of the revolutionary events declared that the Revolution of 1905 was not a bourgeois revolution in which the hegemony belonged to the bourgeoisie. Yet this same Kautsky in substance rejected the Marxist-Leninist views on the dictatorship of the proletariat. He rejected the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution, denied the necessity of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, came out against the armed uprising and in general against force and distorted the role of the proletariat as the leader of the revolution.

Under the influence of the Revolution of 1905 and the bolshevik struggle against opportunism, the Left wing in the Ger-

man Social-Democratic Party headed by Rosa Luxemburg took more definite shape. The Left Social-Democrats called upon the proletariat to profit by the great lessons of the Revolution of 1905. They demanded more energetic methods of struggle in Germany. The Lefts fought, though with insufficient determination, against opportunism and in these moves the Bolsheviks supported the Left Social-Democrats.

But parallel with this the Left Social-Democrats committed a number of very serious political and theoretical mistakes. The opportunist load still weighed upon them and in many questions they were in accord with the Mensheviks. Parvus* and Rosa Luxemburg concocted the theory of the "permanent revolution" which Trotsky caught up and developed in the Revolution of 1905. Rosa Luxemburg did not believe in the ability of the proletariat to lead the peasantry. Menshevik fashion, she rejected the policy of an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry, denied the necessity of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry and of an organized preparation of the armed uprising. The Lefts distorted the leading role of the Party in the revolution and underestimated its importance.

While waging a struggle against the opportunists, the Lefts did not take a course towards a complete rupture and split with them. Therefore the Russian Bolsheviks, by supporting the Lefts, severely criticised their semi-menshevik mistakes and exposed their indecision and inconsistency, their concessions to the opportunists.

Throughout the whole course of the Revolution of 1905 the irreconcilable struggle of the Bolsheviks under the leadership of Lenin against the opportunists of all hues and shades steeled bolshevism and secured to the proletariat the role of leader in that revolution.

The Revolutionary Movement After January 9

After January 9 the revolutionary movement spread like wildfire. The strike movement embraced an increasingly large number of participants. In the white heat of the revolutionary

* During the imperialist war Parvus openly deserted to the imperialists.
—Ed. Russian ed.

situation the Party strove to transform the economic strikes of the working class into political strikes and endeavoured to impel the proletariat to take up a decisive struggle for the overthrow of the autocracy. The May First political strikes in 1905 in the Baltic provinces and in Poland were exceptionally great in extent. During these strikes the slogan, "Down with the Autocracy!" and the demand for the eight-hour working day were advanced. In the summer a new strike wave arose. Under the leadership of the bolshevik organization a general strike was called at Ivanovo-Voznessensk, in the Moscow industrial district and elsewhere.

The Lodz political strike was extremely acute in character. On June 10 it grew into an armed uprising. The strike embraced Odessa, Kharkov, Riga, Ekaterinoslav. A general strike also began in the Caucasus.

This strike grew into an armed uprising under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party and became a powerful weapon in the political struggle against the autocracy.

The growth of the revolutionary movement among the proletariat exerted a powerful influence upon the peasantry. Following upon the actions of the working class, the peasant movement likewise experienced a great upsurge. The peasant uprisings spread from the Central Black Soil districts to the Ukraine and the Volga districts. There followed a wave of agricultural labourers' strikes. About 2,000,000 farm labourers participated in these strikes. In a number of localities these labourers' strikes took place under such slogans as "Strike Against Taxes" and "Change the Government." Most prominent were the peasant revolts in the Baltic provinces, in Poland, in the Saratov and Chernigov provinces as well as in the Caucasus, which turned into great uprisings. Here the bolshevik organizations played a great part. They gave out leaflets and appeals, sent agitators into the villages, arranged meetings, established circles and Party organizations in the rural districts. They organized the broad masses of the peasantry for the decisive struggle.

In 1905 alone there were more than 8,000 peasants uprisings and raids upon landlord estates but all this constituted only an insignificant part of what had to be destroyed in order that the revolution might be victorious.

The Bolsheviks, headed by their leader Lenin who had returned to Russia from abroad at the end of 1905, were the real leaders of the revolutionary movement which was unfolding on a constantly wider scale. Comrade Stalin, this true Bolshevik and steadfast Leninist, played a great part in the leadership of the revolutionary movement. As a member of the Regional Bureau of Transcaucasia, Comrade Stalin was in charge of the illegal organ *Struggle of the Proletariat*. Under his leadership the Transcaucasian Bolsheviks who were fighting against the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries headed the labour movement and the struggle of the oppressed peoples for their national liberation.

The mass movement of the proletariat and peasantry and the intensified work of the Party among the troops were drawing the tsarist army and navy into the revolutionary tide. In the summer of 1905 a mutiny broke out in the Black Sea fleet on the battleship *Potemkin*. Lenin attached the greatest importance to this mutiny. He despatched Vassilyev-Yuzhin to participate in the leadership of the mutineers and to secure support for the battleship. However, this comrade did not succeed in getting on board this ship. Despite the great heroism of the sailors and the general strike in Odessa, the battleship failed to receive the necessary backing. It was compelled to sail to Rumania and surrender to the authorities there. The crew was subsequently delivered into the hands of the tsarist government, which executed some of the mutineers, sentencing others to exile at hard labour. The mutiny of the *Potemkin* was of exceedingly great significance, because here for the first time a whole battleship openly went over to the side of the revolution. The revolution gained in strength. The army began to waver.

The tremendous sweep of the political movement of the proletariat and the uprisings in the countryside and in the tsarist army compelled the autocracy to make concessions and to attempt to divert the movement into peaceful channels. To this end the tsarist government decided to convoke a State Duma to consist of representatives of the various classes. According to the regulations issued, this Duma (called the Bulygin Duma after the cabinet minister who drew them up) had no leg-

islative powers. Its decisions were not binding upon the tsar. The working class was not granted any electoral rights. The tsarist government calculated that by permitting the big bourgeoisie to participate in the Duma it would draw the big bourgeoisie more firmly to its side. Parallel with this, the government endeavoured to disorganize the rapidly growing revolutionary movement by calling the Duma.

The Bolsheviks clearly saw that in calling the Duma the government was trying to put an end to the revolution and to hold the growing discontent of the masses within lawful, peaceful bounds. The Bolshevik Party countered this policy of the autocratic government by a policy of intensified preparation and organization of the armed uprising for its overthrow. Therefore the Bolsheviks called upon the masses to sabotage, to actively refuse to participate in the elections to this Duma, *i.e.*, to boycott the Duma.

The Mensheviks, who in fact were opponents of the armed uprising and of a decisive struggle against the autocracy, deemed it possible to take part in the elections. Thereby they brought bourgeois influence to bear on the proletariat.

The Bulygin Duma never met. The powerful wave of the revolutionary upsurge in October 1905 did not permit the elections to be held.

The October Political Strike

During the first days of October a strike of the Moscow railway terminal workers broke out. It spread rapidly to all the railways. Soon the railway workers and employees of all Russia were out on strike. Each day new factories and mills joined the strike. The Bolsheviks used all their persistence and perseverance to mobilize the masses for the organization of a general political strike of the Russian proletariat. By the middle of October the general political strike held almost all of Russia (more than 120 cities) in its grip.

Life came to a standstill—trains stopped, factories and mills ceased working, post and telegraph offices ceased operating, study came to an end in the educational institutions, banks and stores closed down.

The principal demands of the October strike were: abolition

of the autocratic government and convocation of the Constituent Assembly by universal, direct, secret, and equal suffrage. In the big industrial centres—Moscow, Kharkov, Odessa and Ekaterinoslav—the strikers took to barricades. This barricade fighting was very stubborn. Everywhere fighting detachments and militant strike committees were formed and these led the barricade fighting of the masses. At that time the struggle of the masses attained especially great strength in Georgia (Caucasus). There the general strike grew into an armed uprising in which about a thousand armed workers and peasants participated.

The October political strike was a forceful manifestation of the powerful upswing of the proletarian movement which carried the great masses of the working class with it. It fully confirmed the correctness of the Bolshevik line for developing the revolution. It showed that the proletariat marches in the van of the nation-wide offensive under the flag of the Bolshevik Party. In this respect the funeral of N. Bauman, one of the leading workers of the Bolshevik Party who had been killed by the Black Hundreds, was quite indicative: at this funeral the Moscow Bolsheviks for the first time succeeded in rallying to their banners all the class-conscious workers of Moscow.

The October strike showed the unshakable force of the proletarian movement and undermined the might of the government apparatus. It compelled the autocracy to make new concessions. On October 17 the tsar issued a manifesto which promised to grant some "liberties" to all classes and to enlarge the powers of the State Duma. This was a tactical manoeuvre by means of which the autocracy hoped to induce an abatement of the revolutionary movement and to gain time to defeat the revolution. At the same time the tsarist government made mass arrests among the revolutionaries and all those suspected of participation in the revolutionary movement. Fiendish Black Hundreds singing the patriotic strains of "God Save the Tsar," organized savage pogroms against Jews and other minor nationalities in more than a hundred cities. Over four thousand persons were killed and about ten thousand wounded and maimed during the course of about two weeks.

The liberal bourgeoisie triumphantly welcomed the manifesto

of October 17. Some of them joining hands with the landlords organized the party of the Octobrists led by Guchkov. This party openly rushed into the embraces of tsarism.

The Bolsheviks Under the New Conditions

Before the revolution the Bolshevik Party worked under exceedingly difficult conditions. The cruel terror of the autocracy was exercised primarily against the Bolsheviks. The Bolshevik Party worked underground, hiding in whatever way it could from the persecution of the gendarmes. There were therefore only very few elected Party committees in Russia before 1905. The Party was constructed on the principle of rigid centralism. By means of careful selection, the best tested comrades who were steeled in battle were appointed to or drawn into the leadership of the Party committees. These committees added to their membership any comrade they needed without adhering to any elective principle. The Party consisted of a comparatively small number of persons who were all connected with the masses and devoted to the cause of the working class. It directed the revolutionary struggle of the working class under the most difficult conditions. The Party held its congresses abroad from where most of the revolutionary literature—pamphlets, newspapers and so forth—was brought into Russia.

With the upsurge of the Revolution of 1905, after January 9, the conditions under which the Party worked began to change. Hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants were attracted to the revolutionary struggle. The revolutionary creativeness of the masses broke through the police limitations and prohibitions. The revolutionary masses forcibly seized much of what had formerly been under the ban. By the end of 1905 the Party and the working class had already begun to set up everywhere trade unions, co-operative organizations, clubs and other mass labour organizations. The working class also took possession of buildings for its numerous meetings.

This actual freedom which was established to some extent at the end of 1905 was made use of by the Bolsheviks to increase their ideological influence upon the masses considerably and to strengthen the Party organizations.

Under these new conditions the Party was squarely confronted with the acute problem of reconstructing its ranks to correspond to the changed situation. Lenin as early as March 1905 in his article *New Tasks and New Forces* demanded that the slogan "Organize!" be immediately carried into practice. This slogan demanded in the first place that the work of the Party organization be changed to suit the new methods. While retaining the illegal forms of its organization, it was the duty of the Party to develop in addition new—legal and semi-legal—forms, to organize more extensive labour organizations and link them up with the illegal Party organizations. In his article *The Reorganization of the Party* written after October, Lenin spoke with still greater insistence about the reconstruction of the ranks of the Party. He demanded that democracy within the Party be developed and that the membership of the Party organizations be enlarged by taking in new cadres which had grown up.

The Bolsheviks, following the directions of their leader and teacher, Lenin, formed factory, sub-district and district Party committees; also Party organizations in the army and the fleet as well as in the rural districts. They organized clubs, leagues and other mass organizations of the working class. In the course of a few months the Party organizations drew tens of thousands of workers into their ranks. The Party intensified its efforts to train new members by calling general Party meetings and separate meetings for the active members while at the same time developing numerous circles. Under these new conditions of inner Party life, the Bolsheviks adopted the policy of a more extensive application of the elective principle and less secrecy within the Party. The Party began to publish millions of leaflets and a number of newspapers. In St. Petersburg the newspaper *Novaya Zhizn* (*New Life*) began to appear. This was the first legal bolshevik newspaper. In April 1906 the *Volna* (*Wave*) appeared in its stead. Soon (in May 1906) it was closed down. Later it came out again under the name of *Vperyod* (*Forward*). In Moscow the Party also published a legal newspaper *Borba* (*Struggle*); afterwards appeared *Svetoch* (*Beacon*) and *Svobodnoye Slovo* (*Free Speech*). Through its Party publishing house, the *Vperyod*, and such legal publishing houses as the *Burevestnik* (*Petrel*), *Kolokol* (*The Bell*) and *Molot* (*Hammer*), the Party

put out hundreds of thousands of social-democratic booklets. In addition, at the close of 1904 (old style) an illegal bolshevik organ began to be published abroad called *Vperyod* which was later replaced by the newspaper *Proletary* (*Proletarian*).

Lenin said that in the autumn of 1905 the Bolshevik Party began to lead tremendous masses which had been drawn into the revolutionary struggle. The Party organized fighting detachments consisting of Party and non-Party members which in the conditions of partisan warfare often acted in groups of three or five persons; secret workshops were set up to manufacture bombs in preparation for an armed uprising against the autocracy. The Party set the task of preparing military instructors and commanders to lead the armed street fighting.

While rearranging their ranks the Bolsheviks prepared and organized the masses of the working class for the decisive armed struggle against the autocracy.

*The Soviets * of Workers' Deputies*

In the conditions of growing revolutionary enthusiasm, the working class for the first time in history created new organs of revolutionary struggle—Soviets of Workers' Deputies. The first meetings of delegates from all the factories and mills, which later on were given the name of Soviets of Workers' Deputies, took place in Ivanovo-Voznessensk and in the Urals even before the October general strike. During the first half of that month a Soviet of Workers' Deputies was set up in St. Petersburg. The October general strike lent great impetus to the creation of soviets in Moscow, Kharkov and other cities. In both Moscow and Ivanovo-Voznessensk Bolsheviks were the organizers and leaders of the soviets.

The soviets were organs of armed uprising. In Moscow, Rostov, Novorossisk, Ekaterinoslav and Chita, the soviets organized and led the armed uprisings.

The soviets were genuine mass organizations. They were the new power in embryo, the rudimentary revolutionary dictatorship of the workers and peasants. Thus in St. Petersburg the

* Literally "councils."—Ed. Eng. ed.

soviets arrested the police, seized and assumed control of printing plants, confiscated money belonging to the tsarist government, called upon the people to refuse to make any payments into the tsarist exchequer. In Novorossisk the soviet was the only power in the city from October to December. The soviets likewise represented public authority in Chita (Siberia); they seized and administered the railways, lands, goldfields, post and telegraph offices. In Chita and in Krassnoyarsk, (Siberia) the soviets set up a new revolutionary government apparatus. These soviets had troops and militia at their disposal and possessed fighting detachments.

All efforts of the Bolsheviks were directed towards transforming the soviets into organs of insurrection, into organs of the new revolutionary power.

The Mensheviks appraised the soviets differently. They assigned to the soviets the role of provisional organizations to last until a popularly elected assembly would be formed. They asserted that the soviets were organizations of local revolutionary self-government only. In their practical work the Mensheviks reduced the role of the soviets to defending economic interests within the scope of the autocratic state. The Mensheviks, especially Trotsky, who for some time was at the head of the St. Petersburg soviet, did not make use of all the revolutionary forces of the soviets and in fact undermined their revolutionary work. The Mensheviks and Trotsky disrupted the preparations made by the soviets for an armed uprising. This attitude of the Mensheviks toward the soviets was closely connected with their entire opportunist line in the revolution, with their denial of the necessity of armed insurrection, of the necessity of establishing the power of the workers and peasants and the achievement of the revolutionary dictatorship.

The Armed Uprising in Moscow

In November mutiny broke out on the warship *Ochakov* which was joined by other ships—the *Potemkin*, (afterwards renamed *Panteleimon*), the *Dniester*. Lieutenant Schmidt who led the mutiny on the *Ochakov* sent a telegram to the tsar in which he demanded that a Constituent Assembly be called. In the name-

of the "glorious Black Sea Fleet" he declared that the navy refused obedience to the authorities. A bombardment by land batteries succeeded in crushing this mutiny. Schmidt was arrested and executed. But tsarism did not succeed in checking the growth of the revolutionary movement. The mass revolutionary movement assumed ever greater proportions and reached its peak in the December armed uprising.

In the beginning of December the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies, which was led by Bolsheviks, declared a political general strike with the idea of converting it into an armed uprising. In response to the call of the Party about 100,000 persons went out on strike in Moscow on the very first day. Fighting and partisan detachments were rapidly organized. The military organizations of the Bolshevik Party armed the proletariat and made military and technical preparations for the armed uprising.

On December 9, the political general strike developed into an armed uprising. The workers began to build barricades. On December 11 the biggest district of Moscow, the Presnya, rose in armed rebellion. Here, under the leadership of Comrade Syedoy, a Bolshevik, the best fighting detachments waged a heroic self-sacrificing struggle against the armed forces of tsarism. The military bodies of the Moscow garrison were wavering. But the government took all measures to prevent these vacillating troops from taking action. The government kept the unreliable troops locked in their barracks, disarmed them and made them drunk.

In St. Petersburg the workers also declared a general strike on December 9 in token of their solidarity with Moscow. However this strike did not draw in the basic masses of the St. Petersburg workers. Even the bourgeois newspapers continued to appear there. The Nikolayevsky (now October) Railway* remained in the hands of the government. Traffic on this road was not stopped and the government was able to transfer reliable troops from St. Petersburg to crush the uprising. Thus, the Moscow workers did not receive the requisite support.

Tsarism decided to suppress the uprising no matter what the price. On the eve of the December uprising the tsarist government dispersed the St. Petersburg soviet, declared a state of siege

* Which connected St. Petersburg (Leningrad) and Moscow.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

in a number of districts and arrested dozens of leaders of the revolutionary movement. Now, on December 17, well-armed troops, which outnumbered the fighting detachments many times, began to bombard Presnya with artillery fire until the district was completely wrapped in flames. Then savage punishment began to be meted out by the Cossacks to the insurgent proletariat. Punitive expeditions worked without let-up. "Make no arrests, grant no quarter," were the orders of Colonel Min, the tsar's executioner. The greatest district of the capital was laid waste.

The armed uprising was defeated. The forces of the working class had proved inadequate to deliver a decisive blow to the monarchy. The peasantry lacked activity and organization in their fighting. The tsar's army and navy as a whole remained on the side of the monarchy because revolutionary forces were not utilized for an "active, enterprising, aggressive campaign among the wavering troops." (*Lenin.*) The weak side of the December armed uprising consisted also in the fact that it did not assume the offensive against the enemy but occupied a defensive position.

"December confirmed another of Marx's profound postulates," wrote Lenin, "which the opportunists have forgotten, namely, that rebellion is an art, and that the principal rule of this art is that a desperately bold and irrevocably determined *offensive* must be waged. We have not sufficiently assimilated this truth. We have not sufficiently learned, nor have we taught the masses this art and this rule of attacking at all costs."*

The poor technical preparation of the uprising, the inadequate leadership and the treacherous role of the Mensheviks who sabotaged the preparations for the uprising were also important factors in the defeat of the latter. These are the principal causes of the defeat of the December uprising.

The Moscow armed uprising was not unique. Subsequent to it insurrections broke out in Rostov, Novorossisk, Sormovo, Chita, Ekaterinoslav, in Latvia, Georgia and elsewhere in Russia. These uprisings against tsarism likewise succeeded in suppressing.

December 1905 was the high point of the onslaught against the autocracy. At that time the proletariat showed its strength.

* Lenin, "The Lessons of the Moscow Uprising," *Selected Works*, Vol. III, p. 351.

This struggle, said Lenin, was the greatest proletarian movement after the Paris Commune. The working class headed by the Bolshevik Party waged a practical struggle for the revolutionary dictatorship of the workers and peasants (in the form of soviets), which was to grow into the dictatorship of the proletariat. The proletarian masses became more and more convinced that the overthrow of tsarism and the victory of the revolution were possible only as the result of a victorious armed uprising.

"Let us remember," wrote Lenin about the lessons of the Moscow uprising, "that the great mass struggle is approaching. This will be an armed uprising. It must, as far as possible, be simultaneous. The masses must know that they are entering upon an armed, sanguinary and desperate struggle. Contempt for death must spread among the masses and thus secure victory. The offensive against the enemy must be most energetic; attack and not defence must become the slogan of the masses; the ruthless extermination of the enemy will be their task; the organization of the struggle will become mobile and flexible; the wavering elements of the troops will be drawn into the active struggle. The Party of the class-conscious proletariat must do its duty in this great struggle."*

Such were the conclusions of the Bolsheviks drawn from the experience of the October and December battles of the proletariat in 1905.

The Mensheviks and Trotskyists appraised the December armed uprising quite differently. Especially striking was the way in which the menshevik views were expressed by Plekhanov, who had remained abroad all the time despite Lenin's invitation to come and work in Russia. After the defeat of the uprising Plekhanov stated: "They should not have taken up arms." The Menshevik Cherevanin spoke of the uprising as a product of despair. Thus the Mensheviks once more affirmed their opportunism and their betrayal of the working class. Only the Party of the Bolsheviks prepared the armed uprising and it alone led the heroic struggle of the proletariat.

* *Ibid*, p. 353.

CHAPTER V

THE PARTY AFTER THE DECEMBER UPRISING

Lenin's Political Forecast of the Prospects of the Revolution After the December Armed Uprising

After the defeat of the December armed uprising Lenin immediately made a clear political forecast of the further development of the revolution. Lenin and the Bolsheviks asserted that the immediate tasks confronting the revolution—the overthrow of tsarism, the abolition of the landlord estates, the eight-hour working day and so forth—had not been solved, that the revolution was not ended and that the country stood before a new revolutionary upsurge. The tasks of the Party, said Lenin, consist in preparing the masses for a new armed uprising. In accordance with this line the Bolsheviks redoubled their efforts to organize fighting detachments and to supply the proletariat with arms. In Moscow the military and technical bureau organized workshops for the manufacture of explosives and shells, and taught the workers the art of war. In St. Petersburg the Party began to publish the military newspaper *Kazarma* (*Bar-racks*); in Moscow—*Zhizn Soldata* (*The Life of the Soldier*). The Party called a special conference of its military fighting organizations which was held at Tammerfors (Finland).

In contradistinction to the Bolsheviks who were preparing the masses for an armed uprising, the Mensheviks considered that no new revolutionary upsurge was possible. They strove to guide the revolutionary movement into legal channels. Therefore they called upon the masses to work peacefully in the Duma and in the trade unions. They thus remained true to their opportunist line.

In the middle of 1906 the Party was confronted by a new partial upsurge of the revolution. During the second quarter of 1906 there were almost half a million political strikers alone.

Towards summer the peasant movement developed. Major mutinies occurred in the army and the fleet at Sveaborg (Finland) and Kronstadt. In token of solidarity with the insurgents, 80,000 workers went out on strike in St. Petersburg (August 3).

The militant mood of the masses during this period appears very strikingly from the narrative told by Comrade N. K. Krupskaya about the mass meeting at the People's House in St. Petersburg at which Lenin spoke under the name of Karpov. This was Lenin's first public appearance in Russia at a great mass meeting.

"The hall was filled to overflowing by workers from all districts. The absence of police was striking. Two police inspectors who had buzzed around in the hall before the meeting commenced had disappeared somewhere. 'Someone must have sprinkled them with insect powder,' remarked a wag. After the Cadet Ogorodnikov, the chairman gave the floor to Karpov. I was standing among the crowd. Ilyich was greatly agitated. For a minute he stood silent, terribly pale. All the blood had flowed to his heart. One immediately felt how the emotion of the speaker was being communicated to the audience. Suddenly tremendous hand-clapping commenced—the Party members had recognized Ilyich. I remember the uncomprehending, excited face of the worker standing next to me. He asked loudly: 'Who is it, who is it?' But nobody answered him. Deadly silence prevailed. At the end of Ilyich's speech, all those present were swept with extraordinary enthusiasm—at that moment everyone was thinking of the coming fight to the finish.

"Red shirts were torn up for banners and singing revolutionary songs they dispersed to their districts." *

However, the upsurge in the spring of 1906 and likewise in 1907 did not attain the heights of December 1905. The Revolution began to wane.

The revolutionary movement of 1906-07 was of great significance.

"... As the onslaught of the revolutionary struggle of the masses was insufficiently strong in 1905," wrote Lenin, "defeat (both in politics and in 'economics') was inevitable and... if the proletariat had not been able at that very time to rise at least twice for a new attack against the enemy (a quarter of a million persons involved in political strikes alone during the second quarter of 1906 and also 1907), the defeat would have been still greater; the coup

* N. K. Krupskaya, *Memories of Lenin*.

d'état would have taken place not in June 1907, but a year, or even more than a year, *earlier* and the workers would have been deprived of the economic gains of 1905 sooner than they were."*

*Boycott of the First Duma and the Change to
Participation in the Second Duma*

The December uprising compelled the tsar's government to promulgate a new law to govern the elections to the Duma. This new law extended the range of electors somewhat beyond that of the Bulygin Duma. In February 1906 the government published another law, which transformed the Duma from a consultative into a legislative body, however, with restricted rights. This law guaranteed in the Duma the interests of the landlords and made it possible for tsarism to dicker with the bourgeoisie. The government permitted the workers and peasants to participate in the elections to the Duma. But it raised so many barriers ** that, in effect, it deprived the broad masses of participation in it.

The Bolsheviks, taking into account the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses, continued to prepare for an armed uprising. Therefore they agitated in favour of an active refusal to participate in the elections to the Duma and of disrupting its work. The Bolsheviks explained to the masses that what was needed was not seats in the Duma but preparation for an armed uprising. The most important task in boycotting the Duma was the struggle of the Bolsheviks against the illusory belief that it was possible to obtain civil liberties by peaceful, parliamentary means. These so-called "constitutional illusions" were spread among the masses especially by the bourgeoisie which was aided in every way by the Mensheviks. Despite the great mass work of the Bolsheviks, the boycott of the First Duma was successfully carried out only by the most advanced workers of St. Petersburg and some other industrial centres. Most of the peasants and some of the workers participated in the elections. The First Duma met but it existed for only a few months. The revolutionary speeches delivered there by the representatives of the peas-

* Lenin, "Historical Meaning of Internal Party Struggle in Russia," *Selected Works*, Vol. III, p. 511.

** By a system of *curiæ*—Ed. Eng. ed.

antry, who demanded the confiscation of the landlord estates, greatly frightened the government. It decided to dissolve the Duma and so, in the beginning of July 1906, the First Duma was sent home.

Towards the close of 1906 the revolutionary wave ebbed rapidly. With the aid of the bourgeoisie, tsarism considerably consolidated its positions. The deceptive belief in a constitution, in the possibility of gaining civil liberties by peaceful, parliamentary means, continued to prevail among the masses although the mass work of the Bolsheviks and the dissolution of the First Duma did much to shatter these illusions.

Under these conditions of a temporary subsidence of the revolutionary wave, the elections to the Second Duma were held. The Bolsheviks changed their policy from boycotting the First Duma to participating in the elections to the Second Duma. If the recession of the revolutionary wave is a fact, if among the masses which are not yet sufficiently steeled in the struggle, the illusory belief in the constitution is widespread, said Lenin, the masses must be helped to disabuse themselves of this belief, they must be trained to struggle under the new conditions. To this end we must make use of the tribune of the Duma and of the other legal possibilities to expose the tsarist government, to enlighten, train and weld the masses, to prepare the armed uprising.

Thus, the Bolsheviks adapted their tactics to the new conditions of struggle, to the period of the fall of the revolutionary wave. While preserving and strengthening the illegal forms of work under the new conditions, the Bolsheviks now began to make determined use of the tribune of the Duma and of other legal possibilities.

In the course of the elections to the Second Duma, the Bolsheviks rejected all agreements with the counter-revolutionary party of the Cadets—the Party of the liberal bourgeoisie. Here, too, the Mensheviks were in favour of an election agreement with the counter-revolutionary bourgeois parties. The Bolsheviks considered it expedient to carry out the tactic of a “Left bloc,” i.e., of an election agreement with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks. Among the workers the Bolsheviks acted with complete independence.

The Second Duma began its work in February 1907. The Bolsheviks and Mensheviks organized a joint social-democratic Duma fraction. In this fraction the Mensheviks were in the majority. They pursued a policy of compromising with the bourgeoisie. Thus, they voted for a Cadet as president of the Duma and their draft reply to the address of the government made no mention whatever of socialism.

Only the Bolsheviks firmly maintained their positions. The Bolsheviks drew the peasants' deputies to their side and worked extensively among the masses. They exposed in every way the opportunism in the work of the social-democratic fraction of the Second State Duma, and of the menshevik centres which directed its work. All the activities of the bolshevik deputies were under the direct guidance of Lenin, of the Party.

The Party Leadership of the Trade Unions in the Revolution of 1905-07

The Revolution of 1905 gave great impetus to the growth of the trade unions. By 1907 the trade unions had several hundred thousand workers on their rolls.

The Bolsheviks throughout the entire revolution fought for a new type of trade union movement. These trade unions were to work under bolshevik ideological influence and pursue a revolutionary line. The Mensheviks however argued that the trade unions ought to be independent, "neutral" with respect to the Party and tried in every way to fence them off against bolshevik influence.

This theory of the "neutrality" of the trade unions called forth a sharp rebuff by the Bolsheviks. They asserted that the theory of "neutrality" disarmed the proletariat and that if the trade unions were not under the ideological influence of the Party they would inevitably come under the influence of the bourgeoisie.

The Mensheviks tried to give the trade unions of Russia the same complexion that characterized the trade unions of the West: divorcement from the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party (France), obliteration of the border line between the trade unions and the Party (England, Belgium), solicitude

only for improving the material conditions within the framework of the existing system, and so forth. The Mensheviks did not succeed in carrying their point because the Bolsheviks waged an irreconcilable struggle against these attempts and diverted the trade union movement into a new, revolutionary channel.

The trade unions played a great part in the revolution. They defended the economic interests of the working class by drawing even the backward masses into the struggle against tsarism. Under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party the trade unions, far from fencing themselves off against politics, from confining themselves to their narrow craft interests, came out as militant mass organizations of the working class.

Beginning with the middle of 1907 tsarism which had recovered cut short every attempt to unite the workers in trade unions. In 1907 the government closed one-fourth of all the unions and the vast majority of the remaining big trade unions were broken up afterwards.

The Struggle of the Bolsheviks for the Party

The Bolsheviks were an independent party throughout the entire Revolution of 1905. They pursued a revolutionary line, had their own rules, their own leading centres and their own press organs. They had their own guide and teacher—Lenin, the consistent continuator of the cause of Marx and Engels in the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions.

During the revolution a considerable number of new workers entered the Party. Not all of these new working class recruits grasped the fine points in the disputes between the two parties—the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. They did not always understand the necessity for the existence of two parties at that time. A considerable number of the lower party organizations were united, including both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The Bolsheviks in these united organizations exposed the leaders of the Mensheviks, revealed their utter opportunism and treachery. They fought to carry out their own line and to win over the adherents of the Mensheviks.

The First Bolshevik Conference which was held in December 1905 in Tammerfors, Finland, was strongly in favour of calling a unity congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Under the pressure of the lower ranks the menshevik leaders agreed to arrange a joint congress. A united Central Committee was formed which announced the convocation of the Fourth Congress.

On every point of the Congress agenda Lenin and other Bolsheviks worked out proposals which they defended in the pre-Congress discussion that developed and thus exposed the errors in the menshevik positions.

During that period, Comrade Stalin played a great part in consolidating the Bolshevik Party. Throughout the entire Revolution of 1905 he proved himself a firm exponent of the Leninist line. At the first Party conference Comrade Stalin was present as a delegate of the Transcaucasian Bolsheviks and served as a member of the political commission which drew up the resolutions. It was also at this conference that Comrade Stalin first established personal contact with Lenin.

• Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. at Stockholm

The Fourth Congress met in March 1906 in Stockholm. It was called the Unity Congress because it attempted to unite the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks.

The Mensheviks were in the majority, having sixty-seven delegates against the forty-nine delegates of the Bolsheviks.

The menshevik majority at the Congress may be explained by the fact that the menshevik organizations considerably increased their membership during the revolution, especially in the provinces and in the borderlands, as a result of the great influx of petty-bourgeois elements at the time when the revolutionary movement had experienced its upsurge; also by the fact that these menshevik organizations had suffered less from tsarist terror than the Bolsheviks. Many Georgian menshevik delegates were present at the Congress. They were headed by Jordania and still exercised very great influence over the peasants of Georgia.

On the other hand, the Bolsheviks who predominated in the principal proletarian centres had to bear the brunt of the intense political persecution that set in after the armed uprising had been crushed.

During the Congress the Bolsheviks mercilessly exposed the viewpoints of the Mensheviks on all issues.

The Congress discussed the following questions: the agrarian program, current events, the Duma, armed uprising, guerrilla warfare, the correct attitude towards the trade unions and the peasant movement, and the Party rules.

On each question the Bolsheviks introduced their own resolution at the Congress. But the Congress adopted the menshevik resolution on the agrarian program, evaded an appraisal of the armed uprising (it was not for nothing that the resolution on this question was called "resolution on the unarmed uprising"), condemned individual raids on banks and munition stores (so-called guerrilla warfare), condemned the boycott of the First State Duma and endorsed a number of other menshevik points of view.

None the less the influence of the Bolsheviks on the decisions of the Congress was considerable. Lenin demanded that the nationalization of the land be included in the program of the Party. He argued that the nationalization of the land would not only decisively destroy the remnants of feudalism and organize the peasants in the best manner for the overthrow of tsarism, but would also enflame the class struggle within the peasantry itself and be instrumental in rallying the poor around the proletariat, *i.e.*, would create the best conditions for the growing of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution. Lenin further demonstrated that the revolutionary peasantry solidly supported the demand for the nationalization of the land.

The Congress rejected the proposal submitted by the Bolsheviks to include the clause on the nationalization of the land in the program. It adopted the menshevik agrarian program which provided for the municipalization of the land. This municipalization provided that the landlord estates be transferred to the organs of local self-government, *i.e.*, to the

zemstvos,* and that the peasant allotments be left to their present owners. In other words, the peasants could get their own land free of charge but had to rent the fine landlord estates from the *zemstvo* and pay a big rental for them. The Mensheviks did not make the fulfilment of this program contingent upon the overthrow of the autocracy, the revolutionary seizure of the landlord estates, or an immediate call on the peasants to seize the landlord estates. The municipalization program followed from the entire line of the Mensheviks in the bourgeois revolution; it did not aim to destroy the remnants of feudalism but calculated upon striking a bargain with the landlords.

At the Congress the struggle of the Bolsheviks headed by Lenin resulted in the adoption of a number of amendments. The Menshevik agrarian program was amended by the addition of a clause on the nationalization of the forest lands and bodies of water. At the same time in place of the menshevik demand for the "alienation" of the landlord estates (which did not preclude compensation), the demand for their "confiscation" was adopted, i.e., the landlord estates were to be taken away without compensation. Upon the insistence of the Bolsheviks a clause providing for the independent organization of the rural proletariat was likewise adopted.

Under the influence of Lenin's criticism the Mensheviks refrained from putting their resolution on current events to a vote. Comrade Stalin participated in the debate on this question.

"If the class interests of the proletariat lead to its hegemony," said Comrade Stalin, "if the proletariat must march not at the tail-end but at the head of the current revolution, it goes without saying that the proletariat can renounce neither active participation in the organization of the armed uprising nor the seizure of power.

"Such is the 'scheme' of the Bolsheviks. Either the hegemony of the proletariat or the hegemony of the democratic bourgeoisie—this is how the issue stands in the Party, this is where we differ." **

* *Zemstvos*—rural local authorities, set up in the 'sixties after the emancipation of the serfs, and representing exclusively the landowning interests. They appeared at various periods as more or less active though moderate opponents of the autocracy. Most of the leaders of the bourgeois political parties which sprang up after October 1905 emerged from and received their political training in the ranks of the *zemstvo*.—Ed. English. ed.

** *Minutes of the Unity Congress.*

As to the resolution on the armed uprising, the Mensheviks agreed to the first clause which set forth that it was the immediate task of the revolutionary movement to wrest power from the autocratic government. In one of the resolutions of the Congress the Bolsheviks even succeeded in incorporating the recognition that insurrection was the only means of gaining liberty. In the resolution on the trade unions the Mensheviks recognized the necessity of close ideological contact between the trade unions and the Party.

And finally Lenin, who was on the commission for drawing up the Party rules, succeeded in having a number of bolshevik demands inserted. The rules were adopted unanimously, including the first paragraph* and the principle of democratic centralism.

The Congress accepted the application for membership in the R.S.D.L.P. made by the national social-democratic organizations (the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, the Bund, and the Social-Democratic Party of the Latvian region), which had led a separate existence heretofore. This decision of the Congress was of the greatest importance in the struggle for bolshevik influence among the Social-Democrats from these national organizations. It aided in winning over to the side of the Bolshevik Party those Mensheviks who had been members of the Party in the national minority districts, and in establishing a single party for all nationalities.

The Congress elected a Central Committee on which the Mensheviks were in the majority.

"This was the first time I saw Lenin in the role of vanquished. . . . But what sort of defeat was it? You should have seen Lenin's opponents, the victors of Stockholm—Plekhanov, Axelrod, Martov and the others; they did not in the least look like real victors, because, in his ruthless criticism of menshevism, Lenin, so to speak, did not leave a sound place in their bodies. I remember the bolshevik delegates gathering together in a small crowd gazing at Lenin and asking him for advice. In the conversation of some of the delegates one detected a note of weariness and depression. I remember Lenin, in reply to such talk, sharply saying through his clenched teeth: 'No snivelling, comrades, we shall certainly win, because we are right.' " **

* Lenin's formulation of who is a Party member.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

** Stalin, *On Lenin*, p. 28.

To countervail the Central Committee elected at the Congress, the Bolsheviks, who remained an independent party, formed a separate leading centre at a meeting of their own.

Thus the unity established at the Congress was only formal. The Bolsheviks had been and remained an independent party. The struggle carried on at the Congress sharpened the line of demarcation. It permitted the workers to obtain a better view of the Mensheviks as agents of the bourgeoisie in the working class. It showed once more that the Bolsheviks were the only revolutionary party of the working class and that Lenin was their leader. Lenin considered that one of the main ideological issues of the Congress was the drawing of a clear and a distinct line of demarcation between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks as he stated in his report on the Congress to the St. Petersburg workers.

The Struggle for the Party After the Congress

Immediately after the Congress the bolshevik delegates issued a manifesto to the Party in which they subjected the menshevik resolutions adopted by the Congress to criticism. In this manifesto the Bolsheviks, without refusing to submit to the decisions of the Congress, called upon the members of the Party to fight against the menshevik positions and test the lines of the two parties in practice.

After the Congress Lenin worked most assiduously to expose the Menshevik Central Committee which was openly pursuing a policy of striking a bargain with the bourgeoisie, of betraying the revolution.

The Menshevik Central Committee at that time demanded that the First Duma be supported although the latter engaged in negotiations behind the backs of the workers for a compromise with tsarism and when the Duma was dissolved the Mensheviks called upon the workers to fight for its restoration.

It was at this time also that the Mensheviks began their campaign to abolish the underground revolutionary party. They proposed that a "Labour Congress" be called at which they contemplated the creation of an all-inclusive labour party to embrace also all members of co-operative organizations, trade

unions and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. This menshevik scheme would have meant the destruction of the revolutionary Party; its diffusion among the broad non-Party masses and the creation in its stead of an organization adapted to peaceful collaboration with the bourgeoisie.

By mercilessly unmasking the opportunism of the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks won over to their side the best working-class elements which formerly had followed the Mensheviks. Backed by the Party masses, Lenin demanded that a new congress be called to discuss the line of the Central Committee and to elect a new Central Committee.

The Second All-Party Conference (autumn of 1906) rejected the demand of the Bolsheviks for the immediate convocation of a Party congress. The Menshevik Central Committee continued its treacherous line. At the same time it waged a furious campaign of incitement against Lenin, made an attempt (which, true enough, was unsuccessful) of haling Lenin before a Party court because his pamphlet entitled *The St. Petersburg Elections and the Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One Mensheviks* had laid bare the utter treachery of the Mensheviks and the utter bankruptcy of the Menshevik Central Committee. The St. Petersburg Committee on which the Bolsheviks predominated again demanded that a Party congress be called. Despite the opposition of the Mensheviks the struggle for a congress became so extensive that by October a number of the most important industrial committees had endorsed it.

Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

In April and May 1907 the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. met in London. Three hundred and two delegates were present representing one hundred and fifty thousand Party members.

The merciless struggle of the Bolsheviks headed by Lenin against the opportunist currents in the working class and against conciliationism towards these currents, their day-to-day work of enlightening the broad masses of the Party members, led to the point where the Bolsheviks at the Congress received a majority of the delegates from the biggest and most industrialized centres (St. Petersburg, the Urals). At the Congress the

Bolsheviks were supported by the national social-democratic parties (the Poles and the Latvians) on a number of questions (e.g., on the question of the attitude toward non-proletarian parties and on the Labour Congress). However, these parties were not sufficiently staunch; they frequently wavered and at times voted for the Mensheviks. Trotsky's attitude at the Congress was non-factional in words but menshevik in deeds.

At the Fifth Congress bolshevik decisions were adopted on a number of basic questions on the agenda.

Defining its attitude towards the Duma, the Congress stated that it considered it necessary to make use of the Duma as a tribune from which to expose tsarism.

The Congress permitted agreements to be made with parties recognizing the necessity of the armed uprising, for instance, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, pointing out at the same time that it was necessary to expose the petty-bourgeois essence of this party. The Congress also issued an appeal to struggle mercilessly against all bourgeois parties as counter-revolutionary parties.

On the initiative of the Bolsheviks the idea of a Labour Congress was condemned. This idea had been advanced by P. Axelrod and was supported by a number of other prominent Mensheviks. Their proposal was to call together a congress of the representatives of workers' organizations irrespective of party or faction and at this congress to found an All-Russian Workers' Union or a "broad Labour Party." On this question not only the Polish Social-Democrats, (headed by Rosa Luxemburg) and the Latvian Social-Democrats, but even the Bundists voted against the Mensheviks for the bolshevik motion.

A resolution was adopted which stated that the Party must act as leader of the trade unions.

The Bolsheviks proposed that the activity of the Menshevik Central Committee and the fraction of the Second State Duma be condemned. Here, however, the Mensheviks were supported by the national parties with whose aid the bolshevik motion was defeated. On the report of the Central Committee the Congress adopted a brief and meaningless resolution and passed on to the next point on the order of business. As for the work of the Duma fraction, the Congress condemned, though with

insufficient emphasis, its opportunist errors.

It then elected a Central Committee on which the Bolsheviks received a majority.

" . . . I then saw Lenin for the first time in the role of victor," wrote Comrade Stalin, who was a delegate to the Congress. "Usually, victory turns ordinary leaders' heads, makes them proud and boastful. Most frequently, in such cases, they begin to celebrate their victory and rest on their laurels. But Lenin was not in the least like such leaders. On the contrary, it is precisely after victory that he became particularly vigilant, on the alert. I remember Lenin at that time earnestly impressing upon the delegates: The first thing is, not to be carried away with victory and not to boast; the second thing is, consolidate the victory; the third thing is, crush the opponent, because he is only defeated, but not yet crushed by a long way." *

The Central Committee elected by the Congress included Mensheviks as well as Bolsheviks. Being fully aware of how unreliable the leadership of a Central Committee representing different currents would be, the Bolsheviks at the time of the Congress called a fractional conference of their own at which they elected a separate bolshevik centre consisting of fifteen comrades.

Causes of the Defeat of the Revolution of 1905; Its Lessons and International Significance

The Russian Revolution suffered a temporary defeat. The workers and peasants had for the first time engaged in decisive battle with the autocracy. The proletariat of a number of industrial centres had not yet developed the degree of organization and the intensiveness in fighting that was necessary for victory. The peasants had gone into the fight scattered, unorganized, insufficiently aggressive and less class-conscious than the proletariat. Many peasants did not yet understand that if they did not overthrow the autocracy they would not receive any land nor would they be freed from the bondage of the landlords. It appeared that as many as three-fifths of those participating in the revolutionary struggle were workers in factories and mills while the peasants represented a small

* Stalin, *On Lenin*; p. 29.

minority, not more than one-fifth. The mass uprisings were sporadic and many of them were quite feeble.

The Mensheviks retarded the decisive struggle of the workers and peasants at every step. At the same time tsarism succeeded in finding a way out of the Russo-Japanese War, of concluding peace with Japan and securing the support of the Russian bourgeoisie which after the December armed uprising openly went into the embraces of tsarism. The West-European bourgeoisie rendered substantial aid to the autocracy: France granted Russia a loan and thereby facilitated its emergence from the financial crisis; Germany mobilized its military forces which only waited for the order to enter the lists against the Russian revolutionary movement.

Finally, tsarism succeeded in crushing the December uprising, in smashing the attempt of the advanced section of the working class to prepare a new attack in 1906-07.

Although the Revolution of 1905 suffered defeat, its significance nevertheless is very great.

Two years of civil war had transformed tsarist Russia into revolutionary Russia and had thrown the activities of all classes and parties into the limelight. The proletariat waged a most determined, consistent struggle. It began the revolution by mass strikes and went as far as barricade fighting at the time of the armed uprising in December 1905. The number of striking workers reached three million in 1905, in 1906—one million, in 1907—seven hundred fifty thousand. The world had never yet seen such a powerful strike movement. For the first time in the history of the world labour movement the proletariat acted as hegemon in a bourgeois-democratic revolution. It led the broad masses of the peasantry. The leadership exercised by the proletariat over the masses showed the invincible force represented by the oppressed classes when they break with the bourgeoisie and come under the guidance of the workers. The revolution showed that the Bolshevik Party, which had become steeled and consolidated, was the only revolutionary party of the proletariat, the only party that could ensure success in the struggle of the proletariat for its dictatorship. The revolution disclosed to a still greater extent the petty-bourgeois character of the party of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the opportun-

ism of the Mensheviks, their conciliatory attitude towards the bourgeoisie, their treacherous role.

The tremendous significance of the Revolution of 1905 consists also in the fact that it taught the Party and the working class the art of civil war.

In 1905, under the conditions of imperialism and bourgeois-democratic revolution, the most effective means of struggle possessed by the working class—"armed uprising backed by a political general strike"—was applied for the first time.

Lenin wrote:

"The December struggle in 1905 *proved* that an armed uprising can be victorious under the conditions of modern military technique and military organization. The December struggle made this contribution: that the entire international labour movement must henceforth take into account the likelihood of similar forms of combat in the proletarian revolutions of the immediate future." *

These directions were aimed against the opportunist line of many prominent theoreticians of the Second International who held that under the conditions of modern technique and city planning (straight streets, etc.) armed uprisings were doomed to inevitable failure and that therefore this method of struggle was obsolete.

In the Revolution of 1905 the proletariat evolved the soviets as organs of uprising and revolutionary dictatorship. The Revolution of 1905 ushered in a new epoch in the national struggle for the liberation of the colonial peoples. It called forth a movement all over Asia. It drew hundreds of millions of colonial slaves into the revolutionary struggle. It exerted a most powerful influence on the revolution in Turkey (1908), in Persia (1909) and in China (1911).

The Western proletariat watched the course of events in Russia with utmost intensity. In Austria the October strike led to demonstrations and to the winning of universal suffrage. After the mutiny on the *Potemkin*, disturbances occurred in the German fleet. The Bulgarian proletariat came out into the streets and compelled the exploiting classes to repeal a number of laws obnoxious to the people. The year 1905 lent impetus

* Lenin, "An Estimate of the Russian Revolution," *Collected Works*, Vol. XII.

to the development of the mass strike movement in Great Britain.

The Revolution of 1905 sharpened the line of demarcation between classes throughout the whole world. It knit the world bourgeoisie close to tsarism. It rallied the proletariat of the West and the oppressed peoples of the East still more closely around the proletariat of Russia. It brought the proletariat of Russia to the fore as the advanced detachment of the world revolutionary movement.

The Revolution of 1905 has come down in the history of the revolutionary movement as the prelude to the international proletarian revolution. Its basic issues (soviets, hegemony of the proletariat, the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the proletarian revolution, revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, insurrection, and so forth) were at the same time basic issues of the international revolution.

The decisions which the Bolsheviks, primarily Lenin, made on all these questions were of tremendous international significance, as they raised new and old questions of the theory of Marxism and elucidated them in a way entirely different from that of the opportunists and Centrists of the Second International. Comrade Stalin in his letter to the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolyutsia* (*Proletarian Revolution*) noted correctly that the Party of the Bolsheviks from the very beginning of its existence developed further the theory of Marxism, leading the fight not only against the Russian Mensheviks but also in the international arena.

The revolution consolidated the position of bolshevism in the international labour movement to an extraordinary extent and laid bare the opportunism of the leadership of the Second International to a still greater extent. On all the basic issues which the struggle of the working class of Russia brought to the fore during the period of the Revolution of 1905-07 and which were of tremendous importance on points of principle (the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution, the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois revolution, the question of the rela-

tionship between the Party and the trade unions, the Labour Congress, etc.) the leaders of the Second International assumed an opportunist stand and absolutely denied that these most important issues of the Russian Revolution were also issues of the international proletarian revolution, that they were of gigantic importance for the whole world revolutionary movement.

The Revolution of 1905 was, finally, of decisive importance for the victory of the socialist revolution in October 1917.

"Without the general rehearsal of 1905 the victory of the October Revolution of 1917 would have been impossible." (*Lenin.*)

CHAPTER VI

THE PARTY OF THE BOLSHEVIKS DURING THE YEARS OF REACTION (1907-10)

The Period of Reaction and the Essence of the Stolypin Period

On June 3, 1907 the tsarist government dissolved the Second State Duma. The social-democratic fraction of the Duma was arrested. After a trial eighteen social-democratic deputies were sentenced to hard labour and ten were exiled to Siberia. At the same time a law was promulgated which announced the procedure in the elections to the Third State Duma. This new election law guaranteed the absolute domination of the feudal landlords and the representatives of the big bourgeoisie in the Duma. The workers and peasants as well as the oppressed nations were almost entirely shorn of electoral rights. Instead of the sixty-five Social-Democrats in the Second Duma, the Third State Duma counted only fifteen Social-Democrats.

The dissolution of the Second State Duma and the publication of the new electoral law (the so-called *coup* of June 3) testified to the fact that the counter-revolution was temporarily victorious and that Russia was entering a period of darkest reaction. The autocracy held the entire country tightly in the grip of a ruthless oppression. Punitive expeditions and courts martial were rampant throughout the whole country. From 1907 to 1909 more than twenty-six thousand sentences were pronounced for participation in the revolutionary movement. More than five thousand persons were condemned to death. The autocracy hurled itself with the greatest cruelty upon the working class. The labour organizations were broken up. Their leaders, arraigned before court, were exiled. From 1906 to 1910 about a thousand trade union organizations and more than a hundred labour newspapers and magazines were closed down.

During this period (1907-09) the country experienced a severe economic depression. The bourgeoisie tried to mitigate it by increasing its pressure upon the working class. With the support of the government the employers soon cancelled all the gains achieved by the workers during the years of revolution. Wage rates were sharply cut, the working day was lengthened, overtime and fines increased. The more active workers were discharged and blacklisted as a result of which they were nowhere taken on to work. Even purely economic strikes ended in mass arrests and sentences of exile. Under the influence of the economic depression and the political reaction the labour movement likewise began to simmer down. While in 1907 more than forty per cent of the whole working class of Russia participated in strikes, in 1910 not more than two and a half per cent downed tools. The number of trade union members dropped from three hundred and twenty-five thousand in 1905-06 to fourteen thousand at the close of 1909.

Simultaneously the autocracy with the support of the bourgeoisie increased the oppression of the national minorities of Russia to the utmost. Tsarism enflamed national strife in every way, inciting the oppressed nationalities against each other, organizing Jewish pogroms, fanning the flames of the Armenian-Tyurk struggle in the Caucasus, and so forth.

Towards the countries of the East—Persia, Turkey, China—the autocratic government pursued a predatory, imperialist policy.

While remaining a government of the feudal landlords, the policy of the autocracy at the same time safeguarded the interests of the biggest bourgeoisie. During the years of reaction tsarism still further strengthened its alliance with the upper layers of the trading and industrial bourgeoisie, making yet another step along the road of its *conversion into a bourgeois monarchy*.

After the December uprising the liberal bourgeoisie (headed by the Cadet Party)* in its turn finally went over to the side of autocracy and openly declared its support of tsarism and the counter-revolution.

* Abbreviation for Constitutional-Democratic Party.—Ed. Eng. ed.

In its struggle against the revolution the autocracy did not confine itself to police measures. Stolypin, who headed the cabinet, understood that if a new revolution was to be prevented in Russia it was necessary above all to solve the most important question—the question of land.

During the years of the revolution the peasantry fought under the leadership of the proletariat against the feudal landlords, endeavouring by means of a revolutionary uprising *from below* to overthrow the yoke of the landlords and thus receive land. Stolypin set himself the task of crushing the revolutionary struggle of the peasantry while at the same time carrying through *from above* a number of reforms that were to render a new revolution impossible.

His plan consisted in a partial satisfaction of the kulak at the expense of the poor peasant, thus making the kulak a supporter of the autocracy. Stolypin calculated that by relying on the kulak in the countryside, the autocracy would be able to preserve the landlord estates.

The land reform carried out by Stolypin aimed at strengthening kulak capitalist economy to the utmost without impairing the interests of the landlords. He allowed the peasants to leave the communities freely and to convert the communal land which they were holding into their private property. The kulaks were foremost in taking advantage of this right. They left the communities to form homesteads, consolidated their husbandry and extended their land holdings by buying up land from the ruined poor peasants. The poor peasants also left the communities, selling their patches of land to the kulaks and thus definitely entering the ranks of wage workers. By the beginning of the imperialist war of 1914 about two million households, constituting 20 per cent of their entire number, had left the communities. One million two hundred thousand peasants, mainly poor peasants, had sold their allotments.

The land policy pursued by Stolypin was a bourgeois policy. The government gave every encouragement to the growth of kulak economy; it granted loans to the kulaks, aided them by surveying the land, etc. The police apparatus forced the poor peasants to sell their allotments at extremely low prices. By increasing the ruination of the village poor and decreasing

their land holdings, Stolypin succeeded in enlarging the kulak land holdings to some extent, and in creating a more extensive stratum of kulaks. But Stolypin's reforms failed to solve the land problem; they merely hastened the ruin of the bulk of the peasantry, particularly the poor peasants.

Stolypin's policy only led to an accentuation of the class contradictions in the countryside and intensified the hatred of broad strata of the peasants for the landlords. At the same time Stolypin's policy sharply intensified the struggle of the village poor against the kulaks.

The autocracy suppressed the slightest manifestation of discontent by the peasants with incredible cruelty. They were arrested, beaten up, whipped *en masse*, dragged before court, exiled. The more extensive revolts were savagely subdued by punitive detachments. In the countryside the absolute, arbitrary rule of the zemstvo chiefs and village constables held full sway.

"The triumph of the knout and of mental darkness was complete," said Comrade Stalin about this epoch.

The attempt of autocracy to solve the land problem by means of the Stolypin reform *from above* suffered shipwreck.

Stolypin's policy still more enflamed the hatred of the peasants for the autocracy. The peasantry became convinced from its own experience that only by overthrowing the autocracy in alliance with and under the leadership of the proletariat would it be able to rid itself of poverty and starvation.

Such was the setting in which the Party of the Bolsheviks fought during the years of reaction after the defeat of the Revolution of 1905-07.

Tactics of the Bolsheviks During the Years of Reaction

The main tasks of the Party in the period of reaction were defined in the decisions of the All-Russian Party Conferences—the fourth held in November 1907, and the fifth held in December 1908, especially the latter at which the Bolsheviks had a majority.

The Fifth Party Conference adopted a resolution drawn up by Lenin, *On Current Events and the Tasks of the Party*. In his works of this period Lenin gave an exhaustive appraisal of the

conditions that had been created in the country after the *coup* of June 3 and mapped out the tasks of the Party in the conditions of reaction. In the first place Lenin underscored the fact that the basic problems of the revolution in Russia had not been solved. The causes which gave rise to the Revolution of 1905 continued to operate and a new revolution was inevitably ripening. At the same time the contradictions between the capitalist countries were becoming more acute, the class contradictions between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the West were gaining strength, the national movement for liberation in the East was growing. All this rendered the international situation more and more revolutionary.

The principal goal of the struggle of the proletariat remained unchanged: to overthrow the autocracy, achieve victory in the bourgeois-democratic revolution for the purpose of fighting for its immediate growing over to the socialist revolution. The proletariat was to continue its struggle for the leadership of the peasantry, so as to prevent the bourgeoisie from leading the peasantry in its wake. However, in the new situation, in the period of reaction, as Lenin pointed out, new methods of struggle, new tactics, became necessary.

"In the period from 1907 to 1912," wrote Stalin, "the Party was compelled to resort to tactics of retreat, as we then experienced a decline in the revolutionary movement; the tide of the revolution was at ebb, and tactics necessarily had to take this fact into consideration. The forms of struggle as well as the forms of organization were correspondingly changed: in place of the boycott of the Duma, there was participation in the Duma; in place of open, direct revolutionary action outside of the Duma, there were parliamentary speeches and work in the Duma; in place of general political strikes, there were partial economic strikes, or simply a lull in activities. Of course, the Party had to go underground during that period, while cultural, educational, co-operative, insurance and other organizations permitted by the law took the place of revolutionary mass organizations." *

The principal tasks of the Party during these years consisted in preserving the working class from complete defeat, in preserving the revolutionary energy within it and maintaining its readiness for a new struggle. To this end it was first of

* Stalin, "Foundations of Leninism," *Leninism*, Vol. I, p. 76.

all necessary to maintain the fighting capacity of the illegal Party organization, to strengthen it and prepare it for a new attack.

Lenin pointed out that the Party must exert all its strength to raise the political activity and consciousness of the proletariat, must explain to the toiling masses the idea and the significance of the policy of tsarism, must expose the agrarian policy of Stolypin, the imperialist foreign policy of the autocracy, must fight against the policy of oppressing various nationalities.

All Party work was carried on under three main bolshevik slogans: a democratic republic, eight-hour day and the confiscation of all landlord estates. These slogans called upon the masses to overthrow the autocracy, to abolish the landlord estates, to take to the path of revolution. The Mensheviks attacked these bolshevik slogans with utmost fury, calling them utopian and inopportune, but despite the Mensheviks increasingly broad masses of class-conscious workers rallied to the revolutionary banner of the Bolsheviks.

In the promotion of revolutionary propaganda and agitation Lenin attached exceedingly great importance to the utilization of every kind of legal organization, that is, organizations permitted by law and acting openly. Instances of such organizations were the State Duma, trade unions, co-operatives, cultural and educational societies, sick benefit societies, congresses of various public organizations, and so forth. The Bolsheviks considered it their duty to work wherever masses of workers were to be found without shrinking from work under the most difficult conditions. This was the only way the Party could win the majority of the working class.

Lenin was particularly persistent in his fight to have all the activities of Party members in legal organizations strictly subordinated to the leadership and control of the illegal Party.

Indeed, the conditions under which the Bolsheviks had to work were exceedingly difficult. The autocracy was particularly severe in dealing with the bolshevik organizations which it tried to smash completely. The tsarist secret police set up a network of secret agents and *provocateurs* who penetrated the Party organizations, ascertained the most active Party workers and thus facilitated the break-up of these organizations by the secret police.

The *provocateur* Malinovsky delivered into the hands of the secret police Comrades Stalin, Sverdlov and others who were active illegally in St. Petersburg. It was due to the *provocateur* Romanov that the secret police was able repeatedly to frustrate the work of the Moscow Bolsheviks.

However, in spite of all persecutions and arrests, it was impossible for the police to destroy the Bolshevik Party. The Bolsheviks who remained at liberty constantly set up new underground committees, made contacts anew with the enterprises and developed the Party work.

The Party committees at the enterprises (the Party nuclei) and the fractions in the trade unions, the co-operative and other workers' organizations were points of support through which the Party carried its work to the masses and led all workers' organizations. The strength of the Party consisted in the fact that it concentrated all its work at the enterprises and fought to transform *each factory and mill* into a fortress of bolshevism.

The Party, by combining legal and illegal work, was able under the leadership of Lenin to reconstruct its organizations in time to meet the new requirements which arose as a result of reaction. In consequence of the police terror the electoral principle which had found broad application in the period of 1905 was now considerably curtailed. To replace the arrested leaders the Party promoted new people who had developed in the work and enjoyed authority among the masses. During all these years the Party raised a new cadre of leaders, of professional revolutionaries who had sprung from the workers and were inseparably connected with them. The work of Comrade Stalin is an exceptionally striking example of the struggle of the Bolsheviks, of the professional revolutionaries.

After returning from the Fifth (London) Congress, Comrade Stalin conducted a most energetic struggle in Baku to rally the Baku organization around the bolshevik slogans. Under his leadership the Baku organization, where the Mensheviks hitherto had enjoyed considerable influence, was transformed into a stronghold of bolshevism. In March 1908 Comrade Stalin was arrested and exiled to Solvychevodsk (Vologda Province). After a few months he escaped from exile and returned to underground work in Baku. There he waged an active struggle for the Lenin-

ist line until 1910 when he was again arrested and sent into exile. In 1911 Comrade Stalin again escaped, this time to St. Petersburg where he took charge of the work of the Party organization by order of the Central Committee. However in a short period of time he was once more arrested and exiled to Vologda. At the end of 1911 Comrade Stalin again escaped from exile to St. Petersburg.

During this period Y. M. Sverdlov likewise did a tremendous amount of work as a professional bolshevik revolutionary. After serving a sentence (1906 to 1909) in a fortress, Comrade Sverdlov, having regained his liberty in the autumn of 1909, immediately launched upon strenuous underground work in Moscow. In December 1909 he was arrested and exiled to the Narym region. After a few months Comrade Sverdlov fled from there and again entered upon underground work in St. Petersburg. In November 1910, Comrade Sverdlov was once more arrested and in May 1911 returned as an exile to the Narym region. Six times Comrade Sverdlov attempted to flee from exile but each time he was caught. Finally he succeeded in making his escape. In the autumn of 1912 he arrived in St. Petersburg where he worked till February 1913. This time when arrested he was exiled to Turukhansk region where he stayed until the February revolution of 1917.

Among the many other Bolsheviks who in this period dedicated themselves to the valiant struggle of the professional revolutionary, who constantly risked their lives, were Comrades Voroshilov, Bubnov, Kalinin, Orjonikidze and Pyatnitsky. These were the best representatives of that cadre of professional revolutionaries working underground who by their heroism and wholehearted devotion to bolshevism guaranteed under the leadership of Lenin the preservation and consolidation of the Party during the difficult years of reaction.

All Party work was under the direct leadership of Lenin, who at that time lived abroad (in 1908 in Switzerland, from 1910 on in Paris). The illegal newspaper *Proletary** published by Lenin

* *Proletary*—central organ of the Bolsheviks which under Lenin's leadership appeared during the years of reaction. The enlarged conference of the editorial board of the *Proletary* at that time acted as the bolshevik centre, the leading organ of the Party of the Bolsheviks.—Ed. Russian ed.

was of exceptional importance for the Party organizations. Through its columns the Party spread the bolshevik views, carried on propaganda of revolutionary Marxism, exposed the opportunists and aided the work of the local organizations. Lenin though abroad led the work of the bolshevik representatives, made contacts with the Party organizations in Russia, gave them directions, organized the shipment of illegal literature to Russia, etc.

In the summer of 1911 a Party school was organized near Paris (in the village of Longjumeau) under the leadership of Lenin. About twenty Party members who had been sent from Russia received instruction there. Among the students at the school were Comrades Sergo Orjonikidze, Semyon Schwartz, Zevin, (one of the twenty-six Baku commissars that were shot in 1918 by the British interventionists and whiteguards) and Prukhnyak (who later became a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern). This Party school graduated quite a number of devoted Party workers.

It was only thanks to the firm leadership of Lenin and the self-sacrificing work of the basic cadre of the Bolsheviks—the professional revolutionaries—that the Party organizations, though weakened, did not fall apart, did not permit themselves to be broken up but renewed their work after each of the numerous raids.

Thus, in 1908 for instance, in the Urals alone eight underground Party newspapers were published and eleven underground printshops were at work. In Moscow no less than 120 nuclei were functioning, a newspaper was being published, circles were maintained and lectures were being held. The same was true of St. Petersburg, Ivanovo-Voznessensk, Moscow region and other proletarian districts of the country.

The Bolsheviks did active revolutionary work in the trade unions. They organized the workers to repel the offensive of capital and energetically defended the interests of the workers. Using the day-to-day questions arising in the lives of the workers to illustrate their point, they convinced the latter of the necessity of overthrowing the autocratic government. At various public congresses held to combat intemperance, to promote co-operatives, etc., at women's congresses and at conventions of

factory physicians, the Bolsheviks rallied the workers' delegates to their banner. On returning from these congresses the delegates would spread the bolshevik doctrines throughout the whole land. In their revolutionary work the Bolsheviks made use of clubs, general educational courses, co-operative organizations, sick benefit societies and so forth.

Parallel with this the Bolsheviks waged a stubborn struggle to win the peasantry to the side of the proletariat. In and out of the Duma the Party unmasked before the peasants the feudal character of the policy of the autocratic government. The Party made it plain that the peasants' lack of land and of legal rights and the arbitrariness and violence practised against them could not be abolished without overthrowing tsarism. Day after day the Bolsheviks exposed the counter-revolutionary policy of the Cadets, demonstrated to the masses that the proletariat and its Party alone were fighting resolutely against the survivals of feudalism.

The struggle of the Bolsheviks against the national oppression practised by the autocracy was of no less importance. By their bold speeches in and out of the Duma, the Bolsheviks stirred up revolutionary sentiments among the toiling masses of the oppressed nationalities. Day after day the Party exposed the liberals who supported the policy of national oppression. The Bolsheviks showed to the masses that the proletariat and its Party alone were fighting consistently against national oppression.

The revolutionary work of the Bolsheviks roused all revolutionary and democratic elements in the country, drew them on to the path of a more decisive struggle against autocracy, helped them to cast off their vacillation and half-heartedness.

The Struggle of the Party on Two Fronts in the Labour Movement

In carrying out their line the Bolsheviks during the years of reaction waged a stubborn fight against opportunism in the labour movement and in the Party. Reaction called forth ideological confusion in the revolutionary organizations. With the advent of reaction the intelligentsia, which during the years of

revolution had joined the labour movement, fled cowardly from the revolutionary organizations. Some of them openly deserted to the side of counter-revolution, others abandoned political life and became petty-bourgeois philistines.

The petty-bourgeois parties of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries openly renounced revolution. The Mensheviks (Martov, Martynov, Axelrod, Dan, Potressov and others) declared that the bourgeois revolution in Russia was over, that any further change in the political order of Russia would take a constitutional course, the course of parliamentary reforms. According to their statements, the proletariat was to give up as hopeless its attempts at a new revolution. It was to direct all its forces towards gradually improving its economic and political condition under the existing order, towards winning electoral rights, the right of assembly, the right to strike, the right of association, etc.

The Mensheviks were of the opinion that inasmuch as Russia had started on a constitutional course, it was in no need of a militant revolutionary party but of a peaceful parliamentary labour party like the other social-democratic parties of the Second International. They fought openly for the liquidation of the illegal Social-Democratic Labour Party, being of the opinion that its place should be taken by a new, a legal party which was to be created and which was to wage an *exclusively legal* struggle within the scope permitted by the Stolypin regime. Though formally still constituting part of the local social-democratic organizations, the Mensheviks undermined the work of the R.S.D.L.P. from within, fought its decisions, tried to prove to the workers the necessity of liquidating the Party. Hence they were called *Liquidators*.

The Liquidators called the Party a "corpse," assured the workers that the Party "was dead" and declared every attempt to maintain or consolidate the illegal Party harmful. At the same time they endeavoured to substitute a diffused and opportunist "broad", "wide-open" labour Party, *i.e.*, the notorious "Labour Congress", for the firmly tested Marxian Party. They openly renounced the main principles of the theory of Marxism, of the old social-democratic program. Through the mouth of one of their leaders, Noah Jordania (an active whiteguard after the

October Revolution), the Mensheviks declared that the proletariat should refrain from demanding a democratic republic as this was frightening the bourgeoisie. The proletariat, in their opinion, must refrain from fighting against the bourgeoisie but on the contrary must fight together with it for a "moderate constitution." The Liquidators (for instance, the same Jordania) further argued that the slogan of the eight-hour working day ought to be dropped.

All the tactics of the Liquidators were directed towards pleading with the autocracy for petty alms for the workers. They did everything in their power to hold the workers back from striking and persistently steered them away from the political struggle.

Menshevism during the years of reaction thus grew into liquidationism, completely renounced the revolution, Marxism and the Social-Democratic Party.

Menshevism during the years of reaction was transformed, according to Lenin, into a Stolypin labour party.

During the years of reaction Trotsky at bottom occupied the very same liquidatorial position. On all basic issues he followed the Liquidators, supported and defended them. Concealing his views by "revolutionary" phrases Trotsky like the Liquidators at that time definitely abandoned the struggle for the revolution. The principal task of the working class was reduced by him to a demand for partial reforms (freedom of association, etc.) without the overthrow of the autocracy.

Declaring that he belonged to neither the Bolsheviks nor the Mensheviks, Trotsky under colour of an attempted union of all fractions made great efforts to destroy bolshevism as an independent party, to subordinate the Bolsheviks to the Liquidators. Trotsky was a typical Centrist in the social-democratic movement of Russia. Centrism was the name given to that current in the Second International which in words diverged from the open opportunists but at the same time in deeds supported them on all basic issues. The Centrists spoke hypocritically about the necessity of "reconciling" all currents in the Party at any price while in practice they helped the opportunists to deceive the workers. In the struggle, which the "Left" revolutionary elements waged against opportunism, the Centrists supported the oppor-

tunists. Concealing themselves behind "Left" phrases, the Centrists endeavoured to stifle the Left revolutionary wing, to subordinate it to the open opportunists. Such was Kautsky's position in German Social-Democracy during that period. Trotsky pursued the same line in Russia.

Lenin fought most energetically against Trotsky. He wrote:

"Trotsky and the Trotskyists and compromisers who resemble him are more harmful than any of the Liquidators, since the convinced Liquidators elucidate their views straightforwardly and it is easy for the workers to make out their mistakes, but the Messrs. Trotsky deceive the workers, *conceal* the evil, render its exposure and cure impossible. Whoever supports Trotsky's group supports the policy of falsehood and deception of the workers, the policy of screening liquidationism." *

The struggle against liquidationism and the centrism of Trotsky was a most important task of the Bolshevik Party. Only after these agents of the bourgeoisie in the labour movement had been finally defeated were the Bolsheviks able to mobilize the proletariat for the revolutionary struggle against tsarism and the bourgeoisie.

Besides the struggle against liquidationism as the *main*, the Right danger in the labour movement, the Bolsheviks fought ruthlessly also against the "Left" opportunist elements in the revolutionary movement. Some of the petty-bourgeois elements which had adhered to the revolution, as well as some of the least steadfast and least class-conscious workers springing primarily from the Socialist-Revolutionaries and anarchists did not believe in a new revolutionary upsurge of the masses and bent all their forces to organize acts of terror (the assassination of individual ministers, gendarmes, officials) and of expropriation (armed robbery of government funds from government depositories, and so forth). They concealed their disbelief in a new upsurge of the masses by clamouring that under the Stolypin regime it was impossible to do revolutionary work in mass organizations, that they would continue the "hand to hand" fight against autocracy, that they would not enter the Black Hundred Third Duma.

The Party of the Bolsheviks fought against this "Left" phrasemongering by retorting that it merely screened the helplessness

* Lenin, From the Camp of Stolypin's "Labour" Party, *Collected Works*, Vol. XV.

ness of the "Lefts," that it was an attempt to justify their refusal to do the hard, stubborn, serious work of training and organizing the masses.

These opportunist currents—liquidationism on the Right, opportunism on the "Left" and the centrism of Trotsky—reflected the sentiments of the petty-bourgeois elements which were endeavouring to subject the labour movement to bourgeois influence. The Bolsheviks promptly exposed the petty-bourgeois, anti-revolutionary essence of these sentiments to the workers. The influence of these opportunist currents on the working class was insignificant.

The best elements of the Mensheviks, primarily the menshevik workers, did not follow their leaders when they finally turned to liquidationism. These working-class Mensheviks formed a special group, the "Party Mensheviks," who were headed by Plekhanov. While retaining their menshevik positions on the principal questions of tactics, the Party Mensheviks came out against the Liquidators and defended the necessity of preserving the illegal party. They thereby helped to expose liquidationism in the eyes of the working-class Mensheviks. Therefore Lenin considered it possible for a certain period to form a *bloc* with Plekhanov for a joint struggle against the Liquidators. The Bolsheviks however did not for a moment forget that Plekhanov and his adherents remained Mensheviks and therefore did not cease to criticize and expose their opportunism. "This is a *bloc* and not a merger," emphasized Comrade Stalin in 1910. This *bloc* made it easier for the Bolsheviks to win over working-class Mensheviks. Local Party organizations in which the latter at first followed Plekhanov went over in increasing numbers to the side of the Bolsheviks, as they gradually outlived their menshevism. Plekhanov however continued to remain a Menshevik and gradually lost all influence among the workers. In the end he and his tiny group of adherents were left completely stranded beyond the pale of the labour movement.

The Struggle Against the Opportunists in the Ranks of the Bolsheviks

The difficult conditions that prevailed during the period of reaction exerted their influence also on a minor section of the

least steadfast Bolsheviks. In connection with the elections to the Third State Duma, a group of Bolsheviks (headed by A. Bogdanov, L. Kamenev and others) demanded a boycott of the Duma, i.e., refusal to participate in these elections.

In the beginning these boycott sentiments were entertained by a considerable number in the Party. Lenin, who maintained that it was necessary to participate in the Third Duma, at first was in the minority; most of the Bolsheviks, both at the St. Petersburg conference and at the Third All-Russian Conference of July 1907, advocated a boycott of the Duma. However, as a result of energetic struggle and persistent explanation of the harmfulness of a boycott at the given stage, Lenin succeeded in dissipating these boycott sentiments. The Party took part in the elections and returned fifteen social-democratic deputies to the Duma (five of whom were Bolsheviks).

In explaining the necessity of participating in the Third State Duma, Lenin argued that the slogan of boycotting the Bulygin Duma in 1905 had been absolutely correct: at that time the country was going through a period of revolutionary upsurge; the boycott slogan was a slogan which called upon the masses to engage in revolutionary struggle, in non-parliamentary forms of struggle—in strikes, demonstrations, armed uprising.

When the Third Duma was convened conditions had radically changed. The revolutionary movement was experiencing a temporary decline. The masses had no faith whatever in the Third Duma and therefore participation in it could not foster any false illusions among the masses. On the other hand the opportunities for open propaganda and agitation were quite curtailed at that time and therefore, argued Lenin, the Party was duty-bound to make use of the Duma tribune.

Bolsheviks, he explained, by no means advocate a boycott under *all* circumstances. In a period of revolutionary upsurge they may boycott a bourgeois parliament in order to focus attention and to direct the energy of the masses towards open revolutionary struggle. In the conditions of a temporary decline of the revolution, when an armed uprising is not immediately on the order of the day, the Party of the proletariat can and must make use of the bourgeois parliament alongside of the other forms of struggle.

Participation in the Third Duma enabled the Party to propagate Bolshevik views there for the purpose of winning over the masses.

After the opening of the Duma some of the former boycottists demanded that the social-democratic deputies be *recalled* from the Duma, hence the name *Otzovists** given to this group. The Otzovists were headed by A. Bogdanov, Lyadov, G. Alexinsky** and others. They tried to show that in this Black Hundred Duma the social-democratic fraction could not pursue a consistent revolutionary line. They denied that under the conditions of reaction tactics of *retreat* were necessary. Despite the low tide of the revolutionary movement, the Otzovists continued to defend the tactics of the preceding period of revolutionary upsurge. They considered that the basic task of the Party must consist in preparing the armed uprising, creating fighting detachments and so forth. At the same time the Otzovists absolutely refused to make use of any legal organizations whatever. They claimed that the Bolsheviks should not enter the trade unions and the other legal workers' organizations, inasmuch as the conditions for working there were exceedingly difficult on account of the police persecution. This position of the Otzovists was thoroughly opportunist. If the Party had renounced the difficult work in the State Duma, in the trade unions and other legal workers' organizations, it would thereby have rendered the greatest service to the Liquidators, as it would have afforded them the opportunity of corrupting the minds of the workers in these organizations without let or hindrance. The Party would have lost all contact with the masses. The tactics of the Otzovists denoted in practice a complete renunciation of revolutionary work among the masses, although they in contradistinction to the Liquidators, concealed this renunciation behind "Left" phrasemongering. This is the precise reason why Lenin called them Liquidators turned inside out, or "Liquidators on the Left."

The *ultimattist* current (Lunacharsky, Shantser-Marat and others) represented a variety of the Otzovists. At bottom the Ultimattists repeated all the arguments of the Otzovists. They dif-

* Recallists.—Ed. Eng. ed.

** Subsequently an active counter-revolutionary whiteguard.—Ed. Russian ed.

ferred from them in that they proposed to present first an ultimatum to the fraction to carry through their line in the Duma and in case the fraction refused to submit to this ultimatum, to recall its members from the Duma. Essentially this current differed in no wise from the Otzovists, for which reason Lenin called them "shamefaced Otzovists."

The Party set its face sternly against the Otzovists and the Ultimacists.

The Bolsheviks could not tolerate in their ranks the existence of a separate opportunist otzovist faction which on the basic questions of tactics was at loggerheads with the Leninist line of the Party. The enlarged conference of the editorial board of the newspaper *Proletary* which took place in June 1909 made the clear-cut declaration that bolshevism had nothing in common with this opportunist current and read the Otzovists—Bogdanov, Krassin, and the rest—out of the Bolshevik Party. The Party thereupon declined all responsibility for any political moves made by these former Bolsheviks.

In 1920 Lenin wrote that the defeat suffered by the revolution of 1905-07 proved a very useful lesson to the Party and the working class.

"Of all the defeated opposition and revolutionary parties," wrote Lenin, "the Bolsheviks effected the most orderly retreat, with the least loss to their 'army,' with the nucleus of their Party best preserved, with the fewest splits (in the sense of deep, irremediable splits), with the least demoralization, and in the best condition to renew work on the broadest scale and in the most correct and energetic manner. The Bolsheviks achieved this only because they ruthlessly exposed and expelled the revolutionary phrasemongers, who refused to understand that it was necessary to retreat, that it was necessary to know how to retreat, that it was absolutely necessary for them to learn how to work legally in the most reactionary parliaments, in the most reactionary trade unions, co-operative societies, insurance societies and similar organizations." *

Some of the Otzovists (A. Bogdanov, Lunacharsky and others) who made common cause with the group of Liquidators (Valentinov, Yushkevich and others) began a struggle against the very foundations of Marxism, particularly against Marxian philosophy. This group openly began to preach bourgeois the-
 ory.

* Lenin, *'Left-Wing' Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, pp. 21-22.

ies, religious notions. Lunacharsky preached a new religion concocted by him, known as god-creating. In place of the old bad god he suggested another, a new god, in his attempt to link socialism to religion.

Lenin came out most energetically against these attempts to drag in a new form of religious quackery under the flag of Marxism. He proved that religion had always served as an instrument for stupefying the masses, that it had always helped the ruling classes to keep the toiling masses in subjection by conjuring up the "fear of the Lord." Every religious idea, wrote Lenin, every idea about a "good Lord" is the most dangerous filth, the vilest contamination. There is not the slightest difference between the old and the new, "pure" good Lord. The gospel of this "pure," new good Lord was still more pernicious, according to Lenin, had a still greater tendency to stupefy the masses.

"Of late the Russian bourgeoisie has been constrained, for its counter-revolutionary purposes, to revive religion, to strengthen religion among the people," wrote Lenin.

This gospel of god-creating preached by Lunacharsky and others reflected the turn of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and intelligentsia to religion and religious quackery. The same conference of the enlarged editorial board of the *Proletary* declared that the gospel of god-creating, especially that of Lunacharsky, was a renunciation of the very foundations of Marxism and represented one of the forms of struggle of the petty-bourgeois elements against proletarian socialism.

In his struggle against the opportunists who were distorting the very foundations of the theory of Marxism, Lenin during the years of reaction devoted a great deal of attention to questions of Marxian philosophy.

In 1908 Lenin wrote his notable work *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. This book was of exceptional importance in the development of Marxist-Leninist theory. Lenin raised the development of the basic questions of Marxist philosophy to a hitherto unattained altitude. The struggle by Lenin against bourgeois distortions of Marxian philosophy evoked the unbridled wrath of all opportunists. The Liquidators, the Otzovists and the

other opportunist elements took the adherents of bourgeois philosophy under their wing.

Soon thereafter, in 1909, the Otzovists, Ultimativists and God-Creators, who had formed a mutual alliance, organized a special-fraction called the *Vperyodists*.*

In 1909 the Vperyodists organized their factional school on the island of Capri (Italy). Here, under the guise of training Party workers, the Vperyodists did intensive factional work among those who arrived from Russia, setting them against Lenin and the Bolsheviks in every way. The Vperyodists succeeded in converting some of the students at the school into their adherents. Others, headed by the worker Michael Vilonov, understood the factional character of this Vperyod undertaking. They dropped the school and went to see Lenin in Paris. After attending a course of lectures given by Lenin, Krupskaya, Dubrovinsky and others, this group left Paris to work in Russia where they took up the cudgels to fight for the Leninist line.

At the end of 1910 the Vperyodists organized a second school of the same type in Bologna, Italy, in which even Trotsky and the Liquidators took part, thus coming out in a united front against Lenin and the Bolsheviks.

The Vperyod group fiercely fought the Bolsheviks up to the Revolution of 1917. In their struggle against the Bolshevik Party the Vperyodists made common cause with the overt Liquidators in a joint endeavour to liquidate this revolutionary, irreconcilably Marxist workers' party.

The Bolsheviks linked up the struggle against opportunism on the Right as well as on the "Left" with a determined struggle against conciliationism and lack of consistency in their own ranks. At that time it was L. Kaménev, G. Zinoviev, I. Dubrovinsky, A. Rykov, M. Lubimov and others who occupied conciliatory positions. The conciliators opposed a determined break with the opportunists and insisted on working jointly with the Liquidators, Otzovists and Trotsky. Despite Lenin and the Party, they came to an understanding with the representatives of the Liquidators and the Otzovists to call a special Plenum of the Central Com-

* Followers of the newspaper *Vperyod*, not to be confused with the earlier Bolshevik *Vperyod*.—Ed. Eng. ed.

mittee for the purpose of uniting and "reconciling" all currents.

The plenum took place in January 1910. In addition to the Bolsheviks the Plenum was attended by representatives from all currents which formally still constituted part of the R.S.D.L.P.—the Liquidators, Trotskyists, Vperyodists, the representatives of the national social-democratic organizations (Latvians, Poles, Bundists). As early as this Plenum Lenin deemed it necessary to effect a complete rupture with all these currents except the Party Mensheviks. At the Plenum he set forth a clear and plain policy of struggle against the Liquidators on the Right and on the "Left," while exposing the harmfulness and untenability of rotten conciliationism. However the majority at the Plenum consisted of conciliators, who strove to bring everybody together without distinction. At this Plenum the bolshevik conciliators (Kamenev, Nogin and others) came out against Lenin in support of the unprincipled policy of Trotsky who in the guise of fighting against factionalism endeavoured to ensure the victory of the Liquidators over the Bolsheviks.

To prevent a split with the Liquidators the conciliators at the Plenum pursued a line opposed to the struggle on two fronts.

Due to the conciliators, representatives of various opportunist currents were brought into the editorial boards of the *Sotsial-Demokrat* (*Social-Democrat*), the central organ of the R.S.D.L.P., and other Party organs. In the decisions passed by the Plenum, some of Lenin's propositions were included, for instance his denunciation of liquidationism and otzovism. This constituted the positive side of the Plenum. At the same time the conciliatory decisions of the Plenum retarded the struggle of the Bolsheviks against the Liquidators, rendered it more difficult to cleanse the Party of anti-Party elements.

"An all-conciliationist hodge-podge" and "idiotic conciliatory mistakes of the Plenum" is what Lenin wrote about the conciliatory decisions of the January Plenum. Subsequent events completely confirmed the correctness of Lenin's appraisal of the Plenum of the Central Committee in 1910.

After the Plenum the opportunist Liquidators and others openly worked within the Central Committee and the Central Organ in a manner calculated to disintegrate the Party. They

blocked the calling of the Central Committee and violated the decisions of the Plenum. Though themselves members of the central organs of the Party they fought for the liquidation of the Party. However, despite this, the conciliators continued to support them, thus playing the role of servitors of liquidationism and otzovism and retarding the struggle of the Bolsheviks against opportunism. Therefore Lenin called the conciliators *concealed Trotskyists*, waged an irreconcilable struggle against them and succeeded in bringing about their complete exposure. The policy of the conciliators caused much harm to the Party: because of them the Party for two whole years after the January Plenum remained without a strong Central Committee, capable of restoring the Party work which had been weakened during the years of reaction; because of them the final break with opportunism was postponed for almost two years—until the Prague conference (January 1912).

In their anti-Party struggle, their struggle against the Leninist line, the bolshevik conciliators joined hands with the representatives of the Polish Social-Democrats—Rosa Luxemburg, Tyszko, Markhlevsky and the others. These leaders of Polish Social-Democracy while not fully adhering to the Liquidators interfered in every way with the struggle of the Bolsheviks against the Liquidators, strove to unite the latter and to make the Bolsheviks subordinate to the opportunists.

The Bolsheviks have in substance been an independent party ever since the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. held in 1903, although formally they were considered a fraction of that party. In the united social-democratic organizations (in which they worked together with Mensheviks), the Bolsheviks set themselves the task of exposing the Mensheviks in the practical Party work, the task of driving them from the labour movement and of winning over to their side those social-democratic workers who had not yet understood the necessity of splitting with the Mensheviks, the Trotskyists, the Vperyodists, etc. This task was splendidly discharged by the Bolsheviks.

As the result of stubborn, patient work among the masses, and of irreconcilable struggle conducted under the leadership of Lenin against all forms of opportunism, the Bolsheviks dur-

ing the years of reaction won over to their side the vast majority of workers in the social-democratic organizations functioning in Russia. By 1910-11 almost all illegal Party organizations were Bolshevik. By that time the Liquidators, Trotskyists, Otzovists, Vperyodists, etc., had been reduced to insignificant handfuls of petty-bourgeois intellectuals who exercised almost no influence in the social-democratic organizations of the various localities.

CHAPTER VII

THE PARTY IN THE PERIOD OF THE NEW REVOLUTIONARY UPSURGE (1911-14)

The Party of the Bolsheviks in the Van of the New Revolutionary Upsurge

The second half of 1910 ushered in a decided change in the development of the labour movement. The industrial crisis was beginning to give place to an industrial boom. All branches of industry were experiencing a rapid up-grade movement. New large-scale enterprises employing a great number of workers were being established. New lines of production (electrical supplies, machinery, etc.,) were being introduced. Unemployment declined. The strike movement gained ground. The workers who had recovered from the difficult years of reaction were no longer on the defensive as during the preceding years but attacked the capitalists, demanding an increase in their wages, a shortening of their hours of work and an improvement in their conditions of work.

Whereas in 1910 there were only 222 strikes, in 1912 their number exceeded 2,000 and in 1914 there were already more than 3,500 strikes in which more than 1,300,000 workers participated.

The strike struggle of the period of upsurge was distinguished for the great obstinacy and the degree of organization displayed by the workers. The mass revolutionary upsurge attained particularly great force in 1912.

The shooting of the Lena goldfield workers on April 17 of that year galvanized the masses into action. On that day the workers of the Lena goldfields in Siberia who had long experienced savage exploitation gathered in order to declare their grievances to the gold mine management. Treshchenkov, an offi-

cer of the gendarmes, gave the order to fire. Two hundred and seventy persons were killed and two hundred and fifty wounded. This savage act of repression against unarmed workers called forth great indignation among the whole working class of Russia. A wave of strikes swept the whole country as a token of protest against the Lena shooting. In April 1912 no less than three hundred thousand workers were out on strike. About five hundred thousand took part in the May First strike of that year. Even the most backward of the workers—construction labourers, workers employed by small enterprises and so forth—were drawn into the movement. The strikes bore a clearly political character and were accompanied by mass meetings and demonstrations. The masses demonstrated under the principal bolshevik slogans. The workers set up political slogans to supplement their economic demands: "A Democratic Republic," "An Eight-Hour Working Day," "Confiscation of the Land." While in 1910 political strikes constituted less than four per cent, in 1912-14 they already constituted two-thirds of the total number of strikes.

The strike movement of 1912-14 testified to the fact that the period of decline was passing, that a new revolutionary upsurge had begun and that, as Lenin emphasized, this upsurge reached immeasurably greater heights than it had before the first revolution.

The stubbornness of the struggle waged by the workers may be judged by the strike at an electrical supplies works (in St. Petersburg) which continued for three and a half months, or by the famous strike at the New Lessner Works which lasted 102 days. The mass revolutionary movement grew incessantly until the very beginning of the imperialist war.

In July 1914 the revolutionary struggle of the workers reached its highest point. Mass strikes gripped St. Petersburg, the Urals, the Donbas, the Moscow textile region, the Baku oil-fields. In St. Petersburg on July 16 the police shot down the Putilov workers who had assembled for a meeting. In reply to this shooting the St. Petersburg Committee of the Bolsheviks called out the workers on a general strike. The latter answered the call of the Party by downing tools to a man. Demonstrations started on the streets of the capital. The workers built barricades. Already the first armed clashes were taking place between the workers on

the one side and the police and the army on the other. The movement grew; it expanded from day to day.

The upsurge of the revolutionary movement in 1912-14 proceeded under the direct leadership of the Bolshevik Party. The Bolsheviks changed from the tactics of retreat to those of determined attack, striving to stimulate the masses to engage in active revolutionary combat.

Lenin said:

"The most important thing is that the strikes, the meetings and demonstrations go on without a stop; that the whole of the peasantry and the whole of the army get to know about the stubborn fight the workers are putting up; that the rural districts, even the most remote, get to see that things are not quiet in the cities, that '*their own people*' have risen, that they are fighting a life-and-death struggle, that they are fighting for a better life, for higher wages, for an end to the lawless and arbitrary actions of the authorities, for the transfer of the landlord estates to the peasants, for the overthrow of the landlord monarchy of the tsar, for a republic. The latent rage and the restrained murmur of the countryside jointly with the indignation of the barracks must find their centre of attraction in the revolutionary strike of the workers." *

The basic line of the Bolsheviks was directed toward transforming the growing mass movement into a new revolution, towards uniting the separate actions into a general revolutionary onslaught.

The Party gave to the whole movement organization and discipline. Thanks to the leadership of the Party the struggle of the workers at the individual enterprises met with the support of the whole working class; partial strikes were changed into mass strikes, the economic struggle was transformed into a political struggle.

This policy of the Bolsheviks encountered the furious resistance of the Liquidators who in every way strove to hold back the growing revolutionary upsurge. Following in the footsteps of the bourgeoisie they pursued a line of disrupting the strike struggle.

The Liquidators declared to the workers that strikes *hindered* the organized struggle of the working class, that they *weak-*

* Lenin, "Development of the Revolutionary Strike and Street Demonstrations," *Collected Works*, Vol. XVI.

ened the workers. Instead of calling upon the workers to engage in the revolutionary strike struggle, the Liquidators summoned the workers to carry on peaceful work in the trade unions and other legal organizations.

Seeing that it was impossible to hold the workers back from striking, the Liquidators tried to give this struggle as peaceful a character as possible, to keep it from growing into a revolutionary struggle, to restrain the workers from setting up political slogans and demands. To counterbalance the revolutionary slogans of the Bolsheviks (democratic republic, eight-hour working day, confiscation of the landlord estates), the Liquidators launched the reformist slogan of "the right of association," i.e., the right of assembly and of forming trade unions, freedom of the press and so forth. They expected to receive these rights as a result of the reforms introduced by the tsarist government. These were purely liberal demands fully acceptable even to the Cadets.

Instead of sponsoring the revolutionary struggle the Liquidators set forth their plan of a "petition campaign." They proposed to draw up a petition on the reforms needed, to collect signatures of workers in support of this petition and then to present it to the State Duma. This liquidationist plan had only one purpose: to take the minds of the masses off the revolutionary struggle. The "petition campaign" was fully endorsed by Trotsky who actively agitated in its favour. This campaign of the Liquidators suffered a miserable fiasco. The workers refused to sign the Liquidators' "petition"; they understood full well that they would get nothing for the mere asking and that there was no use expecting anything from the Black Hundred State Duma. After collecting only 1,300 signatures in the course of several months, the Liquidators dropped their scheme.

All the attempts of the Liquidators to draw the workers away from the revolutionary struggle ended in complete failure. The workers followed the Bolsheviks.

Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.

In December 1910 a weekly bolshevik newspaper, the *Zvezda* (*Star*) began to appear. It at once acquired great influence among the workers. At the same time the Bolsheviks under

Lenin's leadership began to prepare to call a Party conference.

The incipient revolutionary upsurge necessitated a Party conference that would consolidate the Party and its leading organs, would map out the tactics for the impending period and would finally purge its ranks of opportunist elements.

Orjonikidze, S. Schwartz, Goloshchekin, Shaumyan, Stassova and other comrades worked hard to prepare the conference. They travelled to a number of cities, made contact there with the underground Party organizations, acquainted the latter with Lenin's conception of the tasks of the Party and attended to the elections for the conference.

The conciliatory elements once more tried to draw the Vperyodists, the Mensheviks and Trotsky into the conference. However from the very start Lenin firmly set his face against their attempts. He believed that only the representatives of the local underground organizations who did Party work in Russia should be allowed to participate. Only such a conference would really be representative of the Party, would really be a Party conference. The groups of the Vperyodists, the Trotskyists and so forth, on the other hand, were groups of *literati* living abroad who were not connected with any Party work in Russia. They did not represent any Party organizations. Therefore, argued Lenin, to draw these opportunist groups into the conference would be a direct violation of the will of the majority of the Party.

The conference took place in January 1912 in Prague. Almost all Party organizations working in Russia were represented.

All delegates who came to the Conference from twenty Russian organizations, with the exception of two Party Mensheviks, were Bolsheviks. The Conference by unanimous vote expelled the Liquidators from the R.S.D.L.P. Trotsky as well as the Vperyodists and the other opportunist groups who refused to recognize the decisions of the Prague Conference were also ousted from the Party.

Thus at the Prague Conference the Bolsheviks made a clean sweep of all remnants of a formal union with the Mensheviks by finally driving them out of the R.S.D.L.P. The Conference recognized the fact that all Party organizations in Russia had rallied unanimously to the Leninist line and that thus the Bolshevik Party (R.S.D.L.P. [Bolsheviks]) alone embodied that

revolutionary social-democracy which the vast majority of the working class of Russia was following. The Conference, which really played the role of a Party congress, elected a new Bolshevik Central Committee with Lenin at its head. Comrades Stalin, Sverdlov, Orjonikidze, Kalinin, Bubnov, Stassova and Spandaryan were also elected members of the Central Committee.

These were the leaders who during the difficult years of reaction had under Lenin's leadership shouldered the task of preserving and consolidating the Party, had borne the brunt of the fight against opportunism; under unbelievably difficult conditions they had preserved the Party from breaking up and had ensured its restoration.

The Conference mapped out the tactics of the Party for the immediate period of the rising revolutionary upsurge. It pointed out that the principal task of the Party was to consolidate its illegal organization. It instructed all organizations to intensify their efforts to train and organize the proletariat in a socialist manner, to support and extend the revolutionary struggle of the masses in every possible way under the revolutionary slogans of the Party (democratic republic, eight-hour working day, confiscation of all landlord estates). In its resolution the Conference once more emphasized the fact that the struggle for a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry continued to be the immediate aim of the proletariat. The Party was assigned the task of explaining to the broad masses of the toilers, especially to the peasants, the inseparable connection between their wretchedness (starvation, unemployment, etc.) and the whole policy of tsarism. The Conference mapped out the tactics of the Party for the elections to the Fourth State Duma which were to take place in the autumn of 1912.

The Prague Conference issued clear, concrete directives for the development of Party work under the conditions of the new uprising of the revolution. It welded and consolidated the Party still more into a single whole on the basis of the Leninist line.

The August Bloc

Headed by Trotsky all opportunist groupings waged a fierce struggle against the decisions of the Prague Conference.

In August 1912 Trotsky convened the so-called August Conference in Vienna at which Liquidators, Trotskyists, Vperyodists and also representatives of the Bund, of the Latvian Social-Democratic Party which at that time was under the leadership of Liquidators, and of the petty-bourgeois Polish Socialist Party, the P.P.S. (*Levitsa**), congregated.

This was an agglomeration of the most heterogeneous elements which differed in opinion on quite a number of fundamental issues. The only thing that united all these anti-Party currents was their common hatred of bolshevism. In every other respect the August *Bloc* granted the groupings which composed it absolute freedom to carry on their respective opportunist lines. Lenin called this unprincipled anti-Party *bloc* an *adventure*.

Subsequently, in 1926, Trotsky then a member of the Bolshevik Party once more set up an unprincipled anti-Party *bloc* to fight the Leninist Central Committee. In addition to Trotsky and his adherents, Kamenev, Zinoviev and other opportunist elements joined in this *bloc* on a Trotskyist platform. The Party at that time immediately unmasked the lack of principle of this *bloc* and pointed out that this Trotskyist *bloc* of 1926 was a direct repetition of the August *Bloc* established by Trotsky in 1912.

At the August Conference overt liquidationism was the governing keynote. The Conference openly renounced the struggle for a republic, for the eight-hour working day, for the confiscation of the land, in fact all the principal demands contained in the social-democratic program.

The Conference looked upon the attempt to obtain partial reforms from tsarism by marching together with the liberal bourgeoisie as the principal task of the working class.

The August *Bloc* created by Trotsky was, according to Comrade Stalin's definition, "the hotbed of centrism" in Russia. The Vperyodists who took part in it, calling themselves "Left" Bolsheviks, served as nothing more nor less than a screen for its liquidationist character.

Trotsky, who concealed the anti-Party nature of his *bloc* by ranting about unity of all Social-Democrats, was unmasked by

* Left Wing.—Ed. Eng. ed.

the Bolsheviks before the masses. In all their work the Bolsheviks showed to the advanced workers that no unity was possible with the opportunists, that unity was possible only among those who were carrying on revolutionary Party work on the spot.

In 1913 Stalin wrote in the *Pravda*:

"We assert that only that union will be firm which the *workers themselves* will set up at the factories and mills. The slogan of those who really want unity ought to be: *unity from below*. To begin at the other end—with diplomatic 'negotiations' with the leading group of the Liquidators—would mean to make unity more remote rather than bring it nearer." *

Due to the blows dealt it by the Bolsheviks, Trotsky's pitiful attempt ended in dismal failure. Precisely in consequence of its lack of principle the *bloc* was bound to fall apart in the long run. At the August Conference itself the Vperyodists split away from it. Afterwards the *bloc* was forsaken by the Latvians and the Georgian Mensheviks. Finally Trotsky left it, having quarrelled with the Liquidators.

The August *Bloc* did not meet with the slightest sympathy on the part of the working class.

The liquidationist newspaper *Luch* (*Ray*) published by the *bloc* found its principal support among the petty-bourgeois intellectual strata. Even the Liquidators themselves (for instance Mantov) were compelled to admit that the masses of the workers did not support their paper and that its influence among the workers was next to nothing.

The Pravda and the Bolshevik Fraction in the Fourth State Duma

The Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda* (*Truth*) which began to come out daily in May 1912 played an enormous part in the revolutionary training of the masses. In simple, intelligible language the *Pravda* explained the ideas of bolshevism to the broadest masses, reacted quickly and energetically to all events in the life of the workers. The numerous acts of police persecution, the fines, arrests and confiscations were all unable to gag

* *Pravda*, No. 31, (1913).

the voice of the bolshevik *Pravda*. During its first year the *Pravda* was confiscated more than forty times and this in addition to fines, arrests of editors and so forth. Each time the police prohibited it, it reappeared under another name. The workers at the enterprises voluntarily collected money for the "iron fund" of the *Pravda*. The sum of eighteen thousand rubles—an enormous amount for that time—was collected by the workers penny by penny in the course of one year alone. It was only thanks to the support of the workers that the *Pravda* was able to exist and perform its revolutionary work. Lenin attached tremendous importance to these workers' collections taken up on behalf of the *Pravda* and carefully studied these collection lists. By the amount contributed in any particular district, he said, it was possible to gauge the influence of the *Pravda* and of the Bolshevik Party among the workers of that district. In comparing the data on the contributions made to the *Pravda* and to the liquidationist *Luch*, Lenin specially emphasized the fact that the *Pravda* was supported by the workers while the *Luch* received its contributions almost exclusively from the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia.

The very intimate contact between the *Pravda* and the workers was one of the great merits of that paper. More than 11,000 contributions sent in by workers were printed in the *Pravda* in one year alone.

It continued its revolutionary work down to the outbreak of the war, roused the working masses in the most backward corners of Russia, linked up the foremost workers with the Party. On July 21, 1914, the *Pravda* was prohibited and did not reappear again until the February Revolution of 1917.

Under the reactionary police regime the *Pravda* served as the vehicle through which the Party distributed its directives, strengthened the ideological and organizational coherence and unity of the Party organizations. During the two and a half years of its existence the *Pravda* trained a strong cadre of bolshevik workers.

To quote Comrade Stalin:

"As early as 1902 Comrade Lenin wrote in his *What Is To Be Done* that a well functioning national (all-Russian) militant newspaper must not only be a collective agitator but a collective organ-

izer. This is precisely the kind of newspaper into which the *Pravda* was changed in the period of the struggle against the Liquidators to preserve the underground organization and win over the legal labour organizations."

The *Pravda* appeared under the direct leadership of Lenin who at that time moved from Switzerland to Cracow (near the Russian border) and almost daily contributed to its columns.

Comrade Stalin also took a direct part in the leadership of the *Pravda* during his stay in St. Petersburg at the end of 1912 until his arrest in the spring of 1913.

Other active contributors to the *Pravda* were Comrades Molotov, Bubnov, Olminsky, Solts, Demyan Byedny, Krylenko and Yenukidze.

The Bolshevik fraction in the Fourth State Duma performed a tremendous amount of Party work. At the elections to the Duma, which were held in the autumn of 1912, seven Liquidators and six Bolsheviks were elected, the former in such non-proletarian districts as Transcaucasia, Siberia, etc. In the working-class centres the Bolsheviks carried off a splendid victory. About 90 per cent of all votes cast by the workers in the biggest working class centres of the country were for the Bolsheviks.

The bolshevik deputies who entered the Duma were G. I. Petrovsky (now President of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee), Badayev (subsequently President of the Moscow Union of Consumers' Societies), Muranov, Samoylov, Shagov and Malinovsky. The last-named subsequently turned out to be an *agent-provocateur*.

Lenin, who attached exceedingly great importance to the work of the bolshevik fraction in the Duma, gave it direct leadership from abroad. From abroad he sent the bolshevik delegates material and instructions on various questions. All the principal moves of the Bolsheviks were made on Lenin's instructions. Lenin personally wrote quite a number of the most important speeches that were to be delivered by the Bolsheviks from the tribune of the Duma (for instance, the speech on the national policy, on the agrarian policy of the government, on the policy of the Ministry of Education and on the Ministry of Agriculture).

The bolshevik deputies repeatedly visited Lenin abroad and received directions for their work from him. In December 1912

at Cracow and in September 1913 in Poronino (Galicia) enlarged conferences of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. were convened with Party workers attending. At both conferences the work of the bolshevik fraction in the Duma was a point at issue.

Through the medium of the speeches delivered by the bolshevik fraction in the Duma, the Party enhanced its influence among the masses. The speeches of the bolshevik deputies were published and distributed throughout the country. By instruction of the Party the Duma fraction conducted quite a number of major political campaigns which stirred the entire working class of Russia. Thus, for instance, the action taken by the fraction of the Duma on the occasion of the savage drive of the government against the trade unions was supported by the powerful strike of sixty thousand St. Petersburg workers.

Not confining their activities within the walls of the Duma, the bolshevik deputies maintained constant contact with their working class constituencies and local organizations and carried on much agitational and organizational work by direction of the Party. The bolshevik fraction in the Fourth State Duma and the newspaper *Pravda* were the principal legal points of support by means of which the Party carried on its revolutionary work among the masses.

Until October 1913 the Bolsheviks and the Liquidators in the Duma formally constituted a joint social-democratic fraction although from the very first day a stubborn struggle went on between the two groups. Taking advantage of their majority of one vote (seven against six) the Liquidators hindered the work of the bolshevik deputies in every manner, did not permit them to speak from the Duma rostrum, did not allow them to enter the various commissions. In all their practical work the seven liquidationist deputies pursued an openly liquidationist line. In October 1913, at the suggestion of Lenin, the bolshevik deputies left the united social-democratic fraction after a long and stubborn struggle and formed an independent, bolshevik fraction.

The Bolsheviks conducted much work among the masses in connection with the split in the Duma fraction. They explained to the masses the opportunist line of the Liquidators and the necessity of a split with them. The vast majority of the workers

fully approved the conduct of the Bolsheviks. An uninterrupted torrent of resolutions drawn up by workers, of greetings and promises of support inundated the bolshevik fraction. During a month and a half ten thousand signatures in support of the Bolsheviks were collected while the Liquidators could hardly get four thousand.

This campaign in connection with the split of the Duma fraction strengthened the influence of the Bolsheviks among the workers still more.

The Party also devoted a great deal of attention to work in the legal organizations—the trade unions, clubs, hospital and sick benefit societies, co-operative organizations. In contrast to the Liquidators who were pursuing a policy of driving all politics out of these organizations, the Bolsheviks endeavoured to transform these organizations into weapons of political training of the workers, into a bulwark of the Bolshevik Party.

In 1913-14 the Bolsheviks won all the existing big trade unions to their side: the St. Petersburg Metal Workers' Union, the unions of the textile workers, of the tailors, woodworkers, store clerks, etc.

All attempts of the Liquidators and of Trotsky to steer the labour movement along a course of compromise with the bourgeoisie suffered complete shipwreck. The workers drove them out of the trade unions and other legal organizations where they had succeeded in gaining a foothold during the years of reaction. In the middle of 1914 when a new revolution was rapidly making headway, the vast majority of the working class followed the lead of the Bolshevik Party.

While enhancing its influence among the workers the Party during the years of upsurge devoted very much attention to the question of Party construction. This question was raised at the Cracow and Poronino conferences of the Central Committee to which other Party workers had been invited. On the basis of the decisions taken at these conferences, the Party in every respect strengthened its nuclei at the various enterprises, formed fractions in the trade unions and other legal organizations. The Party restored the Party committees which had been broken up during the years of reaction and formed new ones. In 1913 the Party energetically proceeded to restore the regional com-

mittees by calling regional councils and wherever possible regional conferences. The period of upsurge was a period when the Party experienced considerable organizational consolidation.

At the end of 1913, after the Peronino Conference, the Party began to prepare for the convocation of the next regular (the Sixth) Party Congress. The Congress was to have met in August 1914. In the spring and summer of 1914 the work of preparing for the congress went ahead full blast. The Central Committee sent its representatives to the various local organizations who made reports concerning the Congress and caused elections of delegates to be held. By July 1914 almost all the preparatory work was finished. However, by reason of the war which had begun, the Congress had to be postponed. It could not take place until July-August 1917, i.e., after the February Revolution.

During these years Comrade Stalin played a most important part in leading the Party work in Russia. Having fled from exile at the end of 1911, Comrade Stalin was put in charge of underground work in St. Petersburg. After the Prague Conference he was active in the capacity of member of the Central Committee. At that time Comrade Stalin by order of the Central Committee travelled to the most important districts of Russia, guided the work of the newspaper *Zvezda* during the days of the Lena strike and took a leading part in establishing the *Pravda*. In April 1912 Comrade Stalin was again arrested and exiled to the Narym region. In the summer of the same year Comrade Stalin once more fled from exile to St. Petersburg. From there he went to see Lenin who was in Cracow, and took part in the well-known conference of the Bolsheviks held in that city the same year. He then returned to St. Petersburg where, acting under Lenin's direct instructions, he was in charge of the Bolshevik election campaign for the Fourth Duma, and directed the work of the Bolshevik fraction in that Duma and of the Bolshevik organs *Zvezda* and *Pravda*. He was again arrested and exiled in the spring of 1913. This time he was sent to the Turukhansk region where he stayed during 1914-16. Only the February Revolution of 1917 set him free to return from exile.

*The Struggle of the Party Against Opportunism in
the National Question*

The Party attached a great deal of importance during that period to the national question. The great-power policy, i.e., the policy of gross persecution of the national minorities, pursued by the autocracy with the support of the bourgeoisie, intensified the movement for national liberation among the oppressed peoples of Russia. The national question, as a problem of the reserves and the allies of the proletariat in the revolution, acquired exceptional importance at that time and was also of particularly great international importance in connection with the approaching imperialist world war.

The Bolsheviks fought for the *right of nations to self-determination including political* secession*. This slogan meant that each nation had the right to secede from Russia and form an independent state. The Bolsheviks did not consider it absolutely necessary that Russia be cut up into a great number of petty national states. But they were of the opinion that no one had the right forcibly to detain any particular nation within a unified Russian state, that each nation must itself freely decide whether it will remain part of Russia or form an independent state. The Party staunchly asserted that the struggle against national oppression was inseparably bound up with the entire struggle against the autocracy and that the realization of equal rights for all nations was impossible without a decisive victory of the revolution.

By fighting for the realization of the right of nations to self-determination including political secession, the Party of the Bolsheviks delivered a telling blow against the policy of Great-Russian chauvinism.

The articles on the national question published by the Bolsheviks and their speeches at meetings and in the Duma on this topic exerted tremendous revolutionary influence throughout the country and drew the sympathy of all revolutionary democratic elements of the oppressed nationalities to the Bolsheviks.

* That is, secession as an independent state.—Ed. Eng. ed.

While propagating their program on the national question, the Party waged a staunch struggle on two fronts against the opportunist currents in the national question. On the one hand it fought determinedly against the Liquidators who, jointly with the Bund and the Georgian Mensheviks, rejected the bolshevik program on the national question and launched the opportunist slogan of "national cultural autonomy." The demand of national cultural autonomy amounted to this: that the right to control their cultural affairs, *i.e.*, to organize schools, to publish literature in their mother tongue, etc., was to be obtained for the oppressed nations by peaceful reformist means, without overthrowing the autocratic order of society. The Party mercilessly exposed this opportunist demand by showing that the Liquidators and Bundists were occupying a liberal bourgeois position on the national question as well as on all other issues of the revolution and that they were thus outright agents and abettors of the bourgeoisie in the labour movement.

On the other hand the slogan of self-determination of nations was also rejected by the Polish Social-Democrats (Rosa Luxemburg, Tyszko, Radek and others). They asserted that the proletariat was not interested in the solution of the national question and that the struggle for national liberation would divert the proletariat from its principal task—the struggle against capitalism and for the proletarian revolution. The Bolsheviks, headed by Lenin and Stalin, directed their fire also against this deviation in the national question, explaining that such an underestimation of the national question was carrying grist to the mill of Great-Russian chauvinism, would lead to a rejection of the hegemony of the proletariat in the struggle for national liberation, would hand over the toiling masses of the oppressed nationalities to the sole leadership of their national bourgeoisie.

While waging this struggle against the Liquidators and the adherents of Rosa Luxemburg, and for the correct solution and understanding of the national question among the Social-Democrats, the Party also fought against the petty-bourgeois nationalist sentiments among the masses. The national bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations strove to divorce the toiling masses of their respective nations from the all-Russian revolutionary

movement and to bring them under their own leadership. The Party of the Bolsheviks waged a stubborn fight to expose this bourgeois policy, to make it impossible for the national bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations to exercise leadership over the toiling masses, primarily the peasantry.

The Party laid every possible stress on the necessity of amalgamating the proletariat of all nationalities of Russia in united proletarian organizations (in a single Party uniting the foremost workers of all nationalities, in unified trade unions and so forth). The Party waged an energetic struggle against the efforts made by the Bund and the Polish and Latvian Social-Democrats to separate themselves from the movement. The works of Lenin on the national question written during this period (*The Right of Nations to Self-Determination* and others) were of the greatest international importance in developing the Marxist theory of the national question and exposing the opportunist theories which were widespread in the Second International.

The struggle for the Leninist line in the national question waged by Comrade Stalin during all these years was of exceptional importance. In his *Marxism and the National Question* written during this period and first printed in 1913, Comrade Stalin developed the bolshevik theory of the national question and exposed the opportunist theories prevalent in the Second International. After unmasking the Liquidationist and Bundist program of "national cultural autonomy" and making plain its bourgeois essence, Comrade Stalin gave detailed grounds for the national program of the Bolshevik Party. Lenin in 1913 laid particular stress on the paramount importance of Comrade Stalin's work on the national question. In speaking of the struggle which the Bolsheviks waged in that period for the revolutionary line on the national question, Lenin wrote:

"In Marxian theoretical literature this state of affairs and the foundations of the national program of the Social-Democrats have of late already been elucidated."* (Here Comrade Stalin's article stands out prominently.)

* Lenin, "The National Program of the R.S.D.L.P.," *Collected Works*, Vol. XVII.

*The Struggle of the Bolsheviks Against the Opportunists of the
Second International During the Years of Reaction
and Upsurge*

The struggle of the Bolsheviks during the years of reaction and upsurge was very important for the whole international labour movement. Instead of engaging in such peaceful work as the Socialist parties were doing in the parliaments of the capitalist countries, instead of asking the bourgeoisie for small favours for the workers, the Bolsheviks showed how participation in a bourgeois parliament must be utilized for the purpose of preparing the revolution.

By their revolutionary work in the trade unions the Bolsheviks showed how the masses of workers must be prepared through them for the forthcoming revolution. By transferring the focal point of all their work to the factories and mills, the Bolsheviks showed that this was the only way the Party could really win the majority of the working class.

The Bolsheviks set an example of how to combine legal with illegal forms of work and showed how the labour press should be run. The Bolsheviks set an example of how to struggle for the leadership of the toiling masses of the peasantry and oppressed nationalities.

The Bolsheviks showed how a rising revolutionary movement is to be led, how it is to be raised to an ever higher level, how the strike struggle of the workers is to be brought to the point of armed uprising.

Finally the Bolsheviks set an example of irreconcilable struggle against opportunism on the Right and on the "Left" and against a conciliatory attitude towards it. The Bolsheviks showed how the proletarian parties must cleanse their ranks of opportunist elements, how to drive this struggle to a decisive rupture with these elements.

The entire struggle of the Bolsheviks during the years of reaction and upsurge in Russia was of the greatest international importance, exemplifying as it did a really revolutionary struggle for the labour movement of all countries. This was an illustration of how the proletarian *party of the new type* was to be built and how it was to carry on the struggle.

During the entire epoch of reaction and upsurge the Bolsheviks waged an irreconcilable struggle against the opportunism of the Second International, striving to impart to the West European workers the revolutionary experience of bolshevism.

The Bolsheviks were active at the congresses of the Second International and in the International Socialist Bureau of which Lenin was a member.

The majority in the Second International occupied the same position on the principal questions of the revolution as the Russian Liquidators and Trotskyists. The leaders of the Second International, especially Kautsky, supported the Liquidators in their struggle against the Bolsheviks and before the war repeatedly tried to effect a "reconciliation" between the Bolsheviks and the opportunists, to subordinate the Bolsheviks to the opportunists.

On the eve of the war (in July 1914) the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International called a conference in Brussels consisting of Bolsheviks, Liquidators, Trotskyists, Vperyodists, Latvian and Polish Social-Democrats and others. At this conference, on the proposal of Kautsky, despite the protests of the Bolsheviks, a resolution was adopted voicing a need to unite all these currents in a single party. When the Bolsheviks refused to submit to this decision to unite with the opportunists, the secretary of the bureau, Huysmans, uttered dire threats against the Bolsheviks.

In contrast to the Second International which confined all its tactics to peaceful, reformist work, Lenin emphasized the revolutionary energy that was accumulating all over the world and the approach of the socialist revolution. Accordingly Lenin struggled for active revolutionary tactics in all countries, for a decisive defeat of opportunism, which was the main obstacle to the development of the revolutionary struggle of the international proletariat.

In connection with the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International held in 1907 Lenin, in dealing with the question of the threatening war, sharply flayed the leaders of the Second International who dissipated the vigilance of the masses by their phrasemongering and resolutions, who diverted them from revolutionary struggle and aided the bourgeoisie to make secret

preparations for the future war. With reference to the overt opportunists (for instance, the German Social-Democrat Vollmar) Lenin stated outright that by approving increases in armaments they stood completely on the side of their bourgeoisie and actively aided the preparations for an imperialist war. Lenin came out strongly also against Bebel who, while not completely supporting the standpoint of the overt opportunists, in his resolution submitted to the Stuttgart Congress evaded the question of the concrete measures to be taken in the struggle against militarism. Lenin showed that the half-way resolution of Bebel, despite its "Left" phrases, did not commit the Socialist parties to anything and that owing to this circumstance it in fact merely aided avowed opportunism. At the Congress itself Lenin together with Rosa Luxemburg introduced amendments to the resolution in which he raised the question of the necessity of waging a practical revolutionary struggle against war and pointed out the concrete paths this struggle must take. Lenin emphasized the fact that the task of Social-Democracy consisted not only in fighting against the outbreak of war but also in making use of war, once it has broken out, for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, for revolution.

Lenin unmasked Kautsky who had slurred over the opportunist character of the policy of the British Labour Party (1908). Lenin repeatedly disclosed the opportunist errors of Kautsky and his conciliatory attitude towards all kinds of opportunist manifestations, his abandonment of the revolutionary struggle, his lack of principle in questions of theory, etc.

In 1909 Lenin came out strongly in defence of the Left revolutionary elements in the Dutch Social-Democratic Party, against the International Socialist Bureau which supported the opportunists in Holland.

On the occasion of the Copenhagen Congress of the Second International (1910), Lenin declared outright that the German Social-Democratic Party, the leading party of the Second International, had shown its complete inability to adhere to a true line, that its leaders were flinching before opportunism.

Thus, Lenin and the Bolsheviks systematically uncovered every concrete manifestation of opportunism in the work of the Second International and the individual Socialist parties.

At the same time the Bolsheviks afforded every assistance to the Left revolutionary elements which took shape in the Socialist parties of Western Europe. The Bolsheviks directly *impelled* the Lefts to split with the opportunists. Lenin energetically supported the split with the opportunists which the Left revolutionary elements in Holland, Italy and other countries carried out. At the time of the Stuttgart (1907) and Copenhagen (1910) Congresses of the Second International, Lenin convened special conferences of the revolutionary elements and strove to weld them together for the struggle against the opportunists. However the Left Social-Democrats at that time represented a weak, amorphous, ideologically unequipped group which, as Comrade Stalin said, was even afraid to utter the words "break" or "split."

The Lefts* undoubtedly had quite a number of good points and could be credited with many revolutionary actions against opportunism and the conciliatory leadership of the Second International. They fought against the conciliatory position of Kautsky and Bebel in relation to the avowed opportunists—Bernstein and the others—and demanded Bernstein's expulsion from the Party. After the Revolution of 1905 they insisted on the adoption in Germany of a more energetic revolutionary struggle. Rosa Luxemburg called upon the entire labour movement to learn from the great lessons of the Russian revolution. The Lefts came out against the leadership of the German Social-Democratic Party who pursued a line tending to weaken the class struggle. This is precisely why the Bolsheviks supported them.

But the Left Social-Democrats at the same time committed a number of very serious political mistakes. They differed with the Bolsheviks on the national and peasant questions, on the question concerning the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution and they espoused the menshevik theory of permanent revolution. They came out against the Bolsheviks on the question of the necessity of forming a party of a new type. They differed with the Bolsheviks on the question of the function of

* In Germany the Lefts were headed by Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Clara Zetkin, Karl Radek, L. Tysko, Y. Marchlevski. They were called "Left Radicals."—Ed. Russian ed.

the soviets and the trade unions. On a number of basic questions of the revolution, the Left Social-Democrats had not yet freed themselves finally from their opportunist burden. They had not yet made up their minds to wage a consistent struggle against opportunism to the point of a split. Therefore while supporting the Lefts, especially the German Left radicals, the Bolsheviks had to criticize severely their semi-menshevik errors, to expose their indecision, inconsistency, their concessions to the opportunists. The Bolsheviks were the *only* Party which long before the imperialist war had finally broken with the opportunists and was pursuing a consistent line of revolutionary Marxism. The Bolsheviks were the *only* Party which after the declaration of war was able to lead the struggle for the formation of the new, revolutionary Third International.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PARTY IN THE YEARS OF THE IMPERIALIST WAR

The Imperialist War

The world imperialist war began on August 1, 1914. About twenty-five different states took part in it. The belligerents on the one side were Russia, England, France, Italy (beginning with the spring of 1915), Belgium, U.S.A. (beginning with the spring of 1917), Rumania, Japan, and others; opposed to them were Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. About seventy million men were called to arms.

The imperialist governments had secretly prepared for this war long before it was declared. The British and the French bourgeoisie aspired to seize the German colonies, to destroy their rapidly developing rival—Germany. On the other side, the Austrian and the German bourgeoisie strove to defeat their richer rivals—England, France and Belgium—and to extend their colonial possessions at their expense. Besides this the Austro-German bourgeoisie strove by means of the war to crush the aspiration of the South Slavic peoples (the Serbs and others) to national independence. Tsarist Russia prepared for the war in order to seize Galicia from Austria-Hungary and Constantinople and Armenia from Turkey.

At the same time the bourgeoisie in all countries strove by means of the war to distract the attention of the toiling masses from the revolutionary struggle, to disunite them and incite the workers of the various nationalities against one another, to exterminate the best section of the workers in the war and thus weaken the revolutionary movement of the proletariat.

In order to stupefy the masses, to compel them to go to war without a murmur, the bourgeoisie in each country developed a frantic propaganda of lies in its attempt to prove that it was its own particular country that had been attacked, that it had to

defend the fatherland against the invasion of the enemy, that it was waging the struggle solely for the liberation of the peoples oppressed by a foreign imperialism. Ruthlessly crushing every expression of discontent against the war, the bourgeoisie in all countries stirred up a wave of chauvinism through which they incited the toilers of the various nationalities against each other. At the start the bourgeoisie succeeded in deceiving more or less considerable sections of the toilers, to instil in them the thought that the war was being waged for the sake of defending their native land against the hated enemy. Revolutionary Social-Democracy was confronted with the very important task of exposing this bourgeois falsehood.

Collapse of the Second International

The war finally laid bare the opportunist complexion of the Second International. At various congresses of the Second International held before 1914 the question of a threatening imperialist war had been repeatedly discussed (at Stuttgart in 1907, at Copenhagen in 1910 and at Basle in 1912). In order to tranquilize the masses, the Second International had adopted vehement resolutions against war. However, these resolutions remained paper resolutions. The Second International did not wage any real struggle against the increase in armaments or against war preparations.

After war had been declared the leaders of the Socialist parties in all the principal capitalist countries at once openly deserted to the side of their respective bourgeoisies. The German and French Socialists on August 4, 1914 voted in their respective parliaments for war credits, for the support of their respective governments in this war. At the invitation of the bourgeoisie the Social-Democrats in Belgium, France, Great Britain and afterwards also in Germany and other countries accepted cabinet posts in their respective imperialist governments.

In each country Social-Democracy completely took up the bourgeois position of the *defence* of the fatherland. In carrying out the orders of the bourgeoisie, the social-democratic leaders called upon the masses to support the war, justifying it by claiming that the enemy had attacked their side and had thus com-

pelled Social-Democracy to defend the fatherland against the invasion of foreign imperialists. The Social-Democratic parties of the belligerent countries directed all their energies towards holding back the workers from the class struggle, from strikes, towards compelling them to endure without a murmur the monstrous exploitation that increased during the years of war.

Social-Democratic agitators induced the workers to take an active part in the war, to go to the front, etc. They persuaded the workers to believe that in wartime, in the face of a common foe, they must patiently put up with want and privation and give all their strength to the "fatherland."

By going over to the side of their own bourgeoisie, the leaders of the Second International betrayed the labour movement. Acting in close collaboration with their reactionary governments, they started a frenzied baiting of all revolutionary elements in the labour movement, helped to drive the most active workers out of the shops, etc. Thus the Social-Democratic parties finally slid down to social-chauvinism. Social-chauvinists are Socialists who *openly* support the imperialist policy of their bourgeoisie, openly renounce the class struggle, openly strive to oppress foreign nations. The most conspicuous representatives of social-chauvinism were Plekhanov and Potressov in Russia, Scheidemann and Südekum in Germany, Vandervelde in Belgium, Albert Thomas and Renaudel in France and Henderson in England.

This treason committed by the socialist leaders was by no means an accident. It had been prepared by the whole preceding history of the Second International. From its very inception a struggle was going on within the Social-Democratic parties between the revolutionary and the opportunist wings.

The bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries used part of the tremendous profits received from the exploitation of its colonies to bribe the labour aristocracy, the most highly skilled workers; it placed them in a privileged position, paid them better, etc. Thus this stratum of workers was directly interested in the imperialist policy of its bourgeoisie, in the despoliation of the colonies. The labour bureaucracy, *i.e.*, the officials of the trade unions, of the Social-Democratic parties, of the workers' co-operatives, etc., were closely connected with the labour aristocracy. It was these strata that constituted the principal support

of opportunism. They were in essence agents of the bourgeoisie in the labour movement. They supported class collaboration instead of class struggle and renounced all revolutionary fighting. The war transformed the secret alliance between the opportunists and the bourgeoisie into an open alliance, transformed opportunism into social-chauvinism.

Parallel with avowed social-chauvinism, which was outspoken in propagating the subordination of the interests of the working class to those of the bourgeoisie (participation in the war, class collaboration and so forth), there was also another, a concealed and therefore much more dangerous form of social-chauvinism which existed in the Second International—*centrism*. In speech the Centrists did not agree with outspoken defence of bourgeois ideas which the avowed Social-Chauvinists were preaching, but in practice they fully supported them. During the war the most prominent representatives of centrism were Kautsky in Germany, Trotsky and Martov in Russia, MacDonald in England and Rakovsky in Rumania.

Kautsky, who was the chief theoretician of centrism since long before the war, showed with striking clarity by his position during the war how the opportunists while verbally invoking Marxism were defending the bourgeois policy in practice. Kautsky sanctioned the vote of the Social-Chauvinists for war credits and helped them justify their treachery. While hypocritically spouting Marxian phrases, Kautsky denied the imperialist character of the war. He tried to prove that the Social-Democrats were defending the "fatherland" in this war. He declared that the International—the world-wide association and expression of solidarity of the working class—was an "instrument of peace." He thereby justified the treason of the Social-Chauvinists in all countries and helped them to hoodwink the workers.

Trotsky likewise came out in words against the war and social-chauvinism, but at the same time found all kinds of grounds on which to justify the Social-Chauvinists and fought against a split with them. Nothing in the world is more pernicious or more dangerous for the proletariat, said Lenin, than the dastardly hypocrisy of the Centrists who want to slur over everything, hush up everything, calm the workers by their false and pseudo-scientific chatter.

From the very first days of the war, as soon as the treachery of the leaders of the Second International became known, the Bolsheviks headed by Lenin broke finally with the Second International and waged an energetic struggle for the *immediate* split with social-chauvinism and centrism in the international labour movement, for the creation of the Third International. This betrayal of socialism, wrote Lenin, denotes the collapse of the Second International.

"The Second International is dead, having been defeated by opportunism," said Lenin. "Unity with the opportunists now means the subjection *in practice* of the working class to 'its own' national bourgeoisie, an alliance with it for the purpose of oppressing foreign nations and of struggling for Great-Power privileges."

The Tactics and Slogans of the Bolsheviks During the Years of the Imperialist War

The Party of the Bolsheviks was the only one of all the Social-Democratic parties which from the first days of the war waged an irreconcilable struggle against it. The Bolsheviks exposed its imperialist character and explained to the masses the predatory interests which each of the belligerent countries pursued in this war. The Bolsheviks indefatigably explained to the masses the essence of imperialism and imperialist wars. At that time Lenin wrote his remarkable work *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, a treatise of the greatest importance in developing the Marxist-Leninist theory. In this book Lenin expounded his doctrine of imperialism. After giving an exhaustive analysis of imperialism, Lenin demonstrated the decay and inevitable fall of capitalism. He made it plain that imperialism could not exist without wars and that therefore wars would cease only with the fall of imperialism, only after the victory of the socialist revolution. Hence Lenin drew the only possible revolutionary conclusion: that a consistent struggle against war meant a struggle for the overthrow of imperialism, for the proletarian revolution.

During the war years the principal slogan for the proletarians of the world advanced by Lenin called for a struggle to *transform the imperialist war into civil war*. This slogan ap-

pealed to the masses to transform the imperialist war into a war of the proletariat against its own bourgeoisie. Lenin summoned the workers and soldiers to turn their bayonets against their own governments. This slogan called upon the masses to engage in a revolutionary struggle.

It was clear to the Bolsheviks that this war which was ruining the toiling masses throughout the world must inevitably aggravate the discontent of the masses, accentuate their revolutionary sentiments. Therefore the Party bent all its energy toward preparing the masses for revolutionary action. The Party explained to the broad masses of workers and toilers the true predatory idea behind this war. It established and consolidated the illegal mass organizations and made use of all legal and semi-legal organizations for the revolutionary struggle.

The Bolsheviks did much work among the soldiers and sailors in the imperialist armies and navies, explaining to them the reasons why the bourgeoisie was driving them into the trenches. The Party attached the greatest importance to the organization of *fraternization in the trenches* among the soldiers of the warring countries. As the result of this revolutionary agitation, fraternization became so extensive towards the end of the war that the military authorities of Germany, Great Britain and Russia began to take the sternest measures against it, severely punishing any soldier who tried to organize fraternization.

The Party in every way promoted the revolutionary discontent among the masses, organized revolutionary actions, strikes, meetings, demonstrations, and took energetic steps to consolidate its own ranks.

The slogan of the defeat of one's own government advanced by the Party was of the greatest importance.

"A revolutionary class in a reactionary war cannot but wish the defeat of its own government," wrote Lenin.*

Military defeat, while weakening the government in question, facilitates the revolutionary struggle against the ruling classes. Therefore, said Lenin, the proletariat of each country must strain every fibre to weaken its own bourgeois government by

* Lenin, "Defeat of One's Own Government in the Imperialist War," *Collected Works*, Vol. XVIII.

waging a revolutionary struggle against it. Lenin argued that without practical work directed toward weakening its own bourgeois government, millions of revolutionary phrases against the war "are not worth a brass farthing."

At the end of February 1915 a conference of the bolshevik organizations abroad was called by the Party in Berne, Switzerland. War conditions did not permit of a more inclusive conference in which the representatives of the Russian organizations might also participate. Therefore the Berne Conference of bolshevik organizations abroad had virtually the significance of a general Party conference. In its resolutions written by Lenin the bolshevik tactics and slogans with reference to the war were clearly elucidated. The decisions of the Conference were of the greatest historical importance. They pointed out the path of struggle and the tasks of the revolutionary proletariat not only in Russia but also in the other capitalist countries. They elucidated the program of struggle for the labour movement of the whole world.

The Social-Chauvinists and Centrists fought desperately against the bolshevik slogans. The Social-Chauvinists of every country told the masses that the defeat of their government and civil war would lead to the conquest of their native land by the enemy and therefore appealed to the workers to defend their fatherland.

The Bolsheviks stubbornly exposed these tactics of the Social-Chauvinists who with the aid of these hypocritical phrases about the defence of the fatherland, etc., strove to compel the workers to defend the bourgeoisie and the autocracy. "The workers have no fatherland" were words uttered by Marx and often quoted by Lenin. Whoever desires the real welfare of his country must fight with all revolutionary means against the monarchy, the landlords and the capitalists, i.e., the worst enemies of our native land, wrote Lenin.

With still greater determination the Party exposed the Centrists. The slogan of fighting for peace was one of the principal slogans issued by the latter during the war. Trotsky supplemented this slogan at that time by adding: "Neither Victory nor Defeat." The Bolsheviks exposed these slogans as centrist slogans which in essence merely covered up the avowed

Social-Chauvinists. These slogans, in the words of Lenin, were tantamount to a renunciation of revolutionary struggle. They served to justify the bourgeoisie and Social-Chauvinists who likewise declared that they did not desire war, but were compelled to fight to avert "defeat." The Party developed a very active struggle against these slogans of the Centrists, explaining that these slogans only deceived the people because they held out the hope that the ruling classes and the governments were able to conclude the peace so much desired by the masses.

Another slogan of the Centrists, the slogan of disarmament, bore the same opportunist stamp. In fighting against it, the Bolsheviks laid bare the fact that the slogan of disarmament merely expressed the dream of the petty bourgeoisie that all strife cease. Lenin explained that the Bolsheviks were not at all opponents of *every* war: that the proletariat fights against imperialist wars but is in favour of civil war, the war of the proletariat against its own bourgeoisie.

"Our slogan must be: arming of the proletariat in order to vanquish, to expropriate and to disarm the bourgeoisie." *

The Party fought with especial energy against the centrist slogans because by reason of their seemingly "Left" character these slogans diverted the masses from the revolutionary struggle which alone could put an end to the imperialist war.

The Leninist Theory of the Possibility of the Victory of Socialism in One Country

Formerly Marxists upheld the view that a simultaneous revolution in all advanced countries was necessary for the victory of socialism. Lenin, basing himself on the essence of the Marxian doctrine, proved that in the epoch of imperialism it was possible for socialism to be first victorious in a single country. In his works he showed that the economic and political development of the individual countries in the epoch of imperialism proceeded with great unevenness, spasmodically. Countries which formerly were backward forged to the fore by accelerating their development, crowding out countries which had gone ahead, striving to seize their markets and colonies. This inevitably called forth

* Lenin, "The 'Disarmament' Slogan," *Collected Works*, Vol. XIX.

clashes and wars between the various countries for the redistribution of the world, for the elimination of dangerous rivals. These clashes and wars weaken the front of imperialism, make possible a breach of this front in individual countries. On the basis of this law of uneven development of capitalism Lenin showed that the victory of socialism was possible first in a few and even in a single capitalist country. This Leninist theory is of the greatest importance for the whole international labour movement. The theoreticians of the Second International (Kautsky and others) as well as the Russian Mensheviks asserted that the socialist revolution could only occur simultaneously in a number of the most advanced countries such as Germany, England, U.S.A. but in so far as this process of simultaneous revolution had not yet begun, they considered that the working class of their respective countries ought not to begin the revolution. This meant that in a country like Russia, for instance, there could be no talk of a socialist revolution until the revolution had triumphed in the advanced countries.

With the aid of this opportunist theory the leaders of the Second International in every way held back the workers from the revolution, leading them to believe that the revolution had not yet matured. On this issue Lenin administered a decisive defeat to the opportunists. He emphasized the fact that the proletariat not only can seize power but build socialism in one country, overcoming all internal contradictions by dint of its own forces and the support of the toiling masses of the peasantry. This Leninist theory has inspired the proletariat with the greatest faith in its own strength, energy and will to fight. It has mobilized the worker masses for the revolutionary struggle against capitalism in all countries. This theory has inspired the workers of the capitalist countries with the conviction that they can conquer at home even if the proletarians of other countries have not yet succeeded in overthrowing their own bourgeoisie.

The Leninist doctrine of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country dealt an exceptionally heavy blow to the theories of Trotsky. Trotsky during the war continued to advocate his menshevik theory of permanent revolution. In 1915 he came out against Lenin with the argument that a revolution in one country, for instance in Russia, would be doomed to

defeat if the proletariat of the advanced countries did not take power into its own hands and come to the aid of the Russian revolution. Trotskyism made use of this theory also in its subsequent struggle against the Bolshevik Party. At present this counter-revolutionary theory serves as a weapon in the hands of the enemies of the proletarian dictatorship in their struggle against the U.S.S.R. and the Comintern.

The Party of the Bolsheviks waged a most energetic struggle against this counter-revolutionary theory of Trotsky, defending the Leninist doctrine of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country. The magnificent successes of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. attest the triumph of Leninism and the truly counter-revolutionary essence of this Trotskyist theory.

The Struggle of the Bolsheviks for the Creation of the Third International

The Left current which existed in the labour movement before the war had not crystallized. With the outbreak of the war, the Left elements in the various countries, excepting the Bolsheviks in Russia, acted in disunity, each by himself, with unclear, sometimes even confusing, slogans against the war and the betrayal of the social-democratic leaders. The Bolsheviks were confronted with the task of organizing the Left elements into groups from which the new International was to arise.

Having broken with the Second International, the Bolsheviks launched the slogan of forming the *Third International* and began to make preparations to organize it. Left revolutionary groups of internationalists began to spring up everywhere. These Left groups reflected the hatred of the advanced section of the workers for the war and their indignation at the treachery of their leaders. In Germany these Lefts were the Spartacus group (Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Clara Zetkin) and the Radek group; in Sweden—the group of the so-called Swedish “Young”; in Switzerland—the group of Willy Münzenberg; in Bulgaria—the Party of the Tyessnyaki (“narrow” Socialists) headed by Blagoyev, Kolarov and others. Such groups also arose in France, Great Britain, Italy and other countries. These revolutionary groups, few in number and weak at first, gradually gained strength and mass influence among the workers. Despite police ter-

ror and persecution, they waged a heroic struggle against the imperialist war.

Lenin, who after the commencement of hostilities moved from Galicia to Switzerland, energetically proceeded to unite and rally all internationalist elements, to establish contact with them, to correspond with them, to acquaint them with his views, to enlighten them on their errors, to convince them. The representatives of the Bolshevik Party spoke at various gatherings of the Social-Democratic parties of the different countries and there exposed the Social-Chauvinists and Centrists, setting forth their own views for the purpose of winning the best of the social-democratic workers to their own side. These actions of the Bolsheviks as well as the letters of Lenin and the distribution of bolshevik literature hastened the formation of Left revolutionary groups in all countries to which they rendered great aid. Thus, the Bolsheviks headed by Lenin were the pivotal point around which the unification of all revolutionary elements in the international labour movement gathered.

At the beginning of 1915 a group of Swiss, Italian and other Centrists began to prepare an international socialist conference of war opponents. The Bolsheviks clearly saw the Centrist character of this conference. They understood that the conference was being called by the Centrists to calm the workers with "Left" phrases and to help the bourgeoisie strangle the revolutionary sentiments which were making themselves felt. However the Bolsheviks attributed great importance to the conference as this was the first international meeting of internationalists during the war.

The Bolsheviks went to this conference, first, in order to brand the treachery of the leaders of the Second International and the hypocrisy of the Centrists who concealed their opportunism by Left phrases while in essence justifying the treason of the Social-Chauvinists; second, because representatives of revolutionary workers who entertained a sincere hatred of the war but did not know how to fight against it were also expected to take part in this conference alongside of the centrist leaders. The Bolsheviks set themselves the task of rallying these workers around themselves and of showing them the road to struggle.

The International Socialist Conference took place in Septem-

ber 1915 at Zimmerwald, Switzerland. It was attended by representatives of Russia, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Norway and other countries. The resolutions adopted by the Zimmerwald Conference exhibited inconsistency and half-heartedness. The Conference did not brand the treason of the Socialist parties, did not see its way clear to recognize the crash of the Second International, refused to adopt the motion of the Bolsheviks to organize a Third International. It did not call the masses to outright revolutionary struggle against the imperialist governments. At the same time the Conference was undoubtedly a step forward in the direction of uniting the proletarian elements of the countries at war with each other, elements which were ready to protest against the war. Despite its half-truths, the Conference underscored the imperialist character of the war, condemned the social-chauvinist idea of the "defence of the fatherland," and so forth.

At the Zimmerwald Conference the Bolsheviks stubbornly fought for a consistently revolutionary, internationalist line. They secured the adoption of a number of important amendments to the resolutions of the Conference. Of particular importance was the fact that the Bolsheviks rallied to themselves the most revolutionary section of the delegates, united them into a special current, the so-called "Zimmerwald Left." At the Conference the Zimmerwald Left expounded its views at length and presented its draft manifesto in which all the principal Leninist slogans were developed.

"The overthrow of the capitalist governments is the aim which the working class of all belligerent countries must set itself, because only then will there be an end to the exploitation of one people by another, an end to wars, will the power to dispose of the life and death of peoples be wrested from capital," declared this draft manifesto.

The bureau set up by the Zimmerwald Left consisted of Lenin, Zinoviev and Radek. It did much practical work among the revolutionary elements of all countries. The Zimmerwald Left carried on agitation among the workers, printed and distributed illegal literature, established contacts with the revolutionary groups in all countries, rendered them aid in their struggle against the war. The organizations connected with the

Zimmerwald Left published about twenty newspapers and magazines in the various countries.

At the time of the Second International Socialist Conference (which took place in April 1916 in Kienthal, Switzerland) the numerical composition and political importance of the Zimmerwald Left had made considerable strides. At the Conference itself the Bolsheviks succeeded in drawing almost half of the delegates to their side on various questions. None the less, this Conference showed with perfect clarity that its centrist majority was attempting to lull the workers to sleep with its "Left" phraseology, to draw them away from revolutionary struggle. The Kienthal Conference adopted resolutions which were still more Left than those of the preceding conference. It denounced the Social-Chauvinists and declared that it was necessary to fight against the war. To this extent Lenin considered it a further step ahead. Yet it rejected the motion of the Bolsheviks to break with the Second International and create a Third International. It also refused to call the workers to revolutionary struggle.

A few months after the Kienthal Conference Lenin stated that it was time to break with the Zimmerwald Alliance. The Centrists who had a majority in this Alliance attempted to hold back the growing revolutionary tide. They moved more and more to the Right, towards a *rapprochement* with the avowed Social-Chauvinists, united with them in order to struggle against the revolutionary internationalists, against the Zimmerwald Left.

"Zimmerwald has gone bankrupt," wrote Lenin.

By this time the Bolsheviks had succeeded in rallying to themselves a considerable number of revolutionary internationalists in all countries and in severing them from the Zimmerwald majority. To stay on in Zimmerwald together with the Centrists would have been harmful: it would only have delayed the exposure of the Centrists. But the actual break between the Bolsheviks and Zimmerwald occurred after the February Revolution of 1917, while the official announcement was not made by the Party until after the October Revolution.

In posing the question of leaving Zimmerwald Lenin advanced the task of immediately proceeding to organize a Third

International. The new international was to unite only really internationalist elements, capable of whole-hearted revolutionary struggle against their own governments. In it there could be no room for Social-Chauvinists nor even Centrists, however "Left" the phrases in which they wrapped themselves. The revolutionary elements included in the first place those who rallied around the Zimmerwald Left. The Bolsheviks placed great value on the revolutionary activity of the Lefts (Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Clara Zetkin and others) considering that only they and their adherents could be drawn into the new, Third International.

Speaking of Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, who were thrown into prison by the German government for their revolutionary struggle against war, Lenin said on many an occasion that they were followed by all that was best and really revolutionary among the Socialists of Germany, that Liebknecht had shown examples of sincere, relentless struggle against capitalism.

Referring to Rosa Luxemburg who after August 4, 1914 declared that German Social-Democracy had become a "stinking corpse," Lenin said at that time that she was fighting resolutely and sincerely for revolutionary tactics against the Social-Chauvinists and imperialist war.

At the same time the Bolsheviks kept criticising the mistakes of the Lefts, their vacillations and half-heartedness, their fear to proclaim revolutionary slogans without reserve. The Lefts rejected the Leninist slogan of the *defeat of one's own government*. In contradistinction to the bolshevik tactics they advanced slogans which brought them near to the Centrists—slogans of peace and disarmament. Rosa Luxemburg and Radek denied the necessity of struggling for the self-determination of nations, thus rejecting the role of the national movement for liberation as an ally of the proletarian revolution.

One of the biggest mistakes committed by Rosa Luxemburg and other Lefts was their rejection of the decisive role of the Party in the preparation of the revolution. They did not understand the necessity of establishing a strong, compact, underground organization. Though struggling against their Social-Chauvinists and Centrists, most of the Lefts could not make up their minds to break with them completely. The Lefts hoped

that after the war it would be possible to resurrect the Second International after cleansing it of the Social-Chauvinists who had disgraced themselves most.

Thus even the best among the Lefts—Luxemburg and Liebknecht—could not stand squarely on the revolutionary platform of the Bolsheviks during the war.

The Lefts could enter the Third International only after they had finally cast off their semi-centrist burden, only by adopting the position of revolutionary Marxism-Leninism. Lenin stubbornly fought against the mistakes of the Lefts; he explained things to them, argued with them and corrected their mistakes. Gradually, step by step, the Bolsheviks overcame the vacillations of the Lefts, rallied them around the Leninist line and thus created and consolidated cadres for the new, Communist International.

The Revolutionary Work of the Bolsheviks in Russia

The Party developed an enormous amount of revolutionary work in Russia during the war years.

The entire struggle of the Bolsheviks in Russia was directed towards realizing in practice the slogan of transforming the imperialist war into civil war. For Russia this slogan meant a struggle to overthrow autocracy, to set up a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Even during the war the Party continued to fight for the realization of this plan of revolution, the plan which had been advanced by the Bolsheviks before the Revolution of 1905. The Party pointed out that the first stage of the Russian revolution would be the bourgeois-democratic revolution. At the same time the Bolsheviks laid great stress on the fact that the Russian revolution was an inseparable and component part of the world proletarian revolution. In November 1915 Lenin wrote that the proletariat would immediately make use of the liberation of bourgeois Russia from tsarism and the power of the landlords for the purpose of accomplishing the socialist revolution in alliance with the proletarians of Europe.

Lenin pointed out that as the result of the war, the conditions for a successful struggle to transform the bourgeois-dem-

ocratic revolution into a socialist revolution were becoming considerably more favourable and that therefore the second stage of the revolution—the socialist stage—was coming much nearer to the first—the bourgeois-democratic stage.

From the very beginning of the war, the overwhelming majority of the Party organizations had taken up an irreconcilable revolutionary position against it. However, Party work among the masses during the first period was weakened. After mobilization had been proclaimed, severe police measures were applied to the Party which were designed to break it up. The terror of the tsarist government assumed immense proportions. The newspaper *Pravda* was closed down. Quite a number of Party committees were arrested the next few days. Legal labour organizations were throttled. A considerable number of active workers of the Party who had succeeded in escaping arrest were mobilized and sent to the front. Contact between the Central Committee of the Party and Lenin who was abroad (in Switzerland) was temporarily cut off. Comrade Stalin was in exile in far-away Siberia. The Bolsheviks who remained at liberty at once began the work of restoring the Party organizations. With tremendous difficulty contact with Lenin was restored. Soon after the beginning of the war the manifesto of the Central Committee concerning the imperialist war, written by Lenin, was received in Russia. It presented a detailed exposition of the reasons for the stand taken by the Bolsheviks. This manifesto and the decisions of the Berne Conference as well as Lenin's letters helped the Party organizations in Russia from the very first to occupy a consistently revolutionary line with reference to the war.

During the war Lenin continued to publish the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*. Despite great difficulties the *Sotsial-Demokrat* was shipped illegally to Russia where it played a tremendous part. By utilizing every opportunity to keep in touch with Russia, Lenin from abroad exercised direct leadership over the work of the Party organizations in the various localities, gave them instructions and corrected the mistakes which they committed.

The bolshevik fraction in the Fourth State Duma did an enormous amount of work at the beginning of the war. Up to

the time they were arrested the bolshevik deputies travelled all over Russia and organized numerous labour meetings, established contacts between the various organizations, explained the Leninist line to them and restored the committees which had been broken up. The bolshevik fraction was the only parliamentary social-democratic fraction in the world that consistently held to a revolutionary line in the struggle against war. On the basis of Lenin's directives the fraction boldly came out in the Duma against war credits. To the appeal of the Belgian Socialist Vandervelde (one of the leaders of the Second International) temporarily to stop the struggle against tsarism, the bolshevik fraction alone answered by a sharp retort. On the other hand the menshevik fraction of the Duma agreed with Vandervelde and declared that it "would make no move against the war." In November 1914 the entire bolshevik fraction of the Duma was arrested because of its revolutionary work and after a trial was exiled to Siberia. The Party made extensive use of the court proceedings against the fraction for the purpose of showing the masses that the Bolsheviks were fighting courageously against the imperialist war despite the rampant chauvinism.

In the middle of 1915 there was considerable animation in the work of the Party organizations in Russia where a bureau of the Central Committee had been set up at the head of which was Comrade Molotov. This bureau was in direct charge of all work of the local organizations.

The Party worked energetically among the masses. Illegal printed matter was published on a large scale. The St. Petersburg Committee alone got out eighty-seven different underground publications (a total of three hundred thousand copies) during the war. The Party made use of the smallest legal opportunities to do its work. Sick benefit societies, cultural and educational organizations, co-operatives, general educational courses, etc., were all taken advantage of.

The conditions of work were incredibly difficult during the war. Police terror raged without restraint. The autocracy was particularly cruel towards the workers. Upon the slightest suspicion of sympathy with the revolution, workers were arrested and exiled or immediately despatched to the front, to the trenches. Nevertheless, the revolutionary struggle did not sub-

side. Under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party the workers organized meetings, strikes, demonstrations, fought against the war, against savage exploitation, against the high cost of living. The Bolsheviks transformed the separate partial actions of the workers into organized mass strikes. The Party converted the economic struggle of the workers into a political struggle, and strove to have the workers advance political slogans alongside of their economic demands: "Down with War!", "Overthrow the Autocratic Government!", "Confiscate the Landlord Estates!", "We Demand the Eight-Hour Working Day!" In its agitational work the Party devoted much attention to the high cost of living and to the food, fuel and housing crises, which became particularly acute during the war. The Bolsheviks explained to the masses that the growing need and starvation were an inevitable consequence of the imperialist war and that only the revolution could provide a way out of the unbearable impasse into which the war had driven the country.

The Bolsheviks also carried on much revolutionary work in the army and navy. In St. Petersburg, Smolensk, Siberia and elsewhere the military organizations of the Bolsheviks were very active among the troops. All big vessels of the Baltic fleet—in Finland, Kronstadt, St. Petersburg—were in contact with each other through the military organization of the Bolsheviks. The Riga committee which was working in the front line zone issued literature for the soldiers in tens of thousands of copies.

In carrying out its line the Party waged a merciless struggle against all manifestations of social-chauvinism and centrism in Russia. As soon as war was declared, the Mensheviks turned definitely social-chauvinist in Russia where they were called *Defencists*. They openly advocated war, arguing that it was necessary to render active aid in the conduct of the war, to go to the front, etc.

An admittedly most chauvinist line, a line directly supporting tsarism, was taken at that time by Plekhanov, Potressov and their followers.

The defencists made every effort to suppress all revolutionary moves inasmuch as these interfered with the continuation of the war. During the war the Mensheviks, who long before this had renounced revolution, openly tried to convince

the workers that in Russia power ought to be in the hands of the bourgeoisie.

The Bolsheviks exposed the avowed Social-Chauvinists (Plekhanov, Potressov and others) before the masses and explained that the Mensheviks by their support of the war had finally become transformed into lackeys of the autocracy, into a support of the imperialist bourgeoisie. The Party exposed the menshevik fraction of the Fourth State Duma headed by the Menshevik Chkheidze and explained to the workers that the entire line of the Mensheviks was directed towards collaboration with the ruling classes, towards holding the workers back from the revolution.

Simultaneously the Bolsheviks unmasked the Centrists—Trotsky, Martov and others—who while wrapping themselves in "Left" phrases wholly supported the line of Chkheidze, drew the masses away from the revolutionary struggle, preached political passivity. The Bolsheviks waged a stubborn struggle to prevent the Social-Chauvinists and Centrists from gaining leadership over the masses.

Of great importance was the struggle which the Party waged in connection with the elections to the War Industrial Committees. These committees were created by the bourgeoisie for the purpose of helping tsarism carry on the war. They distributed the war contracts and looked after their execution. The bourgeoisie (Guchkov and others) tried to draw the workers also into the activities of these War Industrial Committees. It calculated that in this way it would be possible to divert the workers from revolutionary actions, from the strike struggle, and to direct all their energy toward promoting the war, inculcate patriotic sentiments among them. In pursuance of the instructions of the bourgeoisie the Mensheviks (Gvosdev and others) began to agitate for participation in the War Industrial Committees.

The Party of the Bolsheviks came out in the most determined fashion against entering the War Industrial Committees. At the meetings of the workers the Party argued that the bourgeoisie and the followers of Gvosdev were striving to create workers' groups in the War Industrial Committees for the purpose of deceiving the workers, of converting the proletariat

into a submissive tool of the bourgeoisie. Despite every aid given by the employers and the police, Gvosdev and his followers suffered defeat at the elections. Responding to the appeal of the Bolsheviks the workers refused to send their representatives to these committees. Thus, in Moscow at the Dynamo Works, only 74 out of the 1,500 workers took part in the election of deputies; at the Moscow Metal Works (now Hammer and Sickle) only 100-120 voted out of 3,000; at the Postavshchik Works less than 300 voted out of 8,500, etc.

In Petrograd a meeting of authorized representatives elected according to enterprises adopted the bolshevik resolution to refrain from participating in War Industrial Committees. In the resolution adopted the representatives of the St. Petersburg workers called everyone who entered the War Industrial Committees a traitor to the working class. The elections showed clearly and plainly that the workers followed the Bolsheviks.

Later on the Mensheviks with the assistance of the employers and the police none the less created their groups which they called "labour groups" and which were attached to the War Industrial Committees. These groups tried to act in the name of the working class. However, their usurpation of power was perfectly evident. They had not been elected by the workers, nor did they have any contact or support among the masses of the workers.

The struggle around the War Industrial Committees considerably strengthened the influence of the Bolshevik Party and helped to unmask the Mensheviks. It gave the workers visible proof of the fact that the Mensheviks had been finally converted into servitors of the bourgeoisie, into abettors of war.

In 1920 Lenin wrote:

" . . . if bolshevism was able to attain victory in 1917-20, one of the basic reasons, for this victory was that bolshevism, ever since the end of 1914, had been ruthlessly exposing the baseness, loathsomeness and despicableness of social-chauvinism and Kautskyism . . . while the masses had become ever more and more convinced, from their own experience, of the correctness of the views of the Bolsheviks." *

* Lenin *'Left-Wing' Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, p. 23.

*Struggle on Two Fronts Against Opportunism
in the Ranks of the Bolsheviks*

While waging the struggle against the Social-Chauvinists and Centrists for the Leninist line, the Party was compelled to fight stubbornly against the opportunist elements in its own ranks also. During the war the Leninist line of the Party was attacked, on the one hand, by the group of "Left" Bolsheviks (Bukharin, Pyatakov, E. Bosh and others); on the other hand, by the Right opportunists (Kamenev) and the conciliators (Shlyapnikov and others).

Bukharin and his group rejected the Leninist doctrine of imperialism and the proletarian revolution. Rejecting the Leninist law of the uneven development of capitalism, they asserted, on the contrary, that the contradictions in the epoch of imperialism were diminishing, that capitalist economy was becoming more and more organized.

At the Berne Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Bukharin asserted that the peasantry, being a class of petty proprietors, could not render any aid to the proletariat in the socialist revolution. Thus, he thought that the proletariat would find itself alone in the revolution, without allies.

In the same way Bukharin and Pyatakov denied that the national liberation movement of the oppressed nations could be an ally of the proletariat in the socialist revolution. With this as their point of departure, they fought against the Leninist slogan of the right of nations to self-determination. This slogan was of tremendous revolutionary significance even before the war, and during the war its role was enhanced still further, since the war particularly aggravated the national oppression in all countries. The "Lefts" fought against the slogan of the right of nations to self-determination; they spurned the Leninist slogan of the defeat of one's own government, replacing it by the centrist slogans of "peace" and "disarmament." Bukharin tried in every way to bring the Bolsheviks and the centrist group of Trotsky closer together. The "Lefts" waged an intense factional fight against the Leninist Party and thereby obstructed its consolidation.

On the other hand, the Party also fought against the Right

opportunists, particularly Kamenev. When arrested together with the Duma deputies, Kamenev instead of defending the bolshevik slogans before the court declared that he was not in agreement with the Party line on the question of war, that he did not agree with the slogan of "defeat." In essence he slipped down to the position of defencism. The Right opportunists justified the Social-Chauvinists of Belgium and France by claiming that these allegedly democratic countries were fighting against German militarism. Thereby the Right opportunists in essence denied the imperialist character of the war.

The Party waged an irreconcilable struggle against these Right and "Left" opportunist distortions of the bolshevik line. Individual members of the Party (Shlyapnikov and others) occupied an unprincipled conciliatory position and tried to weaken this struggle. The conciliators slurred over the opportunist essence of the Rights and "Lefts," concealed their factional fight against the Party, took them under their wing, tried to explain the whole struggle against them as captiousness on the part of Lenin. The Party scotched all these attempts of the conciliators and exposed their lack of principle. Lenin wrote that conciliationism was a most pernicious thing for the Party, that it spelt ruin for the Party.

As a result of the stubborn bolshevik struggle against them, the Right and "Left" opportunists as well as the conciliators were reduced to an insignificant group. Their views secured almost no hearing in the Party organizations of Russia.

The Situation in Russia and the Work of the Party on the Eve of the February Revolution

The longer the war dragged out, the more profound became the economic ruin and desolation of Russia. By the end of 1916 almost fourteen million persons had been mobilized for the army. The peasant farms were going to wrack and ruin. In the rural districts there was a shortage of more than half the requisite labour power. The sown area was greatly reduced; the number of draught animals decreased. The revival which at that time occurred in industry affected only those branches which worked for the army; the other branches suffered a severe decline.

The country experienced a severe fuel crisis. Dozens of big enterprises were stopped for lack of fuel. Transportation, which was not equipped to handle the tremendous military shipments, reached a catastrophic state during the war and was on the verge of a complete breakdown. In the cities starvation was rampant. The wages of the workers fell rapidly. With the support of the Mensheviks the employers launched an offensive against the working class all along the line; they lengthened the working day and introduced night work. Under pretext of working for the country's defence, the exploitation of the workers was intensified beyond all limits.

The military defeats at the front revealed that the autocracy was rotten to the core. Adventurers of the type of Rasputin exerted great influence on the administration of the country. The feverish replacement of one minister by another showed that the ruling clique was not in a position to preserve its domination. For the sake of saving the monarchy, the tsarist government commenced secret negotiations with Germany for a separate peace.

The ruin and starvation raised the revolutionary mood of the masses. Beginning with the second half of 1915 the workers offered increasingly stubborn resistance to the offensive of the capitalists. Whereas during the second half of 1914 about 35,000 workers participated in strikes, in 1915 the number of strikers rose to 540,000 and in 1916 to 952,000. Under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party the strike struggle grew and expanded, becoming ever more persevering, involving greater and greater masses and constantly assuming a more political character.

At the same time the army became more and more a prey to disintegration. The bad food supply, the lack of munitions and the hopeless prospect of an early peace augmented the discontent among the soldiers, further disintegrated the army and made it an unreliable support of the autocracy. Cases of refusal to go into battle, of desertion, of voluntary surrender to the enemy, of fraternization, etc., multiplied. Under the influence of the revolutionary struggle of the workers, the soldier masses began to resort to active revolutionary attacks. In October 1916, at the time of the clashes between the workers of the Renault factory in St. Petersburg and the police, the soldiers of the 181st

Regiment who were quartered nearby actively supported the workers against the police.

On the other hand, the bourgeoisie, too, saw that the government was not in a position to guarantee the successful conduct of the war. As early as the beginning of 1916 this discontent with the government of Nicholas II began to spread in the ranks of the bourgeoisie. A court revolution was being debated. The bourgeoisie was not averse to the idea of replacing Nicholas II by another tsar who would be better able to safeguard its imperialist interests and bring the war to a victorious termination.

This plan found support also among the Allies—the representatives of Anglo-French capitalism—who likewise considered that the government of Nicholas II was not capable of continuing the war.

By the end of 1916 a revolutionary situation was on hand. The Party (through its Bureau of the Central Committee) issued instructions to proceed to a more determined attack, to bring the masses out into the street, to prepare a general strike to be followed by an armed uprising.

The entire work of the St. Petersburg, Moscow and other organizations from that moment on was directed toward the preparation of the armed uprising.

On December 30, 1916 an immense strike broke out in Ivanovo-Voznessensk which was almost transformed into a general strike.

On January 9, 1917, the anniversary of Bloody Sunday, the overwhelming majority of workers of St. Petersburg downed tools in response to an appeal of the Party. From that moment on strikes, meetings and demonstrations under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party grew incessantly until the end of February 1917. In January 1917, 244,000 workers struck, in February their number was already 432,000. In that month 95.6 per cent of all strikes were political in character. This testified to the fact that the working class was rising to struggle against the tsarist regime. These strikes were an immediate preparation for the February Revolution.

CHAPTER IX

THE PARTY IN THE STRUGGLE FOR OCTOBER (FEBRUARY-OCTOBER 1917)

The Overthrow of Tsarism

By the beginning of March 1917, the revolutionary movement had attained its peak. The Party of the Bolsheviks called upon the workers, soldiers and peasants to rise in arms against the tsarist government, to struggle for the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. The Party explained to the masses that they could rid themselves of imperialist war and threatening death by starvation only by overthrowing tsarism and seizing power. Each day the hatred for the autocracy became stronger. In Petrograd the workers thronged the streets in protest against the war and starvation. On March 8 and 9 (February 23 and 24)* workers' demonstrations took place under bolshevik slogans: "Down With the Autocracy!", "Down With War!" Clashes with the police usually ensued. On March 10 a general strike which developed into an uprising commenced in Petrograd. On that day the demonstrations were still more numerous than during the preceding days. In several districts of Petrograd the workers began to disarm the police. On March 11 demonstrations were renewed with increased vigour. The police broke up the demonstrations with rifles and machine guns. Under the influence of bolshevik propaganda the troops began to go over to the side of the workers. A company of the Pavlovsk regiment mutinied and opened fire on the police. On March 12 the Volynsky regiment mutinied, shot its officers and joined the workers. The example of the Volynsky men was followed by other regiments. By the end of the day the entire garrison of Petrograd went over to the side

* The dates hereafter given in parenthesis are those of the old style, Julian calendar used in Russia until the October Revolution. They are thirteen days behind the new-style, Gregorian calendar which is in international use and was introduced in the U.S.S.R. after the October Revolution. Beginning with this chapter, all events are recorded according to the Gregorian calendar.

of the revolution. The workers and soldiers who had risen in revolt disarmed the police and gendarmes and arrested the ministers. A few days later the tsar was also put under arrest.

In this way the slogan of the Bolsheviks: "Transform the Imperialist War into Civil War" began to be materialized in March 1917. The February Revolution of 1917 was the first revolution born of the imperialist war. It was the beginning of the transformation of imperialist war into civil war.

Its *motive forces* were the workers and peasants dressed in soldiers' uniform. It was precisely they who went out into the streets and battled with the police and the gendarmes. *The working class* marching in the van of the peasantry was the *leader*, the *hegemon*, in the mortal combat with tsarism.

According to its character and motive forces the February Revolution was a *bourgeois-democratic* revolution.

The February Revolution completely confirmed the correctness of the bolshevik strategy and tactics. The question of the motive forces of the revolution, the growing of the general strike into an armed uprising and the growing of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution had all been worked out by the Party long before the February Revolution, even during the Revolution of 1905. Lenin had always taught that the party of the proletariat must play the decisive role in the revolution, and it was precisely the Party of the Bolsheviks that prepared and organized the February Revolution. The underground work of the Bolsheviks during the whole preceding period, especially during the imperialist war, had prepared the proletariat for the uprising, for civil war.

The Party of the Bolsheviks was in direct charge of the armed struggle of the workers and soldiers. Among the hundreds who during the February days perished in the streets of Petrograd there were many members of the Bolshevik Party, including members of the Petrograd Committee (the worker P. Koryakov, etc.).

Dual Power

From the very first days of the revolution, Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies were set up in Petrograd and everywhere else in Russia, following the example of 1905.

The first soviet to arise in the course of the February Revolution was that of Petrograd which was organized on March 12 (February 27). The bulk of the revolutionary workers, soldiers and peasants were on the side of the soviets. These were organs of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

Because of their revolutionary activities the soviets at once called down upon themselves the implacable hatred of the bourgeoisie. The latter understood that the workers and soldiers would not halt at the overthrow of the autocracy but would drive the revolution further, would continue the struggle—against the war, against the landlord estates, against the capitalist order. The bourgeoisie regarded the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies as a mortal danger to its rule. It remembered well its experience in 1905 when the soviets in a number of cities began to be transformed into organs of revolutionary power. The bourgeoisie acted as a counter-revolutionary force which strove to preserve the monarchy at any price.

Having no adequate armed force with which to crush the incipient revolution openly, the bourgeoisie tried to hoodwink the masses by seeking to reduce matters to a mere substitution of Michael Romanov for his brother Nicholas II. This manoeuvre of the bourgeoisie was not successful. The armed workers supported by the soldiers did not permit the monarchy to be restored. Then the bourgeoisie hastened to seize power with the intention of first making a few minor concessions to the workers and peasants so as to tranquilize the masses and afterwards wreak bloody vengeance upon the revolution, and consolidate its own rule.

Under cover of phrases expressing sympathy with the revolution, the bourgeoisie on March 14 set up a Provisional Government consisting of members of the Fourth State Duma to which it entrusted the task of "restoring order" in Petrograd. The Provisional Government consisted of representatives of the biggest capitalists and landlords—Prince Lvov, Milyukov, Guchkov and others. In order to deceive the people it also included Kerensky who after February had joined the party of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Thus, parallel with the soviets, the organs of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat

and the peasantry, a Provisional Government was established which represented the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The soviets as a matter of fact constituted a second government inasmuch as the armed power of the revolution was in their hands. This was "... another, as yet weak, embryonic, but undoubtedly real and growing government. . . ."*

This other government existed alongside of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The soviets might from the very beginning have become the sole government in the country, if the majority in these bodies, relying on the support of the masses, had wanted to call out these masses to struggle against the Provisional Government. However, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries controlled the majority in the soviets, and they believed that after the overthrow of tsarism power must pass into the hands of the bourgeoisie. Therefore, the menshevik-socialist-revolutionary majority in the soviets proceeded to compromise, to collaborate with the bourgeoisie. Though actually holding power in their hands, the menshevik-socialist-revolutionary soviets voluntarily relinquished it to the bourgeoisie and reserved for themselves only the right to "supervise" the actions of the bourgeois Provisional Government. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries appealed to the masses to support the Provisional Government, but deceived these masses by claiming that this government was working for the welfare of the revolution. It was only due to this support given it by the soviets that the Provisional Government was able to carry through its measures.

Thus, a peculiar dual power without precedent in history took shape. It was an

"... interlocking of two dictatorships: the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie . . . and the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry."**

This dual power created during the first days of the February Revolution was its most characteristic feature.

One of the principal reasons for the dual power was the fact that by and large the masses during the period immediately

* Lenin, "A Dual Power," *Collected Works*, Vol. XX.

** Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution," *Collected Works*, Vol. XX.

after the February Revolution placed implicit trust in the bourgeoisie and its agents, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The revolution drew into active political life tens of millions of toilers who formerly had taken no part in politics, who had been browbeaten by the terrible oppression of tsarism and by their galley-slave drudgery for the landlords and manufacturers. Taking part for the first time in political life and insufficiently class-conscious as it was, this mass consisting mostly of peasants followed the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, believed their phrases about the revolutionary character of the Provisional Government, their promises to terminate the war, to call a Constituent Assembly, etc.

The considerable change in the composition of the workers at the enterprises during the war was to a certain extent responsible for this. Many of the advanced workers who had followed the Bolshevik Party were in prison or had been sentenced to hard labour. More than a third of the workers had been mobilized for the front. Their places in the factories had been taken by new workers, mostly from the villages, who had no experience whatever in the class struggle. This section of the workers whose class consciousness was little developed also trusted the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

In elucidating the essence of the dual power Lenin wrote:

"A gigantic petty-bourgeois wave swept everything before it and overwhelmed the class-conscious section of the proletariat not only numerically but also ideologically, *i.e.*, infected wide circles of workers with the political views of the petty bourgeoisie." *

This explains why the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries controlled a considerable majority in the soviets during the first period of the revolution and thus were enabled in the name of the soviets to pursue their policy of compromise with the bourgeoisie.

The dual power which was established could not last long, as two governments cannot exist simultaneously in one state. The bourgeoisie from the very beginning fought to establish its sole rule. On the other hand, the revolutionary proletariat under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party began to struggle to have the

* *Ibid.*

soviets take all power into their own hands and to set up the power of the workers and peasants. For this it was necessary to dispel the confidence of the masses in the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, to convince the masses that only a Soviet government could end the war and economic ruin and solve the bread and land problems.

The Party During the First Days of the Revolution

During the first days of the February Revolution the Bureau of the Central Committee located at Petrograd exercised leadership over all the work of the Party. The Central Committee of the Party headed by Lenin was living abroad during that period, while Comrades Stalin and Sverdlov, members of the Central Committee, were in exile in Turukhansk. From the very beginning the Party waged an energetic struggle against the bourgeois Provisional Government. On March 17, the Bureau of the Central Committee published a manifesto in which it stated that no agreement with the Provisional Government was permissible, that the workers and peasants must create their own government.

Comrade Stalin who returned from exile at the end of March, wrote in the *Pravda* that the revolution must be propelled further and that for this purpose it was necessary to strengthen the alliance between the workers and the peasants, to shatter the influence of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries over the masses and to establish strong organizations in the various localities. Comrade Stalin pointed out that the first thing required for the victory of the revolution was the creation throughout all Russia of a network of soviets and their union in an All-Russian Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. The soviets, wrote Stalin, must be transformed at the appropriate moment from organs of revolutionary struggle of the people into organs of revolutionary power. Comrade Stalin especially stressed the necessity of the immediate arming of the workers and the creation of a Red Guard. He wrote that unless the imperialist war were stopped there could be no talk of a victorious revolution. Comrade Stalin mercilessly tore the mask from the face of the bourgeois Provisional Government, explaining to the masses

that the government's vociferous defence of freedom merely concealed the ambition of the bourgeoisie to continue the imperialist war.

The newspaper *Pravda*, which began to reappear on March 18, systematically exposed the imperialist policy of the Provisional Government and the conciliatory role of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The *Pravda* called for fraternization at the front and demanded that the workers be armed. It called upon the workers to introduce the eight-hour working day at the factories on their own authority. The workers caught up this challenge and thus introduced the eight-hour working day without any prior authorization. The *Pravda* called upon the peasants to seize the landlord estates by revolutionary means, without waiting for the Constituent Assembly. In the resolution published on April 8 (March 26) the Bureau of the Central Committee pointed out that the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in the cities and the Soviets of Peasants' and Agricultural Workers' Deputies in the villages must become embryos of state power around which the masses are to rally and to which plenary power must pass in future.

The entire line of the Party was thus directed essentially towards the further development of the revolution, towards the transition to the second stage, that of the proletarian revolution.

This line of the Party was opposed by Kamenev, who during that period returned from his exile in Siberia where he together with the Bolshevik deputies of the Fourth Duma had been since 1915. Kamenev argued that the proletariat of Russia was not yet ripe for the socialist revolution and that therefore the revolution should not pass beyond the bounds of its bourgeois-democratic tasks. Kamenev persistently drew the Party in the direction of supporting the Provisional Government instead of exposing the counter-revolutionary character of the latter. In his articles published in the *Pravda* he wrote that in so far as the Provisional Government was fighting against the remnants of the tsarist regime, it must be "assured of the determined support of the revolutionary proletariat." *

* Kamenev, *Pravda*, March 27 (14), 1917.

On the war question Kamenev occupied a semi-defencist position. At the time Lenin wrote that "... we shall become Defencists only when power will have passed into the hands of the proletariat." *

Kamenev came out against fraternization and appealed to the soldiers to reply to the Germans bullet for bullet, shell for shell.

The Party administered a sharp rebuff to Kamenev and decidedly rejected his opportunist position. An insignificant group of Right Opportunists (Vladimir Voytinsky, Sevruck), who openly advocated defencist views, were expelled from the Party during the first few days after February.

Lenin's April Theses

The February Revolution destroyed the autocracy. The proletariat and its Party were confronted by the task of organizing the struggle for the second stage of the revolution, for the transformation of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution.

"... The bolshevik slogans and ideas," wrote Lenin, "have in general been fully confirmed by history; but concretely events have taken shape *differently* than could have been anticipated by anyone (whoever it be)—in a more original, more unique, more variegated way." **

"*Nobody* hitherto thought, or could have thought, of dual power." ***

In this new peculiar setting a new orientation, new tactics, new slogans were necessary to solve the new tasks of the Party.

"The old, pre-revolutionary platform demanding the direct overthrow of the government was plain and definite, but it was no longer appropriate for the new conditions of the struggle. It was now no longer possible to work for the direct overthrow of the government, for the latter was associated with the soviets which were under the influence of the Defencists, so that the Party would have been obliged to conduct a war against both the government and the soviets, which would have been beyond its strength. But

* Lenin, "To the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXI.

** Lenin, "Letters on Tactics," *Collected Works*, Vol. XX.

*** Lenin, "A Dual Power," *Collected Works*, Vol. XX.

on the other hand, a policy of supporting the Provisional Government was impossible, for it was an imperialist government. In the new conditions of struggle, a new orientation of the Party became necessary." *

By taking the basic bolshevik theses as its guide, the Party even during the first few weeks of the February Revolution, even before Lenin's arrival, proceeded to elaborate, though in a groping manner, the new orientation in the revolution. When Lenin arrived from abroad he gave the Party this new orientation. Lenin's arrival, said Comrade Stalin, helped the Party "at one sweep to come out on the new road."

Lenin returned from abroad on April 16. On the very next day he enunciated his famous *April Theses* at a meeting of the Bolsheviks. In these theses Lenin with perfect clarity mapped out the path of the further development of the revolution, pointed out the plan of struggle of the proletariat, advanced clear-cut slogans which mobilized the workers and poorest peasants to struggle for the socialist revolution.

Lenin set forth in his theses that the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia was finished, inasmuch as tsarism had been overthrown and power had passed into the hands of a new class, the bourgeoisie. Thus, the revolution, said Lenin, has gone through its first stage and has entered upon the second stage; a new task has come to the fore, the task of the socialist revolution. The proletariat can accomplish this task only when the majority of workers and poor peasants will cease believing in the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries and will follow the Bolshevik Party.

The majority of the workers and peasants who had been deceived by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had no interest in the prolongation of the war but faithfully believed that the war was really being waged to defend the revolution. Lenin called these workers and peasants "conscientious Defencists." In his theses he said that the principal task of the moment consisted in steadfastly and patiently explaining to the misled masses the deception practised on them by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Lenin pointed out that the Mensheviks and the Socialist-

* Stalin, *On the Opposition*.

Revolutionaries were the main obstacle to the development of the revolution, as the bourgeois Provisional Government could consolidate its power only with their support. Therefore he appealed for a determined struggle against these parties, stating that the slightest concession to them was treason to socialism.

The Party had to explain to the masses that even under the Provisional Government the war remained an imperialist war, that without overthrowing the bourgeois Provisional Government it was impossible to finish the war, that a just peace could be concluded only when power would pass into the hands of the workers and poorest peasants.

In order to accelerate the revolution in the other countries, the theses appealed for fraternization among the soldiers of the belligerent armies at the front.

In exposing the Provisional Government as the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, Lenin demonstrated that all promises of this government to give peace and bread to the harassed nation were false, that not the slightest support must be rendered to the Provisional Government, that it would be overthrown when the majority of the toilers understood its imperialist essence. However, Lenin warned at the same time that during this period—in April—it was still impossible to advance the slogan of the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government, since it had the support of the majority of the soviets.

“Whoever wanted to overthrow the Provisional Government at that time had to overthrow also the soviets,” said Comrade Stalin.*

In order to come to power, the class-conscious workers had to win over to their side the majority of the toilers. Therefore the tactic of patient elucidation, of convincing the masses, of the merciless exposure of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries was the only correct tactic.

Lenin said in his theses that the soviets were the only possible form of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the poorest peasantry and that therefore all state power had to pass into the hands of the soviets. Russia must become a republic of soviets. The task of the Party was to win the majority in the soviets and to make them Bolshevik.

* Stalin, *On the Road to October*.

Further on the theses spoke of the necessity of confiscating the landlord estates and of carrying out the nationalization of all land.

Lenin proposed to merge all banks in a national bank over which the soviets were to exercise control. At the same time Lenin stressed the fact that it was not the immediate objective of the proletariat to "introduce" socialism at once, that for the time being the Party merely demanded the immediate transition to the control by the soviets of production and of the distribution of products. This was not socialism but only a step towards it. Socialism could not be "introduced" at one sweep; it had to be built on the ruins of the old world and this required a persistent struggle on the part of the toilers for a number of years.

With reference to the tasks of Party construction, the theses spoke of the necessity of immediately calling a congress of the Party and of working out a new program.* Lenin suggested that the name of the Party be changed from Social-Democratic to Communist (Marx and Engels had called themselves Communists) in order to differentiate themselves from the Social-Democrats who had betrayed socialism by going over to the side of the bourgeoisie in all countries of the world. Finally, Lenin in his theses brought to the fore the task of creating the *Third Communist International*.

Thus, Lenin's April Theses furnished a concrete, detailed plan of struggle by the Party for the transformation of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution, for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

"The struggle of the Party for the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry" was the principal slogan of the theses under which the Bolsheviks prepared the forces for the victory of the socialist revolution.

Seventh (April) All-Russian Party Conference

In May (old style—April) 1917 the Central Committee of the Party convened the Seventh All-Russian Party Conference in Petrograd. Its sessions opened on May 7 (April 24). The dele-

* At that time the Party was still governed by the program adopted at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903.

gates who assembled for the Conference represented eighty thousand Party members. The Conference was to give an appraisal of the period which the Party was passing through and to map out a plan of struggle for the preparation of the socialist revolution.

The overwhelming majority at the Conference came out in favour of Lenin's plan as expounded in his April Theses. Only a small group of Right opportunists headed by Kamenev spoke sharply at the Conference against the Leninist line. Kamenev, Rykov and others argued that the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia was not finished, that the struggle for the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry was still on the order of the day. They asserted that a course heading for the socialist revolution would lead to a rupture with the peasantry, as a result of which the proletariat would find itself single-handed, without allies and the revolution would be crushed. The Rights argued that Russia was not yet ripe for the socialist revolution, that the socialist revolution could be begun only in the advanced countries of the West but not in Russia. They denied the very possibility of the victory of socialism in one country.

In combating the Rights Lenin made it clear that in Russia all pre-conditions for the victory of the socialist revolution were present, that to wait for a socialist revolution in the West would be tantamount to a betrayal of the proletariat and to a surrender to the mercy of the bourgeoisie. Lenin proved that in its struggle for socialism, the proletariat would not be single-handed, but would be supported inside of Russia by the millions of the peasant poor and outside of Russia by the West European proletariat.

At the same time Lenin relentlessly exposed Trotsky who continued to propagate his menshevik theory of the permanent revolution. Lenin once more laid full stress on the fact that Trotsky's slogan of "No Tsar but a Workers' Government" would lead to a renunciation of the revolution.

Side by side with Lenin, Comrade Stalin likewise waged a determined struggle against the opportunists. In his articles in the *Pravda*, his speeches at the Seventh Conference and in all

his work he consistently defended the Leninist line in the revolution. Thus, headed by Lenin and Stalin, the Party defeated the Right opportunist group of Kamenev at the Seventh Conference and adopted Lenin's line.

Parallel with the struggle against the Rights who at that time constituted the main danger, the Party waged an irreconcilable struggle against such "Left" opportunists as, for instance, Bogdatyev, a member of the Petrograd Party Committee. In April when the Bolsheviks were still a minority in the soviets and in the army, the "Left" opportunists launched the slogan of the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government. This position threatened to divorce the Party from the masses.

In this connection Comrade Stalin wrote:

"The Party would have been isolated from the working class and the working class would have lost its influence among the broad masses of the peasants and soldiers if the proletariat had followed in the footsteps of the 'Left' Communists who called for insurrection in April 1917, when the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries had not yet exposed themselves as advocates of war and of imperialism, and when the masses had not yet had sufficient time to learn from their own experience how false the speeches of the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries about peace, land and freedom were." *

The struggle at the Conference for the Leninist line on the national question was of tremendous importance. Comrade Stalin reported on this question in the name of the Central Committee. The group of the "Lefts" (Pyatakov and others) which continued to maintain the opportunist position occupied by them as early as the imperialist war, tried to prove that the slogan of the "right of nations to self-determination" was a bourgeois slogan, that the proletariat had no interest in the self-determination of nations. In fighting this group of "Lefts," Lenin and Stalin argued that the proletariat was duty-bound to uphold the right of nations to self-determination. The national liberation movement of the oppressed peoples was directed against imperialism, and "we must support every movement directed against imperialism," said Comrade Stalin. By waging a struggle against

* Stalin, "Foundations of Leninism," *Leninism*, Vol. I, p. 82.

national oppression, the oppressed peoples of Russia became the allies of the Russian proletariat in its struggle for power.

The Conference rejected the opportunist position of Pyatakov and adopted Lenin's line on the national question. It recognized the necessity of forming a Third (Communist) International and instructed the Central Committee to prepare the draft of a new program for submission to the regular Party Congress.

The Seventh (April) Conference of 1917 was of great importance in the history of the Bolshevik Party and in the history of the world revolutionary movement. It mapped out a concrete plan of struggle for the transformation of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution, issued basic slogans under which the Party mobilized the masses for the overthrow of the rule of capitalism. The Conference rallied the vast majority of Party members in support of the Leninist line.

The Struggle of the Party for the Masses

The Party did an enormous amount of work to carry the decisions of the Seventh (April) Conference into practice. It explained the bolshevik slogans to the workers and the poorest peasants, organized the masses, prepared them for the socialist revolution and began to create a workers' Red Guard.

The Bolsheviks directed their main attention to organizing the proletariat itself for the conquest of power. Lenin said that the proletariat must

"display marvels of proletarian and nation-wide organization in order to prepare for its victory in the second stage of the revolution." *

This was a period of whirlwind organizational construction. Party nuclei and trade unions were growing, factory committees were being established at the enterprises. Having burst the police shackles, the working class set up dozens of organizations of every description—political, trade union, economic, cultural, educational, etc. All these organizations thrived with life. The Bolsheviks made use of all these organizations for the purpose of propagating their ideas. They joined these organizations and

* Lenin, "Letters from Afar" (First Letter), *Collected Works*, Vol. XX.

worked in them in their endeavour to win the bulk of the workers over to their side.

The Party attached particularly great importance to the trade unions as the connecting link between the Party and the masses. Pursuing as it did a policy of exercising undivided influence in the trade unions, the Party achieved tremendous successes which forced the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries to the background. In the industrial centres the biggest trade unions (those of the metal workers and textile workers) were greatly under the influence of the Party. Most of the factory committees in the big cities were coming over to the side of the Bolsheviks and were carrying out the bolshevik line in the revolution.

Thus organized under the leadership of the Bolsheviks, the proletariat rallied to itself the village poor. The Party formed bolshevik nuclei in the countryside and these exerted a revolutionary influence on the peasant soviets.

During the February Revolution thousands of new members had poured into the Party. These had to be trained in the spirit of bolshevism. The Party performed a vast amount of work among its own members.

Tens of thousands of Party members received their Leninist tempering at the meetings of the factory, army and rural Party nuclei, at the district and city Party meetings, at the district, county, provincial and regional Party conferences, in the fractions of the soviets, trade unions and other mass organizations. The Party members also passed through a bolshevik school while the various election campaigns were going on—elections to soviets, factory committees, soldiers' committees, city Dumas and so forth. In these campaigns the Bolsheviks were pitched against the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in a fierce contest to win the masses.

The Party carried on a tremendous amount of educational work through the bolshevik newspapers, popular pamphlets and books, patiently explaining day after day the line of the Party on all principal questions and equipping the members of the Party with Marxist-Leninist theory. In order to organize and train the Party masses, collegiums of organizers, agitators and propagandists were formed in the various district, county, provincial and regional committees.

Each day the Party grew both ideologically and numerically. It consolidated the unity and coherence of its ranks and prepared itself for the impending socialist revolution, concerning which Lenin wrote at that time that the Party must "prepare itself for . . . a revolution a thousand times as strong as the February Revolution."

The Bolsheviks conducted their work for the winning of the masses under the slogan of "All Power to the Soviets!," "Down with War!," "The Land to the Peasants!," etc. The Party steadfastly agitated among the masses in favour of the soviets taking power into their own hands. The Bolsheviks convinced the masses that all armed forces of the revolution were on the side of the soviets and that therefore the bourgeoisie which had not yet managed to organize its counter-revolutionary detachments could not block a peaceful transfer of power to the soviets if the soviets wanted to take power.

This would not yet have meant the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries still held a majority in the soviets, but it would have been a tremendous step forward on the road to the socialist revolution. A transfer of power to the soviets during this period would have destroyed the rule of the bourgeoisie, would have put an end to the dual power and would have set up the plenary power of the soviets. The Bolsheviks would have continued their struggle against the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries within the soviets to make the soviets bolshevik and thereafter to transform them into organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Having set down this line the Party never for a moment ceased to prepare its forces for the armed uprising.

However, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who controlled the soviets did not even want to listen to any proposal to break with the bourgeoisie and take power into their own hands. Therefore it was impossible to carry the revolution forward without defeating these parties. To deprive the compromising parties of all influence among the masses was now the principal problem of the day. The Bolsheviks patiently and steadfastly exposed the treacherous role of the Mensheviks and

Socialist-Revolutionaries by quoting examples from actual life. The Bolsheviks proved to the masses from practical experience that the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries were supporting imperialism, that they were incapable of solving a single problem of the revolution, that only the Party of the Bolsheviks was really determined to protect the interests of the toilers.

Milyukov's note to the Allies played a great part in exposing the imperialist character of the Provisional Government before the masses.

On May 1, when for the first time a grand demonstration in honour of the proletarian holiday of labour was openly held in Russia, Milyukov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a note which he despatched without the knowledge of the masses, declared to the Allies that Russia would continue the war until complete victory had been achieved and promised that the Provisional Government would discharge all the obligations of the tsarist government to the Allies—Great Britain and France.

The Bolsheviks informed the broad masses of the contents of this note which set forth the predatory aims of the war. They agitated energetically among the masses, exposing the imperialist essence of the Provisional Government. When they learnt about Milyukov's note, the indignant workers and soldiers on May 3-4 (April 20-21) organized a grand demonstration of protest on the streets of Petrograd under such Bolshevik slogans as "Down with Milyukov!", "All Power to the Soviets!" *

A group of members of the Petrograd Party Committee headed by Bogdatyev launched the slogan of the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government. The Central Committee of the Bolsheviks held back the masses from this premature step and severely condemned the "Lefts" who had violated Party discipline and had tried to rush the Party along a ruinous path.

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries came out in support of the Provisional Government. They assured the masses that Milyukov had issued the note in question without the knowledge of the Provisional Government and that the latter therefore could not be held responsible for it.

* This demonstration has come down in history as the April Demonstration. (It was named according to the old calendar.)—*Ed. Russian ed.*

Under the pressure of the indignant masses, Milyukov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Guchkov, Minister of War, had to resign. In order to strengthen the shaken confidence of the masses in the Provisional Government, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries sent their representatives as ministers into this government—Chernov, a Socialist-Revolutionary, and Tsereteli and Skobelev, Mensheviks. Thus, a coalition government was formed, a government which was composed of representatives of the compromising parties side by side with those of the bourgeoisie.

On this occasion, when the compromisers entered the bourgeois Provisional Government, the Bolsheviks agitated energetically among the masses to which they explained that this meant the open desertion of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries to the side of the bourgeoisie.

The demonstration on May 3-4 and the educational work conducted by the Party greatly enhanced the influence of the Bolsheviks among the masses.

Lenin's speech at the All-Russian Congress of Peasant Deputies held on June 4, 1917 played a great part in the struggle of the Bolsheviks to win the toiling masses of the peasantry. The peasant delegates paid the closest possible attention when listening to the leader of the Bolsheviks, in spite of all attempts of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries to disrupt his speeches. Lenin's appeal to begin at once with the organized seizure of the landlord estates, without waiting for the Constituent Assembly, was especially well received by the peasantry.

The Bolsheviks also worked intensively in the trade unions where the Mensheviks held the leading posts. However, the bulk of the trade union members in ever greater numbers joined the Bolsheviks, sympathized with them.

On June 12-16 the Petrograd Conference of Factory Committees took place. Three-fourths of the delegates followed the lead of the Bolsheviks. Speaking at the Conference, Lenin called upon the workers to introduce *workers' control of production*.

The Conference adopted bolshevik resolutions and the factory committees in their respective localities carried into life the slogan of the Bolsheviks to introduce workers' control of production.

The Bolsheviks also gained great authority among the broad

strata of the workers by reason of their struggle for the eight-hour working day.

Taking into consideration the fact that many members of the soviets no longer reflected the sentiments of the masses, which were rapidly becoming revolutionized, the Bolsheviks launched an extensive campaign in favour of recalling these members of the soviets and of holding new elections for their seats. As a result of the elections thus held the influence of the Bolsheviks in the soviets increased considerably. In June the Bolsheviks already composed almost one-half of the workers' section of the Petrograd soviet and about one-fourth of the soldiers' section. In the elections for the district dumas of Petrograd, the bolshevik influence likewise gained much ground. The Bolsheviks made a clean sweep of the Vyborg ward дума. The same thing happened in a number of other cities.

The military organization of the Bolsheviks carried on much work among the soldiers and sailors. It enjoyed great influence not only in the Petrograd garrison but also in the provinces, at the front and in the navy.

The Bolsheviks fought determinedly to carry into practice the famous Order No. I which had been issued by the Petrograd soviet on March 14 (1) to the troops of the Petrograd military district. This order gave the soldiers the same status as civilians and directed that soldiers' and sailors' committees be elected in the respective military and naval units. At the same time the army units were instructed that in all their political actions they were to take orders only from the soviets. The Bolsheviks waged an energetic campaign for the creation of soldiers' and sailors' committees in the army and navy and for elective commanders, with the aim of wresting the soldiers and sailors away from the influence of the counter-revolutionary generals and admirals and of converting the army and navy into a bulwark of the revolution. In their respective company, regimental, army, ship or fleet committees, the Bolsheviks waged a fierce struggle against the reactionary officers and representatives of the compromising parties for influence over the soldier and the sailor masses. Bolshevik nuclei were formed in all units of the army and navy. The masses of soldiers and sailors turned more and more to the side of the Bolsheviks.

The conference of bolshevik military organizations which took place in June 1917 showed a rapid growth of the Party's influence in the army. The Party enjoyed particularly great influence among the sailors of the Baltic Fleet among whom the Kronstadt sailors were foremost in casting off the influence of the petty-bourgeois parties and rallying to the banner of the Bolsheviks.

Thus, thanks to their tireless work, the influence of the Bolsheviks among the masses rose from day to day. They rallied to the Party and its militant slogans.

On June 16, 1917 the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets convened in Petrograd. At this Congress the many millions of workers, peasants and soldiers of the whole country were represented. The Bolsheviks who were in the minority at this Congress indefatigably exposed the treacherous role of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries and their compromises with the bourgeoisie. The Bolsheviks fought energetically to wrest the bulk of the delegates of the Congress away from the influence of the Mensheviks, to win them over to their side.

As the Congress progressed there was a noticeable turn to the Bolsheviks. An increasing number of sympathizing non-Party Congress delegates attended the open sessions of the bolshevik fraction.

This turn became especially strong as a result of the powerful demonstration on July 1 (June 18), when half a million workers and soldiers demonstrated solely under bolshevik slogans: "All Power to the Soviets!", "Down with the Capitalist Ministers!", "Down with War!", "The Land to the Peasants!", etc. The next day Lenin wrote in *Pravda* with reference to this demonstration that it was the first political demonstration in which the masses powerfully demonstrated their will—not in resolutions but on the street—to fight for the power of the soviets.

In the provinces and at the front the influence of the Party was not yet as preponderant at that time as in Petrograd and in the other big proletarian centres; however, there too, the masses showed increasing sympathy with the bolshevik cause.

The Party in the July Days

In the rear, ruin and unemployment kept increasing, railway transportation was coming to a stop, the cities were without bread. The capitalists laid waste production, purposely closed down enterprises, threw tens of thousands of workers upon the streets. This called forth growing indignation among the workers. The strike wave mounted higher and higher. The workers demanded that power be placed in the hands of the soviets. The peasants rose against the landlords, set fire to the country mansions, seized the land. In July three hundred twenty-five counties were affected by the peasant movement.

In continuing the struggle to win over the masses, the Party became especially active against the contemplated new offensive at the front, for which the Provisional Government was making great preparations.

On July 1 (June 18), Kerensky, at the demand of the Russian, French and English imperialists and with the sanction of the menshevik-socialist-revolutionary majority of the First Congress of the Soviets, ordered the front-line troops to attack the Germans. However, under the influence of bolshevik agitation, Kerensky was losing his grip on the front. Several regiments refused to attack, and those that did attack were defeated by the German army.

The defeat at the front called forth a new wave of discontent among the soldiers against the Provisional Government. The army was disintegrating. The front-line soldiers ceased to believe the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries and went over to the side of the Bolsheviks. The soldiers became more and more obstinate in their assertions that the "socialist" ministers had sold out to the bourgeoisie and that they might as well chuck their arms and go home.

The bourgeoisie was gathering its counter-revolutionary forces, preparing to smash the revolution. Its plan consisted in withdrawing the revolutionary regiments from Petrograd, disarming the workers and breaking up the Party of the Bolsheviks.

The Bolsheviks unmasked the plots of the bourgeoisie and pointed out to the masses the danger menacing the revolution. Indignant at the actions of the counter-revolutionaries, the Petro-

grad workers and soldiers came out into the streets on July 16-18 (3-5) with the demand that the soviets take power into their own hands.

The Central Committee of the Bolsheviks tried to stop this move of the masses for at that time it was premature and therefore disadvantageous to the proletariat. However, the indignation of the masses was so great that they acted in spite of everything. Then the Central Committee called upon the Party organization to take part in the demonstration, to head it and give it a peaceful, organized character.

No less than 500,000 persons participated in the demonstration of July 17. The factories and mills were on strike. Sailors arrived from Kronstadt. The revolutionary regiments—the First Machine-Gun, the First Infantry, etc.—sent a delegation to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee which presented the following demands: that the soviets take power, that the offensive be stopped, that the land be given to the peasants, that control of industry be instituted, that all bourgeois newspapers conducting counter-revolutionary agitation be closed down, etc.

The workers of the Putilov Works who appeared in a body at the Tauride Palace declared that they would not leave until the soviets took power into their own hands. At all enterprises, in the barracks, the streets and squares meetings were continually being held demanding that power be transferred to the soviets.

The warnings of the Bolsheviks that the bourgeoisie was preparing a blood bath for the workers and soldiers proved well-founded.

In the afternoon of July 17 (4) the tremendous demonstration in Petrograd was shot upon at a street crossing by *Junkers** and officers' detachments and by Cossack troops recalled from the front by the Provisional Government.

Similar demonstrations were going on simultaneously in Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznessensk, Nizhni Novgorod, Kiev and other cities. These demonstrations were accompanied by bloody clashes between the workers and soldiers on the one hand and the adherents of the Provisional Government on the other.

* *Junkers*—cadets at the tsarist military academies.—Ed. English ed.

After shooting down the demonstrators the infuriated bourgeoisie began to wreak vengeance upon the revolution and the Party of the Bolsheviks. The Junkers disarmed the workers. The premises of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks and the editorial offices of the Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda* and others were wrecked by the Junkers. The bolshevik newspapers were closed down. Bolshevik agitators were killed in the streets.

At the front the Provisional Government re-introduced the death sentence. Soldiers were shot for sympathizing with the Bolsheviks.

The most prominent functionaries of the Party of the Bolsheviks were arrested and thrown into prison. A warrant was issued for the arrest of Lenin and he had to go into hiding. For a few weeks he hid in a hut in the fields near Sestroretsk. In September when cold weather set in he went to Finland where he stayed until October 20, constantly leading the Party work from his place of hiding.

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries fully supported all the counter-revolutionary measures of the Provisional Government. They openly became transformed into the direct abettors of barefaced counter-revolution. To the workers and soldiers who had taken part in the demonstrations for Soviet power they gave such epithets as criminal band, enemies of the revolution.

The bourgeoisie with the active assistance of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks now began a despicable campaign of incitement against the Bolsheviks. At every turn and corner the counter-revolutionaries loudly inveighed against the Bolsheviks who were alleged to be agents of German imperialism. Forged documents were printed and published in the newspapers claiming that Lenin was a German spy. The bourgeoisie and the compromising parties demanded Lenin's arrest and trial with a view to murdering the leader of the revolution. The government placed a high monetary reward upon the head of Lenin.

However, the class-conscious workers, soldiers and peasants did not believe this slander. All their sympathies were on the side of the Bolsheviks. New members flowed in an uninterrupted stream into the Party of the Bolsheviks which had gone

underground, while the social-treason parties rapidly faced decay.

Sixth Congress of the Party

It was under these conditions of rampant counter-revolution that the Sixth Party Congress assembled semi-legally in August 1917 in Petrograd. One hundred and fifty-seven delegates having the right to vote and representing two hundred and forty thousand Party members were present at the Congress. The Congress proceeded on the basis of the directives given by Lenin from his hiding place; the direct leader of the Congress was Comrade Stalin. In his report at the Congress on the political situation in the country, Comrade Stalin developed in detail the Leninist appraisal of the moment. Lenin on the eve of the Congress had explained that the situation in the country after the July days had changed precipitately. Temporarily counter-revolution had triumphed. The dual power was at an end, said Lenin, and power had temporarily passed entirely into the hands of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. Now the forces of revolution and counter-revolution were openly taking the field against each other. On the one side stood the Cadet Party, around which the entire counter-revolution had rallied; on the other side—the Party of the Bolsheviks around which the masses of workers, soldiers and peasants were rallying in increasing numbers. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had finally been converted into an appendage of the counter-revolution.

In view of this Lenin pointed out the necessity of changing the tactics of the Party and its slogans. After the July days the slogan of "All Power to the Soviets" had become out-of-date. The slogan of transferring all power to the soviets, wrote Lenin, was correct in April, May, June, until July 16-18 (3-5), i.e., until power had actually been transferred into the hands of the military bourgeois dictatorship. At the time of the dual power, when all armed power was on the side of the soviets, the bourgeoisie could not have offered any serious resistance if the soviets had agreed to take power. But after the July days, explained Lenin, the menshevik-socialist-revolutionary soviets had become a weapon of counter-revolution. Under these conditions the slogan of "All Power to the Soviets" would have meant to sup-

port the menshevik-socialist-revolutionary soviets. It would have concealed the fact that the soviets had gone over to the side of the counter-revolution. Therefore Lenin proposed that this slogan be withdrawn. Instead of the slogan "All Power to the Soviets"

"we launched the slogan of transferring power to the proletariat and the poor peasantry," *

said Comrade Stalin at the Sixth Congress. The Congress adopted this slogan.

The temporary withdrawal of the slogan of "All Power to the Soviets" did not mean "Down with the Soviets." It was necessary that the soviets continue their existence as mass organizations and future organs of proletarian dictatorship.

"In this new revolution," wrote Lenin, "... we shall be in favour of building the whole state after the type of soviets..." **

But for this purpose the *soviets must become bolshevik* and therefore the Bolsheviks tirelessly continued the struggle for a majority in the soviets by driving the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries out of them.

The Congress pointed out that the Party must continue to muster the army of workers and poorest peasants, must prepare it for the armed uprising against the Provisional Government. For this it was necessary in the first place to smash every variety of opportunism in the ranks of the Bolshevik Party.

At the Sixth Congress the opportunist elements attempted to cause the Party to deviate from the Leninist position. Thus, on the question of the role of the peasantry, Bukharin upheld the opportunist position. He asserted that inasmuch as all peasants were petty proprietors, they would take their stand against the proletariat in the socialist revolution and that the working class would thus remain single-handed, without any allies. Stalin exposing the anti-Leninist views of Bukharin stated that the mass of the poorest peasants would not support the bourgeoisie, that the village poor had so far been following the bourgeoisie because of their lack of class consciousness, that they had simply been deceived. He argued that the Party must help the poorest

* *Minutes of the Sixth Congress.*

** Lenin, "On Slogans," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXI, p. 49.

strata realize their mistake and that they would then join the proletariat in overthrowing capitalism.

The opportunist views were also upheld at the Congress by Preobrazhensky who came out against the Leninist thesis of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, Russia in particular. He and his followers held the view that the backwardness of Russia made it impossible to build socialism there unless the proletarian revolution was first victorious in the West. This in substance was the Trotskyist position.

Comrade Stalin came out sharply against the Trotskyist position of Preobrazhensky and vigorously defended the Leninist doctrine of the possibility of building socialism in one country.

"The possibility is not excluded that Russia may be the very country which will pave the way to socialism . . .

"We must reject the outworn conception that only Europe can show us the way," * said Stalin.

At the Congress the Right opportunists—Nogin and others—also took the floor. They were opposed to the Party line for an armed uprising and spoke decidedly against the struggle for the socialist revolution. Denying that after July 16-18 (3-5) the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had openly gone over to the side of the counter-revolution the Rights pursued the policy of compromising with them.

The Congress firmly rejected all these opportunist distortions of the Leninist line and fully endorsed the line of the Central Committee of the Party.

The question whether Lenin should appear before court was a special point on the agenda of the Congress. The Congress declared that the bourgeoisie intended to make use of Lenin's trial in order to deprive the Bolshevik Party of its leader. There could be no talk of Lenin receiving an impartial trial. It would merely supply the occasion for a dastardly act of retaliation by the bourgeoisie against the leader of the world proletariat. After hearing the report of Comrade Orjonikidze the Congress was decidedly against Lenin's surrendering to the government of Kerensky and therefore ordered Lenin to remain in hiding.

* *The Eve of October* (Sixth Party Congress), p. 47.

The Inter-Regionalists were taken into the Party by the Sixth Congress. They were a group of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks who had split off and united in 1913 in St. Petersburg in a special organization headed by an inter-regional committee. A centrist organization, they rejected the bolshevik struggle against opportunism on two fronts; they were against a split with the Defencists. During the war they endorsed the centrist positions of the Zimmerwald majority. In 1917 the leaders of the Inter-Regionalist organization were Trotsky, Lunacharsky, Yurenev, Joffe and others.

In the summer of 1917 the Inter-Regionalists came nearer to the position of the Bolsheviks. They took a stand in favour of establishing the power of the Soviets, of transforming the imperialist war into civil war, of an immediate offer of peace by the Soviet government on the basis of no annexations and no indemnities, and the complete self-determination of nations.

At the Sixth Congress the Inter-Regionalists declared that they fully subscribed to the bolshevik line and principles on all the main issues of the program and tactics. On this basis the Congress accepted them as members of the Bolshevik Party. Thus Trotsky became a member of the Bolshevik Party. However, as it afterwards turned out, Trotsky, on entering the Party, only for a while "concealed his menshevik burden in his cupboard," to use the words of Comrade Stalin. Subsequently Trotsky repeatedly fetched it out to struggle against the Party, until finally (in 1927) he became an open counter-revolutionary and was expelled for good from the U.S.S.R.

All the decisions of the Sixth Party Congress were directed toward the preparation of the proletariat and the poor peasants for the armed uprising. This was the Congress that cleared the deck for the October insurrection. The Party emerged from the Congress welded still more firmly and ready to give battle for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Party During the Kornilov Days

After the Sixth Congress the Party intensified its work of preparing the uprising and of organizing the masses, of rallying them in ever greater numbers under its banner. The two

opposing forces—the proletariat and the bourgeoisie—were preparing for the decisive combat.

In order to strengthen its authority in the country, the Provisional Government on August 25 called a State Convention in Moscow to which only the representatives of the big bourgeoisie, the landlords and the military were invited. The Soviets were represented at this Convention only by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who were members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The Bolsheviks, even those who were members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, were not admitted.

The organizers of the State Convention who feared the revolutionary workers and soldiers of Petrograd decided to call it in Moscow, where they expected to find quiet and calm. But the Moscow proletariat was on guard for the revolution. In response to the call of the Bolsheviks, four hundred thousand Moscow workers came out on a general strike on the day its sessions opened as a sign of protest against calling the State Convention.

At the State Convention the bourgeoisie openly demanded the abolition of the soviets and the creation of a military dictatorship to continue the war and smash the revolution. The most reactionary section of the bourgeoisie wanted to disperse not only the soviets but also the Provisional Government, the policy of which seemed to them to be too spineless. The bourgeoisie designated General Kornilov, the commander-in-chief, as its military dictator. He had been the first to re-introduce the death penalty at the front, and to have the executed soldiers put on exhibition to deter others. Even while the Convention was sitting in Moscow Kornilov moved Cossack regiments from the front to Moscow in order to set up his own dictatorship. However, the unanimous action of the Moscow proletariat on the day the Convention opened compelled the bourgeoisie to postpone for some time its attempt to effect a *coup d'état* so that it might be able to make better preparations for it.

At the time of this Moscow Convention the Cadet Party came to a final understanding with Kornilov about this *coup*. On September 8, Kornilov moved the third Cossack corps and a cavalry division to Petrograd. Thereupon the Central Committee

of the Bolsheviks appealed to the proletariat and the revolutionary soldiers to defend the revolution.

The trade unions mobilized their members and kept them in military preparedness. Tens of thousands of workers entered the Red Guard. This together with the revolutionary garrison of Petrograd constituted a formidable army which went to meet Kornilov's troops. Many bolshevik agitators were active among them.

The Bolsheviks roused the entire toiling population of the country to ward off Kornilov's attack. Kronstadt sent several thousand sailors to defend Petrograd. In Moscow and other cities the Bolsheviks took energetic steps to arm the workers and created detachments of the Red Guard which later on played a decisive part in the October Revolution.

At the insistence of the Bolsheviks, revolutionary committees and headquarters to combat Kornilov were established in many cities. The masses sharply veered to the side of the Bolsheviks.

During the Kornilov days the Bolsheviks led the majority of the soviets even where this majority continued to trust the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The wavering masses convinced themselves from their own experience of the counter-revolutionary character of the bourgeoisie, of the treachery and powerlessness of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The mass pressure was so great that both the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, in order to retain at least some measure of influence over the toilers, resorted to manoeuvres and in their endeavour to save the Provisional Government came out against Kornilov.

Kerensky, the head of the Provisional Government, secretly conspired with Kornilov. However, on seeing that the whole working class and the soldier masses rose against the Kornilovists, Kerensky was compelled to declare that he, too, was against Kornilov. But this by no means meant that Kerensky broke with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. It was merely a manoeuvre designed to deceive the masses.

All the work of organizing the resistance against Kornilov was performed by the Bolsheviks.

While mobilizing all the forces of the revolution for the struggle against Kornilov, the Bolsheviks did not in the slightest

relax their struggle against Kerensky's government. They exposed before the masses the weakness, the vacillation of Kerensky who was incapable of conducting the struggle against Kornilov's counter-revolutionary march. For the purpose of exposing the counter-revolutionary essence of the Provisional Government, the Bolsheviks agitated among the masses for the presentation of the following demands to Kerensky: that the leaders of the bourgeoisie (Milyukov, Rodzyanko, etc.) be arrested, that the State Duma be dispersed, that the transfer of the land to the peasants be sanctioned, that workers' control of grain and the factories be introduced and that peace be immediately offered to Germany. The Bolsheviks knew that not one of these demands would be fulfilled by the Provisional Government and that as a result the masses would be more firmly convinced than ever of the necessity of overthrowing it. By opening the eyes of the masses to the counter-revolutionary essence of the Provisional Government, this agitational work still more intensified their hatred for Kerensky, linked the masses still more closely to the Party of the Bolsheviks and brought nearer the moment of armed uprising.

In the struggle against Kornilov the Bolsheviks exercised undivided leadership. The defeat of Kornilov was achieved only through the revolutionary determination of the Bolsheviks who during those days were able to draw the workers, soldiers and peasants into the struggle against him and to lead the wavering majority in the soviets. Under the influence of this bolshevik agitation among the Kornilov troops, disintegration among the latter became rife. Kornilov himself was arrested and put in prison from which he afterwards succeeded in escaping.

The Kornilov days played a very important part in preparing for October. The authority of the Bolsheviks during these days grew immeasurably in the eyes of the toilers while the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries lost their influence over the masses almost completely. One of the most important results of the struggle of the Party during the Kornilov days was the fact that while mobilizing the masses for the struggle against Kornilov, it still further developed the work of strengthening the detachments of Red Guards organized since the beginning of the February Revolution and armed the workers. The weapons re-

ceived by the workers during the Kornilov days were used by them during the days of the October insurrection.

*The Party Wins a Majority in the Soviets and
Other Mass Organizations*

By September 1917 the Provisional Government's policy had reduced the country to complete economic prostration. The solution of all basic questions of the revolution—those concerning peace, land and the equality of nations—had been postponed by the Provisional Government until the Constituent Assembly, the convocation of which was being delayed on every possible pretext.

On all the main issues the Provisional Government continued the policy of the tsar: the peasants received no land, the war went on, ruin and starvation grew apace.

By their policy the "socialist" ministers had finally exposed themselves in the eyes of the masses as the agents of the bourgeois counter-revolution. The Socialist-Revolutionaries Chernov and Maslov, who were Ministers of Agriculture, fought in every way against the seizure of land by the peasants; they appealed to the peasants to wait patiently for the Constituent Assembly and sent punitive expeditions against them whenever the peasants seized any estate. The Menshevik Skobelev (Minister of Labour) helped the bourgeoisie to deprive the workers of the eight-hour working day and waged an open struggle against the factory trade union committees at the enterprises. The Menshevik Tsereteli suppressed peasant activities with armed force, advocated the death penalty at the front and supported even the most counter-revolutionary steps of the bourgeoisie. The Socialist-Revolutionary Kerensky finally revealed himself as a covert Kornilovist. The words of the Bolsheviks that the Provisional Government was protecting the interest of the imperialist bourgeoisie and would give the people nothing while the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had finally become converted into lackeys of the bourgeoisie, into hangmen of the revolution, were fully confirmed. The masses saw that an economic catastrophe was fast approaching and their hatred for the bourgeoisie and the compromising parties grew rapidly. Each day the influence of the Bolshevik Party among the toilers increased.

The soviets began to pass into the hands of the Bolsheviks—at first in the big centres (Petrograd, Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk); later on in other towns (in the Urals, Siberia, the Volga region).

The same occurred in the labour organizations. The factory committees at the enterprises were almost everywhere in the hands of the Bolsheviks. The trade unions were likewise gradually won over by the Bolsheviks. The most important unions (those of the metal workers, textile workers and others) in the industrial centres began to make common cause with the Bolsheviks.

The influence of the Bolsheviks in the army also grew rapidly. The Party won over the soldier masses through the bolshevik nuclei in the companies and regiments and through their press. The work of these nuclei was led by the military organization of the Central Committee of the Party which united thousands of bolshevik soldiers.*

The military organization of the Central Committee sent its organizers, agitators and propagandists among the various regiments. It published the newspaper *Soldatskaya Pravda* (*Soldiers' Truth*) which was distributed at the front in thousands of copies and likewise among the armed units of the rear. The military organization of the Central Committee published and distributed hundreds of thousands of bolshevik leaflets and booklets among the soldiers. Especially intensive work was done among the composite companies which were being despatched to the front to replenish the troops there. These companies carried with them to the front bolshevik ideas and slogans from the proletarian centres.

In September many company, battalion and regimental committees were already under bolshevik leadership. Bolshevik influence was especially powerful in the Twelfth Army where the *Okopnaya Pravda* (*Trench Truth*) was published. Kronstadt and the Baltic fleet were bolshevik. Under the pressure of the bolshevik-minded sailors, the Central Committee of the Black Sea Fleet on September 24 carried a resolution to transfer all power to the soviets. The Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies in the rear and

* At the All-Russian Bolshevik Conference of Military Organizations which took place at the end of June, 26,000 bolshevik soldiers were represented.
—Ed. Russian, ed.

at the front were coming over to the bolshevik position. Each day the influence of the Bolsheviks in the countryside grew. The Party sent working-class agitators and propagandists to work among the peasantry. It published special peasant newspapers (in Petrograd—the *Derevenskaya Byednota* (Rural Poor), in Moscow—the *Derevenskaya Pravda*, (Rural Truth). The bolshevik slogans of "Peace," "Land for the People," "Immediate Seizure of Landlord Estates," met with the full sympathy of the peasants.

Through soldiers on leave, who were supplied with bolshevik newspapers, leaflets and booklets, the Party exerted very great influence in the countryside—even in the most remote border districts of Russia.

In the villages the Party organized bolshevik nuclei which consisted primarily of the village poor and the soldiers who had returned from the army. These nuclei fought to win the peasantry over to the side of the Bolsheviks, to expose the Socialist-Revolutionaries and to sap their influence in the countryside.

Owing to the influence of the Bolsheviks the peasant movement attained whirlwind growth before the October Revolution. Several provinces (for instance the Penza and the Tambov) were completely swept by insurrection. Punitive detachments which were sent against the peasants still more inflamed the hatred of the latter for the Provisional Government. In twenty-three provinces and four armies the soviets came out against the coalition (i.e., against a government consisting of the bourgeoisie, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries). The peasant soviets likewise began to go over to the Bolsheviks. The Petrograd Soviets of Peasants' Deputies adopted a resolution on October 15 that power be transferred to the soviets.

After the Kornilov mutiny the role of the soviets grew considerably. Wherever the soviets had come into the hands of the Bolsheviks, they were constituted into fighting mass organizations capable of engaging in armed combat with the Provisional Government. Therefore the Party again launched the former slogan of "All Power to the Soviets." But now this slogan meant the transfer of power to *bolshevik* soviets. Now this slogan was a call to armed insurrection, for the dictatorship of the proletariat. The bolshevik control of the soviets, trade unions, the

soldiers' committees in the army and other mass organizations, and the growth of the influence of the Bolsheviks among the peasant poor fully confirmed the correctness of the Leninist line in the revolution. These successes were attained by the Party only in consequence of its resolute struggle against all varieties of opportunism. Thanks to the stubborn struggle of all Party organizations at the centre and in the provinces, the Party became more and more closely connected with the broad masses of the toilers and was winning them away from the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Their compromising policy brought the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries to complete bankruptcy, as the masses were casting off their influence. The Provisional Government was losing its support among the masses day by day. In order to save it, the Menshevik--Socialist-Revolutionary All-Russian Central Executive Committee convoked the so-called Democratic Conference on September 27. It consisted of representatives of the municipal authorities, the zemstvos, the co-operative organizations, the soviets, the trade unions, the army organizations, etc.

By juggling with the method of representation, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries secured a majority in the Conference calculating that it would take the minds of the masses away from the idea of a new revolution. They held out the Conference as a genuine representative body of the revolutionary nation, figuring that it would support the authority of the Provisional Government. However, the vast majority at the Conference took sides against the Provisional Government coalition and against admitting the Cadets to power.

Despite this, the leaders of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries on October 8 formed a third coalition government which again included the Cadets.

The Democratic Conference elected about three hundred of its own members who together with the representatives of the bourgeoisie appointed by Kerensky constituted the Provisional Council of the Republic (Pre-Parliament), which was to act as an advisory body attached to the Provisional Government. This Pre-Parliament was supposed to embody popular representation

and was to be a support upon which the Provisional Government could rely in carrying through its policy. But it was a palpable counterfeit, inasmuch as its bourgeois and petty-bourgeois composition did not reflect the sentiments of the masses to any extent whatever. Kerensky assumed that this counterfeit representative body would permit him to stave off the convocation of the Constituent Assembly which the bourgeoisie did not want to be convened.

The Bolsheviks took part in the Democratic Conference for the purpose of exposing it before the masses in their speeches delivered from its rostrum and for the further purpose of demonstrating that it was a counterfeit manufactured by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The bolshevik fraction of the Democratic Conference (by a vote of 77 against 50) decided to enter the Pre-Parliament. However, Lenin and Stalin strongly argued against this decision and proved that it was wrong.

Lenin wrote that at a time when a new revolution was maturing the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries should not be permitted to deceive the masses, to draw them away from the revolutionary struggle by their chatter about the Pre-Parliament. Lenin wrote that the Pre-Parliament should be boycotted. One must turn to the soviets, the trade unions, the masses; it is they who must be called upon to take up the struggle. The masses must be given a correct slogan: to disperse the Kerensky band together with its Pre-Parliament.

In accordance with Lenin's instructions, the Central Committee corrected this error: the Bolsheviks left the Pre-Parliament at its first session after reading a statement in which its counter-revolutionary role was exposed. The Party bent all its forces to the preparation of the armed uprising. The Right opportunists—Kamenev, Rykov and others, who were decided opponents of the armed uprising, vehemently objected to this line of the Party. They advocated participation in the Pre-Parliament. After the Central Committee had unanimously voted down this motion of the Rights against Kamenev's sole affirmative vote, the latter in protest against the Party line refused to carry on the work on the All-Russian Central Executive Committee entrusted to him by the Party.

Preparations for the Uprising

But neither the Democratic Council nor the Pre-Parliament could save the Provisional Government. The war continued. Unemployment and starvation kept increasing. The oppressed nations of Finland, White Russia, the Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tataria, Bashkiria, etc., felt implacable hatred for Kerensky's government which continued the tsar's policy of national oppression.

The petty-bourgeois parties of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries suffered final shipwreck at that time. The masses expressed their full confidence in the Bolsheviks. Every sign pointed to the fact that the masses no longer wanted to wait, that they had ceased to believe the promises and persuasive oratory of the compromisers. The strike struggle at that time reached the highest tension. The textile workers in the Moscow and Ivanovo-Voznessensk regions who were fighting against lockouts practically seized the factories. The Moscow leather workers stayed out on strike for two and a half months receiving the fraternal support of other unions during this time. The printers' strike affected almost the whole country. The general strike of the metal workers was coming to a head. The struggle of the Donetz workers against the government and the industrialists who tried to crush them with the aid of Kaledin's Cossacks was transformed into an armed uprising. The workers demanded that power pass into the hands of the soviets, realizing that this was the only salvation against unemployment and starvation.

In the countryside peasant uprisings multiplied. At the front spontaneous demobilization set in. A considerable number of soldiers threw away their arms and left the front for home, having no further desire to wage war. The masses demanded that the Bolsheviks take decisive action.

The latter, carrying into life the Leninist tactics, gained tremendous influence in the country. The following four distinguishing features of the tactics employed by the Bolsheviks were of paramount importance:

1. The preparation of the October Revolution proceeded solely under the undivided leadership of the Party of the Bolsheviks;

2. The principal line of the Party's tactics was directed towards the *isolation* of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who were the firmest support of the bourgeoisie;

3. The struggle against the compromising parties for the dictatorship of the proletariat was waged by the Bolsheviks under the slogan of "All Power to the Soviets," as they were endeavouring to transform the soviets into organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat;

4. The Party won over the masses by its ability to convince them from their own experience of the correctness of the Bolshevik slogans.

The international situation at that time also took a turn favourable for the uprising of the proletariat in Russia. On account of the discontent with the war, strikes of workers and mutinies of troops began to break out in the belligerent countries of Western Europe. Lenin said that if under these conditions the proletariat of Russia, after seizing power, offered peace to all warring nations, this move would meet with the sympathy of the toilers of the whole globe and that an armistice could be concluded with Germany immediately.

"Now to obtain an armistice at this moment," wrote Lenin, "would mean to vanquish the *whole world*."*

The favourable internal and international situation thus placed the armed uprising on 'the order of the day. Lenin at the end of September had already declared with all sharpness that "the crisis had matured," posing in the Central Committee the question of immediate preparation for an armed uprising. Lenin laid maximum stress on the necessity of carefully preparing the uprising, since insurrection, as Marx and Engels had said, was an art.

Lenin pointed out five principal rules governing this art:

"1. *Never play with insurrection; but, when it is once begun, know firmly that it must be carried through to the end.*

"2. Concentrate, at the decisive place and time, *forces greatly superior* to those of the enemy; otherwise the latter, better prepared and better organized, will defeat and exterminate the insurgents.

"3. Once the insurrection has begun, it is necessary to act with

* Lenin, "Marxism and Insurrection," *Marx-Engels-Marxism*, p. 165.

the greatest *determination*, and, at all costs, on the *offensive*. 'The defensive is the death of every armed insurrection.'

"4. Make sure of taking the enemy by surprise and seize the moment when his troops are scattered.

"5. Endeavour to win successes *each day*, even small ones (one might say 'each hour' if it is the case of one town), and at all costs maintain '*moral ascendancy*.'" *

Applying these rules to Russia, Lenin mapped out the following plan for the armed uprising:

"Combination of our three chief forces: the navy, the workers, and the army units, to occupy without fail and hold at all costs: a) the telephone; b) the telegraph; c) the railway stations; d) above all, the bridges. . . . To encircle and cut off Petrograd; to take possession of it by a combined attack of the navy, the workers, and the troops—a task which requires *art and triple audacity*." **

In order that this plan might be successfully carried out, the Central Committee of the Party as early as September began to make practical preparations for the organization of an armed uprising in the very near future. The Central Committee, at its session of October 7, devoted special attention to organizing and instructing the Red Guard in the art of war. In the military department of the Central Committee courses were organized to train instructors who in turn were to prepare commanders.

On October 20 (7) Lenin came from Finland to Petrograd so as to be in direct charge of the preparations for the uprising.

On October 23 (10) an historic session of the Central Committee was held under the leadership of Lenin. At this session the Central Committee decided to begin the armed uprising within the next few days. All Party organizations were instructed that all their work must serve to prepare the uprising. At this same session a political centre, headed by Lenin and including Stalin, was elected to lead the uprising.

At this session of the Central Committee Kamenev and Zinoviev came out against the line of the Party and tried in every way to hold it back from proceeding to insurrection. Next day, October 24, they handed the Central Committee and distributed to the Party organizations a statement in which they set forth

* Lenin, "Advice from an Onlooker," *Marx-Engels-Marxism*, pp. 168-69.

** *Ibid.*

that the uprising was inopportune, claiming that the proletariat was badly organized and that the majority in the country was inimically disposed toward the Bolsheviks. They proposed that the Central Committee wait for the Constituent Assembly which would decide all questions of the revolution. "We raise our voice in warning against this ruinous policy" of the Central Committee—Kamenev and Zinoviev stated in conclusion.

Trotsky was also against the uprising contemplated by the Party. He contended that the question of power should be decided by the Second Congress of Soviets. If the Party had listened to Trotsky and had postponed the uprising until the Second Congress of Soviets met, the Provisional Government would have managed to mobilize the counter-revolutionary forces and rout the proletariat.

On October 29 (16) an enlarged session of the Central Committee was held jointly with the Petrograd Committee and representatives from the military organization, from the fractions of the soviets, trade unions, factory committees, etc. This meeting discussed the practical measures to be taken in preparing the uprising. Kamenev and Zinoviev once more opposed the uprising. The overwhelming majority sharply condemned them as panic-mongers and capitulators who were flinching at the most decisive moment of the revolution.

At this session the Central Committee appointed also a practical centre alongside of the political centre to lead the uprising. It consisted of Comrades Stalin, Svendlov, Dzierzynski, Bubnov and Uritsky.

The next day Kamenev published a defence of his opportunist views in the menshevik newspaper *Novaya Zhizn* (*New Life*). By this move Kamenev tried to undermine the decision of the Central Committee concerning the uprising. At the same time the Central Committee, in order to keep the plan of the uprising secret, could not come out openly and mention the decision passed by the Party to begin the uprising immediately. Lenin wrote:

"Kamenev and Zinoviev have betrayed to Rodzyanko and Kerensky the decision of the Central Committee." *

* Lenin, "Letter to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXI.

Lenin called them traitors to the revolution, betrayers of the working class, and demanded that they be immediately expelled from the Party.

Kamenev and Zinoviev stood alone; they had no support in the Party. Their treasonable move did not interfere with the armed uprising. In pursuance of the decision of the Central Committee, the Party organizations in the various localities made vast practical preparations for the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the organization of the new government. The Petrograd Committee increased its agitation among the masses, organized the military training of the workers and strengthened the contact between the Party committees, the factory committees and the military bodies. Each factory and mill had its squads and companies of workers trained in military matters, ready to launch the uprising and carry it through.

The Moscow regional bureau of the Party sent out its representatives to prepare the uprising in the Nizhni-Novgorod, Ivanovo-Voznessensk, Vladimir, Smolensk, Tver and other provinces. In the factories (for instance, the Michelson and Motor Works in Moscow) fire-arms and bombs were being manufactured for the Red Guards. The supply of arms to the workers was being organized through soldiers. The railroad workers of the Moscow junction played an especially great part in preparing the uprising.

Representatives were sent by the Central Committee of the Party to Helsingfors, Kronstadt, Reval, the northwestern front, etc. The Central Committee gave instructions to all these organizations to prepare the workers and the military units for action in support of Petrograd when that city would rise against the Provisional Government. In the centres surrounding Petrograd (Reval, the 12th Army, the Baltic Fleet, etc.), Revolutionary Military Committees were established, commissars were appointed, etc.

In accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee the Party organizations throughout all Russia energetically prepared for the armed uprising and the seizure of power by the workers and poorest peasants.

The October Revolution

On October 22, by order of the Central Committee of the Party, the Petrograd Soviet, in which the Bolsheviks had a majority, created a Revolutionary Military Committee to lead the insurrection in Petrograd. By order of the Provisional Government the commanding officers of the Petrograd military district were attempting to send the revolutionary troops out of Petrograd to the front in order to paralyse the centre of the revolution. But the soldier masses in Petrograd recognized only the power of the Petrograd Soviet as standing above them, and the latter did not permit any troops to be moved out of Petrograd.

The Petrograd garrison sided with the Bolsheviks and came out in favour of an armed uprising. The Provisional Government on its part ordered military units to be sent to Petrograd from the front in order to smash the revolution. The Revolutionary Military Committee put the Red Guard and the garrison in fighting trim. The workers of the Sestroretsk Munition Factory sent ten thousand rifles for the Petrograd Red Guard. The great number of rifles found by the workers in the fortress of Peter and Paul also went to arm the Red Guard of Petrograd. Besides, the workers were supplied with rifles by the military units stationed in Petrograd and in its environs. The revolutionary detachments at Kronstadt and other nearby cities were sent for. A squadron of torpedo boats arrived from Helsingfors.

The Revolutionary Military Committees set up all over Russia established a control over the actions of the commissars of the Provisional Government and the commanders of the military units. They closely scrutinized the movements of the troops so as to prevent the Provisional Government from summoning reinforcements to its aid in Petrograd.

On November 5 (October 23) the Provisional Government issued a decree ordering the prosecution of the members of the Revolutionary Military Committee, the arrest of the Bolsheviks and the closing down of the bolshevik newspapers. On November 6 (October 24) the *Rabochy Put* (*Workers' Path*), the central organ of the Bolsheviks, and the *Soldat* (*Soldier*), the organ of the military organization of the Central Committee of the

Party, were closed down. On the same day the Provisional Government called in the Junkers, who were stationed near Petrograd. The Junkers occupied the government buildings, the railway stations and bridges and stationed posts on the streets. Telephone connections to Smolny Institute, the headquarters of the revolution, were cut; the bridges across the Neva were raised with the object of isolating the proletarian districts from the centre of the city.

But the initiative was in the hands of the Bolshevik Party which put the proletariat of Petrograd and its vicinity under arms.

The centre elected by the Central Committee of the Party to lead the uprising issued instructions to begin the combat. Fighting actually commenced on November 6 (October 24) with Lenin in direct charge of the insurrection.

On that day the Revolutionary Military Committee issued an order that the bolshevik newspapers be published. A detachment consisting of the First Reserve Battalion and of the Lithuanian Regiment was stationed there to guard the printshops where the newspapers were being printed. The newspapers were published. The Revolutionary Military Committee further ordered the bridges to be lowered and kept under guard. By the evening of November 6 the bridges began to be lowered.

During the night of November 6 to November 7 (October 24-25) the battle between the insurgent proletariat and the troops of the Provisional Government began. The Red Guard joined by the units of the garrison occupied the railway stations, the telephone exchange and almost all government buildings, driving out the Junkers everywhere. On November 7 (October 25), before evening Petrograd was in the hands of the workers who had risen in arms. The Provisional Government was ensconced in the Winter Palace, surrounded by the Junkers and the Women's Battalion. Lenin issued orders to take the Winter Palace immediately and arrest the Provisional Government. Late in the evening of November 7, (October 25), the Winter Palace, the last refuge of the counter-revolution, was stormed. The Provisional Government was arrested, but Kerensky succeeded in escaping. Power passed to the Bolshevik Revolutionary Military Committee.

On the same day, at 10:45 p.m., the Second All-Russian Congress of the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Depu-

ties opened. The Bolsheviks and their adherents formed the overwhelming majority at the Congress. The Menshevik and Right Socialist-Revolutionary deputies, the adherents of the Provisional Government, formed an insignificant minority. These traitors declared at the Congress that they refused to take part in its work. After reading their declaration in which they called the October Revolution a military conspiracy, a crime against the fatherland and the revolution, the Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries left the Congress. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries remained and collaborated with the Bolsheviks in the work of the Congress.

In its resolution dealing with the withdrawal of the Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Congress recorded the fact that the withdrawal of these compromising parties had not weakened the power of the Congress of Soviets or its influence on the masses, but on the contrary had strengthened it, as the Congress purged itself of counter-revolutionary elements.

Having accepted power at the hands of the Revolutionary Military Committee, the Congress issued a manifesto to all workers, soldiers and peasants of Russia, in which it announced the transfer of all power to the Soviets.

"Supported by the will of the vast majority of workers, soldiers and peasants and in reliance upon the victorious uprising of the workers and the garrison accomplished in Petrograd, the Congress takes power into its own hands," reads the manifesto written by Lenin.*

On November 8 (October 26), the second day of its sessions, the Congress adopted the decree on peace submitted by Lenin. In this decree the Congress proposed to all governments and the peoples of all belligerent countries that they immediately open negotiations for the conclusion of a just peace, *i.e.*, a peace without annexations or indemnities, and that these negotiations be conducted openly, without any secrecy. The Congress was convinced that not a single one of the bourgeois governments heading the belligerent countries would agree to such conditions for peace negotiations. But then the predatory ambitions of

* Lenin, "To Workers, Soldiers and Peasants," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXII.

these bourgeois governments, their unwillingness to end the war immediately, would be definitely revealed to the toiling masses. This unmasking of the bourgeois governments aided in enlightening the masses and kindling in their hearts the desire to take the fate of peace into their own hands. The decree on peace was of great historical significance. It was an appeal to the workers, soldiers and peasants of the belligerent countries to rise against "their own" imperialist governments.

In his report at the Congress Lenin emphasized this aspect of the peace decree. He said that in all belligerent countries the interests of the government diverged from those of the people and that Soviet Russia was to help the different peoples actively to interfere in the questions of war and peace.

This decree was a weapon for exposing the imperialist bourgeoisie and transforming the imperialist war into civil war. It still further enhanced the influence of the Bolsheviks in the army and consolidated the position of the Soviet government which had just arisen.

After the passage of the decree on peace, the Congress adopted the decree on land, written by Lenin.

The decree on land was based on the summary of two hundred and forty-two local peasant instructions* which expressed the will of the vast majority of peasants. This decree abolished the private ownership of land forever. The estates of the landlords, of the imperialist family, of the monasteries and the churches were transferred, without compensation, to all the toilers.

The landlord estates alone furnished about sixty million dessiatins of land, the usufruct of which was given to the peasants, according to the decree. The peasants, besides, were relieved of the annual rentals which they had formerly paid to the landlords and which amounted to between four hundred and four hundred and fifty million rubles.

The land law further provided that all the treasures of the earth (ores, oil, coal, etc.) as well as forest lands, bodies of water and lots of land of high-grade cultivation (orchards, plantations,

* Instructions given by the peasants to their deputies in the First All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies held in Petrograd on May 4, 1917. Ed. Eng. ed.

hothouses, etc.), together with all their livestock and agricultural implements, should come under the control of the state. Equal land tenure was decreed, *i.e.*, the land was to be divided among the tillers of the soil according to the so-called labour or consumption level.*

The introduction of the principle of equal land tenure was explained by the fact that in the land question the vast majority of the peasants were still to a certain extent under the influence of the Socialist-Revolutionary program of the socialization of the land. Most of the peasants wanted to have a small, individual farm with systematic repartitions and equal land tenure. But the toiling masses of the peasants could be finally won over to support the bolshevik agrarian program by persuasion and example, but not by force. Therefore the Bolshevik Party took the course of making concessions to the peasantry on the question of the use of the land, for it knew that as a result of the educational work of the Party and of their own experience the peasants would inevitably pass entirely to the side of the Bolsheviks in the land question.

Reporting at the Congress on the land question, Lenin said:

"In the crucible of life, while applying it (the land decree) in practice, and while carrying it into execution at the various localities, the peasants themselves will understand where the truth lies. We must grant the masses complete freedom of creation . . . The crux of the matter is absolutely to convince the peasantry that there are no longer any landlords in the countryside." **

This was the *only correct line with reference to the peasantry*, since this line and only this line strengthened the confidence of the peasant masses in the Soviet government, rallied them around the proletariat and the Bolshevik Party.

This brilliant tactic of the Bolsheviks sets an example for the fraternal Communist Parties. The concession to the peasantry was regarded by the Bolsheviks as a transitional measure that would not impair the cause of socialism.

* Labour level: an allotment that can be cultivated by the members of the peasant's household. Consumption level: an allotment sufficiently large to supply the requirements of the peasant household.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

** Lenin, "The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXII.

On this subject Lenin said:

"If socialism is victorious (workers' control over factories, their subsequent expropriation, the nationalization of the banks, the creation of a Supreme Economic Council to regulate the whole of the country's national economy)—on this condition," said Lenin, "it is the *duty* of the workers to *agree* to the transitional measures proposed by the small toiling and exploited peasants, provided these measures *do not injure* the cause of socialism." *

By carrying out the decree concerning land the old feudal bondage in the village was completely destroyed. But the significance of the decree was not confined to this alone. The confiscation of private land meant also the confiscation of hundreds of millions of rubles invested by the banks in mortgages on this land. Consequently the decree was a crushing blow not only to the survivals of feudalism but also to the bourgeoisie. The abolition of private property in land under the conditions of a victorious proletarian revolution was a matter of the greatest importance, for it greatly facilitated the transition to the collectivization of agriculture. By giving the proletarian state possession of the high-grade cultivation farms, centres of socialist land-tilling were created. The transfer of the confiscated implements and livestock to the soviets made it possible to proceed to the realization of socialist control over the small peasant farms, to regulate them, etc. All this taken together caused the decree concerning land to acquire the importance of a most powerful weapon in the struggle for the reconstruction of society along socialist lines.

The decree rallied the broad masses of the toiling peasantry still more closely around the proletariat and thereby immeasurably strengthened the influence of the Party and the Soviet government in the countryside.

The Second Congress of Soviets adopted a decree to establish a Council of People's Commissars. Lenin was elected President of this Council while Stalin was elected People's Commissar of Nationalities. Other members elected to the Council of People's Commissars were Skvortsov-Stepanov, Krylenko, Milyutin, Lunacharsky and Rykov.

* Lenin, "The Alliance Between the Workers and the Toiling and Exploited Peasants," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXII.

For the first time in the history of the world a workers' and peasants' Soviet government, the organ of the dictatorship of the proletariat, was set up.

Thus, the Bolsheviks, after wresting power from the bourgeoisie in the course of two days, carried into life the slogan of peace and land. Thus, the Bolsheviks showed to the millions of workers and toiling peasants that only the Bolshevik Party was in a position to protect their vital interests.

Hardly had all the members of the Second Congress of Soviets departed for home, when the Soviet government was forced to suppress a counter-revolutionary uprising of the Junkers and Cossacks against the dictatorship of the proletariat. After leaving the Congress the Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, together with Kerensky who had fled from Petrograd, entered into a conspiracy. They formed a "Committee for the Salvation of the Fatherland and the Revolution," the aim of which was to overthrow the Soviet government, restore the power of the Provisional Government, put an end to the Bolsheviks whom they declared to be enemies of the people, and in alliance with Great Britain and France continue the war against Germany.

After making his way to the front with the intention of moving troops against Petrograd, Kerensky received some support in the Third Cavalry Corps which had taken part in the Kornilov campaign. General Krassnov who was in command of this corps assembled several hundred Cossacks and they together with Kerensky marched on Petrograd on November 10. After a battle with the Red Guards, Krassnov's detachment occupied Tsarskoye Syelo. On the morning of November 11 the Committee for the Salvation of the Fatherland and the Revolution headed by Avxentyev, a Socialist-Revolutionary, engineered an uprising of the Junkers in Petrograd. The Junkers seized the Mikhailov Riding Academy with its armoured cars, also the Telephone Exchange. The enemies of the proletarian revolution intended to take bolshevik Petrograd by a combined attack—one blow was to be delivered from Tsarskoye Syelo and this was to be seconded by the uprising within Petrograd itself. But the designs of the plotters were shattered.

The Bolshevik Party and the Soviet government placed tens

of thousands of Petrograd workers and soldiers under arms. Detachments of sailors and torpedo-boats headed by the battleship *Republic* were summoned by Lenin from Kronstadt and Helsingfors. The uprising of the Junkers was put down in one day. It was over by the evening of November 11. On November 13 the Red Guards and the sailors engaged in a decisive battle against Krassnov's detachment on the heights of Pulkovo. The Cossack forces were smashed and General Krassnov himself taken prisoner. This time, too, Kerensky succeeded in making his escape.

In his appeal *To the Population* published in the *Pravda* of November 20, Lenin wrote:

"The Workers' and Peasants' revolution has been finally successful in Petrograd, after scattering and arresting the last remnants of the few Cossacks who had been deceived by Kerensky." *

In Moscow the proletariat which had risen took power into its own hands after a bloody battle with the troops of the Provisional Government. The fighting lasted eight days.

The Junker detachments which were loyal to the Provisional Government were ensconced in the Kremlin and wanted to use it as an inaccessible fortress, in the expectation that the Moscow workers would not dare to desecrate this "venerable shrine," would not shoot at the Kremlin. The Junkers and officers made sorties from the Kremlin, attacking the units of armed workers and soldiers that were moving up. The troops of the Provisional Government even made use of the military academy at Lefortovo. Relying on these centres in their hands they offered desperate resistance to the advancing Red Guard detachments. But the stubborn fighting, the incessant attacks and unswerving determination of the Moscow worker and soldier masses to put an end to the Provisional Government, wiped out these hotbeds of the counter-revolution.

The socialist revolution was victorious all over Russia. The officials of the Provisional Government were everywhere overthrown and power was taken by the soviets. The local bolshevik organizations led the uprising of the proletariat at the various localities.

* Lenin, "To the Population," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXII.

The determined line of the Party for an uprising, the firm leadership of the Leninist Central Committee, the merciless struggle on two fronts against the opportunists, the efficient preparations made for the uprising under the leadership of Lenin, the undivided leadership of the Bolshevik Party over the masses—all these assured the victory of the proletariat. On November seventh the second stage of the revolution was finished and the third stage—the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the construction of socialism—was ushered in.*

Character and Motive Forces of the October Revolution

The October Revolution put an end to the domination of the bourgeoisie with comparative ease, thanks to the favourable international and domestic situation that had taken shape.

First, the October Revolution began during the war when the imperialist governments were engaged in a conflict among themselves and were unable to render timely assistance to the Russian bourgeoisie.

Second, the October Revolution began in the fourth year of the imperialist war when the wearied mass of toilers of all belligerent countries yearned for peace more than anything else, when the workers and soldiers of Russia had convinced themselves from their own experience with the coalition government that it was impossible to extricate the country from the imperialist war without a socialist revolution. The struggle of the Bolsheviks for immediate peace called forth the greatest sympathy with the October Revolution on the part of the workers of the West and the oppressed peoples of the East.

Third, in 1917 a powerful labour movement swept all Europe, and the revolutionary movement in the East directed against imperialism grew apace. This gave the October Rev-

* Trotsky and later on Shlyapnikov, in expounding the history of October, slanderously distorted the line of the Party in 1917. Trotsky denied the socialist character of the October Revolution. He tried to depict himself as the leader of the October Revolution. Trotsky denied the leading role of the Central Committee and of Lenin as the real organizer and leader of the proletarian revolution.

Ambitious to substitute "Trotskyism" for Leninism, Trotsky declared that the Bolsheviks in 1917 ideologically "re-equipped themselves" and went over to the position of Trotskyism.

olution true allies in the struggle against the world bourgeoisie. World imperialism was unable to throw all its forces against the October Revolution, as it was compelled to fight the revolution at home, in every capitalist country.

Of decisive importance was the fact that the October Revolution was prepared by and proceeded under the undivided leadership of the Party of the Bolsheviks, a Party which had been tested in class battles, which was unified and welded in iron discipline. It proceeded under the guidance of the greatest leader of the world proletariat—Lenin. Without the Bolshevik Party the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie would have been out of the question. The strategy and tactics of the Bolsheviks in the October Revolution are a pattern for all fraternal parties in their struggle to overthrow imperialism.

Furthermore, the proletariat of Russia already had behind it the experience of two revolutions—the Revolution of 1905 and that of February 1917.

Finally, the October Revolution had to deal with a comparatively weak Russian bourgeoisie, whose support—the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries—had suffered final bankruptcy in the Kerensky period. The masses turned away from them, left them to join the Bolsheviks.

Such were the principal causes of the comparatively easy victory of the October Revolution.

In its character the October Revolution was a *socialist* revolution. It was a socialist revolution because it overthrew the bourgeoisie and transferred power to the proletariat. It established the dictatorship of the proletariat.

At the same time the October Revolution in passing solved bourgeois-democratic problems: it abolished the estates of the landlords, the oppression of the national minorities, established equal rights for women, disestablished the church, etc.

Lenin taught:

"We decided the issues of the bourgeois-democratic revolution *inter alia*, in passing, as a 'by-product' of our main and real, our proletarian revolutionary, socialist work." *

* Lenin, "The Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXVII.

The motive forces of the October Revolution were the proletariat and the poorest peasantry.

The working class marched together with the poor peasantry against capitalism in town and country to win the dictatorship of the proletariat while simultaneously carrying out the policy of neutralizing the middle peasantry. But in so far as the October Revolution in passing solved the issues of the bourgeois-democratic revolution (in the first place the land question), "it was bound to meet with the sympathy of all peasants" (Stalin).

The International Importance of the October Revolution

As a result of the October Revolution the most oppressed and exploited class—the proletariat—rose to the position of ruling class while the private ownership of factories, railways, banks and land was abolished. This was the first time the proletariat had control of these key positions and converted them into public property. For the first time the state apparatus of the exploiting classes was destroyed and in its stead the dictatorship of the proletariat—the Soviet state, the state of the new type—was erected.

"The epoch of bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism has terminated. A new chapter of world history has been started: the epoch of the proletarian dictatorship," wrote Lenin.*

The October Revolution drew a tremendous number of workers and peasants into the struggle to consolidate the power of the Soviets, and for the first time in the history of the world, the proletariat—that of Russia—heading millions of peasants proceeded to build socialist society.

The October Revolution, which had broken the chains of national and colonial oppression in Russia, raised the oppressed nations of what was formerly tsarist Russia to the position of free and equal builders of socialism.

The October Revolution ushered in a new epoch in the development of mankind—the epoch of proletarian revolutions. It

* Lenin, "The Significance of Gold Now and After the Complete Victory of Socialism," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXVII.

laid the foundation of the world proletarian revolution. It kindled the revolution in Europe and stirred the peoples of the East—Turkey, China, India, Indo-China—to struggle against imperialism.

The October Revolution declared war against the bourgeoisie of the whole world. It showed the world proletariat and all oppressed masses the road to the overthrow of imperialism and the cessation of the imperialist war.

At the same time the October Revolution became a powerful bulwark of the world revolution and the victorious proletariat of Russia became the shock brigade of the world proletariat. Its struggle for the construction of socialism is a most powerful lever in the work of disintegrating and weakening world imperialism.

The proletariat and the oppressed peoples of the whole world in their struggle against imperialism find leadership and support in the victorious Land of Soviets. In its turn the proletariat of the whole world, while fighting against its own bourgeoisie, strives to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia. From the moment the October Revolution was born, the success of the proletarian struggle in the whole world became inseparably connected with the might of the country which is

“the first land of socialism in the ocean of imperialist countries. . . .”*

The October Revolution inflicted a crushing blow upon world imperialism. It tremendously aggravated the crisis of the whole imperialist system by accentuating the class struggle within the imperialist countries.

The October Revolution wrenched one-sixth part of the globe out of the system of imperialism. It split the whole world into two opposite systems: the system of perishing capitalism and the system of socialism in construction. In the capitalist countries oppression is intensifying, poverty and starvation are on the increase and wars are inevitable. In contrast to this, the system of socialism which has been victorious in the U.S.S.R. brings with it an unprecedented development of the productive

* Stalin, “The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists,” *Leninism*, Vol. I, p. 137.

forces, a complete abolition of classes and of all exploitation of man by man. It brings with it the greatest cultural development and improvement in the material well-being of the peoples.

Thus a new contradiction—that between the Land of Soviets and the imperialist countries—has grown up which decides and determines the entire contemporaneous political situation.

"The era of the 'stabilization' of capitalism *has gone*, taking along with it the legend of the unshakable character of the bourgeois order.

"The era of the downfall of capitalism *has begun*." *

Lastly, the October Revolution has finally exposed the treacherous face of world Social-Democracy which it cast into the camp of counter-revolution, the camp of imperialism. Leninism has become the ruling doctrine of the world proletariat. The October Revolution was accomplished under the banner of Leninism and under the banner of Leninism the Third (Communist) International was founded and operates.

"The era of the domination of the Second International and of Social-Democracy in the labour movement *has come to an end*.

"The era of the domination of Leninism and of the Third International *has begun*." **

* Stalin, *The October Revolution*, p. 162.

** *Ibid*, p. 164.

CHAPTER X

THE PARTY IN THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT (OCTOBER 1917-JUNE 1918)

Struggle for the Creation and Consolidation of the Proletarian State

The October Revolution laid the foundation for the period of transition from capitalism to communism in Soviet Russia. This change involved a change in the tasks of the Party. Whereas before October the Bolsheviks fought for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the conquest of power by the working class, it now was necessary to wage a struggle for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat and for the reconstruction of society on new, socialist principles. The Party considered it necessary to subordinate its whole struggle for socialism in Russia to the struggle for the world proletarian revolution. The Party took as its point of departure the fact that Soviet Russia had to do

"the utmost possible in one country for the development, support and stirring up of the revolution in *all countries*." *

The most important organ of the proletarian revolution and instrument of socialist reconstruction of society was the *dictatorship of the proletariat* won in the October Revolution. Lenin thoroughly substantiated the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat in accordance with the brilliant teachings of Marx and Engels. He demonstrated clearly that the dictatorship of the proletariat was necessary in order to crush the resistance of the overthrown classes—the landlords and capitalists. This dictatorship was necessary to create a firm alliance between the working class and the toiling peasantry, to draw the broad masses of toilers into socialist construction under the leadership

* Lenin, "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXIII.

of the proletariat. It was needed by the working class for the purpose of organizing socialist production and building classless society.

"Between capitalist and communist society," wrote the greatest teacher of the working class, Karl Marx, "lies the period of revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the *revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat*." *

The dictatorship of the proletariat, Lenin taught, cannot arise out of a peaceful development of the old, bourgeois society. The bourgeois state with its organs of power (the old army, police, gendarmes, court, etc.) is created for the purpose of suppressing the toilers and is the obedient tool of the possessing classes. The old state machinery must be smashed, destroyed without mercy and replaced by a new, a proletarian state apparatus. The Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies are organizations of this type, representing the basis of proletarian statehood. Therefore the task of "smashing," of breaking up the old bourgeois state machinery and of building a state of a new type was the very first task of the Party after the victory of October.

From the very first days of the October Revolution, the Party proceeded to demolish completely the old state apparatus. It destroyed the bourgeois ministries, courts and police. The officials of the Provisional Government were driven out of office; the zemstvos and municipal Dumas were abolished. The old army was demobilized and disbanded. The Red Guard, the Red Army in embryo, rapidly grew up and strengthened. The soviets were consolidated throughout the whole land and gathered all power at top and bottom into their own hands. From the point of view of the internal situation this period was the period "of the destruction of the whole machinery of the old bourgeois rule." **

The new Soviet state differed radically from the bourgeois states. It was created for the suppression of the exploiting minority in the interests of the formerly exploited majority. The

* Marx, *The Critique of the Gotha Program*.

** Stalin, *The October Revolution*, p. 38.

capitalists and landlords were deprived of electoral rights in the soviets and were removed from participation in the administration of the state. On the other hand the toiling masses were given the opportunity of actively participating on the widest scale in the construction of the state. By freeing the workers from capitalist slavery and economic dependence, by taking away from the bourgeoisie the premises for holding meetings, the printshops for printing newspapers, the transport facilities, etc., and transferring them to the workers, the Soviet government created all the necessary conditions for drawing the toilers into the administration of the country. The creation of the Soviet state was of world-historic importance.

"We have created the Soviet type of state," wrote Lenin; "in doing so we have launched a new, world-historic epoch, the epoch of the political rule of the proletariat which has arrived to replace the epoch of the rule of the bourgeoisie." *

The workers of the other countries profited extensively by the experience which the creation of soviets in Russia afforded. Soviets arose and developed in the period of revolutionary battles in Germany, Austria, Hungary and Finland (1918-19).

The bourgeoisie offered desperate resistance to the Soviet government. It made every possible attempt to restore its former rule. The petty-bourgeois, counter-revolutionary parties—the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries—worked hand in glove with the capitalists.

Under the leadership of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie the employees in quite a number of state institutions began to commit sabotage. The officials of various ministries, banks, post and telegraph offices and so forth, refused to carry out the instructions of the commissars of the Soviet government to surrender their funds, correspondence, documents and so forth to its representatives. In numerous places they declared a strike to prevent the workers from consolidating their power. In their struggle against the dictatorship of the proletariat the counter-revolutionary elements made extensive use of the newspapers and magazines at their disposal. In these publications they indulged in the most vicious slander against the Party and

* Lenin, "Notes of a Publicist," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXVII.

the working class. But the Party resolutely repulsed all these moods. With the support of the workers and the lower ranks of employees who were on the side of the Soviet government, the sabotage of the officials was broken up. On motion of the Bolsheviks the Soviet government declared the bourgeois party of the Cadets to be an enemy of the people and closed down a number of bourgeois newspapers (*Dyen*, [*Day*]; *Birzhevye Vedomosti*, [*Stock Exchange News*] and others).

In its fight to set up and consolidate the proletarian state, the Party smashed the opportunist elements in its own ranks also. It administered a merciless rebuff to the Right opportunists (Kamenev, Zinoviev and others) whose line on the questions of power and the "smashing" of the bourgeois state machinery denoted a complete rupture with the line laid down by Lenin. The Rights proposed to establish a government of "all Socialist parties"—from the Bolsheviks up to and including the Popular-Socialists to take the place of the government of the proletarian dictatorship created by the October Revolution. This treasonable position of the Rights was nothing more nor less than a capitulation before the bourgeoisie and was explained by their denial of the socialist character of October and of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was a direct continuation of the anti-Party line of the Rights at the April Conference of 1917 and in the period of the October armed uprising.

The Rights sabotaged and undermined the decisions of the Party in every way, trying to disorganize its compact ranks. Flouting Party unity in the most flagrant manner, these traitors trotted out their platform even before non-Party masses (in the soviets, trade unions, etc.). In order to confuse the Party masses and keep their hands free to fight the Party, the Rights—Kamenev, Zinoviev and Rykov—left the Central Committee on November 17 (4). At the same time a number of Rights (Rykov, Nogin, Teodorovich, etc.) abandoned their posts in the Council of People's Commissars. Lenin roundly denounced the Right opportunists; he branded them deserters and demanded their expulsion from the Party.

"The opposition," wrote Lenin, "completely departs from all the main positions of bolshevism and the proletarian class struggle in general, repeating as it does the profoundly un-Marxian chatter

about the impossibility of a socialist revolution in Russia, about the necessity of yielding to the ultimatums and threats to quit, issued by the obvious minority of the Soviet organization, thus violating the will and decisions of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, thus sabotaging the incipient dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry.*

The Party unanimously denounced the traitorous capitulatory position of the Rights, demanded their unconditional submission to Party discipline and the carrying out of the policy set by the Party.

"We decidedly condemn this desertion," wrote Lenin. "We are profoundly convinced that all class-conscious workers, soldiers and peasants who belong to our Party or sympathize with it will likewise decidedly condemn the offence of the deserters.**"

Not one Party organization supported the Rights. The creation of the proletarian state and the suppression of the resistance of the bourgeoisie were possible only because of the irreconcilable struggle against vacillations in the ranks of the Party itself.

Workers' Control of Production and Distribution

The break-up of the old bourgeois machinery of state and the creation of the proletarian state made it possible for the Party successfully to develop the struggle for the reconstruction of the country's economy on socialist principles.

On November 27 (14) 1917, the Soviet government issued the "Regulations on Workers' Control." Workers' control was instituted at factories, mills, trading and banking enterprises employing hired labour or giving out home work. The exercise of this control was imposed on the factory and mill trade union committees. The organs of workers' control had to fight against the sabotage of the employers, look after the output, the finances, the supply of raw material to the enterprises, etc. Workers' control sapped the power of the capitalists at the enterprises, helped the workers to acquire the knack of manag-

* Lenin, "Resolution of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) on the Questions of the Opposition Within the Central Committee, November 15 (2), 1917," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXX.

** Lenin, "From the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks)," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXII.

ing production and served as a transition stage to the nationalization of all industry.

The bourgeoisie began a desperate struggle against workers' control. Anxious to retain its former positions, the bourgeoisie fought with every means in its power against the measures taken by the Soviet government. In reply to the Regulations on Workers' Control, the Moscow Association of Industrialists declared that "the workers are incapable of handling so complicated a matter as industry." The Petrograd factory owners and manufacturers stated that if workers' control were introduced they would close down their enterprises. The Ural industrialists adopted a decision to refuse credit to any district in which workers' control would be introduced. Nor did the employers stop at making threats; they immediately carried them into execution. In quite a number of cases the proprietors closed their enterprises or abandoned them to their fate hoping that the workers, unable to operate them, would be compelled to capitulate to the bourgeoisie. These tactics, which were directed against the revolution, directly supplemented the military moves of the various counter-revolutionary groups (the expedition of Kerensky and Krassnov against Petrograd during the first half of November 1917; the moves made by the counter-revolutionary General Kaledin on the Don in December 1917, etc.).

But the Soviet government steadfastly continued its policy of workers' control. It responded to the attacks of the bourgeoisie by taking measures which completely suppressed it. The factories and mills, the owners of which were committing sabotage, were not infrequently declared public property.

Only by such action was the Soviet government able to expropriate the capitalists and gain possession of the most important key positions of national economy.

In characterizing this period of struggle against the bourgeoisie as the "Red Guard attack" against capital, Lenin subsequently wrote:

"The lackeys of imperialism often said to us in reproach that we were leading a 'Red Guard' attack against capital. The reproach is absurd and worthy precisely of the lackeys of the money bags. For the 'Red Guard' attack against capital was absolutely dictated at the time by the following circumstances: first, capital offered

military resistance through Kerensky and Krassnov, Savinkov and Gotz. . . . Military resistance could not be crushed in any other way than by military means, and the Red Guards were performing the very noble and great historical deed of freeing the toilers and the exploited from the yoke of the exploiters."*

After issuing the decree on workers' control, the Soviet government proceeded to nationalize the most important branches of national economy. In December 1917 the nationalization of the banks was carried through. This dealt a powerful blow to finance capital. The tremendous power that was concentrated in the hands of finance capital appears from the fact that before the war the banks controlled 85.7 per cent of the entire Russian metallurgical industry, 76.9 per cent of the coal mines and 85 per cent of the oil-fields. The state likewise took possession of all railways which before October had been government property or had belonged to joint stock companies.

At the beginning of 1918 water transport was nationalized. In order to administer the national economy of the country, the Supreme Council of National Economy—the organ of the proletarian dictatorship in the field of the economy of the country—was created in December 1917.

Furthermore, the Soviet government in the beginning of 1918 declared foreign trade to be a monopoly, i.e., it concentrated the entire import and export of commodities in the hands of the state. Owing to the foreign trade monopoly the Soviet government was able to regulate trade relations with foreign countries in the interests of developing socialist construction.

The refusal of the Soviet government to pay the old tsarist debts (see decree of January 28, 1918), which totalled about twelve billion gold rubles, was of the greatest importance in the struggle to free the broad masses of toilers from the yoke of finance capital.

The realization of all these measures represented only the first steps in the sphere of socialist construction. Afterwards it became necessary to nationalize *all* the factories and mills of the bourgeoisie.

This explains why somewhat later (June 28, 1918) a decree

* Lenin, "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXII.

nationalizing the whole of large-scale industry was issued. Later, medium-sized industry was likewise nationalized. The nationalization of these two categories of industry concentrated all the more important industrial enterprises of the country in the hands of the proletarian state. This made it possible for the Party and the working class to achieve rapid progress in socialist construction.

The National Policy of the Soviet Government

One of the most important issues upon the solution of which the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat hinged was the national question. In striving to make closer contact with the toiling masses of the various nationalities for the joint struggle against the landlords and the bourgeoisie, the Party immediately proceeded to abolish all national oppression and inequality.

On November 16 (3), 1917 the Soviet government promulgated its Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia. This document proclaimed the equality and independence of all nations, the right of self-determination including secession and the formation of independent states.

In order to carry out the national policy of the Soviet government, the People's Commissariat of Nationalities was established, and Comrade *Stalin*, who even before the revolution had together with Lenin worked out the foundations of the theory and policy of the Bolshevik Party on the national question, was placed in charge of this commissariat by the Party.

By its national policy the Soviet government eradicated national oppression of every description and overcame the distrust with which the oppressed nations had been imbued toward everything Russian, and created a firm basis for the alliance of the toilers of all nationalities in their struggle against the oppressors.

The carrying out of Lenin's national policy called forth furious resentment on the part of the great-power Russian bourgeoisie and the Russian landlords. The propertied classes of the oppressed nationalities also opposed the national policy of the Party.

Taking advantage of the still inadequate class-consciousness

and organization of the toilers of the national borderlands, the national bourgeoisie after the October Revolution hastened to seize power in many parts of the country. On November 14 (1), 1917, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* proclaimed itself the supreme authority in the Ukraine. This *Rada* was headed by the Ukrainian Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. In December a bourgeois republic was formed in Finland. At the same time the Latvian bourgeoisie decided to proceed to the convocation of the Constituent Assembly of Latvia. Once in power, the bourgeoisie of the national borderlands bent every effort to retain possession of its lands and factories and to prevent the toilers from throwing off the yoke of exploitation. The national bourgeoisie entered into agreements with the Russian bourgeoisie and the imperialists of the West to check the spread of Soviet power to the national borderlands. Thus the Ukrainian *Rada* during the very first days of its existence began to seek support among the French imperialists, rendered aid to the counter-revolution on the Don, refused to let Red Army detachments cross its territory to fight Kaledin, etc.

While seeking support among the West European imperialists and the Russian bourgeoisie, the governments of the national border districts fell completely under their influence and being independent only in words became transformed into mere appendages of the Russian capitalists and the imperialists of the West. The attempts of the border districts to place themselves in opposition to Soviet Russia—attempts which had their origin with the national bourgeoisie—inevitably led to an intensification of every kind of oppression of the toiling masses including national oppression. And experience proved to the masses that only the Soviet government with its national policy was capable of really ensuring freedom from oppression and national inequality.

Adhering strictly to the principles of its national policy proclaimed in the Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia, the Soviet government recognized the secession of Finland and the independence of the Ukraine in spite of the fact that the bourgeoisie was in power there. This proved to even the most backward masses that the Soviet government had renounced not only in words but in actual fact the old tsarist policy of annexa-

tions and violence. At the same time, however, the Party systematically exposed the counter-revolutionary essence of the bourgeoisie of the national borderlands, revealing the exploiting character of its policy and its inability to fight consistently for national independence. As a result of this agitation and of the lessons gained from life itself, the toilers of the national borderlands soon began to understand that the Russian workers were their only real allies and that genuine freedom from national oppression was possible only under a Soviet government.

In January 1918 a workers' revolution broke out in Finland. In February the uprising of the Ukrainian workers and peasants against the Ukrainian Rada was crowned with success. Soviet governments were established both in Finland and in the Ukraine. This was possible only because of the correct execution of Lenin's national policy.

Thus as a result of the national policy of the Soviet government, the toilers of the oppressed nations began to rally around the proletariat of Russia, in order to struggle for the complete victory of socialism under its leadership. But the national policy of the Bolsheviks not only brought the Russian proletariat nearer to the toilers of the national borderlands. It likewise aided in the consolidation of the alliance between the socialist revolution and the national revolutionary movement in the colonies (China, India, Persia, etc.). There the toilers were convinced from the experience offered by the solution of the national problem in Russia that the national yoke could be shaken off only under the leadership of the socialist proletariat.

Destruction of the Hotbeds of Counter-Revolution and the Triumphal March of the Soviet Government

The decrees on peace and on land, the regulations concerning workers' control and the struggle for the realization of the rights of nations to self-determination assured to the Soviet government the support of the widest sections of toilers. Having begun at the biggest centres, the revolution irresistibly spread to the borderlands. The workers and peasants everywhere took the land away from the landlords and set up workers' control at the factories. The Soviet government consolidated its power most easily at the two capital cities and in the largest industrial dis-

tricts because of the great number of proletarians present there. The counter-revolution offered more stubborn resistance to the Soviet government in a number of border districts where the proletariat was weaker and where, therefore, it was easier for the bourgeoisie to organize the struggle against the soviets.

The most prominent border districts where the counter-revolutionary elements succeeded in organizing a more or less lasting resistance to the Soviet government were those of the Orenburg and the Don provinces, with their well-to-do Cossack population.

In November 1917, the counter-revolutionary ataman Dutov proclaimed himself the supreme authority in Orenburg. In December 1917 General Kaledin carried out a counter-revolutionary *coup* in this region. On the Don such former tsarist generals as Alexeyev, Kornilov and Denikin began to organize their Volunteer Army to struggle against the Soviet government. To the Don came also such prominent counter-revolutionaries and representatives of the Russian bourgeoisie as Rodzyanko, Milyukov, Shulgin and others. Thus, the Don became the all-Russian centre of the counter-revolutionary forces.

But neither Dutov nor Kaledin could hold out long. The local workers, peasants and toiling Cossacks rose against them. These, together with the Red Guard detachments which had come from the centre, defeated the counter-revolutionary generals and restored the Soviet power.

The uprising of the Ukrainian workers and peasants under the leadership of the Party against the government of the Rada marked splendid progress. At the close of 1917 the First Congress of Soviets of the Ukraine was held in Kharkov at which the Ukrainian Soviet government was formed.

While the influence of the Bolsheviks constantly increased, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks lost their last foothold among the masses. In November 1917, despite the counter-action of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, a Special Congress of the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies assembled in Petrograd and endorsed the Soviet government. Somewhat later, on December 9, 1917, the Second All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies met, at which the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries developed a fierce struggle against the Bolshevik Party.

But in spite of all these efforts to set the peasants against

the Bolsheviks, the Congress, as the result of a hard-fought struggle, approved the policy of the Council of People's Commissars. The Bolsheviks not only smashed the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, but even succeeded in getting the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who still had a considerable following among the peasants and who had hitherto been quite non-committal, to announce their support of the existing government. In so far as the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries broke with the Rights and supported the Soviet government, the Party proposed that they take part in the government. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries agreed to this and thus some members of this party entered the Council of People's Commissars, a Left Socialist-Revolutionary, being appointed People's Commissar of Agriculture. The participation of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in the government was made contingent upon their full acceptance of all the principal gains of October (the dictatorship of the proletariat, the decrees on land, peace, etc.).

The *bloc* with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries was instrumental in stripping the Socialist-Revolutionaries of the support of those peasants who were still under their influence. But this *bloc* did not in the least denote a "sharing of power" with the petty bourgeoisie, nor a weakening of the leading role of the Bolshevik Party. The Party of the Bolsheviks was and continued to be the sole leader of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Party's tactics on the question of the Constituent Assembly was of major importance in the struggle for the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Until the October Revolution, preparations for the Constituent Assembly were under the auspices of the Provisional Government. The latter was in no hurry to hold the elections for the Constituent Assembly. On the contrary, it strove to postpone them to the latest possible date so that meanwhile it might succeed in smashing the forces of the revolution. For the purpose of exposing this policy the Party demanded that the Constituent Assembly be called as soon as possible. At the same time it stressed the temporary and limited importance of the Constituent Assembly, which was the highest manifestation of bourgeois democracy but was unsuited to carry out proletarian democracy and the tasks of the socialist revolution.

The elections to the Constituent Assembly closed after the October Revolution. But as preparations for it had been made before the October Revolution, under the control of the Provisional Government, the result was that considerable sections of the toilers were not clear in their minds as to what each of the various parties stood for. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries had not yet broken with the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, appearing on the same election ticket as the Rights. In consequence of all these factors a considerable number of peasants voted for representatives of this party. The election results gave a majority in the Constituent Assembly to the Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries.

All kinds of counter-revolutionary elements hastened to make extensive use of this circumstance. The bourgeoisie, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries attempted to convert the Constituent Assembly into the organizational centre of all counter-revolutionary forces. They hoped that even the Bolsheviks would not dare to infringe upon the authority of the Constituent Assembly, and that under its banner they would be able to develop a successful struggle against the Soviet government. At the close of 1917 the bourgeoisie together with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries organized the "Committee for the Defence of the Constituent Assembly" which made energetic preparations for anti-Soviet moves.

The Bolsheviks did much educational work among the masses with regard to the question of the Constituent Assembly. They pointed out to the masses that with the victory of the socialist revolution the time for bourgeois democracy had passed and that power must be exclusively in the hands of the soviets. But in order to show the masses the absolute correctness of this position, it was necessary to give them an opportunity to convince themselves from their own experience of the counter-revolutionary character of the bourgeois Constituent Assembly.

"In order to discredit the idea of a Constituent Assembly in the eyes of the masses, the masses had to be brought up to the very gates, as it were, of the Constituent Assembly with their demands for land, for peace, for all power to the Soviets, thus coming up against a real and living Constituent Assembly. . . . Only in this way could the masses be easily convinced by their own experience

of the counter-revolutionary nature of the Constituent Assembly and the necessity for dispersing it. . . ."

This is the reason why the Bolsheviks decided to convoke the Constituent Assembly although power was already in the hands of the Soviets.

The Constituent Assembly opened its sessions on January 18, 1918. The Bolsheviks submitted for its adoption the Declaration of Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People, which embodied a recognition of the Soviet government and of all the principal gains of the October Revolution (the decree on peace, land, workers' control, etc.). The menshevik-socialist-revolutionary majority in the Constituent Assembly refused even to consider the motion of the Bolsheviks. It thereby sharply stressed its hostile attitude to the Soviet government. This step showed to the masses in practice the utter counter-revolutionary character of the Constituent Assembly. By decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee dated January 20, 1918, the Constituent Assembly was dissolved. Despite the agitation of the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and bourgeois parties, neither the workers nor the peasants rose to its defence.

This result was a splendid confirmation of the correctness of the bolshevik tactics.

In January, after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the Third Congress of the Soviets met. It confirmed the Declaration of Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People, which served as the basis for the constitution of the Soviet Republic adopted later on.

Only about ten weeks elapsed between the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. But during this interval the socialist revolution had achieved enormous successes. The Party had smashed the old state machinery and built the state of the Soviets. It had proceeded to solve the question of peace, had carried out the nationalization of the banks, of the biggest enterprises and had set up workers' control. "In passing" all survivals of serfdom were incidentally destroyed and the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution were completed. This expressed itself in the fact that

* Stalin, "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists," *Leninism*, Vol. I, p. 130.

the Soviet government abolished the landlord estates and national oppression. It did away with all ranks and estates of tsarist Russia, put an end to the inequality of women, disestablished the church, etc. Lenin wrote that in the course of a few weeks a thousand times more was done in the struggle against feudal survivals than the Cadets and petty-bourgeois democrats (the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries) had done in the course of the eight months that they were in power.

"We have cast out all the monarchist rubbish as no one ever did before us," said Lenin. "We left no stone, no brick in place in the hoary structure based on estates.*" **

No revolution in the history of the world had destroyed feudal survivals as completely as the revolution accomplished by the Russian proletariat. The Soviet government strengthened, consolidated and extended its influence to the most remote border districts. Lenin called this period the "triumphal march" of Soviet power.

The Party in the Struggle for the Leninist Line on the Question of Peace

One of the most important questions after the dictatorship of the proletariat had been gained was the question of Russia's withdrawal from the imperialist war. The Entente governments (Great Britain, France, etc.) had no desire to reply to the decree of the Second Congress of Soviets concerning peace. Only Germany consented to conduct peace negotiations and was joined in this by its military allies (Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey). But in consenting to carry on peace negotiations Germany pursued purely imperialist aims. It expected to keep the Russian territories which it had seized (Poland, Lithuania and part of Latvia), to demand that Soviet Russia pay indemnities, and to take advantage of the conclusion of peace with Russia to transfer part of its troops from the eastern to the western front. In case Soviet Russia should fail to agree to these predatory demands, the German government intended to launch a new offensive against it.

* Estates: refers to the mediæval classification of society.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

** Lenin, "The Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXVII.

Negotiations with the Germans began in December 1917. The city of Brest-Litovsk, located in the area of German occupation, was selected as the place for these negotiations. While they were in progress the rapacious plans of the German imperialists became clearly revealed. It was an exceedingly grave moment for Soviet Russia. Imperialist Germany, armed to the teeth, presented so formidable an enemy to Soviet Russia that to have engaged in war with it could only have led to utter defeat. It therefore became necessary for the Party to decide what tactics to pursue if the further development of the socialist revolution was to be ensured.

In January 1918, Lenin came out with his theses on the immediate conclusion of peace with Germany.

The socialist government of Russia, wrote Lenin, is confronted with the urgent task of deciding whether it will immediately accept an annexationist peace or carry on at once a revolutionary war. No midway decision was really possible. Either peace or immediate revolutionary war. Lenin considered that immediate war would be beyond the strength of Soviet Russia. The old army was going to pieces, he said. It was incapable of repelling the attack of the German troops. On the other hand the creation of a new, socialist army demanded a definite period of time. The peasantry was weary after three years of imperialist slaughter and was not in a position to start a revolutionary war. Starvation and ruin inherited from the old regime reigned in the country. Finally it was impossible to foretell the time of advent of the revolution in the West which might prevent German imperialism from crushing Soviet Russia. All this meant that in case of an immediate war Soviet Russia would inevitably suffer defeat and that under the existing conditions it was impossible to cross swords with German imperialism.

In one of his later works, Lenin wrote:

"It becomes our duty prudently to take stock of our forces, to weigh very carefully whether our ally (the international proletariat) will succeed in standing by us. It is to the advantage of capital to defeat the enemy (the revolutionary proletariat) one section at a time, while the workers of the world have not yet united (*i.e.*, have not yet started the revolution). It is to our advantage to do everything possible, to make use of even the slightest opportunity to defer the decisive battle until the moment (or until *after* the moment) when

the revolutionary detachments shall have united in one great international army."*

With this as his point of departure Lenin considered it necessary to sign peace with Germany. By concluding peace, said Lenin, Soviet Russia saves itself from ruin and gains a respite. By taking advantage of this respite the Soviet Republic will develop socialist construction, will strengthen the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry and will organize a powerful Red Army to struggle against imperialism. After establishing the Red Army Soviet Russia will really be able to wage a revolutionary war and successfully repulse any onslaught of the imperialist bands.

The line mapped out by Lenin was an example of tactics calculated, by means of a correct retreat,

"to gain time, to disintegrate the enemy and to accumulate forces in order to assume the offensive later."**

The tactics which Lenin evolved encountered the furious opposition of the enemies of the Soviet government. The Cadets, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries hurled themselves upon the Party with accusations, heaping untold counter-revolutionary slander upon it. The bourgeoisie shrieked that the Bolsheviks were selling the fatherland, were guilty of treason to Russia, etc. The class enemies together with the Entente imperialists (Great Britain, France, etc.) wanted to compel Russia to war against Germany at any price. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries also added their voices to the Mensheviks and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, and, finally, a group of "Left Communists" headed by many prominent Party workers including several members of the Central Committee came out against Lenin's line on the question of peace. The best known representatives of "Left Communism" were Bukharin, Ossinsky, Lomov (Oppokov), Stukov, Maximovsky, Sapronov, Preobrazhensky, Radek, Pyatak, etc. The "Left Communists" seized control of a number of Party committees and proceeded to publish their own factional organs (a newspaper and a magazine called *The Communist*). The Moscow Regional Bureau of the R.S.D.L.P., the majority of

* Lenin, "Left Childishness and Petty-Bourgeois-ism," Sec. 2, *Collected Works*, Vol. XXII.

** Stalin, "Foundations of Leninism," *Leninism*, Vol. I, p. 80.

which were "Left Communists," became their factional headquarters.

The "Left Communists" defended the tactics of an immediate revolutionary war against Germany. The basis for their position was the menshevik conception of the course of development of the proletarian revolution. They denied the possibility of building socialism in one country and of an alliance with the peasantry. Like Trotsky they thought that without the direct state support of the proletariat of Western Europe, the construction of socialism and the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia were impossible. They claimed that there could be no respite since the Russian workers would inevitably come into conflict with the peasantry. They argued that the result would be not a consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship but its disintegration, its fall. Accordingly there was only one thing left to do—go to war against imperialist Germany, to blaze a path for the union with the proletarian West. The "Lefts" slanderously asserted that peace with Germany would be tantamount to capitulation before the bourgeoisie, would be a renunciation of the revolutionary struggle. They tried to prove that the tactic of immediate war was the only international tactic capable of unleashing the revolution as quickly as possible in Western Europe.

Trotsky too made use of the difficulties, which had arisen, to come out against the Party. He also was at heart an advocate of the continuation of the war, but upheld this view in a concealed, masked form.

Instead of the slogan of revolutionary war Trotsky launched the slogan of "Neither Peace nor War," *i.e.*, neither to wage war nor to sign peace. At first glance this Trotskyist slogan seems to have differed from the slogan of immediate war. But the refusal to sign peace would anyhow entail an offensive of German imperialism. In order to quit the imperialist war in a revolutionary manner and obtain a respite, it was necessary to defeat "Left Communism" and Trotskyism.

The Party waged a merciless struggle against "Left Communism" and Trotskyism. The "Left Communists," said Lenin, do not take into consideration the interrelation of the warring forces. They do not want to open their eyes to the fact that the

broad masses of workers and peasants are not in a position to go to war immediately, that German imperialism is immeasurably stronger than the Soviet Republic. By failing to see this and calling for immediate war with Germany, the "Lefts" fell into revolutionary phrasemongering which concealed the most virulent opportunism.

"It must be clear to all (except those who perhaps are altogether intoxicated with phrasemongering)," wrote Lenin, "that to proceed to a serious insurrectionary or military clash, knowing beforehand that there are no forces, knowing beforehand that there is no army, is an adventure which will not help the German workers but will render their struggle more difficult, will make easier the cause of their enemy and of our enemy."*

The "Left Communists" shouted that this peace with Germany was a disgrace, a betrayal of Latvia, Poland, Courland and Lithuania. They were incapable of realizing that the Party was duty-bound to place the interests of the socialist revolution above the principle of self-determination and freedom of nations. The tactics of the "Left Communists" and of Trotsky would inevitably have led to the defeat of Soviet Russia and would thereby have enured to the benefit of international imperialism. The position of the "Lefts" and of Trotskyism bore a criminally adventurist and capitulatory character. "Left Communism" reflected the sentiments and influence of the petty-bourgeoisie. In characterizing the social essence of "Left Communism," Lenin wrote:

"The social source of such types is the small property owner, who has become enraged at the horrors of war, of sudden collapse, of the unheard-of torments of starvation and ruin, who hysterically rushes about seeking salvation and a way out, wavering between confidence in and support of the proletariat on the one hand, and fits of despair on the other."**

In discharging the commission entrusted to it by the Party, the Soviet delegation at Brest-Litovsk successfully exposed the predatory schemes of the German imperialists. The broad masses of Western Europe followed the struggle of the Soviet representatives with the greatest sympathy. In connection with the peace

* Lenin, "On Revolutionary Phrasemongering," Sec. 4, *Collected Works*, Vol. XXII.

** Lenin, "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXII.

negotiations at Brest mass strikes broke out in Austria and Germany. The German workers demanded the quickest possible conclusion of peace with the Soviet Republic. The threat of a maturing revolution compelled Austro-German imperialism to hasten the realization of its predatory plans. The Germans began to insist more and more firmly that the Soviet delegation accept their "proposals." To weaken the position of Soviet Russia, the German government early in January began to conduct separate negotiations with the Ukrainian Rada which had declared that it did not recognize the Council of People's Commissars. The Rada did not have the support of the Ukrainian toiling masses; as a matter of fact the whole Ukraine was already in the hands of the Ukrainian workers and peasants. But the Germans figured that under colour of recognizing the Ukrainian Rada and rendering it aid, they could bring their troops into the Ukraine and convert it into their colony. The more complicated Soviet Russia's international position became, the more the internal Party struggle sharpened.

On January 21, 1918, at a council of Party workers who had come together for the Third Congress of Soviets, Lenin's theses on peace were discussed. Stalin, Sverdlov, Artem and others spoke in support of Lenin. However, the majority backed the "Left Communists." But thanks to the stubborn struggle of Lenin and Stalin in the fraction and at the Congress itself, it was possible to carry a resolution to drag out the peace negotiations for the purpose of exposing still further the predatory policy of German imperialism, while granting the government extensive powers to conclude peace with Germany. Lenin personally gave instructions to Trotsky, the president of the Soviet Peace Delegation leaving for Brest-Litovsk, to drag out the peace negotiations until the Germans should present an ultimatum but when this was presented peace was to be signed. Neither the "Left Communists" nor Trotsky complied with the instructions of the Party. The "Left Communists" continued their factional struggle, Trotsky continued his anti-Party line.

At the beginning of February the Germans signed a separate peace with the Ukrainian Rada and presented an ultimatum to Soviet Russia. It became impossible to drag out the negotiations any longer. A telegram under the signatures of Lenin and Stalin

was forwarded to Trotsky in which he was ordered to sign an immediate peace with Germany. But in violation of all instructions that were given to him, Trotsky on February 10, 1918 read a declaration at Brest-Litovsk which stated that the Soviet government refused to sign peace but would cease war with the Central Powers (Germany, Austria, Turkey, Bulgaria). The Germans in reply started an offensive along the whole front. In very short order they seized Lutsk, Rovno, Minsk, Dvinsk, Polotsk, Pskov and Reval and began to move in the direction of Petrograd. As they retreated almost without offering any resistance, the Russian troops threw aside their shells and equipment, abandoned all kinds of military stores and property, as a result of which the Germans obtained an enormous amount of military booty.

The position became extraordinarily difficult. The Party declared the socialist fatherland to be in danger. The "Left Communists" and the Trotskyists none the less continued to fight against peace. Their adherents in the leading Party and Soviet organs made it their business to try everything possible to prevent the acceptance of the German terms. Thereupon Lenin declared at the session of the Central Committee on February 23, 1918 that an end must be put to the policy of revolutionary phrasemongering. If this policy were kept up he would withdraw from the government and the Central Committee. Seven members of the Central Committee were in favour of signing the peace, while four were against and four abstained from voting.

A despatch was immediately sent to the German command informing it of the Soviet government's agreement to sign the peace. But now the Germans proposed much more stringent terms. They now wanted not only Poland, Lithuania, part of White Russia and Courland but demanded also the withdrawal of the Red Guard from Esthonia and Finland, the restoration of the kulak Rada to power in the Ukraine, compelled the surrender to Turkey of the towns of Kars and Batum and the conclusion of a very onerous economic agreement with Germany. The responsibility for these consequences, attended with such difficulties for Soviet Russia, rested upon Trotsky's policy, for at Brest-Litovsk he had wilfully violated the instructions given him by the Party and the Soviet government.

After the conclusion of peace the Moscow Regional Bureau,—the factional centre of the “Lefts”—passed a vote of non-confidence in the Central Committee of the Party. It declared that it considered a split in the Party inevitable and that in the interests of the international revolution it was expedient to risk losing Soviet power which it claimed was becoming purely formal. Lenin, branding in the strongest terms these capitulatory, schismatic, anti-Party statements of the “Left Communists,” appealed for a still more intensified struggle against them. He wrote:

“More disgraceful than any distressing, any exceedingly distressing peace imposed because of our lack of an army—more disgraceful than any disgraceful peace conceivable is disgraceful despair. Even a dozen exceedingly distressing peace treaties will not cause us to perish if we adopt a *serious* attitude towards the uprising and the war. We shall not perish at the hands of the conquerors if we do not permit ourselves to perish of despair and phrasemongering.”*

Seventh Congress of the Party and Defeat of the “Left Communists”

The Seventh Congress of the Party was called in March 1918 to confirm the peace resolutions passed by the Central Committee and to decide several other questions. Lenin delivered a report on the work of the Central Committee. The “Lefts” had Bukharin as their spokesman who made a co-report on the question of peace. The Congress approved the policy of the Central Committee which was directed towards a revolutionary way out of the imperialist war.

After finishing the question of peace the Congress settled two further questions—that of changing the name of the Party and of revising the Party program. On Lenin’s motion the Congress decided to change the name of the Party from that of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) to the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). A special commission headed by Lenin was instituted to revise the Party program.

Despite the clearly expressed wish of the Party Congress, the struggle of the “Left Communists” against the Party on the question of peace grew in intensity. The “Left Communists” refused

* Lenin, “Strange and Monstrous,” *Collected Works*, Vol. XXII.

to take part in the work of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. At the Fourth Congress of Soviets held in March 1918, where the question of ratifying the Brest treaty was on the order of the day, the "Lefts" again came out with their separate platform despite the direct prohibition of the Central Committee. In their struggle against the Party the "Left Communists" made common cause with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who by reason of their disagreement with its policy left the Soviet government. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries during the days of Brest tried to enter into negotiations with the "Left Communists," especially Bukharin, for the purpose of organizing a *coup d'état*, of arresting Lenin and forming a new government. All this shows how far astray the "Left Communists" had gone in their anti-Party struggle.

The Party, however, accomplished the complete defeat of the "Lefts," whose influence was gradually reduced to zero. At the Moscow Conference of March 4, the "Left Communists" received altogether five votes, while the vast majority of the delegates backed Lenin. At the time when the Moscow Regional Bureau expressed its lack of confidence in the Central Committee the Regional Plenum did not endorse this decision of the Bureau.

On March 21 the "Lefts" suffered a defeat at the Petrograd Party Conference and somewhat later they were completely routed at the Moscow Regional Conference. The Moscow Regional Bureau was now constituted of adherents of the Leninist line. These events in Petrograd and Moscow were duplicated in all Party organizations in which the "Lefts" had been influential hitherto.

By the summer of 1918 the "Left Communist" faction was broken up. The bolshevik fraction in the Fifth Congress of Soviets (July 4-10) was almost unanimous in its endorsement of the policy of the Central Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars.

The correctness of the Leninist line on the question of withdrawing from the war was corroborated by the entire subsequent course of historical events. The respite received by Soviet Russia was used by it to develop socialist construction, accumulate forces and organize the Red Army. Class contradictions in the capitalist countries constantly intensified. In November 1918

the revolution occurred in Germany which made it possible to annul the Brest treaty.

"The Peace of Brest," wrote Lenin, "was a concession that strengthened us and split the forces of international imperialism." *

On January 28, 1918 the Soviet government promulgated a decree to create a regular disciplined and powerful Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Reflecting the pressure of the petty-bourgeois environment, the "Left Communists" opposed the policy of the Party on this question also. They spoke against the formation of regular Red military units, as they proposed to confine themselves to partisan warfare. They opposed strict discipline and argued that the commanders ought to be elected rather than appointed. They likewise declined to make use of the old military specialists. The Party defeated the "Lefts" also on these issues and under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin made rapid progress in the formation of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

The Struggle for the Leninist Plan of Socialist Construction

The conclusion of peace which secured a respite enabled the Party in the spring of 1918 to devote its main attention to the question of socialist construction. Despite the resistance of the counter-revolution, the expropriation of the bourgeoisie made considerable progress. But the administration of national economy was still poorly organized. Socialist accounting and control were very unsatisfactory. Labour productivity was quite low. Cases of laxness, absence of labour discipline, etc., were numerous. The workers had only begun to take the administration of economy in hand and the necessary knack and skill could not manifest themselves at once. The class enemy of the workers tried to hinder them in every way. In the period of the "Red Guard attack" against capital it was necessary for the most part to suppress the resistance of the exploiters. Then came the Brest days when international questions moved to the fore. But in consequence of the respite, the position changed substantially. Now it was necessary to shift the main stress to the organiza-

* Lenin, "New Times, and Old Errors in New Garb," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXVII.

tion and management of economy, to the improvement in national accounting and control. On this Lenin wrote:

"We, the Party of the Bolsheviks, have convinced Russia. We have wrested Russia away—from the rich for the poor, from the exploiters for the toilers. Now we must govern Russia." *

In a number of his works and speeches (*Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government*, "*Left*" *Childishness and Petty Bourgeoisism*), Lenin, in the spring of 1918, mapped out a plan of socialist construction. Soviet Russia, Lenin pointed out, possessed the elements of five economic systems.

In the first place there is the *patriarchal* system, i.e., peasant husbandry, *natural* (self-sufficient) to a considerable extent and to be found among the backward hunting and nomad peoples of the remote border districts, etc. Then follows *small commodity production*, which includes the husbandry of most of the peasants who sell grain; also the handicraftsmen and artisans. *Private capitalism* constitutes the third system. This comprises the factories, mills and estates belonging to private employers. *State capitalism* is the fourth system. It includes the enterprises rented out by the state to private persons, mixed** joint stock companies, and the like. Here the employers receive their share of the profits and are permitted to participate in the management of production. But the state concludes definite agreements with them and keeps them under rigid control. Finally, there is the fifth and highest system, that of *socialism*, which embraces the state enterprises managed by the workers themselves.

Small commodity production was the most wide-spread of all these five systems. By reason of its fragmentary character and lack of organization it was more difficult to introduce accounting and control here; it frequently slipped away from the control of state grain monopoly, etc. Under the conditions of economic ruin and declining large-scale production, the anarchic production methods of the small property owners, of the petty-bourgeois, represented the principal enemy of socialism.

* Lenin, "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXII.

** I.e., with the participation of Soviet state and private, mostly foreign, capital.—Ed. Eng. ed.

Lenin pointed out that in technique and in organizational and economic level the state capitalist enterprises were nearest to socialism.

"Socialism is nothing more nor less than the next step forward after state capitalist monopoly," wrote Lenin. "... State monopoly capitalism is the most complete *material* preparation for socialism, is its threshold, is that rung on the ladder of history which has no intervening rung between it and the rung called socialism." *

In contrast to the scattered small producers, the state capitalist enterprises were managed on the basis of systematic accounting and control and were under the vigilant supervision of the state. Lenin suggested that various forms of state capitalism be employed, such as organizing mixed joint stock companies with Soviet government participation, leasing particular enterprises to capitalists, etc. Because of the weakness of socialist industry, this use of state capitalism was exceedingly advantageous at that time, inasmuch as it made it possible to increase the production of commodities, to strengthen the socialist elements at the expense of the capitalist elements and to increase the influence of socialist industry over the small commodity producers.

In pursuance of Lenin's plan of economic construction, the Soviet government proceeded to negotiate with a number of business men about the formation of mixed companies, etc.

Moreover, in view of the fact that Soviet Russia did not yet have its own Red engineers and technicians, Lenin proposed that the old bourgeois specialists be drawn in and put to work, placing them under the control of the proletarian state.

"Without guidance by specialists in various branches of knowledge, technique and experience, the transition to socialism is impossible," wrote Lenin. "... "And the bulk of the specialists are inevitably bourgeois, by reason of the entire structure of the life of the society that made them specialists." **

Lenin did not consider it possible to cope with the tasks of socialist construction unless the methods of administering econ-

* Lenin, "Left' Childishness and Petty-Bourgeois-ism," Sec. 4, *Collected Works*, Vol. XXII.

** Lenin, "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXII.

omic life were radically remodelled, unless new people from the workers themselves were promoted to the position of organizers, unless self-criticism, the initiative of the masses and socialist competition were extensively developed. Lenin believed that the development of workers' democracy and the initiative of the toilers must be combined with *iron labour discipline* and *one-man management* in production. He wrote:

"We must learn how to combine the stormy democracy of the meetings of the toiling masses, tearing their way like springtime torrents that overflow all their banks, with *iron discipline* during working hours—with *implicit obedience* to the will of one person, the Soviet leader, during working hours." *

Parallel with this Lenin, referring to his book *State and Revolution*, stressed the need of instituting strict control and accounting.

"Accounting and control, these are the chief things necessary for the organizing and correct functioning of the *first phase* of communist society." And this control must be established not only "over the insignificant minority of capitalists, over the gentry with capitalist leanings" but also over those workers who are "thoroughly demoralized by capitalism" and over the "idlers, the gentlefolk, the swindlers, and similar 'guardians of capitalist traditions'." **

Before their final defeat the "Left Communists" came out against the Party also on questions of economic construction. They rejected the Leninist doctrine of the transition period from capitalism to communism, deeming it possible to pass immediately to the kingdom of full-fledged socialism. With this as their starting point they decried the measures taken in the interests of the real construction of socialist society. They came out with the slanderous assertion that recourse to state capitalism and the employment of bourgeois specialists was nothing more nor less than a desertion to the side of the bourgeoisie. They in every way disparaged and sabotaged the measures directed towards raising the productivity of labour: piece-work, graduated wages, one-man management and firm labour discipline. While proposing in words that capitalism be immediately replaced by socialism in all branches of national economy, the

* *Ibid.*

** Lenin, "State and Revolution," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXI, Book 2, pp. 229-30.

"Lefts" in practice were advocates of petty-bourgeois dissoluteness and laxity.

The Party did not succeed in carrying out Lenin's plan of socialist construction at that time, being prevented from doing so by the intense and bloody struggle at the Civil War fronts in the summer of 1918. But the importance of this plan was very great, as it anticipated in the main the new economic policy introduced by the Party in the spring of 1921.

The Struggle for Bread and the Committees of the Village Poor

The more the proletarian revolution developed, the greater the area it affected in the countryside. After the landlords were liquidated, the Party set itself the task of smashing the resistance of the kulaks, who, relying on their economic power, waged an incessant struggle against the Soviet government. The kulaks hid their grain, refusing to give it up at the low prices fixed for it. The policy of the kulaks aimed at starving out the workers so as to compel them to abolish the fixed bread prices and permit them (the kulaks) to speculate on the market, with the result that in the long run the workers would have to surrender all their positions to the capitalists. Starvation became particularly acute in the spring of 1918. The workers of Moscow and Petrograd received half a pound or even an eighth of a pound of bread a day. The kulaks represented the "most numerous and the last of the exploiting classes" that rose against the Soviet government. Under these conditions the struggle for bread was the direct and immediate struggle for socialism.

"It seems that this is only a struggle for bread," said Lenin, "while as a matter of fact it is a struggle for socialism." *

The Party called the workers and the poorest peasants to a relentless and decisive struggle against the kulaks.

"The kulaks are the most brutal, most ruthless and most savage of exploiters," wrote Lenin, "who more than once in the history of other countries restored the power of the landlords, the kings,

* Lenin, "The Fourth Conference of the Factory Trade Union Committees," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXIII.

the clergy and capitalists. . . . The kulak can be reconciled, in fact, easily reconciled, to the landlord, the king and the priest, even if they have fallen out; but the kulak will *never* be reconciled to the working class. . . . Merciless warfare against these kulaks! Death to these kulaks! Hatred and contempt for the parties that defend them: the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks and the present Left Socialist-Revolutionaries!" *

In order to procure bread for the Red Army and the workers, workers' food detachments were despatched to the countryside. By order of Lenin a special food supply army was created. On June 11, 1918 the government issued a decree concerning the organization of Committees of the Village Poor. The immediate task of these committees consisted in helping to take away the surplus grain from the kulaks. But the work of these committees took on a vastly greater scope. The agricultural implements, machines and cattle were taken away from the kulaks and distributed among the peasants. The Committees of the Village Poor carried out requisitions, levied imposts on the kulaks and waged a struggle against counter-revolution and speculation in the rural districts. The kulaks were dekulakized without mercy. The poorest and the middle peasants received about fifty million hectares of kulak land, while the confiscated farming chattels of the kulaks were parcelled out to the poor peasants. The Party systematically led the entire struggle of the Committees of the Poor in the interests of developing the socialist revolution in the countryside.

The kulaks offered desperate resistance to the policy of the Soviet government. Under the leadership of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, they organized quite a number of armed uprisings which were particularly extensive in the Volga region and Western Siberia. In their struggle against the Soviet government, the kulaks made common cause with the bourgeoisie, the landlords and all the other counter-revolutionary elements.

The successes of the struggle against the kulak depended to a considerable extent upon the Soviet policy toward the middle peasant. The latter still manifested considerable vacillations between the bourgeois kulak counter-revolution and the Soviet government. But the toiling peasant was not an enemy of the

* Lenin, "Comrades, We Are Going to the Final Combat," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXIII.

Soviet government—he had to be won over to the side of the proletariat. Therefore, the Party gave the Committees of the Poor instructions to draw also the middle peasants into their work, taking into account their needs and economic demands.

The dekulakization in 1918 is not to be confused with the policy which set in in 1929 and 1930, when the Party assumed the task of liquidating the kulaks as a class on the basis of mass collectivization. Still the influence of the kulaks in the countryside was thoroughly undermined as a result of the bitter struggle against them. The proletarian revolution entrenched itself in the countryside. The rural soviets, which had been transformed into genuine points of support of the proletarian dictatorship, were strengthened. All this was of great importance in preparing for the transition from the slogan of “neutralizing the middle peasant” to the slogan of a “firm alliance with the middle peasants.” One of the most important results of the struggle of the Committees of the Poor against the kulaks was the transformation of a considerable number of poor peasants into middle peasants. The number of land-poor peasants decreased, the number of kulaks fell whereas the number of middle peasants grew rapidly.

The period of the Committees of the Poor was of paramount historical importance. It signified a new stage of development and an accentuation of the socialist revolution in the countryside.

CHAPTER XI

THE PARTY DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND WAR COMMUNISM

Struggle on the Civil War Fronts in 1918

The overthrown capitalists and landlords could not reconcile themselves to the victory of the proletarian dictatorship. After Kaledin and Dutov had been defeated and the Constituent Assembly sent home, they did not consider their cause lost by far. They formed a number of secret counter-revolutionary societies (the "Right Centre," the "National Centre," etc.), organized White armies, gathered forces for a decisive battle with the Soviet government. The aim of the bourgeoisie and the landlords was the complete destruction of the soviets, the return to the former of their factories and estates and restoration of the capitalist order of society.

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were most faithful lackeys and allies of the possessing classes. They concealed their desire to restore capitalism by using high-sounding phrases about democracy, the Constituent Assembly, equality and freedom. They, together with the landlords and capitalists, took a most active part in organizing the armed struggle against the Soviet government. The slogans of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were made use of by the bourgeoisie and the landlords to rally their forces for the establishment of their dictatorship in direct, unconcealed form.

But despite all their efforts, the Russian counter-revolution did not succeed in finding any support among the broad masses of the toilers. Its forces within the country were absolutely inadequate to overthrow the Soviet government. At this juncture the international bourgeoisie entered the fight against Soviet Russia with the fixed purpose of smashing the workers' and peasants' republic.

It prepared its military moves against the Soviet government with the aid and under the leadership of foreign capitalist governments. These bourgeois governments lavishly supplied the *bloc* of Russian landlords and capitalists with money and instructions and co-ordinated the activities of the various conspiracies and underground organizations. From the very commencement of the October Revolution, military supplies and equipment were shipped to Russia for the Russian counter-revolution.

The international bourgeoisie had reasons for striving to smother the Russian revolution. The latter had made a breach in the front of international imperialism. It had split the whole world into two irreconcilably hostile camps, the capitalist and the socialist camp. It had led to the formation of the Soviet Republic, the centre, the vanguard of the world proletarian revolution. Following the example of the Russian workers and peasants, the proletarians of Western Europe and the oppressed nationalities in the colonies were rising in a determined struggle for their liberation. The age-old structure of capitalism began to crack and rock in its foundation. This alone sufficed to cause the international bourgeoisie to hurl itself in a frenzy upon the Soviet state. In addition, the revolution caused the foreign capitalists to lose a most extensive field for exploitation and robbery. It is well known that before the revolution the capitalists of the West owned a great number of enterprises in Russia. The foreign bourgeoisie squeezed tremendous profits and interest charges on loans out of the toilers of Russia. Finally, Russia supplied cannon-fodder for the allied imperialists. Tsarism pitted millions of Russian soldiers against the Germans at the front so that the Entente might gain new markets and colonies. The revolution put an end to all this.

This is why the international bourgeoisie hastened to engineer various campaigns against Soviet Russia.

The Entente imperialists (Great Britain, France, etc.) headed the intervention and counter-revolution. Germany also rendered every possible aid to the Russian counter-revolution although desperate fighting was going on between Germany and the Entente.

As already stated above, German troops occupied the whole

of the Ukraine. Nor did they confine themselves to this. On the Don they established a counter-revolutionary government headed by General Krassnov. He with the aid of the Germans organized an army of 40,000 men and marched against Soviet Russia. In this civil war Soviet Russia was surrounded by enemies on all sides. It became a besieged fortress. The very existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat was directly threatened. At that time the main task of the Party was to repulse the attack of international imperialism and defend the gains of the October Revolution.

Fearing the unrest among their own workers, the imperialists were very anxious to hide the fact that they were interfering in the affairs of Soviet Russia.

"The imperialists were inclined to depict the struggle of Denikin and Kolchak, of Yudenich and Wrangel, against the revolution in Russia as an exclusively internal struggle. But all of us, and not only we, but the whole world, knew that these counter-revolutionary Russian generals were backed by the imperialists of Great Britain and America, France and Japan, and that without their support serious civil war in Russia would be absolutely impossible."*

The Civil War was an armed conflict waged by the international and Russian bourgeoisie against Soviet Russia as the vanguard of the world revolution. It was a gigantic combat between two camps—the capitalist camp and the socialist camp—and as such was fraught with the greatest international significance.

While fierce warfare was still going on between the Entente and the Central Powers (Germany, Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria), the Entente imperialists were not in a position to assign any sizable forces of its own to fight Soviet Russia. During this period (until the end of 1918) they calculated on overthrowing the Soviet government mainly by using the Czechoslovak and Russian whiteguard forces. The Czechoslovaks were former soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian army who had been taken prisoners or had deserted to the Russians during the imperialist war. Out of national enmity toward the Germans they had agreed to fight on the side of the Allies (Russia, Great Britain and France) against Germany. Even under the tsar a beginning had

* Stalin, *On the Opposition*.

been made of forming these men into a special corps which in 1917 took part in various battles against the Germans. The Czechoslovaks counted about 40,000 men. Deceived by their officers, they were obedient tools in the hands of the imperialists. The Entente hoped that with the support of these Czechoslovak battalions they would quickly be able to settle scores with Soviet Russia.

In May 1918, the Czechoslovaks demanded that they be shipped to France to continue the struggle against Germany. The Soviet government consented to transport them abroad and began to transfer them to Vladivostok over the Siberian Railway. Czechoslovak echelons stretched all along this Siberian mainline—from Penza to Vladivostok. At this precise moment the Entente gave the signal, whereupon the Czechoslovaks, egged on by their officers, rose up in arms. Taking advantage of the weakness of the scattered individual Red Army detachments, the insurgents at the end of May occupied Chelyabinsk, Novo-Nikolayevsk (now Novosibirsk), Omsk, Barnaul and Vladivostok. Very soon they also seized Samara, Simbirsk (now Ulyanovsk) and Kazan where the republic's gold reserve amounting to about six hundred million rubles fell into their hands. Thus, a considerable part of the Volga district, the Urals, Siberia and the Far Eastern region came under the control of the Czechoslovaks. Under cover of the Czechoslovak bayonets a provisional Siberian government was formed at Omsk, headed by Socialist-Revolutionaries, while in Samara the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks formed the so-called Committee of the Members of the Constituent Assembly. Both the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries assured the masses that with a Constituent Assembly in power all would live equally well and free. They promised to satisfy the demands of the workers as well as of the bourgeoisie. As a matter of fact the capitalists, landlords and counter-revolutionary officers were of course in power in the insurgent territory. The nationalization of the factories was revoked and the land was given back to its former owners. The Committee of the Constituent Assembly was only a screen for the purpose of deceiving and oppressing the toilers.

The uprising of the Czechoslovaks meant an intensification of the struggle between the village poor and the kulaks. En-

couraged by the Czechoslovak mutiny, the kulaks sharpened their struggle against the Soviet government. Here and there they succeeded in gaining influence over some sections of the middle peasants and attracting them to their side. The counter-revolution received support from the village kulaks. This circumstance increased the difficulties of fighting the enemies of the revolution and facilitated anti-Soviet activities.

In order to render aid to the Russian whiteguards the British troops occupied Archangel with the expectation that from there they would move on Moscow. At Archangel they formed a bourgeois government headed by Chaikovsky, a kulak co-operative official. In the south and southeast the British seized Baku and some districts of Turkestan. At the same time the Ukraine fell into the hands of German forces. In order to effect a junction between the Czechoslovakian and the northern front and grip Soviet Russia in a semi-circle, the Entente imperialists contemplated organized uprisings in Moscow and twenty-three other cities. Most of these uprisings did not take place, but in the cities of Rybinsk, Murom and Yaroslavl the whiteguards succeeded in getting into action.

All kinds of monarchist elements as well as representatives of the petty-bourgeois parties of the Mensheviks and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries were direct participants in these uprisings. Boris Savinkov, one of the most prominent personages of the Socialist-Revolutionary party, played a major part in the preparations for the Yaroslavl insurrection. Soon the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries whose desertion to the bourgeoisie had set in as early as the time of the Brest negotiations also took to the path of direct counter-revolutionary struggle against the Soviet government. Differing with the Party of the Bolsheviks on the question of the Brest-Litovsk peace, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, in March 1918, quit the government, intent upon disrupting at any price the peace policy pursued by the Soviet government and drawing Russia into a new war. At the same time they waged a furious struggle against the food policy of the Soviet government and against the organization of the Committees of the Poor, coming out in defence of the interests of the kulaks, against the poor peasants.

On July 5, 1918, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries caused an

uprising in Moscow. Having seized the telegraph building for a short time, they broadcast an appeal to the population not to carry out the orders of the Soviet government but support the uprising of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Their adventure, however, found no support among the masses of workers and peasants. The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Cheka) and the Red Army suppressed this revolt in short order.

But the Socialist-Revolutionaries did not stop at causing uprisings; they perpetrated a number of murderous assaults upon the highest functionaries and leaders of the Bolshevik Party. In the summer of 1918 Volodarsky was killed by Right Socialist-Revolutionaries in Petrograd. On August 30, Fanny Kaplan, a Right Socialist-Revolutionary, severely wounded Lenin by two revolver shots. On the same day, Uritsky, President of the Petrograd Cheka, was killed in Petrograd.

The enemies of the revolution advanced against Red Soviet Russia from all sides. This was a period when the country was in mortal danger.

At this most critical time the Party concentrated all its forces and energy upon strengthening the Red Army and organizing the repulse of the counter-revolution. Before long it was able to rally the workers and toiling peasants of all Soviet Russia, to enthuse and stir them to heroic struggle. The separate disjointed Red Army detachments were quickly forged into regular units. For the purpose of administering the Red Army, a well organized and steadily functioning centralized apparatus was created. The army units were placed in the charge of permanent commanders and iron revolutionary discipline was established. The Party waged resolute warfare against all insubordination and high-handedness which not infrequently disgraced certain isolated detachments.

Because of the dearth of Red commanders originating from its own ranks, the Party made extensive use of non-Party military specialists—former officers to whom the best, the most tested and most steadfast Bolsheviks were assigned in the capacity of commissars. Thousands of Communists were sent to the front. There, under the leadership of the political departments and the commissars, they did an enormous amount of work,

enlightening and training the Red Army units politically, strengthening their defence capacity and rallying the Red Army men to the slogans of the Bolshevik Party. As a result of this gigantic work the military units were transformed into strong, staunch detachments capable of the greatest heroism.

The eastern (Czechoslovak) front was most important in the summer of 1918. After occupying the Volga district, the Czechoslovaks contemplated moving against Moscow. The "People's Army," which was about ten thousand strong and was organized by the Committee of the Constituent Assembly, joined the Czechoslovaks in this expedition. In view of the special danger represented by the Eastern front, the Party devoted most of its attention to it. Thanks to the measures taken by the Party the tide began to turn on that front in September 1918. Red Army units took Kazan and Simbirsk from the Czechoslovak troops and began to force them to retreat in the direction of the Urals. October witnessed the recapture of Samara, to be followed shortly by that of Buguruslan, Buzuluk, Sterlitamak and other towns. The Committee of the Constituent Assembly fled to Siberia. The entire Volga district was once more in the hands of the Soviets.

In the autumn, General Krassnov's bands began to press hard upon Tsaritsyn, which was the most contested point between Soviet Russia and the counter-revolution in the South. The occupation of Tsaritsyn would have enabled Krassnov to join the Astrakhan and Ural White Cossacks, effect a juncture with the Czechoslovak front and wrest the Caucasus away from Soviet Russia. About forty White regiments were concentrated against Tsaritsyn. Krassnov's bands fought furiously against the Red troops, but were defeated and hurled back to the Don. Comrade *Stalin* played a great part in organizing the victory of the Red Army at the southern front. He had been instructed by the Party to organize the defence of Red Tsaritsyn.* Comrade *Stalin* as well as Comrade *Voroshilov* who at that time was in command of the Tenth (Tsaritsyn) Army converted Tsaritsyn into an impregnable fortress against which every one of the numerous assaults made upon it by General Krassnov was dashed to pieces.

* Now called Stalingrad.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

During this period the offensive of the White armies was accompanied by countless plots, by uprisings in the rear of the revolution, by terrorist attacks and murderous assaults upon the leaders of the working class. In reply to this White terror of the bourgeoisie, the Party and the Soviet government resorted to mass Red terror. To the attempted plots and revolts in the rear of the Revolution, to the murderous assaults and treacherous assassinations of the leaders of the working class, the Soviet government replied by ruthlessly annihilating these counter-revolutionary elements. The application of mass Red terror was a means of eliminating the counter-revolutionary elements and of weakening their struggle against the Soviet government. In combating the uprisings and the murderous assaults, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (the *Cheka*, later the United State Political Administration—O.G.P.U. *), organized in December 1917, played a great part. The party put Felix Dzierzynski, an old revolutionary and staunch Bolshevik, in charge of this organization. The Cheka discovered and prevented numerous counter-revolutionary conspiracies. It caught spies and agents of the Entente red-handed and exposed their participation in the counter-revolutionary uprisings. It demonstrated beyond all refutation that the ambassadors and representatives of the Allies in Russia—Lockhart (Great Britain), Francis (U.S.A.) and Noulens (France)—led the whiteguard activities. The Cheka was a flaming sword in the hands of the proletariat, the truest weapon and best safeguard of the revolution. The heroic struggle of the Cheka spread terror among the enemies of the working class, while it aroused enthusiasm among the toilers and exploited masses.

Owing to the whole-hearted devotion and indefatigable energy displayed by its defenders in the struggle, Soviet Russia succeeded in repulsing the counter-revolution on all fronts. Simultaneously great progress was reported in the countryside in the autumn of 1918. The Committees of the Poor routed the kulaks, crushed their resistance. The wave of kulak uprisings receded considerably. The middle peasants, now convinced that the dictatorship of the proletariat would endure, turned to a firm alli-

* Now incorporated in the People's Commissariat of the Interior—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

ance with the working class. The Soviet government became so strong in the countryside that it was able to disband the Committees of the Poor. The victories of the Red Army at the various fronts and the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the countryside upset the plan of the Entente to defeat Soviet Russia with the aid of Czechoslovak bayonets. Still the struggle of international imperialism against Soviet Russia did not cease; a few months later it redoubled in fury.

*The November Revolution in Germany and the Creation
of the Third (Communist) International*

While Civil War was raging in Soviet Russia, events of the greatest importance for the development of the world revolution were coming to a head in the West. The October Revolution created a tremendous impression upon the toilers of all countries. Ever louder became the voice of the West-European proletariat against the imperialist policy of its respective governments. The revolutionary crisis in Bulgaria, Austria and Hungary was particularly quick to mature. The reverses which set in for the Austro-German armies in the imperialist war and the exceptionally difficult situation of the toilers in these countries considerably aided this development.

In September the Allies broke through the first line of defence of the Germans on the Western front. Following up their success, they forced Bulgaria to capitulate. Thereupon a revolution broke out in that country. In October the Entente concluded an armistice with Turkey. Shortly thereafter a revolution broke out in Austria. On November 3, 1918 a mutiny occurred in the German navy stationed at Kiel. Next day the first Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies were formed in Germany. On the 9th the revolution spread to the heart of Germany. The workers and soldiers dethroned Emperor Wilhelm, who hastily made his escape abroad.

However, the inadequate organization of the proletariat and the influence exercised by the opportunists of the Second International upon considerable strata of workers made it possible for the Social-Democrats, the servitors of the bourgeoisie, to be carried to power. Traitors to the working class—Social-Demo-

crats like Ebert, Scheidemann and others—came out on top in the German republic that took shape.

The development of the revolution in Europe aided the formation of Communist Parties there. Communist Parties began to crystallize in Germany, Austria, Hungary and a number of other countries. The Communists called upon the proletariat not to content itself with a bourgeois republic but to fight for the transfer of power to the working class. They agitated extensively among the masses and organized them for struggle against the whole capitalist system.

But the political leaders of the Social-Democrats (Kautsky, Bauer, Hilferding, and others) assured the workers that the time for the transition to socialism had not yet come. Fulfilling their role of servitors of the bourgeoisie, they rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat and fought against the capture of power by the soviets. Deceiving the proletariat and the peasantry, they declared that what the workers needed in their struggle was not a proletarian dictatorship but a democratic republic. Despite all the efforts of the Social-Democrats, the influence of the Communist Parties grew constantly.

In January 1919, the Berlin workers began to rise. The insurrection was called by the Communists and aimed at the overthrow of the bourgeois government. The social-democratic government of Ebert and Scheidemann ordered out their troops against the workers who had risen in arms and thus drowned the uprising in blood. Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, the leaders of the German proletariat, were seized with the connivance of the Social-Democrats and brutally murdered by a band of officers. In March 1919, Noske, a social-democratic minister, again had hundreds of Berlin workers shot and killed, when they came out into the streets with the demand that the Soviets be recognized, the political prisoners released, etc. But the brutal vengeance meted out by the bloody hangman, Noske, was unable to check the growth of the revolutionary movement.

During this period of the most profound revolutionary crisis the First Congress of the Third (Communist) International convened. The sessions opened on March 2, 1919 in Moscow. The Congress was attended by delegates from the Communist Parties of Soviet Russia, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Switzerland and

several other countries. They were confronted with a most momentous historical task—the foundation of the Comintern and the formulation of its political platform.

The Congress heard Lenin's report on bourgeois democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat. This was the main, the decisive issue of the socialist revolution. The proletariat could be victorious only by overthrowing the bourgeoisie and realizing its own dictatorship. Pointing this out in his report, Lenin mercilessly exposed the falsity of the social-democratic theory that socialism could be victorious within the framework of bourgeois democracy. Lenin explained that bourgeois democracy was essentially nothing but the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie; that if socialism was to be victorious the proletariat must smash the bourgeois state apparatus and build a state Soviet in type. The Congress unanimously approved the postulates laid down in Lenin's report, accepting them as the basis for working out the platform of the Comintern.

The platform elaborated by the Congress pointed out that the imperialist system was suffering shipwreck, that the collapse of capitalism was approaching and the epoch of communist revolutions was on the march. The Congress declared that in this epoch the principal task of the Communist Parties consisted in winning Soviet power. It called upon the proletariat to engage in decisive and whole-hearted struggle against imperialism, for the world dictatorship of the working class. The platform of the Congress clearly traced the paths this struggle must take and strengthened the solidarity between the separate communist detachments engaged in the fight against imperialism. It was the banner around which all consistent and real fighters for communism rallied. The Congress terminated its work by electing the Executive Committee of the Communist International (E.C.C.I.), which leads the struggle of the international proletariat in the interval between Comintern congresses.

The First Congress of the Comintern was of the greatest historical importance. Under the direct leadership of Lenin, it laid the basis for the international organization of the communist movement. It created the Comintern, the world party of the new type resting on the granite foundation of Marxism-Leninism. It laid the basis of the organized international struggle of

the proletariat for the dictatorship of the working class and against the world bourgeoisie.

The German revolution had a very great effect on the fate of the socialist revolution in Russia. As soon as the crash of German imperialism set in, an irresistible yearning to go home seized the German and Austrian soldiers of the occupied regions. Under the influence of bolshevik agitation they began to form soldiers' soviets and to rebel against their officers. It did not take long before the Germans left the Ukraine, White Russia, Lithuania, Latvia and Esthonia where the workers and peasants revolted with the support of Red troops, took power into their own hands and set up soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies.

In the Ukraine the Soviet government was restored. Soviet Socialist Republics were formed in Latvia, Esthonia, White Russia and Lithuania, all of which entered into a very close alliance with Soviet Russia. The collapse of German imperialism attested the irresistible growth of the world proletarian revolution. It infinitely increased the power of Soviet Russia as the vanguard of this revolution. But this by no means meant that the struggle against international imperialism was to be curbed. After the shipwreck of imperialist Germany, wrote Lenin, only one group of victors remains—the Anglo-French imperialists. These now have the opportunity of assigning considerably greater forces to make an attack on Soviet Russia.

On the eve of the German revolution Lenin, who already foresaw that the attacks of Anglo-French imperialism after the fall of imperialist Germany would increase and that the further accentuation of the struggle between Soviet Russia and the imperialists would be inevitable, wrote:

"We decided to have an army a million strong by spring, but now we need an army three million strong. We can and shall have such an army." *

The Eighth Congress of the Party

In March 1919, after the First Congress of the Comintern, the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party took place. The

* Lenin, "Letter to the Joint Session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet and the Representatives of the Factory Committees and Trade Unions, Oct. 3, 1918," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXIII.

Congress discussed and adopted the new draft program worked out by a commission over which Lenin presided. It also heard and decided issues relating to the middle peasant, to military construction, the organizational problem, etc.

Lenin reported on the program of the Party. The new program made an appraisal of imperialism and the developing socialist revolution. It set forth the demand for a state consisting of soviets, and mapped out the principal measures to be taken by the Party under the dictatorship of the proletariat in the fields of general policy, war, the national question, economic construction, etc. The new program fully answered the requirements of the struggle of the proletariat during the period of socialist revolution. It was a *militant Marxist-Leninist weapon in the struggle for the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the building of socialism.*

On discussing the draft program, the Congress determinedly rebuffed Bukharin's attempts to distort Lenin's characterization of the essence of imperialism. Bukharin conceived of imperialism as a "pure," a solid mass in which industrial capital and simple commodity production had already ceased to be of any consequence whatever. Bukharin joined the chorus of the Second International's theoreticians (Kautsky, Hilferding) by asserting that the development of capitalistic monopolies (trusts, syndicates, etc.) was annihilating the anarchy of production inherent in capitalist economy, was replacing it by "organized capitalism," and that in consequence the conflict within capitalist society would likewise die out. These theoretical views which Bukharin propounded for the first time during the imperialist war were quite erroneous and politically harmful. To deny the role of small commodity production inevitably led to a denial of the role of the small producers in the political struggle, led to the *Trotskyist view of the peasantry*. Bukharin's opportunist denial of the role of the national and colonial movements under imperialism was likewise intimately connected with the theory of "pure" imperialism.

At the Congress Lenin came out sharply against Bukharin. "Pure" imperialism never did exist, according to Lenin; it was non-existent then and never would exist. He explained that the most diversified manifestations of capitalism and simple com-

modity production were encountered at every step in life, that they exist simultaneously with and alongside of imperialism and that it was, therefore, a serious error to speak of "pure" imperialism. The Congress decided to leave Lenin's characterization of imperialism in the program without any change whatsoever.

On discussing the program the Congress likewise had to expose Bukharin's opportunism on the national question. The right of nations to self-determination, said Bukharin, is in contradiction to the dictatorship of the proletariat, inasmuch as a nation must be taken to include all classes, even the bourgeoisie, though the latter is to be overthrown. Bukharin was of the opinion that it would be more correct to grant the right of self-determination to the toilers only. He wanted to extend the slogan of the self-determination of nations only to countries where the proletariat had not yet shaped itself into a class and had not perceived the conflict between its own interests and those of the bourgeoisie.

"We lose nothing," said Bukharin, "if we set up the slogan of the right of nations to self-determination for the colonies, the Hottentots and Bushmen, the Negroes, the Indians and others." Pyakatov, who also spoke at the Congress, went even further. He opposed the right of the *toilers* to self-determination, proposing instead to "pursue a firm course of strict proletarian centralization and proletarian unification."

Lenin took Bukharin and Pyatakof severely to task for their position on the national question. He pointed out that not only in the colonies but in a number of advanced countries, the vast majority of the proletariat had not yet come to realize the conflict between their own class interests and those of the bourgeoisie. In proof of this he referred to Poland, Germany and Finland where considerable sections of toilers still trusted in their bourgeoisie. A rejection of the right of nations to self-determination would only sow distrust in the Bolsheviks and Soviet Russia among these toilers, thus playing into the hands of the landlords and capitalists. Lenin pointed out that for instance, as long as the German petty-bourgeoisie or part of the German working class was under the influence of the bourgeoisie and feared that the Bolsheviks might begin to set up their system of society in Germany by force, Bukharin's slogan of the "self-determination of the toilers" would only have the effect of

making the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat more difficult. The Congress completely endorsed Lenin's view.

The Party built up its national policy along the lines of Lenin's program on the national question. In the national districts which had been cleared of the whiteguards (the Ukraine, Turkestan, Bashkiria and others) national Soviet republics were formed. These were governed by the workers and peasants of these districts. Soviet Russia helped these republics to develop their national culture, to set up schools, theatres and clubs functioning in their native tongue, to organize their national press, etc. The Soviet government also took care that the economy of these liberated regions was restored as quickly as possible and that industry and agriculture developed there. As a result the broad masses of toilers in the national regions were imbued with confidence in and sympathy with the Soviet government. This led to the collapse of all attempts of the counter-revolution to find support among the toilers of the national borderlands and to the consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship.

"The Russian workers," says Comrade Stalin, "could not have defeated Kolchak, Denikin and Wrangel without enjoying this sympathy and confidence of the oppressed masses of the borderlands of former Russia." *

The question of the attitude to be taken toward the middle peasant was the second important point discussed at the Congress. As Lenin said, the middle peasant had by that time become transformed into the "central figure" in agriculture. Lenin who delivered the report on this second point, declared that in the struggle for the overthrowing of the bourgeoisie the proletariat had marched together with the village poor, while the middle peasants had been *neutralized*. After the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat the question of the middle peasant must necessarily be put in a *different way*. The middle peasant, said Lenin, is partly a proprietor and partly a worker. He represents a class that vacillates. But while it is necessary to expropriate the capitalists and the landlords and mercilessly crush their resistance, an entirely different policy must be pursued with reference to the middle peasants. They are not enemies of the

* Stalin, *The October Revolution*, p. 54.

Soviet government. The Party policy must seek to strengthen the alliance with the middle peasants and must not countenance any violence against them. Lenin noted the fact that local organizations frequently violated this rule by expropriating middle peasants and kulaks indiscriminately, by refusing to give economic aid to the middle peasants, by enlisting them forcibly into the communes and so forth. Lenin declared that such violence practised against the middle peasants did very great harm, as it drove the middle peasants into the embraces of the kulaks. One must act in such a way as to gain the confidence of the middle peasants and "not dare to lord it over them."

The Congress adopted a special resolution on Lenin's report. Lenin's slogan of *reliance upon the village poor, of a firm alliance with the middle peasants and a struggle against the kulak* was made the basis of their resolution. The policy with regard to the middle peasant mapped out by the Congress played a great historical role. It made it possible for the Party to rally the broad masses of the toiling peasants around the proletariat and to achieve victory in the Civil War. This Party policy also accounted for the successful development of socialist construction in the period following the transition from war to peace.

At the Congress special attention was paid to the question of *building up the Red Army*. The Congress pointed out that in the period of socialist revolution it was impossible to build the army in the old way. To be the weapon of the proletarian dictatorship, the Red Army must consist exclusively of proletarians and toiling peasants. The work of training and instructing the Red Army must be based on class solidarity and socialist education. For this purpose it was necessary to create communist nuclei and political departments in the Red Army, to appoint alongside of the commanders military commissars whose duty it was to control also the actions of the military specialists. While sponsoring the training on a larger scale of its own Red commanders, the Congress likewise pointed out the necessity of making use of the old military specialists in the Red Army on condition that the commissars control and supervise them. The Congress further sponsored military training for all proletarians and the poorest peasants and advocated the closest contact between Red Army units and factories, mills, etc.

These principal postulates by which the Party was guided in constructing the Red Army called forth objection at the Congress on the part of the so-called Army Opposition (V. Smirnov, Safarov, and others). V. Smirnov, acting as their spokesman, delivered a co-report at the Congress on the military question. The Army Opposition denied that it was necessary to make use of military specialists and opposed strict discipline in the Red Army. It was in favour of partisan methods and forms of warfare. Its point of view echoed the opinions of the "Left Communists" on the military question. Under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin the Congress severely condemned the Army Opposition which in essence denied the need of creating a regular Red Army.

The decisions of the Congress were likewise directed against the erroneous line taken by Trotsky who manifested implicit confidence in the military specialists, who underestimated the importance of the commissars, the political departments and the communist nuclei, who divorced himself from the Party and had a penchant for bureaucratic, swivel-chair methods of work.

The line mapped out by the Congress gave an absolutely clear, precise and politically correct answer to all important questions of army construction.

The decisions of the Congress on the *organizational* questions were likewise of great importance. The rigorous conditions of civil war demanded corresponding methods of Party construction. Iron discipline and unconditional execution of the decisions of the higher bodies by the lower bodies were absolutely essential.

"Each decision," reads the resolution of the Congress, "must first be carried out and may only thereafter be appealed to the corresponding higher Party organ. In this sense outright military discipline is necessary in the Party during the present period."

During the Civil War the Party mobilized Communists for the Red Army on an extensive scale and frequently arranged "Party Weeks" during which there was much recruiting of new members into the Party from among the workers and peasants devoted to it. The first Party Week was announced in October 1919, at the time of Denikin's greatest successes, when he was near Tula. Despite the precarious military situation impending, a mighty torrent of workers poured into the Party, thus proving

the intimate contact between the Russian Communist Party and the working class.

In connection with the Party Weeks Lenin wrote:

"... from the proletarian mass which witnessed the 'successes' of Denikin and knew all the difficulties, hardships and dangers connected precisely at this time with the calling and duty of Communist, thousands upon thousands rose to reinforce the Party of the Communists, to take upon themselves this incredibly difficult burden of state administration.

"The success of the Soviet government, the success of our Party, is simply wonderful! . . . Workers who have endured unheard-of tortures of hunger, cold, ruination and devastation not only retain their good spirits . . . but, despite the total lack of preparation and experience, assume the burden of steering the ship of state! And this at a moment when the gale has attained furious force.

"The history of our proletarian revolution is full of such miracles. Whatever sore trials now and then may be in store, such miracles will surely, without fail, lead to the complete triumph of a world-wide Soviet Republic." *

Parallel with these Party Weeks, Party re-registrations were being conducted for the purpose of cleansing the Party ranks of elements that had become degenerate or had crept into the Party under false colours.

Struggle Against Kolchak and Denikin; Defeat of Yudenich

The successes of Soviet Russia and the development of the revolution in the west of Europe evoked the greatest alarm among the international bourgeoisie. International imperialism decided to smash the revolution in Russia whatever the cost. The defeat of the Germans in the imperialist war gave the Entente the opportunity to move a considerable part of its forces against the Soviet Republic. In December 1918 the Allies made a descent upon Odessa. A French squadron was sent to the Black Sea. By February the Entente had concentrated heavy forces in the south of Russia (the Ukraine, Crimea). About twelve thousand French troops were stationed at Odessa, three-fourths of which consisted of colonial units (coloured troops). In addition, the Serbians, the Poles and the Greeks also sent a contingent of

* Lenin, "Results of the Party Week in Moscow and Our Tasks," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXIV.

troops to Odessa. This expedition numbered about twelve thousand men. In the north the Entente concentrated fifty thousand soldiers. Considerable forces were despatched by the interventionists to the Far East and to Siberia.

At the same time the imperialists made it their business still further to strengthen the Russian counter-revolution. When the troops of the Socialist-Revolutionary Committee of the Constituent Assembly were defeated by the Red Army, the Entente decided to dissolve the Socialist-Revolutionary Committee and set up a military dictatorship in its stead. The imperialists designated Admiral Kolchak as military dictator to head the forces of the Russian counter-revolution. On November 18, 1918, Kolchak executed a *coup d'état* and proclaimed himself the Supreme Ruler of all Russia. He issued orders to arrest the members of the Constituent Assembly who "had not surrendered their credentials" and to bring them before a court martial. All Siberia was in his hands. General Denikin who considered himself Kolchak's representative in the south of Russia seized power on the Don and in the Kuban. The north fell into the hands of General Miller. In the west General Yudenich was getting ready to advance against Soviet Russia.

This whole pack of White generals had one main object in view: to stifle the dictatorship of the proletariat and restore the monarchy. Workers and peasants in the occupied territory were subjected to merciless persecution. The estates were returned to the landlords and the factories and works to the manufacturers.

All the non-Russian nationalities were subjected to the coarsest and most brutal violence. Under the rule of the White generals pogroms against the Jews became widespread just as they had been in the gloomiest days of the tsarist regime.

The original plot of the imperialists called for a blow to be dealt to Moscow from every quarter simultaneously: from the south—by the forces of the Entente and Denikin; from the east—by the forces of Kolchak; and from the north—by the Anglo-American troops.

International imperialism did not succeed in carrying out its plan to use its own troops. The Party did a tremendous amount of work among the White armies and allied forces. In addition

the influence of the revolution had spread to the Entente soldiers, who refused obedience to their officers and declined to fight against the Bolsheviks. In the south under the leadership of A. Marty, now a member of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party, an insurrection of the French sailors was being prepared. The French sailors began to fraternize with the Russian workers and participated in demonstrations and meetings.

The situation became so menacing for the imperialists that they were compelled to begin a hasty withdrawal of their troops from Russia. Soviet Russia was winning over the Entente soldiers and thus was wresting from its opponents their most powerful weapon. This was a major revolutionary victory concerning which Lenin said:

"The victory which we achieved by forcing the withdrawal of the French and English troops was the most important victory that we have yet scored over the Entente. We have taken its soldiers away from it. We met its infinite military and technical superiority by nullifying this superiority by the solidarity of the toilers against the imperialist governments." *

Nevertheless the Entente did not want to forego the idea of attacking Soviet Russia. Kolchak took the offensive and captured Perm. The Red Army retreated and an exceedingly difficult situation arose at the Perm sector. To restore the former situation the Party sent Comrade Stalin to the Eastern front who in a short period of time turned the tide there. But the imperialists bent every effort to retard the advance of the Red troops. With the support of the Entente, Kolchak's army was augmented to a total of three hundred thousand effectives. At the same time Denikin's army became two hundred thousand strong.

In the spring of 1919 the Entente launched its first campaign against Soviet Russia with the intention of smashing the Soviet government through the united efforts of the Poles, Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich and the mixed Anglo-Russian detachments in Turkestan and Archangel. Kolchak was to inflict the main and decisive blow. The remaining troops were held in readiness to come to the assistance of the main body. The Entente expedi-

* Lenin, "Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXIV.

tion was accompanied by kulak uprisings which were organized by the enemies of the Soviet government. But thanks to the Eighth Party Congress decisions on the alliance with the middle peasant and the turn made by the middle peasant towards the Soviet government, the kulaks did not succeed in drawing any appreciable sectors of the toiling peasantry to their side.

Developing his offensive, Kolchak in the middle of April was only sixty to eighty kilometres from the Volga. Denikin had entrenched himself in the Donetz Basin where he had seized Lugansk. Then he prepared to attack Tsaritsyn and Saratov in the hope of effecting a juncture with Kolchak. In the west Yudenich occupied Yamburg (now Kingissep), Gdov and Pskov. The Poles also began to stir in the west and threatened Minsk, the capital of White Russia. In May 1919, the counter-revolutionary troops occupied Riga, and Latvia once more fell subject to the rule of the whiteguards. Once more Soviet Russia was in grave danger.

When the Entente launched its campaign, the Party issued the slogan: "All to the Struggle against Kolchak." New troops were despatched to the front to reinforce and replenish the Red Army. The theses of the Central Committee which were drawn up by Lenin contained the instruction to strain every effort to defeat the enemy by arming the trade unions to a man in all districts bordering on the front, by increasing the agitation among the Red Army men, by helping to improve their supply, etc.

In twenty-two provinces great detachments of Communists, trade union members and Young Communist League members were mobilized and despatched to the front. Numerous volunteers took the field against Kolchak.

The enemy offered desperate resistance to the Soviet troops but thanks to the exceptional heroism of the Red Army Kolchak's advance was stopped.

Starting with the end of April 1919, the Red Army under Comrade Frunze's command began to inflict the first serious defeat upon Kolchak near Buguruslan. Soon Kolchak's armies were compelled to retreat on the whole front.

In the northwest, where Yudenich was advancing, the Party put Comrade Stalin in charge of the defence of Petrograd. In the course of three weeks, Comrade Stalin effected a complete

change along the entire front and Yudenich's army fell back under the pressure of the Red troops. Comrade Stalin was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

To beat off the attack begun by Denikin in the south, Trotsky proposed that the pursuit of Kolchak's forces be stopped, that the army entrench itself at the Byelaya River without crossing the Urals and that some of the divisions be transferred from the eastern front to the south. Trotsky thus underrated the need of completely defeating Kolchak.

But the Central Committee of the Party did not agree with him in this, finding that

"... the Urals with their factories and railway network ought not to be left in the hands of Kolchak as he could easily recuperate there, rally his forces and appear once more on the Volga—it is necessary first to drive Kolchak beyond the Ural mountain chain into the steppes of Siberia and only thereafter engage in diverting forces south." *

The decision of the Central Committee made it possible to administer a complete defeat upon Kolchak. At the beginning of 1920, the Red Army destroyed the last remnants of Kolchak's troops. Kolchak himself was captured and shot by sentence of a Revolutionary Tribunal.

The defeat of Kolchak's armies compelled the Entente to change its plan of attack against Soviet Russia. The main role was now entrusted to Denikin whom Yudenich and bourgeois Poland were to assist. In accordance with this plan a second expedition was led by the Entente against the Soviet Republic. Early in July 1919 Denikin succeeded in taking Tsaritsyn, all the Ukraine to the left of the Dnieper and the Crimea. On August 10 he hurled Mamontov's cavalry corps against the Soviet troops. A breach was caused in the Soviet front and Mamontov's cavalry started a devastating raid in its rear. For a short time the cities of Tambov, Voronezh, Kozlov and Yelets were in Mamontov's hands. He wreaked cruel vengeance upon the workers and peasants, especially the Communists and Soviet workers. The commanding staff headed by Trotsky was unable to bring about the defeat of the raiders who after some time rejoined the main body of Denikin's forces.

* Stalin, *On the Opposition*, quoted in *The October Revolution*, p. 78.

Early in October Denikin's troops occupied Voronezh, Orel and the city of Novosil in Tula province. The capture of Orel jeopardized Tula and was a direct menace to Moscow.

Denikin's successes were largely explained by shortcomings of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, primarily in Trotsky's work in the Council. Under Trotsky the Revolutionary Military Council held almost no meetings and the bulk of the work was shifted to second-grade workers. Lenin repeatedly noted these shortcomings with great concern and strove to remove them without delay. Thus in his letter dated September 16, 1919, and addressed to S. I. Gussev, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council, he declared that "our Revolutionary Military Council is working badly," that it is trying to appease while "in fact we are witnessing stagnation, almost collapse." Pointing out cases where the Revolutionary Military Council had shown lack of dexterity, dilatoriness and inflexibility, Lenin finished his letter with the subscript:

"Evidently our Revolutionary Military Council issues orders without being interested in their execution and with no desire to look after their execution. This may be a general remissness, but in military matters it is downright ruinous."

While at the southern front Denikin was drawing near Moscow, on the northwestern front Yudenich was occupying Krassnoye Syelo and Gatchina and was almost at the very gates of Petrograd. The counter-revolutionaries had never yet achieved such major successes. The camp of the enemy was already rejoicing over the impending capture of Moscow and Petrograd. But again the enemies of the revolution did not succeed in carrying out their designs.

Enlisting all its forces and straining all its energies to the task, the Party and the working class set about repulsing Denikin's bands. The Communists of Petrograd, Moscow and other cities were mobilized *en masse*, embracing in various places as many as 50 per cent of the Party membership. During one month alone about two thousand responsible workers were placed at the disposal of the commanders of the southern front. The Party organizations in the regions occupied by the enemy poured into the Red Army almost in a solid body. The Central Com-

mittee instructed all Party organizations to harness the entire state apparatus to the task of annihilating Denikin.

The Central Committee entrusted the task of leading the struggle at the southern front to Comrade Stalin, having first deprived Trotsky of all power to interfere with matters pertaining to the southern front. In point of fact the plan of struggle against Denikin worked out under Trotsky's leadership was such as to threaten great danger to Soviet Russia. According to this plan it was proposed to inflict the main blow against Denikin at Novorossisk by launching an offensive through the steppes of the Don. But such a campaign presented incredible difficulties in view of the lack of roads and the hostile attitude of the local Cossacks towards the Red troops. A campaign along the Don would only have the effect of rallying the Cossacks around Denikin and thus strengthening Soviet Russia's opponents.

Taking all these considerations into account, Comrade Stalin proposed a new plan of campaign against Denikin—to direct the main blow against Rostov by marching through Kharkov and the Donetz Basin. This plan would assure the Red Army of the sympathy of the local population (the Donetz workers and the village poor of the Ukraine), would guarantee the coal supply, the use of the dense network of railway lines and quite a number of other advantages. The Central Committee of the Party adopted Comrade Stalin's plan, rescinded the old plan worked out by Trotsky and vested Comrade Stalin with extensive authority to carry out his new plan.

In order to fight Denikin's mounted troops, the famous First Mounted Army was created at the suggestion of Comrade Stalin and Comrades Budyonny and Voroshilov were placed in command by the Party.

With the slogan "All to the Struggle against Denikin" the workers and peasants of Soviet Russia rose to a man in defence of their revolutionary gains, against the bourgeois and landlord counter-revolution.

In the second half of October Orel was retaken by the Red troops. Budyonny's cavalry completely routed Denikin near Voronezh and Kastornaya. Under bolshevik leadership the discontented peasants and workers in Denikin's rear rebelled. The Red Army followed closely upon the heels of the retreating

Denikin forces, freed the Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus and thus sealed the fate of this counter-revolutionary army. Denikin fled abroad, while remnants of his troops hid in the Crimea and North Caucasus.

As a result of fierce fighting, Yudenich also was successfully wiped out and Red Petrograd made safe against all attack on the part of his counter-revolutionary bands.

In January 1920, Great Britain raised the blockade against Soviet Russia. In February of the same year a peace treaty was signed with Esthonia. Peace negotiations were instituted with Latvia and Lithuania. All this—the result of the Soviet victories—considerably improved the international position of the Soviet Republic.

Economic Policy During the Civil War Period

During the Civil War when all resources were made available for the country's defence, the economic policy of the Party was wholly subordinated to the requirements of the military operations.

From the old imperialist regime Soviet Russia had inherited a ruined country whose productive forces had been sapped to the root. The struggle of the counter-revolution against the Soviet government still more deteriorated the country's economic position.

With the conclusion of the Brest peace and the formation of the Krassnov government on the Don, Soviet Russia was rent into two parts. The loss of Baku and Grosny deprived the Soviet government of oil. The Czechoslovaks cut off the Soviet centre from the Siberian grain and the Ural factories. While in pre-revolutionary Russia (exclusive of Poland), there were seven hundred seventy-five million poods of surplus grain, this amount fell to eighty-seven million in the Soviet Russia of 1918-20.

The blockade of the Soviet republics clamped down by the imperialists made the export and import of commodities impossible. The productivity of labour fell steadily. As a result of all this, starvation, poverty and desolation took on unprecedented proportions. Under the existing conditions the principal task consisted in correctly distributing the supplies on hand, so as to

ensure that the workers and the Red Army be supplied with all necessities.

In order to feed the population and the Red Army, the Soviet government introduced quotas for the delivery of agricultural products to the government.

The peasants delivered all their surplus in the form of food quotas to the state, retaining only the quantity of grain strictly fixed by the state for their own consumption and for sowing purposes. In exchange for their agricultural products the peasants received only very small quantities of manufactured goods inasmuch as industry, under war conditions, showed great gaps in its production. The peasants, as Lenin later expressed himself, gave the state grain in the form of a loan, as it were, in return for "all the land and protection against the landlords" which they had received from the workers' state. The grain collected by means of food quotas was distributed to the population by the organs of the People's Commissariat of Food Supply. Red Army men headed the list of those to be supplied with foodstuffs. Next came the workers and their families, to be followed by the various categories of office employees. The state gave no supplies whatever to speculators or persons exploiting the labour of others.

During the Civil War industry was almost completely nationalized. On June 1, 1918 only four hundred eighty-seven enterprises were in the hands of the state, but in 1920 about sixty-seven thousand enterprises, including many small ones, had already been nationalized. The nationalization which had been carried out made it possible to smash the resistance of the bourgeoisie and to continue work at the most important enterprises. Trade was completely nationalized. In view of the great depreciation of the paper money issued by the state (gold and silver had already been removed from circulation by the tsarist government) a gradual transition to a clearing system without the use of cash payments set in. Wages were paid partly in kind. Militarization of labour was established: the workers were prohibited from changing their places of employment; the peasants were made subject to labour and transport service, to keeping the railway lines clear of snow, etc. Moreover, in 1920, labour armies were formed. This was the name given to the Red Army

units which were transferred from the military front to the labour front. Labour armies were sent out to get wood, coal and other forms of fuel. These armies were formed during the short respite which ensued after the defeat of Kolchak and Denikin, when it proved possible to take several Red Army units temporarily away from the active front, but the danger of an impending new offensive by the imperialists against Soviet Russia did not as yet permit them to be demobilized. The entire administration of national economy of the country was highly centralized. It was made subordinate to "chief bureaus" and "centres"—special institutions put in charge of their respective branches of industry. Such centralization was necessary so that the small stock of supplies still to be found in the country might be correctly inventoried and distributed. In the face of the unbelievably difficult conditions of work and the starvation and ravaged condition of the country, the workers displayed the greatest enthusiasm on the economic front. The communist *subbotniks**—a new form of communist labour—were striking examples of this enthusiasm. Lenin attributed the greatest importance to these communist subbotniks, as they were an expression of the new free and conscious discipline of the toilers themselves. He referred to them as the "Great Initiative," a sprout of the new socialist society.

"... Hungry workers, surrounded by the malicious and counter-revolutionary agitation of the bourgeoisie, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, are organizing 'communist subbotniks' working overtime *without any remuneration whatsoever* and bringing about an *enormous increase in the productivity of labour*, in spite of the fact that they are tired, worn-out and exhausted by underfeeding. Is this not the greatest heroism? Is this not the beginning of a change of world-historic importance?" **

The communist subbotniks spread widely not only throughout the industrial but also the military and soviet nuclei. The broad non-Party masses also took part in these subbotniks shoulder to shoulder with the Party members.

* *Subbotnik*—organized public work voluntarily and gratuitously done outside of working hours to accomplish some specific social work—Ed. Eng. ed.

** Lenin, "The Great Initiative," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXIV.

The economic policy which came into being during the Civil War was given the name of "war communism."

"The peculiarity of 'war communism' consisted in the fact that we actually took from the peasants all their surplus and sometimes even what was not surplus but part of the peasants' necessary food supply; we took it to cover the requirements of the army and to maintain the workers. We took most of it as a loan, paid for it in paper money; otherwise we would not have been able to triumph over the landlords and capitalists in a ruined country of small peasants." *

Thus the military and political alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry came to be established.

As a system of distributing products under the conditions of war and intervention, the policy of war communism afforded tremendous advantages. It made it possible to guarantee the bread supply of the workers and the Red Army, to set up a *military and political alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry* and achieve victory in the Civil War. However, while noting the positive aspects of war communism, Lenin pointed out that it was not and could not be a correct economic policy capable of meeting the economic demands of the proletariat. Measures like food quotas, the complete abolition of free trade and so forth greatly handicapped the development of peasant husbandry. Therefore Lenin always emphasized the fact that war communism was only a temporary measure called forth by war and the ravaged state of the country.

It is entirely within the realm of possibility that war communism may also have to be introduced during the socialist revolutions of other countries, but everything will depend upon the intensiveness and duration of the civil war there, upon the forces which the counter-revolution and intervention will be able to muster.

"In the event of probable capitalist military intervention," says the program of the Communist International, "and of prolonged counter-revolutionary wars against the dictatorship of the proletariat the economic management must first and foremost bear in mind the interests of the proletarian dictatorship; there may arise the need for a war-communist economic policy." **

* Lenin, "Tax in Kind," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXVI.

** *Program of the Communist International*, p. 35.

*The Party as the Organizer of the Victories
of the Red Army*

The tremendous and unparalleled successes achieved by Soviet Russia in the Civil War were possible only because the Communist Party was the leader of the Red Army and the organizer of its victories. Lenin said that a miracle like the Red Army's defeat of the Russian bourgeoisie and the landlords who enjoyed the help of the universally powerful imperialists¹ could happen

"... only thanks to the fact that the Party was on guard, that the Party was under the strictest discipline, that the authority of the Party united all the departments and institutions, and because tens, hundreds, thousands, and in the final count millions rallied as one man to the slogan issued by the Central Committee—only because of all this was it possible for that miracle to happen which did happen." *

At the Eighth Congress the Party elaborated the military program and mapped out the principles of army construction. It carried out a tremendous amount of work in training and educating the Red Army masses. It worked out plans of military struggle and led the actual fighting on all the numerous fronts.

The Party's agitation and propaganda strengthened the political consciousness of the Red Army men, among whom quite a few unstable elements were to be found, recent arrivals from the rural districts who had little class-consciousness. The political work of the Communists enlightened and re-educated these backward sections which thus became staunch, class-conscious fighters for Soviet power. The Communists were the backbone of the Red Army, its iron core. They fought with exemplary courage, invariably marched in the forefront and rallied the non-Party Red Army men to themselves. If danger threatened anywhere, if the enemy began to gain the upper hand, the Party would invariably rush its valiant fighters to that spot to relieve the situation.

Party mobilizations for the front rapidly succeeded each other. In the front-line zone the Party organizations were frequently under arms almost to the last man. As early as 1918, thirty-five thousand Communists were on the rolls of the Red Army. In

* Lenin, "Ninth Congress—Report of the Central Committee," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXV.

1919 this figure rose to one hundred twenty-one thousand while in 1920 there were more than two hundred eighty thousand Communists in the army. These two hundred eighty thousand constituted more than one-third (34 per cent, to be exact) of the entire Party.

The communist nuclei, political departments and commissars of Red Army units played a very important part in the Red Army. The commissars were representatives of the Party and the Soviet government. They were selected from among the best, the staunchest and most tested Bolsheviks. As they were the senior comrades and the leaders of the Party nuclei, they performed a tremendous amount of educational work among the Red Army masses. It was the duty of the commissars to supervise and control the commanders who were former officers, among whom vacillating elements and even covert counter-revolutionaries were sometimes found. The commissars occupied very dangerous posts and often gave examples of supreme heroism which attracted the wavering and hesitant elements to their side. In stressing the role of the commissars during the Civil War, Lenin said that "without the military commissars we would not have had a Red Army." The most important military plans were worked out under the direct leadership of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party which was of decisive importance for the successes achieved at the various fronts.

The Party also worked very strenuously in the rear of the Whites—organizing and leading the struggle against the counter-revolution. The White governments knew the significance of this struggle quite well and therefore fiendishly persecuted the Communists. The Communists were hunted down like wild beasts. The gendarmes tracked them with police bloodhounds and the use of *provocateurs*. Any Communist who was arrested was sure to suffer a torturous death. The Communists had to go into hiding and to work in great secrecy. But despite all these incredibly difficult and strenuous conditions, the Party endeavoured to disintegrate the White armies and troops of the interventionists, to paralyse their fighting spirit while the workers and peasants rose up in arms against the White governments. In the rear of Kolchak and Denikin entire armies of partisans were formed. These constituted a serious menace to the White generals.

Lenin played an exceptional role in the organization of the victories at the various fronts of the Civil War. He was the principal leader and guide of the Red Army. Every important decision on military problems made by either the Party or the government was reached with the close participation and under the direct guidance of Lenin. He not only determined the basis of Soviet military policy but also looked after the development of each operation and managed to be everywhere giving aid and instructions.

Comrade Stalin, who during the Civil War disclosed the qualities of a brilliant strategist and excellent organizer, was the close aide and comrade-in-arms of Lenin. Comrade Stalin was entrusted with the most responsible and most arduous commissions and he always discharged them with signal success.

A great number of the outstanding heroes of the Civil War grouped around Lenin and Stalin. One of these was Comrade K. Voroshilov, a former mechanic of the Lugansk Locomotive Works and an old Bolshevik, now People's Commissar of National Defence. Comrade Voroshilov began his military work as organizer and leader of workers' detachments in the Ukraine. After the German occupation of the Ukraine, he made his way with his detachments to Tsaritsyn where he was appointed commander of the Tenth Red Army. Under Comrade Voroshilov's leadership the Tenth Red Army fought heroically and successfully repulsed the numerous attacks of General Krassnov's troops. Later, Comrade Voroshilov was appointed a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the First Mounted Army with whose name many heroic exploits are associated.

Comrade Budyonny, the son of a peasant of the Don region and a former corporal of the old army, became the commander of the First Mounted Army during the Civil War and gained much deserved fame. Comrade M. V. Frunze, now deceased, was one of the greatest military men of his day. A Party member since 1904, he participated in the December armed uprising in 1905. During the Civil War it was under his leadership that Wrangel was smashed and the bandit groups under Makhno and Petlura were wiped out. Other prominent military organizers were Comrades Orjonikidze and Kirov. With such men as leaders of the Red Army the Leninist line was certain to be carried out.

firmly and resolutely on all questions of army construction without exception. In those cases where efforts to distort the Leninist line in military matters came to light (such as the efforts made by Trotsky and the representatives of the "military opposition" at the Eighth Congress), the Party repelled them without mercy.

The defeat of the White armies was possible only under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party. The Party organized the victory over the counter-revolution and intervention in compliance with the instructions of its great leader, Comrade Lenin and his closest comrade-in-arms, Comrade Stalin.

"The high honour of having been the organizer of our victories belongs to the great collective of foremost workers of our country—the Russian Communist Party." *

The Ninth Congress of the Party

The Ninth Congress of the Russian Communist Party was held in the beginning of April 1920 after the victories over Kolchak, Denikin and Yudenich had been achieved. In view of the liquidation of the principal fronts and the improvement in the international situation of Soviet Russia, the Congress devoted most of its attention to the problems of economic construction. On opening the Congress Lenin declared that despite the fact that the blockade had been lifted and peace proposals submitted by several states, the international imperialists might renew their military activities against Soviet Russia at any moment. Therefore, as Lenin pointed out,

"we must accompany our steps toward peace with complete military preparedness, without by any means demobilizing our army." **

The Congress discussed and mapped out a number of measures to be taken to combat starvation and ruin.

The Congress called special attention to the problems of organizing the management of national economy. The creation of competent, firm, energetic leadership, whether it concerned an individual industrial enterprise or a whole branch of industry, was the chief task when organizing the management of industry.

* Stalin, *On the Opposition*.

** Lenin, "The Ninth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXV.

For the purpose of organizing the management of production in a more simple and more precise manner and for the further purpose of economizing organizational forces, the Congress decided to introduce one-man management. The Congress held that the practical application to everyone, high or low, of the principle of strict personal responsibility for the particular work entrusted is a necessary condition upon which the improvement of the economic organization and the rise in production depend. The resolution on the organization of industrial management adopted by the Congress stated that while the collegiate system had a place in the process of discussion or decision, it must yield this place to one-man management in the process of execution.

The Congress worked out and approved a unified economic plan. It was proposed to begin the restoration of economic life by improving the condition of *transport* and the accumulation of supplies of grain, raw materials and fuel so that the main stress may thereafter be laid on the manufacture of transport machinery, on the *production* of fuel, raw materials and grain. The next stage was to be increased machine building for the manufacture of products of mass consumption, to be followed by the increased manufacture of articles of general consumption.

The need of beginning with the restoration of transport and the accumulation of supplies of raw materials, fuel and grain was occasioned by the complete dislocation of the country's railways as well as by its general ruination and starvation—the aftermath of intervention and blockade. In mapping out its unified economic plan the Congress considered it essential that extensive use be made of electric power in the whole of the country's national economy and made this the keystone of the technical structure of this plan. The Congress was outspokenly in favour of placing the most important enterprises on a priority list to be supplied preferentially with raw materials, fuel and foodstuffs. All decisions of the Congress on economic questions were permeated with the idea of the strictest centralism and the unconditional subordination of the lower economic organs to the higher economic organs, a principle especially imperative under the conditions of war, starvation and general ruination.

The Party offered determined resistance to every attempt, no matter from what quarter, to distort the line mapped out by it

on the questions of economic construction. Headed by Lenin it inflicted a crushing blow upon the self-styled group of Democratic Centralism whose most important leaders were Sapronov, Maximovsky and Ossinsky. Reflecting the influence of petty-bourgeois elements upon certain sections of the Party, elements that were discontented with the regime of proletarian dictatorship, the Democratic Centralism group attempted to undermine the centralism of the Soviet and economic systems, to weaken the guiding influence of the centre upon the localities. This group fought for the collegiate system as opposed to one-man management and came out against strict labour discipline.

Fighting the Democratic Centralism group for their stand on the question of one-man management and the collegiate system, Lenin wrote:

"The collegiate system as the basic type of organization of Soviet management represents something which is rudimentary and indispensable during the first stage when it is necessary to build anew. But upon the establishment of more or less stable forms, the transition to practical work requires one-man management, since it is a system which more than any other assures the best utilization of human capabilities and a real, not merely a verbal, control of the work." *

The Democratic Centralism group was antagonistically disposed towards the specialists and piece-work and advocated petty-bourgeois equalitarianism. In the Ukraine the adherents of the Democratic Centralism group even came out against the formation of Committees of the Village Poor, thus clearly evincing their kulak nature. These anti-Party views of the group on the questions of economic and Soviet construction were topped by its complete refusal to accept the Leninist principles of Party construction. The group fought for the legality of factions and groupings in the Party and attempted to divorce the Soviet economic and trade union organs from the Party and its Central Committee. In defending the collegiate method of managing economy, the Democratic Centralism group proclaimed that this system in one form or another constituted an indispensable base for democracy.

* Lenin, "Speech at the Third All-Russian Congress of Councils of National Economy, January 27, 1920," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXV.

"I maintain," said Lenin at the Ninth Congress with reference to the views of this group, "that during the fifteen years of pre-revolutionary history of Social-Democracy you will not find anything like it. Democratic Centralism means only that representatives from local organizations gather together and elect a responsible body which is to govern. But how? This depends on how many qualified people, on how many good administrators we have there. Democratic Centralism consists in the Congress verifying the activities of the Central Committee, removing it and appointing a new one."*

By assuming the name of Democratic Centralism the group merely tried to mislead the masses, inasmuch as its entire position was in complete contradiction to the Leninist principle of democratic centralism.

On a number of questions (that of the collegiate system, the trade unions and others) Tomsy and Rykov occupied the identical position as the group of Democratic Centralism. In his theses written for the Ninth Party Congress, Tomsy advocated the view that the collegiate system alone could guarantee the participation of the broad masses in the management of production. In his endeavour to weaken the influence of the Party on the trade unions, Tomsy proposed to make the communist fractions in the industrial branch unions directly subordinate to the Party fraction in the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. The Party headed by Lenin completely refuted these mistaken notions of Tomsy and Rykov.

While the Democratic Centralism group decried one-man management, strict labour discipline and strong centralism, Trotsky attempted a diametrically opposite distortion of the Party line. With regard to economic construction he constantly swerved toward a position tantamount to rejecting every form of democracy, of substituting bureaucratic routine order-writing for one-man management while endeavouring to establish purely military forms and methods of work in place of the new forms of socialist labour.

This was particularly noticeable in the case of the labour armies. The labour armies which had been formed by the Party as a temporary measure were looked upon by Trotsky as patterns

* Lenin, "Concluding Speech on the Report of the Central Committee, March 30," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXV.

for organizing labour during the entire period of socialist construction. He fancied that the economic reconstruction of Soviet Russia would take place "through the mass application" of the labour of millions of unskilled peasants and workers (labour armies) "to the debris of pre-war industry."*

This position taken by Trotsky was politically quite erroneous and harmful and therefore the Party exposed it just as it had exposed the platform of the Democratic Centralism group.

*War Against White Poland and Wrangel;
End of the Civil War*

Subsequent events showed how right Lenin had been when at the Ninth Party Congress he had warned the Party that a renewal of war was possible. Around the middle of April 1920, the Polish squires marched against Soviet Russia, instigated as they had been by the international bourgeoisie. This was the third campaign of the Entente against the Soviet Republic. Early in May the Poles succeeded in forcing the Red troops back on the southwestern front and captured Kiev.

Supported by international imperialism, Poland of the landed gentry represented a serious danger.

Once more the Party focussed all its attention upon questions of war and the reinforcement of the Red Army. Once more mobilizations of Communists for the front followed each other in rapid succession.

The Party appointed Comrade Stalin member of the Revolutionary Military Council for the southwestern front. Under his leadership the Soviet troops launched a counter-offensive on that front. On July 5 the First Mounted Army commanded by Comrades Budyonny and Voroshilov broke through the Polish front, gained the rear of the enemy and took the cities of Zhitomir and Berdichev. The Polish armies began to retreat rapidly. An offensive by the Red Army on the western front set in almost simultaneously. The Soviet forces crossed the Beresina and pursued the enemy without stop. By the middle of August they had reached the gates of Warsaw. At the same time the First Mounted Army

* From one of Comrade Stalin's letters to Lenin.

defeated the troops of the enemy in Galicia, in the environs of Lvov.

The Polish workers and poorest peasants prepared to rise against their bourgeoisie. A Polish revolutionary committee was formed, consisting of Comrades Markhlevski, Felix Kohn and Felix Dzierzynski. It seemed as if Poland of the squires was on its last legs.

If the White Polish government had been completely defeated, power in Poland would have passed to the workers and peasants. The wave of revolution would have risen even higher in Western Europe. All this would have meant a tremendous blow to the whole system of international capitalism.

But at the moment when the Red Army units were already at the gates of Warsaw, the Polish troops broke through the Soviet front and the Red Army was compelled to retreat. The causes for the failure at Warsaw were primarily of a purely military and strategic character. Due to the fault of Soviet general headquarters, primarily of Trotsky, the president of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, the attacks of the Red Army developed without a corresponding consolidation of the positions won. The troops on the western front advanced without taking advantage of opportunities to entrench themselves at some natural borderline, to regroup their forces and bring up reserves. Some units fought their way too far in advance of the main body of troops. On the various sectors the rear was unable to communicate with its front. The fighting units in the front line positions began to feel a shortage of food, ammunition and reinforcements. And all this occurred at the moment when the Entente imperialists were straining every effort to help White Poland repel the offensive of the Red Army. It is therefore not surprising if in the long run the Soviet troops near Warsaw were compelled to retreat.

In characterizing the causes of the setback to the Red troops at Warsaw, Comrade Stalin subsequently wrote:

"An advance *without consolidating* the positions already captured is an advance doomed to failure. When can an advance be successful, in the military sphere, let us say? When the advancing force does not confine itself simply to moving forward headlong but tries at the same to *consolidate* the positions captured, to re-

group its forces in accordance with the changed circumstances, to *strengthen* the rear and to *bring* up reserves. Why is all that necessary? As a protection against surprises, in order to close up possible breaches in the line of attack, which may happen in every advance, and thus to prepare for the complete liquidation of the enemy. The mistake that the Polish armies made in 1920, if we take only the military side of the matter, was that they ignored this rule. That, among other reasons is why, having advanced headlong to Kiev, they were obliged to retreat in a no less headlong manner to Warsaw. The mistake the Soviet forces made in 1920, again if we take only the military side of the question, was that, in their advance on Warsaw, they repeated the error committed by the Poles." *

Several political mistakes committed by the Communist Party of Poland and the Polish Revolutionary Committee also contributed to the adverse issue of the Polish campaign. In the districts freed of White Poles only a very small fraction of the estates taken away from the landlords was given to the peasants, most of them being constituted into state farms. Such a policy, of course, could not strengthen the sympathy felt by the Polish peasants for the Soviets. Furthermore the Polish Party so greatly underestimated the importance of the Leninist slogan of the right of nations to self-determination that it facilitated the task of the White Poles to imbue the Polish toilers with the thought that the Red Army was fighting to destroy the independence of the Polish state and to annex Poland to Russia.

However, the Red Army soon rallied and regained its power to repulse the Polish troops. The Poles became reluctant to continue the war and signed a peace despite the exhortations of the Entente to the contrary. Thus, the plot of the Entente to smother Soviet Russia with the aid of White Poland ended in miserable failure.

While the Polish campaign was being fought, another danger represented by the army of General Wrangel menaced Soviet Russia. With the aid of France Wrangel had organized a strong force in the Crimea consisting of the remnants of Denikin's armies. In July 1920 he launched an offensive against the Red troops, thereby offering the greatest support to the White Poles. He succeeded in taking part of Southern Ukraine and threatened

* Stalin, "Reply to Comrades on Collective Farms," *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 235.

the Donetz Basin and Ekaterinoslav. However, after an armistice had been signed with Poland, the Soviet supreme command was able to transfer considerable reinforcements to the Wrangel front. With Frunze in general command the Red troops assumed the offensive in the direction of the Crimea and inflicted a decisive defeat upon Wrangel. In November the Red Army in a heroic attack took the strongly fortified positions at Perekop and Chongar by storm and forced its way into the Crimea. Wrangel and the remnants of his troops were compelled to flee abroad in haste. With the defeat of Wrangel, the Civil War in the main came to an end. Only vestiges of counter-revolution and intervention in the Far East, Transcaucasia and elsewhere remained to be destroyed.

*The International Revolutionary Movement and the
Second Congress of the Comintern*

The Second Congress of the Communist International convened at a time when the Soviet-Polish war was at its height (July 19 to August 6, 1920). More than a year had elapsed since the first Congress. During this period the world revolutionary movement had attained a level surpassing all precedent. In March 1919 a Soviet republic had been established in Hungary and in April a Soviet government had been set up in Bavaria. After they had existed for some time, the Hungarian and Bavarian Soviet republics fell under the hammer blows of intervention and counter-revolution, but their struggle left an indelible mark upon the labour movement. This struggle continued to develop despite the ensuing White terror and persecutions of the bourgeois governments.

In March 1920 the German workers declared a general strike. In several districts of Germany Red Army detachments were formed. Asia followed Europe. In 1919 an uprising of the toiling Koreans against Japanese imperialism occurred. In 1920 the bourgeois national revolution in Turkey broke out. The reserves of the proletarian revolution—the million-headed peoples of the colonial countries—had entered the struggle against imperialism.

The world revolutionary movement gravitated toward Soviet

Russia as its vanguard. The proletariat of the West replied with strikes and demonstrations and other forms of protest against the attempts of the imperialists to smash the Land of the Soviets. In Germany, Czechoslovakia, Norway and Denmark the workers refused to load arms and ammunitions for the White Poles and the Russian counter-revolutionaries. In England committees of action were formed to struggle against the intervention. All this aid given by the international proletariat was of the greatest importance to Soviet Russia; without it the Soviet government would not have been able to maintain itself. Soviet Russia was victorious because, as Lenin said: "the toilers of the Entente countries proved to be nearer to us than to their own governments." Soviet Russia's enemies, infinitely more powerful than it, suffered defeat because

"... there was not, could not, and never can be unity among them, and because each month of struggle with us meant disintegration within their camp."*

However the West European workers were not yet powerful enough nor adequately organized to be able completely to prevent Russian counter-revolution from receiving imperialist support. All the same they were in a position to frustrate the Entente's attempts, to make extensive use of its own troops against Soviet Russia.

Under the conditions of a steadily maturing crisis of capitalism and the general accentuation of the class struggle, the influence of the Communist International increased. The Third International became transformed into a menacing force with which both the bourgeois governments as well as the Social-Democratic parties of the Second International were compelled to reckon. A number of Social-Democratic parties announced their withdrawal from the Second International and their desire to join the Third International. A differentiation occurred also within the anarcho-syndicalist movement, the best elements of which streamed into the Comintern. All this attested the powerful force and influence of the communist movement.

But the rapid growth of the Communist Parties harboured

* Lenin, "Speech at the First All-Russian Congress of Toiling Cossacks, Mar. 1, 1920," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXV.

also several danger points. Those who had come from the Social-Democratic Party and anarcho-syndicalist organizations brought survivals of their former views with them into the Communist Parties. In England, Germany and a number of other countries "Left Communist" groups made their appearance which refused to participate in parliament or trade-union work and deviated in the direction of anarchism. In other instances Right errors could be observed, such as a dislike to break finally with the old social-democratic views. Many of the leaders of the old Social-Democratic parties announced that they were in sympathy with the Comintern but their professions were far from sincere; they were merely a means to forestall a loss of their influence over the masses.

The task of the Second Congress consisted in mapping out the tactics and strategy of the communist struggle, in exposing the opportunist deviations in the Comintern sections and in preventing a dilution of the membership of the Communist Parties by the entry of these opportunist elements.

The Congress worked out and subsequently approved twenty-one *conditions of admission* into the Comintern. These conditions raised an effective barrier against the entry of opportunists and Centrists. *Only organizations which had expelled opportunists and Centrists were admitted to the Comintern.*

The Congress also adopted a resolution on the role of the Communist Parties in the revolution and on the correct attitude toward the parliamentary struggle and the trade union movement. After exposing opportunism of the Right as well as the "Left" sectarian persuasion, the Congress outlined the most important principles of organization and tactics for the Communist International, making extensive use of the rich experience acquired in the struggle of the Bolshevik Party.

The adoption by the Congress of the theses on the agrarian and the national and colonial questions was of very great importance. These theses which were drafted by Lenin map out a clear and precise line along which the international proletariat must struggle to win the leadership in the peasant and the national and colonial movement during the socialist revolution.

Results, Experience and International Importance of the Struggle of Bolshevism in the Period of Civil War

The three years of war, intervention and blockade inflicted tremendous losses on Soviet Russia. A great many factories, mines and mills were laid waste. Large-scale industry had reduced its output to one-fourth, while the smelting of pig-iron had fallen to 2.4 per cent and ore mining to 1.7 per cent of pre-war production. During the Civil War the area sown to grain had been cut 28 per cent and that of industrial crops 56 per cent as compared with 1916. The amount of grain harvested dropped 30 per cent while the yield declined 70 per cent compared with pre-war standards.

This destruction of material values was accompanied by huge human sacrifices: hundreds and thousands of toilers had fallen in battle or died of epidemic diseases.

The struggle of international imperialism against the Soviet Republic had made it necessary for the latter to begin socialist construction after a civil war, under incredibly difficult conditions.

But the international and Russian bourgeoisie did not gain their principal objective—the destruction of the power of the working class. By straining its forces to the utmost the Party and the working class defeated all counter-revolutionary armies, inflicted defeat upon the international bourgeoisie and successfully defended the dictatorship of the proletariat against attack. At the same time the Party safeguarded all the other gains of the October Revolution against the onslaught of the imperialists: the nationalization of the land and the banks, of industry and communication and the monopoly of foreign trade. Thus the Party and the Soviet government succeeded in preserving the foundation necessary for the development of socialist construction.

As a result of the heroic victories of the Red Army over the counter-revolution and intervention, the international position of the Soviet Republic underwent a change. Open armed combat between imperialism and Soviet Russia ceased. For Soviet Russia this meant the inauguration of a period when the country could take a respite. Though this respite was only tem-

porary, exceedingly unstable and uncertain, still it afforded an opportunity of focusing attention primarily on questions concerning the restoration of economy.

After the end of the war the bourgeois governments entered into negotiations with Soviet Russia for the purpose of renewing economic relations. Having suffered defeat on the military fronts, they now calculated upon getting the best of Russia by measures of economic pressure. The Soviet Republic, encircled as it was by capitalist states, could not refuse to have relations with the capitalist world. But it was the task of the Soviet government to make use of the economic relations with the bourgeois countries to further consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and weaken international imperialism.

When it entered the Civil War, Soviet Russia was much weaker in a military sense than its powerful opponents, the bourgeois countries. Economically it was a backward country, ravaged by imperialist war. However, despite all this the proletariat of Russia emerged victorious from the Civil War. This victory must be ascribed to the correct policy carried out by the Communist Party.

The Party was victorious in the first place because it unswervingly fought for the *dictatorship of the proletariat*, while systematically exposing before the masses the deceitful slogans of universal suffrage, the Constituent Assembly, popular rule and the like. The Party roused the entire working class to engage in a heroic struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat and organized the Red Army despite all the difficulties and complexities of this tremendous historical task.

Throughout the entire Civil War the Party successfully led the struggle for the realization of the alliance between the workers and the toiling peasants. With the aid of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, the bourgeoisie and the landlords directed all their efforts towards severing the peasants from the workers, towards destroying the alliance between the workers and the peasants. They calculated that by doing so they would be able to smash the Soviet government. These class enemies tried to induce the masses of the peasantry to come over to their side, to take the ground from under the feet of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But no matter how hard the oppo-

nents of the Soviet government tried to curry favour with the peasantry, they did not succeed in winning their support. For wherever the Whites appeared there were acts of violence, floggings, the return of the landlords, etc. Thus the peasants became convinced by their own experience that only the dictatorship of the proletariat would bring freedom to the toiling masses. Placed before the alternative of a White or a Soviet government, they would invariably choose the latter.

At the same time the Party adopted an absolutely correct line on the national question. It granted each nation the right of self-determination including secession, established a voluntary military and economic alliance between the liberated nations and Central Russia and systematically rendered cultural and economic aid to the backward nationalities. It aided the toilers of the oppressed nationalities to free themselves from the yoke of the capitalists and the landlords. It gained the confidence of the national border districts in the Soviet government. By its correct formulation and decision of the national question, the Party dealt a crushing blow to the international bourgeoisie.

The international character of bolshevism's struggle assured Soviet Russia the support of the entire international proletariat. While in the camp of the world bourgeoisie friction increased and strife grew rife, the world revolutionary movement rallied ever more closely to the cause of Soviet Russia. The support extended by the international proletariat was a most important factor on which the victory of the Russian proletariat in the struggle against counter-revolution and intervention depended.

Finally, all the activities of the Party during the Civil War were based on an irreconcilable struggle against opportunism in Russia as well as on the international arena. All this taken together ensured the defeat of the counter-revolution.

The experience of the Civil War of 1918-21 is of tremendous international value. It showed the methods that must be used in waging the class war of the proletariat against imperialism and established the conditions under which the proletariat can be victorious in a civil war.

CHAPTER XII

THE PARTY DURING THE TRANSITION TO THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE RESTORATION PERIOD

State of the Country and Tasks of the Party on the Eve of the Transition to the New Economic Policy

As soon as the Civil War was over the Party focused attention upon the struggle for economic construction. Lenin said that large-scale industry capable of reorganizing not only industry itself but also agriculture was the only possible material basis of socialism. The Party looked upon the creation of large-scale industry and of developed technique as its most important problem, upon the successful solution of which the reconstruction of society on socialist principles depended.

In the struggle for large-scale industry and highly developed technique, the plan for the electrification of the country adopted by the Eighth Congress of Soviets (December 1920) was of paramount importance. This plan had been drawn up at Lenin's suggestion by the State Commission for the Electrification of Soviet Russia (*Goelro*). It envisaged the construction within ten years of an entire network of huge electric power stations—those of Volkhovstroy, Shterovka, Shatura and others. Electrification was to supply the foundation for the large-scale machine technique of the country's entire national economy. Lenin called the plan of electrification a second program of the Party.

"Our Party program," said Lenin, "cannot remain a Party program only. It must be made the program of our economic construction, otherwise it is not fit to be the Party program either. It must be supplemented by a second Party program, by a plan of work to reconstruct all national economy and to equip it with modern technique. Without an electrification plan we cannot proceed to real construction. . . . Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country." *

* Lenin, "The Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXVI.

Comrade Stalin at that time gave a profound and correct appraisal of the paramount importance of the plan of electrification for the cause of socialist reconstruction of the country. He was extremely energetic in his advocacy of the electrification plan which in his opinion was a masterful sketch of a "really unified and really nation-wide plan."*

The Congress also adopted a number of decisions on agricultural questions. It was decided to form special sowing committees whose duty it should be to see that the sowing plan was fulfilled. In order to induce the peasants to extend the sown area and improve their husbandry, it was decided to offer prizes to be awarded to entire organizations as well as to individual industrious peasants.

The confirmation by the Congress of the decree concerning concessions issued on November 25, 1920 by the Council of People's Commissars was of great importance. This decree permitted the leasing to foreign capitalists of individual enterprises on condition that a definite portion of the output of these enterprises be relinquished to the Soviet state.

The war had a most ravaging effect on the entire national economy of the country. Delivering all their surplus to the state and failing to receive an adequate quantity of manufactured goods in exchange, the peasants gradually cut down the areas sown by them. A severe shortage of fuel, raw materials and foodstuffs for the workers made itself felt. A discrepancy arose between socialist industry and peasant husbandry. The creation of a heavy industry and the electrification of the country encountered tremendous difficulties.

These economic difficulties were accompanied by political difficulties. The discontent of the peasants with the requisitions was not infrequently made use of by the kulaks and various other counter-revolutionary elements. In a number of districts banditism sprang up on a large scale and kulak uprisings occurred. At times the kulaks even succeeded in swinging some of the middle peasants to their side. Kulak uprisings assumed particularly great proportions in Siberia, the Ukraine, the Volga district and on the Don. In Tambov province a large uprising

* See Comrade Stalin's letter to Lenin in the symposium, *Stalin*.

broke out, headed by Antonov. In the situation which arose the question of strengthening the bond between the working class and the peasantry acquired exceptional importance. It was impossible to build socialism successfully without strengthening the economic ties between workers and peasants. In order to consolidate this bond and bring political tranquillity to the village, it was necessary to revise the economic policy maintained during the period of Civil War.

*Discussion on the Question of the Role and Importance
of the Trade Unions*

The great straits in which the country found itself were necessarily reflected in the working class. The proletariat had been considerably scattered during the war: many workers had gone to the front or back to the farm, or had begun to serve in the Soviet apparatus. The productivity of labour and labour discipline fell sharply. The broad non-Party organizations of the working class (trade unions, etc.), which had sent their best workers to the military fronts, had been considerably weakened. The weakness in the work of the trade unions handicapped the drawing of the masses into socialist construction.

The war also had an adverse effect on several links of the Party itself. Under war conditions it was impossible for the Party to develop internal democracy and educational work within the Party. The Party was unable to re-educate and render fully class-conscious some of the new members taken in during the war. In a number of organizations distinct manifestations of bureaucracy and a tendency to become detached from the masses could be observed. Such was the situation in the autumn of 1920 when the internal Party discussion began.

Various opportunist elements, chief among which at that time were the adherents to the group of Democratic Centralism, tried to take advantage of the prevailing economic and political difficulties. These Democratic Centralists came out during the discussion with the demand that no post be filled by appointment, that factions and groupings be allowed to exist in the Party, etc. Herein they saw the road to "recovery" for the Party and the elimination of the shortcomings in its work.

The Party discussion culminated at the Ninth Conference of the Party (September 1920). Lutovinov, Yurenev and others took the floor in support of the views of the opposition. But the Conference severely denounced the representatives of the opposition and passed a special resolution appealing to the Party to further consolidate its ranks and remove the defects in Party work. This resolution contained instructions to develop internal Party democracy and Party educational work, to intensify the struggle against bureaucracy and to take stricter action in cases where there had been any detachment from the masses.

The Conference decided to create control commissions to aid the Party in its fight against bureaucracy and personal degeneracy. Subsequently, the rights and duties of these commissions were considerably enlarged.

By reason of the transition to peaceful, socialist construction which had been inaugurated the question of the trade unions acquired particular importance. Immense tasks were imposed upon the trade unions in the field of training the masses and drawing them into socialist construction. Under the leadership of the Party, the trade unions had to rouse and inspire the masses for the heroic struggle to overcome the economic difficulties, to raise the productivity of labour, strengthen labour discipline, etc. The Party was able to attract the broad strata of workers to socialist construction only because it could rely upon the trade unions to act as transmission belts between the Party and the working class. But the trade unions had to be strengthened, to be linked more closely to the masses, for only then would they be able to cope effectively with their new tasks during this new stage.

The Party considered that the weakness in the work of the trade unions was to be explained by the general difficult situation of the country. For the purpose of strengthening the trade unions, of making them capable of fighting successfully to draw the broad strata of the toilers into the building of socialism, it was necessary to intensify educational work and to bring the unions in closer contact with the broad masses. To this end the old methods of war communism had to be replaced by the new methods of workers' democracy, elections, general meetings, accountability of elective bodies to their constituents, etc., which

had to be widely developed. This was the angle from which the question was put by the Party at the Fifth All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions (November 1920).

But this line on the question of the trade unions was opposed at the Conference by Trotsky, whose views were later on expounded in a special platform. Trotsky declared that the trade unions were undergoing a *special* crisis, disconnected from the general difficult situation of the country. The trade unions, said Trotsky, ought not to occupy themselves with the protection of the cultural, material and social interests of the toilers, ought not to pay any attention to educating the broad masses inasmuch as the workers' state must now, after the transition of power to the proletariat, attend to all this. The only thing the trade unions must do is participate in the economic construction of the country and this participation must be expressed in the form of the direct *management* of economy. Trotsky's pivotal slogan in this discussion was "*nationalization of the trade unions*," i.e., transforming them into organs of the state, by which he proposed to force a coalescence of the trade unions and the state, a conversion of the trade unions into simple appendages of the administrative apparatus.

Trotsky denied the necessity of developing workers' democracy in the trade unions. He proposed that the methods of compulsion be still more intensified in the trade union work, thus completely retaining the methods applied under war communism. Trotsky considered it necessary to "shake up" the old leaders of the trade union movement. In the Central Committee of the Railway and Water Transport Workers' Union where Trotskyists were in control a split almost occurred on account of the Trotskyist policy of "shaking up" the apparatus and of suppressing criticism. This is especially noteworthy in connection with the fact that the Trotskyists always concealed their attacks against the Party behind such demagogic slogans as fighting for the broadest possible democracy, a democracy that knew no bounds.

The Party, headed by Lenin, launched a most determined and relentless struggle against Trotsky and his adherents.

Lenin pointed out that the trade unions cannot be transformed into sections of the administrative apparatus inasmuch

as they occupy a special place in the system of the proletarian dictatorship. The role of the trade union is that of a transmission belt running from the Party to the proletariat. In denying this role of the trade unions, Trotsky destroyed one of the strongest pillars of the proletarian dictatorship. Lenin said that it was a paramount task of the trade unions to educate and teach. The trade union

"... is an educational organization, an organization that draws in, that trains; it is a school, a school of administration, a school of economic management, a school of communism." *

Lenin pointed out that it was also impossible to gainsay the need of the trade union to protect the cultural, material and social interests of the workers. Although we have a workers' state, said Lenin, we still have quite a few bureaucratic distortions, against which a struggle must be waged to improve the condition of the broad masses and to perfect the proletarian state itself.

Lenin pointed out that no *special* crisis of the trade unions existed. The crisis in the trade unions was merely a reflection of the general difficult situation in the country. For the purpose of determining the direction along which the work of the trade unions must be reconstructed, the changes and class shiftings going on in the country must be borne in mind.

Lenin said:

"In analysing the current political situation we might say that we are going through a transition period in a transition period. The whole of the dictatorship of the proletariat is a transition period, but now we have a whole pile, so to speak, of new transition periods. The demobilization of the army, the end of the war, the possibility of a much more protracted peaceful respite than before, of a more stable transition from the war front to the labour front. This alone, this factor alone, already changes the relation of the class of the proletariat to the class of the peasantry. How does it change? This must be carefully examined. . . . The people have become overfatigued; many supplies which should have been used in various urgent lines of production have already been consumed, the relation of the proletariat to the peasantry is changing." **

* Lenin, "The Trade Unions," *Selected Works*, Vol. IX.

** *Ibid.*

Any mechanical transfer of the methods of war communism to the new conditions and particularly the implantation of the Trotskyist policy of "shake up," declared Lenin, could only lead to a split between the Party and the trade unions and a detachment of the trade unions from the masses. New forms of inter-relation between the proletariat and the peasantry were taking shape; these required new methods of economic work and, in accordance with these, new methods of trade union work must be mapped out. This new feature was to find expression primarily in the broad development of trade union democracy and in the intensification of the educational work of the trade unions.

Comrade Bukharin, who paraded his so-called "buffer" platform, also occupied an anti-Party position. His was called a buffer platform because its author had announced that its function was "to conciliate" the Party and Trotskyism. The main plank in Bukharin's platform was the thesis that the trade unions must constitute both a school of communism and a section of the administrative apparatus. Bukharin thus borrowed one-half of his thesis from Lenin and the other half from Trotsky.

Lenin fully and consistently exposed the "conciliatory" position of Bukharin. He caustically ridiculed Bukharin for his eclecticism (*i.e.*, his undialectical, mechanical confusion of heterogeneous views) and proved that Bukharin's "conciliationism" in essence screened the actual defence of Trotskyism, the smuggling in of Trotskyism in disguised form. Lenin's characterization of Bukharin's position proved to be absolutely correct as became apparent in the course of the internal Party struggle. Toward the end of the discussion Bukharin, disbanding his own fraction, openly went over together with his followers to the side of Trotskyism.

Comrade Stalin pointed out that the differences of opinion related to questions of the *manner* of strengthening labour discipline in the working class, the *methods* of approach to the working class now being drawn into the cause of resuscitating industry, the *ways* of transforming weak trade unions of the present day into powerful trade unions that would really be production trade unions.

Comrade Stalin wrote:

"Two methods exist: the method of *compulsion* (the military method) and the method of *persuasion* (the trade union method).... Intoxicated with the success of the military methods when applied to the army, one group of Party workers headed by Trotsky assumes that it is possible and necessary to transplant these methods to a working class environment, to the trade unions. . . . Trotsky's mistake consists in the fact that he underestimates the difference between the army and the working class, that he places military organizations and trade unions in one and the same category, that he is trying, probably by force of inertia, to carry the military methods from the army into the trade unions, into the working class. . . ."

The Party also exposed other groupings which voiced oppositional views in the trade union discussion. In January 1921, the platform of the Workers' Opposition was published. Its authors were Shlyapnikov, A. Kollontai, Medvedyev and others. The Workers' Opposition declared that the Party and the Soviet government were on the road to degeneration. It claimed that the trade unions were the only organizations that had retained their proletarian essence. In accordance with its views it advanced the demand to transfer the entire management of the national economy to the trade unions. The Workers' Opposition proposed to set up a Congress of Producers, i.e., a congress of the representatives of all branches of the country's economy, to function as a supreme organ of industrial management. This in substance meant that the economic organs were to be supplanted by trade union organs. While Trotsky launched the slogan of nationalizing the trade unions, the Workers' Opposition proclaimed the "trade-unionizing of the state." In questions of internal Party construction the Workers' Opposition was an advocate of unlimited freedom for factional groupings.

The platform of the Workers' Opposition reflected more strikingly than anything else the elemental pressure of the petty bourgeoisie upon the working class, the discontent of the petty-bourgeois elements with the strict regime of the proletarian dictatorship. Lenin characterized the platform of the Workers' Opposition as a direct digression from Marxism towards anarcho-sindicalism—a petty-bourgeois current which rejects the

* Stalin, "Our Differences of Opinion," *On the Opposition*.

Party, the dictatorship of the proletariat and recognizes the trade unions as the highest and in fact the only organizational form of the revolutionary proletariat.

The Democratic Centralism group, headed by Ossinsky, Sapronov, Maximovsky and others, also came out with a platform of its own. This platform was distinguished for its exceptional lack of principle. In its endeavour to gain influence among the masses, the Democratic-Centralism group did not hesitate to employ demagoguery and resort to slander against the Party. Lenin pointed out that the platform of this group harboured elements of the worst menshevik and socialist-revolutionary principles. On account of its demagogic methods and lack of principle, Lenin called the Democratic Centralism group a faction "outshouting all shouters."

The discussion showed that the differences of opinion within the Party went substantially further than the question of the role and importance of the trade unions. These differences also broached the question of the proletarian state, the role of the Party and the special characteristics of the current period. These differences in point of view also became apparent in the respective approaches to the solution of the principal tasks of economic construction. A dispute developed over the question of whether Soviet economy should be built in alliance with the peasants, or whether the peasantry should be discarded and the methods of war communism be given full rein, as Trotsky proposed.

Beginning with December 1920, the Party discussion assumed unusually vast proportions. There was hardly a single Party organization that did not participate in it. With the elemental forces of the petty bourgeoisie maturing and strengthening, such a situation presented a very serious danger. It was therefore one of the main tasks of the Party to consolidate the unity which had been shaken and to efface completely all factions and groupings. Lenin placed this task before all Party members, noting with particular emphasis that the Party was ailing, that it was shaken with fever and that the discussion was a profound error.

Under Lenin's leadership the Party gradually gained one position after another from the anti-Party currents. In January

1921, the Fourteenth Petrograd Party Conference took place. The vast majority of those present endorsed Lenin's platform. The Leninist platform also received the vast majority of votes cast by the Party organizations in Siberia, the Ukraine, North Caucasus, White Russia, etc. In February 1921, the Party Conference of Moscow province also gave the Leninist line its full support. At the Tenth Party Congress called in March 1921, the anti-Party currents suffered final defeat.

*Tenth Congress of the Party, Replacement of
Food Quotas by a Tax*

At the beginning of 1921 the economic difficulties reached unprecedented proportions. The irregular delivery of raw materials, fuel and foodstuffs made it necessary to stop production at quite a number of enterprises. At the end of February of that year a mutiny broke out at Kronstadt in which all the difficulties experienced by the country were reflected with striking clarity.

Most of the Kronstadt sailors had long ceased to be that revolutionary vanguard which the Kronstadt sailors of 1917 had been. The best and most militant elements of these sailors had gone to the front. The bulk of the new sailors had very close ties among the peasantry. Politically still quite raw, they were receptive material for the diverse counter-revolutionary agitation which various whiteguard elements had been conducting for a long time in their midst.

Under the influence of this whiteguard agitation the Kronstadt sailors in March 1921 adopted a resolution in which they demanded new elections to the soviets by secret ballot, freedom for the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties, abolition of the cordon detachments* and the revocation of the decree nationalizing the land. Having arrested the majority of their commissars and the local representatives of the Soviet government, they called upon all workers, peasants and Red Army men to follow their example. The insurgents were in possession of a first-class fortress, a great number of warships, tremendous stores of arms and ammunition, etc. The representatives of the

* Militarized posts stationed at railways, highways, etc., to suppress the illicit traffic in foodstuffs.—Ed. Eng. ed.

Russian counter-revolution abroad immediately scented their opportunity and began to make preparations in aid of the Kronstadt mutineers. The mutiny threatened to become the organizational centre of the entire counter-revolution.

The Party and the Soviet government were confronted with the task of quelling the mutiny in the shortest possible period of time. Units consisting of students at the Military Academy and of Red Army men were despatched to crush the mutineers.

Even during the trade union discussion, Lenin had pointed out the need of adopting new forms of inter-relation with the peasantry. At the beginning of February 1921, at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party, he made a practical issue of the question of substituting a tax in kind for the food quotas. The special theses drawn up by Lenin mentioned the necessity "of satisfying the desire of the non-Party peasants that a grain tax be substituted for the food quotas" and it was deemed necessary "to extend the right of the land tiller to make use of his surplus in excess of the tax by letting him place this surplus on the local commodity market." The Kronstadt mutiny showed that the question of substituting a tax for the food quotas had become extremely urgent.

The question of substituting a tax for the food quotas was raised at the Tenth Party Congress which opened on March 8, 1921. The work of the Congress proceeded in the midst of a very grave situation. In many places kulak uprisings were still going on, the economic difficulties had not yet ceased and the Kronstadt mutiny had not yet been subdued. A considerable number of the delegates to the Congress headed by Comrade Voroshilov quit the sessions of the Congress for the purpose of aiding in suppressing the mutiny. But it was not until somewhat later when the Congress had already finished its work that the revolt was finally stamped out.

The Congress, in accordance with Lenin's report, decided to abolish the food quotas and introduce a tax in kind. The tax rates were set at a considerably lower level than the food quotas had been. After delivering the tax in kind the peasants were allowed freely to dispose of their surplus on the local markets.

Lenin substantiated the necessity of such a decision in the following manner:

"In order to ensure the uninterrupted restoration of large-scale industry, the food supply must be so arranged that a store of say four hundred million poods be guaranteed and correctly distributed. We would have been absolutely unable to collect such a fund through the old system of food quotas; 1920 and 1921 showed this. Today we see that this task which presents immense difficulties can nevertheless be fulfilled by means of the tax in kind. With the old methods we shall not fulfil this task and ought to seek out new methods. But we can solve this problem by means of the tax in kind and correct relations with the peasantry as small producers. We have hitherto paid considerable attention to demonstrating this theoretically." *

This decision of the Congress was of great historic importance. It meant the discontinuance of war communism and the transition to a new economic policy. By adopting the decision to permit the peasants to dispose freely of their surplus the Congress did not intend to grant freedom of trade. The supposition was that after the peasants had delivered their tax to the state, they would exchange part of their surplus for commodities produced by large-scale socialist industry and would expend another part in exchange for handicraft and artisan manufactures. For the purpose of organizing the exchange of commodities between state industry and the peasantry, a special fund for the exchange of commodities was provided for. However, as experience subsequently showed, it was impossible to stop at the exchange of commodities, whereupon it was decided to go further and adopt the method of purchase and sale on a nationwide scale. Thus, freedom of trade was restored within certain narrow limits.

The possibility of freely disposing of their surplus gave the peasants an incentive to enlarge the sown area and thus ensured the development of agriculture. On the basis of this advance in agriculture, industry was likewise enabled to develop. The introduction of the New Economic Policy promoted the restoration of exchange between town and country and strengthened the bond between industry and peasant husbandry.

The permission to trade was bound to be attended by a certain revival of the capitalist elements—the nepmen, the kulaks, etc. That some danger should lurk in this revival was inevitable.

* Lenin, "The All-Russian Conference of the Russian Communist Party, May 1921," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXVI.

A stubborn, desperate struggle between the capitalist and the socialist elements was bound to unfold. In pointing to this circumstance Lenin said that the question of "who will defeat whom" had now been put but that this did not mean that the Soviet government must combat the capitalist elements by simple prohibitions. Full power remained in the hands of the proletariat. While permitting freedom of trade the proletariat retained its control over all the key positions of national economy—the nationalized industry, banks, land, etc. This gave the proletariat the certainty that it would be able to subject capitalism to its control, to guide it into the channel of state capitalism (leases, concessions) and ultimately to get the best of it.

"The New Economic Policy is a special policy of the proletarian state based on the existence of capitalism, while the key positions are in the hands of the proletarian state; based on the struggle between the capitalist and socialist elements; based on the growth of the socialist elements to the detriment of the capitalist elements; based on the victory of the socialist elements over the capitalist elements; based on the abolition of classes and the laying of the foundations of socialist economy." *

By introducing the N.E.P. the Party tightened the bond with the peasantry and obtained the opportunity of successfully building socialism.

Lenin called the N.E.P. the only correct economic policy of the proletariat in the transition period from capitalism to communism. In saying this Lenin had in mind not only Soviet Russia, but all other countries. Wherever a proletarian revolution will take place, wherever the building of socialism in alliance with the toiling peasantry will commence, the proletariat will have to carry out measures inherent in the N.E.P. The program of the Comintern also points out this fact. The N.E.P. as the only correct economic policy of the proletariat in the transition period from capitalism to communism possesses tremendous international significance.

For the purpose of securing the unity and coherence of the Party, the Tenth Congress at Lenin's motion adopted a special resolution forbidding every kind of faction or grouping. The Congress authorized the Central Committee to take stringent

* Stalin, *On the Opposition*.

measures against anyone violating Party discipline, even to the extent of expelling such persons from the Party. A special clause was inserted to expel without hesitation even members of the Central Committee if they infringed Leninist Party unity. This was a direct warning to Shlyapnikov and Trotsky who while members of the Central Committee proved to be the worst dis-organizers during the trade union discussion. The Congress enlarged the rights and duties of the Control Commissions and also elected a Central Control Commission.

After deliberating upon the question of the anarcho-syndicalist deviation, the Congress in a special resolution set forth that propagandizing the anarcho-syndicalist views of the Workers' Opposition was incompatible with Party membership. All these decisions, which were adopted by Lenin, were of great importance. The straits in which ruined Soviet industry found itself, the discontent encountered in the rural districts, the partial revival of capitalism attendant upon the adoption of the N.E.P., the difficulties arising out of the demobilization of the army and out of socialist construction all demanded the greatest cohesion and discipline in the Party. In the struggle for this cohesion and discipline the decisions of the Tenth Congress played a major part.

The Congress devoted much attention also to the questions of Party construction. The forms and methods of work are defined by the peculiar features of the given concrete historical situation and the tasks which directly arise from this situation. During the years of war communism the requirements of military operations constituted the principal and most urgent task. Accordingly, extreme organizational centralism and somewhat curtailed internal Party democracy were in order at that time. The method of doing Party work tended to assume the form of military orders. The Congress laid it down as the central task of the new stage that the theoretical level of the Party members be raised, that they be drawn into active participation in the general life of the Party and that the contacts between the Party and the broad masses be strengthened. In order to fulfil these tasks the Congress deemed it necessary to give wide range to the forms and methods of internal Party democracy.

The national question was one of the great issues at the Congress. In his report on this question Comrade Stalin noted the

economic, political and cultural backwardness of the national borderlands in comparison with the advanced districts of Soviet Russia. This backwardness was the result of the policy of tsarism to smother the non-Russian nationalities and maintain the borderlands in the status of colonies—purveyors of raw materials for the industrial centres.

In consequence, the vast majority of the national districts did not have any proletariat of their own and industry in these districts was still at an exceedingly low level of development. For the purpose of attaining complete and actual equality of nations in Soviet Russia, it was necessary completely to abolish the backwardness of the formerly oppressed nationalities in point of economy, politics and culture. To this end the Congress deemed it necessary systematically to implant industry in the former colonies and semi-colonies of tsarist Russia so as to enable them to rise to the economic level of the advanced industrial districts. The Congress recognized the need of helping the national borderlands to consolidate and develop schools, courts, administrative institutions, etc., which would function in their respective native languages. It further recognized the need of accelerating the training of skilled cadres of Party and Soviet workers taken from the native population. The Congress called for a resolute and relentless struggle against the opportunist deviations from the Leninist national policy, whether they tended in the direction of Great-Russian chauvinism or local nationalism.

The deviation towards Great-Russian chauvinism was a result of the influence of the Great-Power Russian bourgeoisie. It consisted in the disparaging attitude adopted towards the peculiar cultural, economic and other specific features of the national borderlands, in the reluctance to take these peculiar features into account, in the aspiration to eradicate and stifle everything un-Russian.

Great-Russian chauvinism inculcates distrust in the Soviet government among the formerly oppressed nationalities, impedes their closer solidarity with the proletariat and thereby inflicts a great loss upon the Party and the working class. The Congress held Great-Power chauvinism to be the main danger in the national question.

The deviation toward local nationalism is the result of the influence of the local bourgeoisie, of the bourgeois intelligentsia and of the philistines upon individual strata of the Party. It finds expression in the over-accentuation of the peculiar features of the national districts, in the unwillingness to wage a consistent struggle against the bourgeois elements of one's own nationality. Local nationalism substitutes the "all-national" point of view for the class line. Local nationalism adopts a distrustful attitude towards everything Russian, even if proletarian in character.

The Party was able to fulfil its task only by irreconcilably combating both Great-Russian chauvinism and local nationalism.

Finally, the Congress concluded the discussion on the trade unions, the vast-majority endorsing Lenin's position. Both Trotsky's platform and that of the Workers' Opposition received only a very small number of votes.

Third Congress of the Comintern

At the time when the C.P.S.U. was entering upon the N.E.P. period the international situation was undergoing a profound change. With the support of the Social-Democratic parties, of the open opportunists and the Centrists of the Second International, the West European bourgeoisie crushed a number of major actions of the working class. At the end of 1920 the widespread revolutionary movement of the Italian workers directed towards the seizure of factories and mills was suppressed. In March 1921 the German bourgeoisie choked off the uprising of the German proletariat which had challenged its power in open combat. Gradually the tide of the revolutionary movement began to ebb. This change in the international situation created new problems for the world communist movement, for the solution of which the Third Congress of the Comintern was called in the summer of 1921.

This Congress evaluated the international situation and the state of the communist movement. It noted the advent of a temporary lull in the revolutionary struggle and pointed out the role of Social-Democracy as the mainstay of the bourgeoisie. The Congress placed before the Communist Parties the task of win-

ning the masses away from the parties of the Second International. It was necessary to deprive Social-Democracy of its influence over the working class, to win over the masses to the side of communism and thus deprive the bourgeoisie of its principal support.

Without winning over the masses, said the resolutions of the Congress, it will be impossible to crush the power of capital and win the dictatorship of the proletariat. In order to win the masses away from the Social-Democrats, the Congress instructed the Communist Parties to take a most active part in the conduct of the day-to-day economic struggles of the working class, to secure the leadership in the trade unions and other mass organizations and to force the Social-Democrats out of these organizations. The Congress issued instructions to establish a systematic link between the struggle for the day-to-day economic demands and the training of the workers for the struggle to win the dictatorship of the proletariat. At the same time the treachery and betrayal of the Social-Democrats was to be exposed at every step.

The decisions of the Congress were then developed in detail in the theses of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on the tactics of the united front. The theses pointed out that in order to win the masses away from the Social-Democrats, the Communists must work among all workers, irrespective of party allegiance. The Communists must also approach the social-democratic workers with the proposal to form a united front with the Communists against the bourgeoisie. In simple slogans intelligible to the broadest masses, the Communist Parties must make it plain to the workers that the Social-Democrats do not want to fight for even the most humble demands and that the Communists alone have the interests of the proletariat really at heart.

In the struggle for the united front tactics, the Comintern advanced the slogan of a *workers' government*. This slogan was a summons to all workers irrespective of Party affiliation to rally around the Communists for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Comintern pointed out that one of the main conditions on which the tactic of the united front was to be applied by the

Communist Parties was that the latter retain their freedom of criticism and complete political independence.

After considering the questions arising out of the struggles of the Western proletariat, the Third Congress heard Lenin's report on the transition to the N.E.P. This new tactic of the Bolsheviks was of immense importance not only in the struggle for socialism in Soviet Russia, but also in the struggle for the victory of the international proletariat.

"At the present time we are exercising our main influence on the international revolution by our economic policy," Lenin pointed out in one of his speeches after the transition to the N.E.P. "All eyes are turned on the Soviet Russian republic, all the toilers in all countries of the world, without exception and without any exaggeration. . . . The struggle on this field is now being waged on a world scale. If we solve this problem, then we shall have won on an international scale for certain and finally." *

At the Congress Lenin explained the reasons for adopting the New Economic Policy, explained its essence and pointed out its significance. The Congress wholly and entirely approved these tactics of the Russian Communist Party. It declared that the transition to the N.E.P. furthered the consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship in the Soviet Republic and was in the interests of the entire international labour movement.

The Party on the Road to the Development of the New Economic Policy

After the introduction of the N.E.P. trade and money circulation rapidly developed. The Party instituted a radical reorganization of the methods of economic work and proceeded to carry out quite a number of new economic measures. In order to regulate money circulation and the market, banks, credit institutions, as well as exchanges, were established. Trading associations, co-operative enterprises of various kinds, joint-stock companies, etc., made their appearance. State factories and mills were put on a cost accounting basis and wage payments in kind were discontinued in favour of money payments.

Inasmuch as the transition from war communism to the N.E.P. represented a precipitate turn, not all Party members

* Lenin, "All-Russian Conference of the Russian Communist Party, May 26-28, 1921," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXVI.

were able to understand and fully appreciate at once the significance of the N.E.P. In a number of cases the methods and habits of work which had become ingrained in the period of war communism were overcome with difficulty and with insufficient speed, facts which harboured serious danger. In other instances the allowance of private trade and of capitalist elements was regarded as a restoration of capitalism and of the bourgeoisie in general. The Party fought determinedly for a correct understanding of the N.E.P. and for the consummation of the tasks associated with it. In numerous speeches and articles Lenin profoundly and exhaustively elucidated the essence and significance of the N.E.P. His *The Tax in Kind* played a very conspicuous part during this period.

At its Tenth Conference held in May 1921, the Party pointed out that the N.E.P. is being introduced for a "long period of time extending over a number of years." It thereby stressed the fact that the N.E.P. was not a short-lived, casual phenomenon but was designed to cover a protracted period of struggle. Lenin explained that in a certain sense the admission of capitalist elements under the N.E.P. was a retreat, but a retreat which bore only a temporary character and was directed towards the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This retreat was necessary to strengthen the bond between the proletariat and the peasantry, as otherwise the proletariat would incur the risk of rupture with the bulk of the toiling peasantry. After strengthening this bond, said Lenin, the Party will reorganize its ranks and once more assume the offensive against the capitalist elements. But then it will march shoulder to shoulder with the entire toiling peasantry, for this alone can lead to the victory of socialism. Lenin declared that we retreated in order to get a better start for a still greater leap forward.

"To link up with the mass of the peasantry, the rank-and-file working peasantry, and begin to move forward immeasurably, infinitely more slowly than we ever dreamed, but in such a way that the whole mass will really move forward with us : . . then, in time, this movement will begin to accelerate at a rate we cannot even dream of at present."*

* Lenin, "The Eleventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXVII.

The first year of the N.E.P. was too short a period to permit its results to become apparent. Here and there civil war was still dragging on (for instance, in the Far East). In the autumn of 1921 the Volga district and the forest and steppe belts of the Ukraine were visited by stark famine in consequence of a crop failure. But even the first year of the N.E.P. stopped the further decline in industry and agriculture. Payment of the tax in kind proceeded successfully. In 1921 the autumnal sowing proceeded satisfactorily. Banditry gradually disappeared in the rural districts.

The international position of Soviet Russia also continued to improve. Many of the capitalist governments initiated trade relations with it.

Trade became the basic form of the bond between town and country in the Land of the Soviets. The ability to trade determined the extent and the speed with which this country succeeded in interlinking socialist industry with peasant husbandry. However, the economic enterprises displayed insufficient ability to trade and manage their business. The state trading and the co-operative systems suffered from an absolute lack of flexibility; moreover they had great overhead expenses. The part played by the private capitalists in the field of trade rapidly increased and at this stage of the N.E.P. they still successfully competed with state and co-operative trade. During the half year from January to June 1922, private trading enterprises in the country rose from approximately 285,000 to 450,438 in number. Such a situation was fraught with great dangers for if trade fell into the hands of private traders, a rift would be created between industry and the peasantry and the former would be unable to exert its influence upon the latter. This was the situation when the Eleventh Congress of the Party was called in March 1922.

Eleventh Congress of the Party and End of the Retreat

At the Congress Lenin read his report in which he summarized the year's work and outlined a number of new tasks.

Lenin pointed out that the transition from war communism to the N.E.P., commenced by decision of the Tenth Party Congress, had in the main been accomplished. The old methods of

management had been replaced by new methods which met the demands of the N.E.P. In the domain of industry and trade, in agriculture and in transport the Party had everywhere adopted the N.E.P. What the Party had done in this respect was quite sufficient to secure the bond with peasant husbandry. This prompted Lenin to declare in his report that the retreat had ended.

"A year we retreated," said Lenin. "Now we must state in the name of the Party: Enough! The goal pursued by the retreat has been attained. This period is ending or has ended." *

Now that the transition to the N.E.P. was an accomplished fact, said Lenin, the main point consists in the correct selection of people and the institution of executive control—the checking of the fulfilment of decisions.

"The *crux* of the matter does not lie in the institutions or in the reorganizations, nor yet in the new decrees," he wrote on the eve of the Eleventh Congress, "but in the *people* and in the *super-vision of the fulfilment of decisions*." **

The correct selection of people, said Lenin, will be a prime factor in deciding the question of how successfully and how quickly we will succeed in making progress with socialist construction.

In his report Lenin made every effort to focus the attention of the Party on the question of trade. Even before the Congress he pointed out the importance of trade as a special form of bond between town and country and called upon the Party "to learn how to trade." He said that in the absence of a flourishing large-scale industry, capable of satisfying the peasantry, at once, with products, there was no other solution for the development of a powerful alliance between the workers and peasants than trade and the gradual raising of agriculture and industry to a higher level.

"The proletarian state must become a cautious, industrious, prudent 'master,' a well-rated *wholesale merchant*, otherwise it will be unable to place the economy of this small-peasant country on its feet. Nor is there any other course of transition to communism now, under present conditions, while flanked by a capitalist (still capitalist, for the time being) West." ***

* *Ibid.*

** *Ibid.*

*** Lenin, "The Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXVII.

At the Congress Lenin developed these postulates still further. He pointed out that the state had entered into a fierce competitive struggle with private traders and other capitalists, that a desperate battle was going on between the capitalist elements and the proletarian state to see which of these two sides would be the swifter and more dexterous in gaining control of the market and consolidating the bond with the peasantry; that the peasantry trusted the Soviet government and was ready to give it its full support, but if the Soviet state should prove unable to cope with the economic problems and turn out to be a worse trader than the private capitalists, the peasants would inevitably turn against the Soviet government.

Of the other questions raised at the Congress, that of the work of the trade unions was of great importance. This question was posed in connection with quite a number of essential changes made during the past year's work on the basis of the N.E.P.

The state enterprises adopted a system of cost accounting which meant that these enterprises were in the main put on a commercial basis.

Private business men and traders had made their appearance alongside of state factories and mills. Inasmuch as a certain revival of capitalist elements was in evidence under the N.E.P., the protection of the class interests of the proletariat and its struggle against capitalism became very important tasks of the trade unions.

Emphasizing the tremendous role of the trade unions as schools of communism and transmission belts leading from the Party to the working class, the Congress pointed out that it was necessary for the trade unions at the state enterprises to fight with greater energy against bureaucratic distortions and to protect the material and social needs of the toiling masses. At the same time the Congress underscored the fact that in a workers' state the proletariat was interested in the rapid growth and development of production and the trade unions must therefore render every possible aid in socialist construction to the Soviet and economic organs. In case of conflicts at the state enterprises the trade unions were invested with the powers of mediators. The decision of the Congress that membership in the trade unions

be made voluntary was of great importance in consolidating the latter.

At the Congress the question of the Workers' Opposition was discussed once more. Though this group had been dissolved it nevertheless did not discontinue its factional activities. Under the leadership of Shlyapnikov, Medvedyev and Kollontai secret meetings were being held, factional work was being done and disintegration was being carried into the ranks of the Party. The Workers' Opposition slanderously asserted that owing to the transition to the N.E.P. the Party and the Soviet state had begun to degenerate. The Mensheviks and the Social-Democrats abroad made extensive use of the slander disseminated by this group.

In the beginning of 1922 the Workers' Opposition filed a special statement with the Communist International in which it charged that the Communist Party had ceased to pursue a proletarian policy. The Congress of the Communist International adjudged the statement to be false and exposed the slander of the Workers' Opposition. The Eleventh Party Congress endorsed this decision of the Third Comintern Congress and gave Shlyapnikov, Kollontai and Medvedyev a stern and final warning.

After the Eleventh Congress Comrade Stalin was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. His election was of very great importance for the further consolidation of the Party ranks and the securing of consistent Leninist leadership for the Bolshevik Party.

Party Construction After the Transition to the N.E.P.

During the Civil War the Party greatly increased in number. By the time the Tenth Congress met, its membership had grown to seven hundred and fifty thousand. This was a sign of the Party's strength, of its tremendous influence over the toiling masses. But in the process of rapid growth, various unstable, insufficiently class-conscious elements succeeded in penetrating its ranks. In isolated cases even alien elements sailing under false colours, self-seekers, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who had decked themselves out in new garb had found their way into the Party.

For the purpose of consolidating the Party ranks, a purging of the Party was carried out in the summer of 1921. About two hundred thousand members, constituting approximately one-third of the total membership, were expelled from the Party. The purging had tremendous political significance. It enhanced the Party's coherence and fighting force, at the same time raising the ideological and political level of the individual members. It was thus instrumental in bringing about the fulfilment by the Party of the new tasks under the N.E.P.

During the Civil War the percentage of workers in the Party diminished. Many of the old working-class Communists perished in battle. A considerable number of the newly admitted members had sprung from a petty-bourgeois environment. All this perforce affected the stability and fighting capacity of the individual links of the Party, particularly because of the transition to the N.E.P., when petty-bourgeois spontaneity received a new lease of life. The Party resolved to so adjust its social composition as to ensure the principal, the basic role in its ranks to the industrial workers who constitute the backbone of the Party. For this purpose the Tenth as well as the Eleventh Congress limited the admission of non-worker elements into the Party.

The transition from war communism to the N.E.P. was attended by a change in the methods of Party work. At the Tenth Congress it was decided to develop democracy within the Party and to carry on Party educational work on a wide scale. The rights and duties of the control commissions established by the decision of the September 1920 Conference were enlarged to facilitate the fight for the unity and consolidation of the Party. By order of the Tenth Congress, the control commissions were given jurisdiction over the strengthening of the unity and authority of the Party, the struggle against manifestations of bureaucracy, careerism, degeneracy in mode of living, etc.

By fighting resolutely and systematically against anti-Party deviations, the Party achieved great success in consolidating and strengthening its ranks. The decision of the Eleventh Congress dealt the group of the Workers' Opposition a terrific blow. Later on two more anti-Party groups were liquidated—the Workers' Group and the Workers' Truth Group.

The Workers' Group headed by Myassnikov was a chip of the Workers' Opposition. It was an obviously counter-revolutionary group which put forward the slogan of a free press for all, "from the anarchists to the monarchists." It engaged in the organization of underground nuclei for the purpose of fighting the Party.

The Workers' Truth group was strongly influenced by Bogdanov, a former Otzovist and leader of the Vperyod group who tried to substitute idealism for Marxian philosophy and was expelled from the Party in 1909. As it denied the socialist character of the October Revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, this group was essentially nothing more nor less than a variety of counter-revolutionary menshevism.

Despite the direct prohibition of factional groupings by the Tenth Congress, Trotsky in actual fact did not relinquish his anti-Party positions. He did not believe in the possibility of a close union with the peasantry and held to the view that the Party would not be able to cope with the economic difficulties. But as they were spurned by the majority of the Party, the Trotskyists bided their time waiting for the advent of some major difficulty to give them the opportunity to come out against the Party full flush.

Meanwhile the Party consolidated and welded its own ranks without deviating one step from the Leninist line, and thus marched unswervingly onward with its program of socialist construction.

Lenin's Last Public Utterances

In the spring of 1922 Lenin fell ill. The uninterrupted torrent of strenuous work which constantly taxed his energies to the utmost had undermined his health. But even in this condition Lenin eagerly seized upon lapses in his illness to engage in Party and state work. In the autumn of 1922 he addressed the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, reporting on the results of the five years of Russian revolution and the prospects of the international revolution. In his report Lenin noted the first considerable successes of the N.E.P. Light industry had been rapidly restored and agriculture had risen to a higher plane. But heavy

industry was still in a bad way. However, in summarizing the N.E.P., Lenin was in a position to state that this policy had proved its worth.

In the beginning of 1923 Lenin wrote a number of articles: *Notes from a Diary, Our Revolution, On Co-operation, How We Should Reorganize the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and Better Fewer but Better*. These were Lenin's last works; they outlined the perspectives of the revolutionary struggle and the tasks confronting the Party.

In Europe the revolutionary wave was receding—the world proletarian revolution was tarrying. Soviet Russia was compelled to build socialism alone—in a capitalist encirclement. The question arose: what must be the tactics of the Communist Party under such conditions, what policy must the Soviet Republic pursue in the future? Lenin expressed his firm conviction that the Party would be able to build socialism despite the ebbing of the revolution in Europe. We have everything necessary and in sufficient quantity to build complete socialist society, wrote Lenin.

In dwelling upon the main task of socialist construction—the establishment of a large-scale machine building industry—Lenin gave it as his opinion that it was a task quite feasible if the bond with the peasantry was maintained and a regime of the strictest economy instituted.

"If the working class retains its leadership of the peasantry," wrote Lenin, "we will be able, at the price of extremely great economy in the economic life of our state, to keep all our savings, even the smallest, for the development of our large-scale machine industry. . . .

"Then we will be able to change horses, to put it figuratively; to change from the impoverished peasant, muzhik horse to the horse of large-scale machine industry, electrification, Volkhovstroy, etc." *

In his article *On Co-operation*, Lenin developed his co-operative plan. It sketched the collectivization of peasant husbandry "by means which would be most simple, most easy and most accessible to the peasantry." Lenin pointed out that in connec-

* Lenin, "Better Fewer but Better," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXVII.

tion with the transition to the N.E.P. co-operation was acquiring extraordinary importance. The organization of the peasants in co-operatives created an indissoluble and firm bond between peasant husbandry and socialist industry. The utilization of the co-operative organizations as transmission belts enabled the Party to draw the broad peasant masses into the construction of socialism. Pointing to the tremendous importance of the co-operatives, Lenin directed that they be given the closest attention and be supplied with all requisite means.

Lenin further called particular attention to improving the work of the state apparatus, in some departments of which much bureaucracy and red tape was still to be observed. In order to be able to fight more successfully for the improvement of the state apparatus, Lenin proposed that the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection be fused with the Central Control Commission, which would give the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection still greater authority. This fusion, in addition to strengthening the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection by supplying it with additional facilities, workers, etc., converted it into a very powerful instrument of struggle for the improvement of the state apparatus.

Lenin displayed particular solicitude for the Party, the unity of which was threatened by the factional moves of various opportunist groupings. In order to weld the Party more closely together and avert the danger of a split, Lenin proposed to strengthen the Central Control Commission by inter-linking it still more closely with the Central Committee of the Party.

The reorganized Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and Central Control Commission thus became highly authoritative organs in possession of all the necessary prerequisites to wage a successful struggle for the improvement of the state apparatus and the consolidation of the Leninist unity of the Party.

In the sphere of international relations Lenin considered it necessary to adhere strictly to the policy of peace, while at the same time enhancing the defence capacity of the country. He was firmly convinced that there would be a new upsurge in the international revolution and that socialism would finally be victorious throughout the whole world.

Assuming the Offensive Along the Road of the N.E.P.

Having proclaimed the end of the retreat at its Eleventh Congress, the Party reorganized its ranks and gradually began to assume the offensive against the capitalist elements. Industry and agriculture grew at a tremendous pace.

Wages rose and the standard of living of the workers and the toiling masses in general improved. The efforts of the Party and of the Soviet government were crowned with considerable success in regulating the currency. In the autumn of 1922 the *chervonetz** was issued, which represented the first step in this direction. This was followed by the complete stabilization of the Soviet ruble. Owing to the general improvement experienced by industry and agriculture, the socialist sector was steadily strengthened. The bond between the proletariat and the peasantry was reinforced.

The formation at the end of 1922 of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics composed of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, the Transcaucasian Federation, White Russia and the Ukraine, was an event of the greatest historical importance.** All these republics united in one federal state. Jurisdiction over military affairs, foreign policy, transport, communication, foreign trade and general supervision over the national economy of the Union were vested in the Union commissariats—the People's Commissariat of the Army and Navy,*** the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, etc. Each republic retained its respective Central Executive Committee and People's Commissariats—e.g., the People's Commissariat of Education, the People's Commissariat of Public Health, the People's Commissariat of Social Maintenance and similar commissariats with jurisdiction over local questions affecting only the respective republic. This confederation increased the might of the proletarian revolution, its position in the struggle against international imperialism and guaranteed the most successful development of socialist construction in conso-

* A ten-ruble denomination of gold-backed Soviet currency.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

** Later, in 1925, the Uzbek and Turkmenian Republics and in 1929 the Tajik Republic joined the U.S.S.R.—*Ed. Russian ed.*

*** Now the People's Commissariat of Defence.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

nance with the interests of the Union as a whole, without in the least impinging upon the independence of the separate republics.

In the spring of 1922 Soviet Russia received an invitation from the Entente governments to participate in negotiations aiming at the restoration of economic intercourse between Soviet Russia and the capitalist countries. The negotiations were at first conducted in Genoa, Italy, but were later transferred to The Hague, Holland. The capitalists proposed to grant credits to Soviet Russia but demanded that the latter pay the tsarist debts which totalled about fourteen billion rubles, discontinue the foreign trade monopoly and indemnify the foreign bourgeoisie for the losses it had sustained in consequence of the policy of nationalization. In other words the Entente governments demanded that Soviet Russia give up the principal gains of the October Revolution and consent to becoming a colony of international imperialism.

By instruction of the Central Committee of the Party the Soviet delegation emphatically rejected all such proposals. However, to a number of comrades it seemed impossible for the Soviet Union to create a large-scale machine building industry with the country's own resources. As they had no faith in the internal strength of the revolution, they considered it necessary to make a further retreat and therefore proposed that further concessions which were wholly inadmissible be made to the bourgeoisie. Sokolnikov introduced a proposal to abolish the foreign trade monopoly; Kamenev and Zinoviev advocated a project to return to the Englishman Urquhart his former enterprises in Russia on terms that were exceedingly onerous to the Soviet Union. Trotsky submitted a proposal to permit the Soviet enterprises to mortgage their property to private capitalists. All propositions of this kind were firmly and resolutely rejected by Lenin and virtually the whole Party.

But there were still many shortcomings in the work of the Soviet and economic bodies. These shortcomings hindered the development of the offensive against the capitalist elements. Bureaucracy and red tape were much in evidence. The maintenance of the Soviet and economic apparatus was very expensive.

Lenin had called attention to this in his last works. The enemies made use of every blunder committed by the apparatus, of all its weak links, for the purpose of undermining and retarding socialist construction. Although trading improved it was nevertheless unsatisfactory. Prices for manufactured goods and agricultural products began to diverge to a considerable extent, forming a so-called "scissors." While prices for industrial products were very high, prices for agricultural products were exceedingly low.

The "scissors" were a phenomenon to be explained by quite a number of causes: the industrial enterprises still worked too far below capacity. In view of the low productivity of labour this gave rise to high production costs for the commodities; the struggle to reduce overhead expenses was conducted in a feeble way; many business managers in their drive for high profits forced up prices too high, etc. But the rise in industrial prices with a simultaneous drop in prices for agricultural products severely affected the purchasing capacity of the peasantry, and the divergence in prices jeopardized the bond between town and country. Several business managers who did not want to understand this screwed up prices still more.

After the N.E.P. had been introduced a slight revival of kulak elements could be observed in the countryside. The kulaks attempted to harness the poor peasants and agricultural labourers to their cart, to exploit their labour on enslaving conditions. All this placed a number of problems before the Party to the solution of which the Twelfth Congress held in April, 1923 dedicated itself.

Twelfth Congress of the Party

The Twelfth Party Congress which met in April 1923 was the first after the October Revolution in which Lenin, due to his ill health, was no longer able to take a direct part. But in its work the Congress took into account and made use of all the directions which Lenin had given in his last works.

The Congress heard reports on and discussed problems concerning industry, work in the rural districts, the national policy, etc. It emphasized the fact that industry could grow only if based

on simultaneously developing agriculture, since agriculture formed the basis for industry.

On the question of work in the countryside, the Congress recognized the necessity of strengthening all forms of co-operation, of extending credits to the peasants and of helping to raise the level of peasant husbandry by carrying out various agroeconomic measures. In view of the development of the market and the improvement in money circulation it had become more profitable and more convenient for the peasants to pay government taxes in money rather than in grain. The Congress therefore decided to permit part of the tax in kind to be paid in currency. In the resolutions of the Congress much attention was paid to the organization of the village poor and agricultural labourers and to rendering them necessary aid in the struggle against the kulaks.

Following Lenin's instructions on the reorganizing of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, the Congress decided to fuse the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and the Central Control Commission of the Russian Communist Party.

One of the most important issues raised at the Congress was the national question on which Comrade Stalin reported. In his report he focused the attention of the Party on the necessity of continuing the struggle for the liquidation of the actual inequality between nations and of overcoming the opportunist deviations on the national question. The transition to the N.E.P. and the slight growth of capitalist elements were attended by a noticeable revival of bourgeois nationalism. Under the influence of this revival deviations toward Great-Power chauvinism and local nationalism were gaining ground among some sections of the Party.

Local nationalism found particularly striking expression before the Twelfth Congress in the Communist Party of Georgia, where the group of so-called Georgian deviators was formed. This group demanded special exemptions and advantages for Georgia at the expense of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the other Transcaucasian republics. It disseminated the slanderous assertion that the Party undervalued the national peculiarities and needs of the Georgian people. At the Twelfth Congress the Party severely condemned the deviations on the national question—

both the deviation toward Great-Power chauvinism which represented the main danger and the deviation toward local nationalism.

The Congress adopted a number of decisions which pursued the line of intensifying the struggle to abolish the actual inequality of nations. The decisions of the Twelfth Congress coupled with the resolutions of the Tenth Congress on the national question have served as the main basis for the national policy of the Party in the period of socialist construction.

On discussing the report of the Central Committee of the Party some comrades made opportunist attempts to distort the Leninist line on the question of the mutual relations between the Party and the state. Such attempts were made by Krassin and Ossinsky who asserted that the Party organs were not in a position to embrace all the complicated and difficult aspects of economic life, that the Party's directions often merely hindered the work of the economic organs and that therefore the influence of the Party over the economic organs ought to be curbed. It is a characteristic fact that the same point of view was also disclosed in Trotsky's theses on industry. The mistakes in these theses which had been composed for the Twelfth Congress were corrected by the Central Committee. Behind the attempts to weaken the guiding influence of the party over the state apparatus there lay concealed the aspiration to dislocate the basis of Soviet and economic construction.

The overwhelming majority of the Congress with Comrade Stalin in the lead completely frustrated these opportunist attempts. At the same time the Congress denounced every attempt to replace the Soviet apparatus by Party organs, a practice countenanced in Zinoviev's speeches at the Twelfth Congress at which he developed the idea of "the dictatorship of the Party." In the resolution adopted on the report of the Central Committee, the Congress specially emphasized the need of unrelaxing Party leadership in Soviet and economic work.

"Get down to business even more than before, pay still more attention to the business organs and provide them with still more leaders and forces" was to be the slogan of the Party for the immediate future, according to the resolution of the Congress.

Economic Difficulties in 1923-24 and Struggle Against the Trotskyist Opposition

The restoration of national economy continued to make steady progress after the Twelfth Congress. The gross output of large-scale and medium-sized industry rose in 1923 to 33 per cent of the pre-war level. On the eve of the transition to the N.E.P. it had constituted only 18 per cent of the pre-war level. Agriculture regained three-fourths of its pre-war output. The number of industrial workers during the 1922-23 fiscal year increased 17 per cent. Finally—and this was of tremendous importance—industry as a whole gradually ceased to operate at a loss. However not all of its branches were in the same position—in heavy industry for instance matters fared not so well. Still a general rise was obvious: the Party gradually won one position after another from the capitalist elements.

Parallel with this, the disproportion between the industrial and agricultural prices (the “scissors”) assumed alarming dimensions in the autumn of 1923. In consequence the peasants almost ceased to purchase manufactured goods. The co-operative enterprises, the trading institutions and the trusts began to experience a very acute lack of working capital. Difficulties arose which adversely affected the entire national economy. The question of the bond between town and country had again reached a very critical stage. By reason of these economic difficulties the position of part of the working class also grew worse.

The economic difficulties of 1923-24 were taken advantage of by the Trotskyists to launch new sallies against the Party. On October 8, 1923 Trotsky filed a statement with the Central Committee in which he accused the Party leaders of steering the country towards ruin. Following upon this statement the platform of the “Forty-Six” was issued. It was signed by such prominent representatives of Trotskyism as Pyatakov, Preobrazhensky and I. N. Smirnov. The Trotskyist platform was subscribed to by the followers of the Democratic Centralism group headed by Ossinsky and Saprionov. The remnants of the former Workers’ Opposition (Shlyapnikov and others) also came to life again and lent support to Trotskyism by their moves against the

Party. In this fashion a motley crew combining diverse oppositional elements sailed under the anti-Party flag of Trotskyism. They were held together by their common hatred of the Party leadership.

The Opposition headed by Trotsky hurled its darts in the first place against the Leninist Central Committee and the Party apparatus. The Oppositionists, like the Mensheviks in the period of the Second Congress, clamoured against the alleged absence of democracy in the Party and claimed that the apparatus had taken the place of the Party, that undue pressure was being used in the Party, that bureaucrats were in the saddle, etc. All this was a monstrous lie. The Party leaders headed by Comrade Stalin systematically fought for the development of widespread internal Party democracy. The question of Party democracy had been specially discussed at the September Plenum of the Central Committee in 1923, long before the Opposition held forth on the subject. But the point was that the Trotskyist Opposition was not satisfied with the Leninist conception of democracy. Trotskyism understood the term democracy to mean freedom to form factional groupings—the objective aimed at by the representatives of the Opposition.

The goal of the Opposition was quite clear—to heap abuse upon the Party, to undermine confidence in its Leninist Central Committee and to get the leadership of the Party into its own hands. In his pamphlet, *The New Course*, Trotsky hurled the slanderous accusation against the Party leaders that they were degenerating and compared the old bolshevik cadres to the opportunist leaders of the Second International. Trotsky endeavoured to use the less steeled Party youth as his support, tried to set them in opposition to the “old members” of the Party. He declared that the Party youth, especially the students at the academic and technical universities among whom Trotskyism found some response, was the “barometer of the Party,” its most sensitive and advanced section. The opposition laid all the blame for the economic difficulties at the door of the Central Committee. It raised the outcry that the Central Committee was leading without any plan and was issuing wrong directives. The adherents of the Opposition proposed that prices of manu-

factured goods be raised, though this would have led to the ruin of the peasantry. Consequently they rejected Lenin's co-operative plan and his slogan of an alliance with the middle peasants.

The Trotskyists looked upon the countryside as a sort of "colony" of socialist industry and therefore proposed to establish a system of peasant exploitation. Approaching the questions of industrial construction from the narrow mercantile, profit-making point of view, Trotsky proposed to close down all enterprises which did not bring any profit. He did not even hesitate to suggest that such gigantic plants as the Bryansky and the Putilov works be closed down. The Opposition also harangued against the establishment of a stable ruble, because they considered it impossible to create a stable currency. The anti-Leninist position taken by Trotskyism could only lead to the utter shipwreck of the proletarian dictatorship. In their schismatic, criminally disorganizing struggle, the Trotskyists did not stay within the framework of the Party—they even tried to set the Soviet apparatus and the Red Army against the Party.

The Party under the leadership of its Leninist Central Committee ruthlessly repulsed the Trotskyists. In the beginning the Trotskyists had succeeded in making some inroads upon some Party nuclei at the universities. But even these minor successes were very short-lived. The vast majority of the Party came out against Trotskyism. All the great proletarian centres, including Moscow, Petrograd, Kharkov, Donbas, Baku and the Ural district, unanimously supported the Party. Trotsky's position was exposed before the Party masses and his cause proved a dismal failure.

The results of the internal Party struggle were summarized at the Thirteenth Party Conference held in January 1924 which declared that in Trotskyism "we have not only a direct divergence from Leninism but also a clearly expressed *petty-bourgeois deviation*." The special resolution adopted by the Conference stated that the Opposition objectively reflected the pressure of the petty bourgeoisie on the position and the policy of the proletarian party. The defeat of the Trotskyist Opposition promoted solidarity in the Party ranks to a still greater extent and ensured further successes in the cause of socialism.

Lenin's Death and the Lenin Recruitment

On January 21, 1924, Lenin died. The Party lost its greatest leader and organizer under whose guidance it had waged a successful struggle for decades. This was a tremendous bereavement for the Soviet and the international proletariat.

But even while Lenin was still alive, his faithful and staunch disciple and comrade-in-arms, Joseph Stalin, who has been the elected general secretary of the Party ever since the Eleventh Party Congress, played a tremendous part in leading the Party and the revolution.

At the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets, Comrade Stalin, speaking in the name of the Party and all toilers of the country, took a solemn vow to carry out all the instructions and precepts of Lenin. This memorable vow stated in part as follows:

"In departing from us, Comrade Lenin bequeathed to us the duty of holding aloft and guarding the purity of the great title of member of the Party. We vow to you, Comrade Lenin, that we will fulfil your bequest with honour. . . .

"In departing from us, Comrade Lenin bequeathed to us the duty of guarding the unity of our Party like the apple of our eye. We vow to you, Comrade Lenin, that we will also fulfil this bequest of yours with honour. . . .

"In departing from us, Comrade Lenin bequeathed to us the duty of guarding and strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat. We vow to you, Comrade Lenin, that we will spare no effort to fulfil also this bequest of yours with honour. . . .

"In departing from us, Comrade Lenin bequeathed to us the duty of strengthening with all our might the alliance between the workers and the peasants. We vow to you, Comrade Lenin, that we will fulfil also this bequest of yours with honour." *

Further on we read that the Party will ceaselessly strengthen and widen the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, will strengthen the power of the workers' and peasants' army and will unflinchingly preserve its loyalty to the principles of the Communist International, fighting at the same time for the consolidation and extension of the alliance among the toilers of the whole world.

* Stalin, "The Bequests of Lenin," *On Lenin*, pp. 41-46.

The vow pledged by Comrade Stalin has become the standard to which the Party has rallied in its struggle for the building of socialism and the victory of the world proletarian revolution. The Party has not digressed one step from the principles of Leninism but under the leadership of Comrade Stalin has carried out all the instructions of its great leader, Lenin.

The non-Party workers responded to the death of Lenin by joining the Party in great masses. This mass admission was given the name of the "Lenin recruitment." Despite the Trotskyist slander about the degeneration of the Party, the ruinous character of its policy and the predictions that the working class stratum in the Party would still be insignificant for a long time to come, etc., the workers recommended 203,000 new members for admission to the Party. This was a direct refutation of the slanderous fabrication of Trotskyism and attested to the insoluble bond between the Party and the broad masses of the proletariat. As a result of this Leninist recruitment the total number of Party members, which had been reduced after the purging in 1921 to some 400,000, now rose to 666,000 members. The percentage of workers in the Party increased considerably and its basic working class core consolidated.

The Thirteenth Congress of the Party; Controversy Over Trotsky's "Lessons of October"

In May 1924 the Thirteenth Congress of the Party took place. Despite the prophecy of the Trotskyists that the failure of the Party's entire policy was imminent, the Soviet Union achieved considerable successes in the field of economic construction. The output of coal and oil rose to 50 per cent, and of light industry to 70 per cent of the pre-war output. The sown area constituted about 80 per cent and wages two-thirds of the pre-war level. State trade and co-operative organizations also scored considerable successes, though rigidity and inflexibility were still in evidence. Due to these adverse factors in the co-operative system, private trade competed quite successfully with the latter, so that much of the country's merchandising went through the hands of private traders. Stressing the tremendous importance of the co-operative organizations, the Con-

gress adopted a number of decisions directed towards the improvement of their work, such as supplying them with credits, reducing their overhead expenses, etc. The Congress pursued the line of developing and realizing Lenin's plan of co-operation.

Furthermore the Congress devoted much attention to the question of Party work in the rural districts. It was decided to improve the organization of farming credits, to develop the work of the peasant mutual aid committees and to intensify the organization of the agricultural labourers and village poor. All these decisions pursued one principal object—to rally the poor and middle peasants around the working class, to raise their political consciousness and to align them with socialist construction.

The Congress confirmed the decision of the Thirteenth Conference concerning the petty-bourgeois deviation in the Party. Trotsky, the leader of the Opposition, promised at the Congress "to stand at attention," i.e., to comply with Party discipline, but as it later developed, this was only a manoeuvre undertaken for the purpose of deceiving the Party.

In the autumn of 1924 Trotsky once more sallied forth to the attack by publishing a collection of his articles entitled *Lessons of October*. It contained a calumnious preface in which Trotsky maliciously distorted fundamental facts in the history of bolshevism. He brazenly asserted that bolshevism did not become a consistent revolutionary current until 1917, when it "re-equipped itself" and went over to the side of Trotskyism. Trotsky did not ascribe the main role in the leadership of the October Revolution to the Party or to Lenin, but to himself. Trotsky depicted the history of bolshevism in such a way as to discredit the Party and substitute Trotskyism for Leninism. But after the defeat of the Trotskyist Opposition in 1923, the Party was more compact and consolidated than before. Under the guidance of Comrade Stalin, its leader, it quickly repulsed this new onslaught engineered by Trotskyism.

Comrade Stalin's book *Foundations of Leninism* which appeared in 1924 was of exceptional importance in exposing the Trotskyist views and in upholding the principles of Leninism. This book, the best exposition and development of Leninism, was a highly valuable contribution to the treasure store of

Marxist-Leninist theory. Entire generations of staunch Bolsheviks have been trained by this book which was dedicated to the Lenin Recruits.

In February 1925 the Plenum of the Central Committee gave Trotsky a stern warning, pointing out the incompatibility of remaining in the Party while preaching a revision of Leninism and disrupting Party unity. The Plenum at the same time removed Trotsky from the presidency of the Revolutionary Military Council, appointing Comrade Frunze, an old Bolshevik, a prominent military authority and hero of the Civil War, to this post.

Fifth Congress of the Comintern

In the summer of 1924 after the Thirteenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, the Fifth Congress of the Comintern was held. In the interval between the Fourth and the Fifth Congress, sharp class battles had taken place in a number of West-European countries. In Germany the profound economic crisis had caused the workers to rise against the rule of the bourgeoisie and to try to set up their own workers' government in several federal republics (Saxony, Thuringia). In October 1923 occurred the heroic insurrection of the Hamburg workers against the German bourgeois government. Pitched battles took place between the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces in Bulgaria (July and September 1923). The same year the workers of Cracow, Poland, rebelled. Thus in several European countries a revolutionary situation was created which placed the direct struggle of the proletariat for power on the order of the day.

But the revolutionary battles of 1923 again ended in the defeat of the working class. With the support of the avowed opportunists and Centrists of the Second International, the bourgeoisie once more withstood the onslaught of the revolutionary masses. One of the main reasons why the revolutionary battles in 1923 were lost was the gross opportunist errors committed by the leaders of several Communist Parties.

The leadership of the German Communist Party which was headed by Brandler and Thalheimer—Right opportunists who were subsequently expelled from the Comintern—was unable to

guide the revolutionary attacks of the masses. Brandler, Thalheimer and their followers did not really believe in the strength of the revolutionary proletariat. Evincing confusion and absolute helplessness in view of the rising revolutionary tide, they looked for support to German Social-Democracy, to which they surrendered one position after another.

This found particularly striking expression in the distortion of the united front tactics as practised by Brandler and Thalheimer. They understood a workers government to mean a government constituting a "*bloc* of all workers' parties." They indulged in the notion that they could establish a workers' government by peaceful, parliamentary means. Due to these rotten planks on which Brandler and Thalheimer had taken their stand, the Saxonian workers' government which was formed in 1923 proved to be completely in the hands of the "Left" Social-Democrats. The Party and the masses hurled themselves into the battle against the bourgeoisie but the leadership proved to be rotten. This was bound to have an adverse effect on the issue of this struggle.

Grave errors were likewise committed by the Communist Party of Bulgaria where in July 1923 the big bourgeoisie headed by Tsankov took the field against the petty-bourgeois government of Stambolisky. While the fight was raging between the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and Stambolisky's government, the Bulgarian Communist Party took up a "neutral" stand and thereby facilitated the victory of the bourgeois counter-revolution. The Bulgarian Party failed to understand that its task was to defeat the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie not by supporting Stambolisky, but by continuing the struggle for the revolutionary mobilization of the masses around the banner of communism.

The mistakes made by the Party leaders in Germany and Bulgaria showed that even in the best Communist Parties of Western Europe the social-democratic survivals were still very strong. Even the best parties still had much to learn before they could be considered capable of giving effect to the main precepts of Leninist tactics. Therefore the Fifth Congress of the Comintern stressed the *bolshevization* of the Communist Parties as one of the principal tasks. Bolshevization meant that the

West European Communist Parties must master the tactical and organizational principles of Leninism. "Bolshevization," according to the theses of the Congress on the questions of tactics, "means the transplantation into our sections of all that is international and of general importance in Russian bolshevism." Bolshevization meant the transformation of the West European Communist Parties into strong and powerful mass parties which must combine the ability to manoeuvre with revolutionary irreconcilability, and the ability to struggle for socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat with the struggle for day-to-day demands. Bolshevization could only become a reality if a stubborn, unflinching struggle was waged against opportunism in one's own ranks, for the Leninist line on questions of tactics and of the organized struggle of the proletariat.

By the time the Fifth Congress met, Trotskyism had become the centre and the rallying point of all kinds of deviators in the ranks of the Comintern. In Germany, Trotsky was supported by Brandler and Thalheimer; in France, by Souvarine, Monatte and Rosmer. Right opportunists who were subsequently expelled from the Party took Trotsky's part. In Norway, Tranmael, likewise subsequently expelled from the Party, came out in Trotsky's behalf, and so all the way down the line. *Vice versa*, Radek who had joined the Trotskyist Opposition in the Russian Communist Party was in full accord with the German Rights—Brandler and Thalheimer. The Congress strongly condemned both the Right and the "Left" deviations which had slid down to the position of the Social-Democrats. It devoted special attention to the activities of the Trotskyist Opposition in Soviet Russia. The Congress found that the policy of the Russian Communist Party was absolutely correct and sharply condemned Trotskyism. It thus confirmed the decisions of the Thirteenth Conference and Congress which had branded Trotskyism as a petty-bourgeois deviation in the Party. This decision of the Comintern Congress dealt a severe blow to Trotskyism.

CHAPTER XIII

THE PARTY DURING THE TRANSITION TO THE RECONSTRUCTION PERIOD

State of the Soviet Republics after the Thirteenth Congress of the Party

Even during the first years of the N.E.P. the Party achieved considerable successes in reviving the national economy of the country. The mines, factories and mills which had been devastated by war and intervention were being restored. By the end of 1925 the equipment which the country then possessed had in the main been put in repair and was in operation. The restoration of national economy proceeded at an unprecedentedly rapid rate, a rate impossible for any capitalist country. Thus, in 1924-25 the iron and steel industry produced almost twice the volume of output of the preceding year, while industry as a whole increased production 60 per cent. The proportion of socialist forms of economy—state industry, state trade and the co-operative system—showed remarkable progress. The proportionate share of private capital in the whole of national economy decreased. In industry private capital represented only about 20 per cent by the end of 1925; in trade the share of private business fell in 1924-25 from 35 to 27 per cent of the total turnover. The currency reform carried out in 1924 introduced a stable currency (the *chervonetz*) in place of the depreciated paper money and thus consolidated the financial position of the country. The rapid rise of the whole of national economy led to a numerical increase in the proletariat and to an improvement in the material position of the latter. Between April 1924 and October 1925 the number of workers increased from 5,500,000 to 7,000,000, i.e., 27 per cent. During the same period wages rose more than 50 per cent, almost reaching the pre-war level and in some branches of industry even exceeding it. The material position of the toiling masses of the peasantry,

especially the village poor, likewise improved greatly as the latter received considerable aid from the state. In 1924-25 the poorer sections of the peasantry were granted state aid totalling about 210,000,000 rubles.

The material position of the workers and peasants improved considerably. Their political activity also made notable strides. The Party drew millions of workers and peasants into active political work through various mass organizations. In the trade unions, voluntary societies, women delegates' meetings, etc., an extensive group of activists arose which took a very energetic part in socialist construction. The Party strengthened its influence over the masses to an increasing extent and rallied around itself the broad strata of the non-Party activists, whose best members were drawn into the Party. During 1924 the Party grew from 446,000 to 741,000 members and candidates, while by the end of 1925 it already counted more than a million members. This tremendous influx of workers into the Party showed better than anything else how the prestige of the Party among the masses was growing.

The Party devoted considerable attention to improving Party work. Having taken in 640,000 new candidates in the course of two years, the Party worked assiduously to train these candidates to become real Bolsheviks in the shortest period of time. In 1924-25 the Party's educational system grew four-fold in comparison with the preceding year (in the rural districts the increase was twenty-five fold); the number of newspapers published doubled and the publication of Lenin's works multiplied thirteen-fold. The work of the Party organizations witnessed a considerable revival, internal Party democracy developed on a wide scale and the activity of the Party masses was increased.

The international situation of the Land of the Soviets became appreciably stronger during this period. The consolidation of the Soviet Union compelled the capitalists to suffer for the time being the "peaceful coexistence" of the U.S.S.R. Capitalism succeeded in *temporarily* scrambling out of the economic chaos in which it had found itself after the war. Production and trade in capitalist countries were approaching the pre-war level at that time. After the defeat of the revolutionary movement in Germany in 1923 and the suppression of the Bulgarian

insurrection of the same year, a lull, an ebb-tide in the revolution set in for the labour movement of the world. It was a period when the international proletariat was gathering its forces, was re-aligning its ranks for a new offensive. The Party and the Communist International called this period the period of *partial stabilization*, i.e., a consolidation of the position achieved by capitalism. We have *two* stabilizations, said Comrade Stalin:

"At the one pole we find capitalism stabilizing itself, consolidating the position it has reached and continuing its development. At the other pole we find the Soviet system stabilizing itself, consolidating the positions it has won and marching forward on the road to victory. . . . What is the difference between these two stabilizations? Whither do the one and the other lead?

"Stabilization under capitalism, while temporarily strengthening capital, at the same time necessarily leads to an intensification of the contradictions inherent in capitalism: a) among the imperialist groups of the various countries, b) between the workers and the capitalists in each country, c) between imperialism and the colonial peoples of all countries.

"But stabilization under the Soviet system while strengthening socialism necessarily leads at the same time to the diminution of contradictions and to an improvement in the relations a) between the proletariat and the peasantry of our country, b) between the proletariat and the colonial peoples of oppressed countries, c) between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the workers of all countries." *

While admitting the stabilization of capitalism, the Party and the Comintern emphatically stressed its temporary, unstable character, pointing out that the temporary low tide in the revolutionary movement which had set in would inevitably give place to a new high tide.

The stabilization of capitalism at the same time led to an intensification of all the contradictions of imperialism: the contradictions among the individual imperialist states, between the imperialist countries and the colonies, between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in all capitalist countries. Simultaneously the contradictions between the capitalist world and the U.S.S.R. became more and more accentuated.

At that time the British bourgeoisie began to make frenzied

* Stalin, "The Fourteenth Conference of the Russian Communist Party," *Leninism*, Vol. I, pp. 152-53.

preparations for a new intervention against the U.S.S.R. and rallied the Soviet Union's western neighbours—Rumania, Poland, Latvia, Esthonia and Finland for the same purpose. The Russian Communist Party and the Comintern fought indefatigably against the approaching war danger. Despite numerous acts of provocation, the Party carried out its policy of peace with utmost firmness, exposed the new war preparations and strengthened the trade relations between the U.S.S.R. and capitalist countries. In the autumn of 1924 France and Japan officially recognised the U.S.S.R. This bore evidence of the considerably stronger international position of the U.S.S.R.

At the same time the Party did everything possible to strengthen the Red Army, fully mindful of the fact that the stronger the Red Army the more difficult it would be for imperialism to start a war against the Soviet Union. In 1924-25 certain military reforms were begun under the guidance of M. V. *Frunze*, and were continued by K. E. *Voroshilov* after *Frunze's* death. The organization of the army was improved, its technical equipment was made more powerful and its cadres were strengthened. The political education and military training of the army were placed on a considerably higher level and the political apparatus in the army was reinforced. All this improved discipline in the Red Army to a still greater extent and further enhanced its fighting power.

The successes achieved by the Soviet Union during the first four years of the N.E.P. were won by the Party in a stubborn struggle against the capitalist elements. The Party knew that in allowing freedom of trade to a certain extent when the N.E.P. was introduced, the capitalist elements in the country would be given some measure of encouragement. In the restoration period the urban bourgeoisie (*nepmen*) and the kulaks in the countryside witnessed a certain revival. Alien elements penetrated the Soviet apparatus by diverse means, and fought fiercely against the policy of the proletarian state in their endeavour to steer the development of the country into capitalist channels. As the consolidation of socialist economy progressed and the Party carried out the policy of restricting and crowding out the capitalist elements with greater determination, the resistance of the class enemy became commensurately stronger.

Kulakdom in its struggle against the dictatorship of the proletariat resorted to any means to gain its end, including the assassination of Soviet workers, of activists, rural correspondents, etc. In Georgia, in August 1924, the Mensheviks who were supported by the foreign imperialists and enjoyed the backing of the former noble estate holders and kulaks, organized an uprising which was put down in the course of a few days. But it showed clearly with what ferocity the class enemy was fighting against the Soviet government.

There was also some discontent among the poor and middle peasants at that time, because of the scarcity and high prices of manufactured goods. Here and there survivals of war communism were still to be met with. There were a number of cases where arbitrary orders had been issued, where the elective principle had been violated or where the middle peasants had been illegally deprived of their electoral rights. All this gave rise to discontent among the middle peasants and even some of the poor peasants. The kulaks did their utmost to use this discontent for the purpose of setting the poor and middle peasants against the policy of the Party and the Soviet government. In isolated cases kulaks succeeded in gaining a certain following among the middle and even the poor peasants. Therefore the Party soon after the Thirteenth Congress posed the very urgent question of work in the countryside, to remedy the shortcomings that had cropped up and consolidate the alliance with the mass of the poor and middle peasants.

Fourteenth Party Conference

The main tasks at that time consisted in rallying the bulk of the toiling peasantry around the proletariat and strengthening the Party leadership in the countryside.

"The main task at present is to link up with the main masses of the peasantry, to raise their material and cultural level, and to move forward together with these main masses along the road to socialism," said Comrade Stalin.*

For this it was necessary in the first place to restore peasant husbandry and raise it to a higher level, to increase the

* *Ibid.*, p. 173.

quantity of agricultural products marketed by the peasants and thus extend commodity circulation between town and country.

At the Fourteenth All-Union Conference (which took place in April 1925), the Party carried out a number of measures which were calculated to promote the development of poor and middle peasant husbandry.

In order to interest the peasants in improving the tilling of their land, frequent land redistributions were prohibited. The leasing and renting of land was allowed. This made it possible to utilize those lots of land which for one reason or another had temporarily not been tilled. Wage labour was permitted in peasant husbandry on the condition that the Soviet labour laws be strictly observed. This made it possible for the middle peasants to make fuller use of the unused labour power to be had in the villages. At the same time the protection of the interests of the poor peasants by the state against the exploiting tendencies of the kulak was fully guaranteed. Land regulation was intensified, agronomic aid to the peasantry was improved, etc. The agricultural tax was lowered almost 40 per cent, but this reduction applied only to the poor and middle peasants. Aid was rendered to the handicraftsmen as the result of which the volume of manufactured products for the villages increased. All these measures were designed to strengthen the husbandry of the poor and middle peasants and to raise the productivity of agriculture. They were calculated to give every encouragement to the poor and middle peasants, especially the latter, to develop their husbandry, to increase their interest in enlarging the sown area, in improving the tilling of the land, etc. This policy of improving the position of middle peasant husbandry strengthened the bond between the proletariat and the bulk of the middle peasants.

The kulaks in the countryside attempted to use for their own ends all these measures designed to encourage the development of the individual husbandry of the poor and middle peasants. However, the proletarian state, which controlled large-scale industry, the banks, the state apparatus, used its whole might to crush the exploiting ambitions of the kulaks and steadfastly pursued a policy of restricting and crowding out the capitalist elements and thus strengthening and consolidating the socialist

forms of economy. The bulk of the taxes was saddled upon the kulak section of the rural inhabitants. With the aid of its food supplies the state regulated the market and maintained prices at a corresponding level, thereby frustrating the speculative machinations of the kulaks.

Under these conditions the co-operative enterprises acquired very great importance. The poor and middle peasants disposed of their products and purchased their manufactured goods, agricultural machinery, etc., through the co-operative stores. They thereby became riveted to the Soviet market, to socialist industry. Through the credit co-operative organizations they became part of the Soviet credit system. Through the medium of the various forms of co-operation the proletarian state guided millions of scattered poor peasant and middle peasant farms. At the same time the entire policy of the Party on co-operation was directed toward crowding out and restricting the kulaks. The Party strictly enforced the elective principle in the co-operative bodies. The struggle against mismanagement and pilfering was intensified. The co-operative system was reinforced by supplying additional workers.

In all this work the Party strove to carry out Lenin's co-operative plan as expounded by him in his last article (*On Co-operation, etc.*). The Party looked upon the consumers' agricultural, credit and handicraft co-operative societies as only a first step which in future would prepare the peasantry for the higher form of co-operation—for the socialization of the means of production, for *collectivization*.

While invigorating the economy of the poor and middle peasants, the Party at the same time intensified its political work in the countryside to a maximum. The Party strove to direct the growing political activity of the poor and middle peasant strata towards the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and to prevent the kulaks from making use of this activity in their own interests.

Even a few months before the Fourteenth Party Conference, in October 1924, the Plenum of the Central Committee emphasized the task of reviving the work of the soviets in accordance with Comrade Molotov's report on work in the rural districts. In its resolutions the Fourteenth Conference laid stress

on the fact that the struggle for the revival of the soviets was one of the principal measures that would help to consolidate the proletarian leadership in the countryside. By carrying out this line in practice, the Party brought it about that the soviets drew still nearer to the bulk of the poor and middle peasants, that their role as leading organs became still more enhanced. The Party took care that the elective principle was strictly observed in the soviets. Non-Party peasants, both men and women, who enjoyed authority among the masses, were elected to the soviets. Thus a numerous non-Party group of activists was formed.

The Party waged an energetic struggle to strengthen the provisions of revolutionary law against persons abusing their powers and against individual local functionaries violating Soviet law. All these measures likewise aimed at strengthening the bond between the proletariat and the bulk of the middle peasants and at finally destroying all survivals of war communism.

At the same time the Party paid much attention to the village poor who were the support of the Soviet government in the countryside. It is our task, said Comrade Stalin, to organize the struggle of the village poor and to lead this struggle against the kulaks. In its decisions at the Fourteenth Conference and at the Plenums of the Central Committee in April and October 1925, the Party specially emphasized the fact that it was necessary to pay particular attention to the needs and requirements of the poor peasants. The material aid given to the poor peasants was broadened by granting them loans, by giving aid to the collective farms of the poor peasants, etc. The October Plenum of the C.C. held in 1925, upon hearing Comrade Molotov's report, decided to organize groups of poor peasants. These groups were attached to the soviets, the co-operative societies and the peasant mutual aid committees, and united the poor peasants and agricultural labourers that composed these groups. As Comrade Stalin pointed out, the groups of poor peasants were

"... to end the dispersion of the poor peasants and make it possible for them with the aid of the Communists to constitute an independent political force which could serve as the organized support of the proletariat in the countryside in the struggle against kulakdom, in the struggle for the middle peasantry."*

* Stalin, *Political Report at the Fourteenth Party Congress.*

In all the work of the rural organizations, whenever new elections were held, the groups of village poor protected the interests of the poor peasants and agricultural labourers. By organizing the village poor and rallying the middle peasant masses around itself, the Party isolated the kulaks in the countryside and rallied the basic masses of the toiling peasantry for the struggle against the kulak.

In order to ensure the fulfilment of all these tasks, the Party made strenuous efforts to consolidate the rural Party organizations. Much educational work was carried on by the Party. The agricultural labourers, the poor peasants and the best elements of the middle peasants were drawn into the Party in great numbers. The Young Communist League organizations also gained strength. The work of the communist fractions in the soviets, the co-operative organizations and peasant mutual aid committees was revived. Rank-and-file workers and peasants were promoted to leading positions on a greater scale. The system of patronage exercised by factories and mills over villages was greatly extended. Three thousand propagandists were sent to the countryside.

Such were the principal measures relating to the rural districts which the Party carried out in 1925. Even a few months sufficed for this policy to produce favourable results. The political mood of the peasantry improved considerably and its confidence in the Party was strengthened. The authority of the Soviet government in the countryside was enhanced. New strata of toilers were drawn into Soviet construction. Activity during elections increased. A considerable group of non-Party activists grew up around the soviets and co-operatives which became a source of strength to the Party leadership.

Simultaneously with these problems concerning work in the countryside, the Fourteenth Conference discussed the problem of developing industry, primarily the iron and steel industry. After hearing the report of Comrade Dzierzynski, the Conference sharply stressed the extreme urgency of developing this industry. In view of the fact that the bulk of the old equipment was used in actual production, a further development of industry would necessitate the building of new enterprises and the re-equipment of the old enterprises. This in turn was contingent upon the

development of the metallurgical industry on an immense scale.

"... The metal industry is the main basis of industry in general; for, without a powerfully developed metal industry, we cannot hope to put our light industry, transport, fuel, electrification and agriculture on their feet. The growth of our metal industry is the basis for the growth of the whole of industry in general, of the whole of national economy in general," * said Comrade Stalin.

The Conference mobilized the whole Party to battle for metal. The metal plan for 1924-25 was almost doubled as compared with that of the preceding year—(360-370,000,000 rubles as against 191,000,000 rubles). Quite a number of big works and individual shops which had been standing idle were started again. Thus the Party prepared the conditions necessary for advancing the cause of the industrialization of the country in the very near future.

The Question of the Victory of Socialism in One Country and the Struggle of the Party Against the "New Opposition"

The decisions of the Fourteenth Party Conference on the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country were of the utmost importance. As early as the imperialist war Lenin had demonstrated that it was possible for socialism to be first victorious in several or even in one capitalist country. Even during the war the Party had waged an irreconcilable struggle against Trotsky and the other opportunists who rejected this Leninist doctrine. In the revolution of 1917 Lenin and Stalin, when combating such opportunist elements as Kamenev, Rykov and Preobrazhensky, constantly emphasized the fact that the victory of socialism in one country, particularly in Russia, was possible. After October this Leninist doctrine that the victory of socialism was possible in Soviet Russia became the foundation stone of the Party's entire policy. This central idea was defended unswervingly by the Party under Lenin's leadership in its struggle against all opportunists. Thus, for instance, in 1918, when combating the "Left Communists," the Party made it plain that their anti-Party position was likewise a result of their denial that socialism could be victorious in one country.

* Stalin, "The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of the Russian Communist Party," *Leninism*, Vol. I, p. 178.

Lenin repeatedly pointed out the path along which the Party must travel to be able to build socialism in the Soviet Union. Shortly before his death he once more wrote that the Soviet Union has "everything necessary and in sufficient quantity for the construction of *complete* socialist society," and that "we shall transform N.E.P. Russia into socialist Russia." Lenin's plan for the electrification of the country and for the development of the co-operatives determined the general line of the Party in the struggle for the building of socialism.

The Fourteenth Conference in its resolutions once more laid full stress on Lenin's position on this question. It sharply branded the anti-Party position of Trotsky who continued to deny that socialism could be victorious in Soviet Russia.

This was the period when the Party put an end to the economic ruination, restored industry and began to rebuild the whole of national economy on a new technical basis. On the other hand the world proletarian revolution delayed its coming, and temporary partial stabilization of capitalism supervened. Under these conditions the question of the possibility of building socialism in one country acquired tremendous political importance. "One cannot really build without knowing the cause for which one builds," said Comrade Stalin. Along what line to build, what to build and what the perspectives ought to be when building were questions without the solution of which the Party could not advance a step. Is it building for the purpose of consolidating capitalism or of constructing socialist society?

"Do we have the possibility of building socialist economy now, under the conditions of the N.E.P., under partial stabilization of capitalism—this is one of the most important questions confronting our Party and Soviet work," * said Comrade Stalin.

To this question the Party replied without the slightest hesitation that the land of proletarian dictatorship, though surrounded by capitalists, could and must build socialism at home. This means that the Party can ensure the victory of the socialist elements over the capitalist elements, can lead the toiling masses of the peasantry along the socialist path, can put an end to the former technical and cultural backwardness inherited from the

* Stalin, *On the Opposition*.

past, can organize socialist economy at home, can liquidate classes, transform all the toilers into workers of classless, socialist society.

The Party started with the premise that it could and must build complete socialist society in Soviet Russia with the country's own resources, overcoming all internal difficulties and contradictions. But the internal contradictions were paralleled by external contradictions—contradictions between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist world. As long as the U.S.S.R. was surrounded by capitalist countries, the danger of intervention, this menace of the imperialist world anxious to crush the country of the proletarian dictatorship, would remain. Therefore as long as the U.S.S.R., the country of the dictatorship of the proletariat, was encircled by this capitalist ring, it could not be considered immune against danger from without.

"A full guarantee against intervention," said Comrade Stalin, "and that means, also, the *final* victory of socialism, is only possible on an international scale, as a result of the combined efforts of the proletariat in a number of countries; or still better, as a result of the victory of the proletariat in several countries." *

The opportunist elements which tried to undermine the line of the Party began to fight against the policy of the Party mapped out at the Fourteenth Conference. The "Left" opportunists who at that time were given the name of New Opposition were foremost in their attacks upon the Party line. Zinoviev and Kamenev assumed the role of leaders of the New Opposition.

As early as the Fourteenth Party Conference they advocated anti-Party views at one of the sessions of the Central Committee, asserting that the C.P.S.U. would be unable to cope with the internal difficulties, because of the country's technical and economic backwardness and that it could only be saved by an international revolution.

Immediately after the Fourteenth Conference they assailed its decisions. The entire anti-Party line of the New Opposition was based on its rejection of the Leninist doctrine that it was possible for socialism to be victorious in one country.

* Stalin, "Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Conference, etc.," *Leninism*, Vol. I, p. 169.

On this main and decisive issue Kamenev and Zinoviev completely adopted the Trotskyist position of denying the possibility of building socialism in one country. With this as its starting point, the New Opposition denied the socialist character of construction in the Soviet Union. It made anti-Party assertions to the effect that the entire system of Soviet economy constituted state capitalism, *i.e.*, capitalism controlled by the state. The Opposition asserted that the N.E.P. was a policy of retreat, that the N.E.P. was capitalism. Socialist industry, the foreign trade monopoly and the state bank, all of which constituted very important key positions of socialism, were slanderously called state capitalist enterprises by the Opposition. The Opposition also classified the co-operative system as a form of state capitalism although the Party had repeatedly pointed out that co-operation was the high-road to socialism, was the most important link, the means by which the scattered poor peasant and middle peasant husbandry was being incorporated in the system of socialist economy.

In the autumn of 1925 Zinoviev published his book *Leninism* in which he developed the anti-Party theory of the New Opposition under the guise of expounding the Leninist doctrine, and grossly misstated all the fundamental problems of Leninism.

Of exceptional and decisive importance was the part played by Comrade Stalin in exposing these anti-Party points of view. It was under his leadership that the Party waged this whole struggle against the New Opposition. The struggle against Kamenev and Zinoviev was dealt with by Comrade Stalin in his *Problems of Leninism*, *The Social-Democratic Deviation in Our Party*, *Once More Concerning the Social-Democratic Deviation in Our Party* and other works in which he elaborated and further developed in exhaustive detail the Leninist doctrine of the victory of socialism in one country, of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the course to be followed in building socialist society, etc. These works by Comrade Stalin are of the greatest political and theoretical importance for the C.P.S.U. and the Comintern.

The New Opposition concealed its desertion to the Trotskyist position on fundamental questions of policy by slanderously raising a hue and cry to the effect that the Party was degenerating, was veering about bent on following a kulak course, etc.

The decisions of the Fourteenth Conference on the Party's policy in the countryside were falsely depicted by the "New Opposition" as concessions to the kulaks, as points of support to the kulaks. With the aim of undermining the Party line, Kamenev and Zinoviev in their public utterances, in the press and at meetings, began to depict the kulak danger to the country with panicky exaggeration. Resorting to figures which they knew to be deliberately false they asserted that the kulaks held almost two-thirds of the country's grain in their clutches, that the kulaks were "overrunning" all the lower rural soviets, etc. Wrapping themselves in "Left" phrases about the kulak danger and feigning to be supporters of the poor peasants, the New Opposition combated the Leninist policy of alliance between the proletariat and the middle peasant and spurred the Party towards a rupture with the bulk of the middle peasants.

Zinoviev spoke outright against the need of an alliance with the middle peasants. He made the calumnious statement that Lenin was not for an alliance with the middle peasant, but for the neutralization of the middle peasant under the dictatorship of the proletariat. In this fashion the New Opposition came out openly against the main strategic slogan which had been launched by the Party on Lenin's suggestion at its Eighth Congress and which has been carried out ever since. The views and slogans of the Opposition, "Left" in form, but menshevik in substance, reflected the pressure of the petty-bourgeois elements upon the Party, the endeavour of the petty-bourgeois elements to weaken the Russian Communist Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

With regard to the problem of Party construction the Opposition advanced the demagogic demand that by the next congress of the Party at least 90 per cent of the Party membership must consist of workers from the bench. This meant that in the course of the next year the Party must swell its ranks by four to five million new members, i.e., that almost the whole working class of the U.S.S.R. must be taken into the Party. This seemingly "Left" demand would have transformed the Party into a menshevik "broad party," would have eradicated every distinction between the Party representing the vanguard of the working class and the mass of non-Party members. The Party merciless-

ly exposed the anti-Party, menshevik character of this demand of the Opposition.

In Leningrad where Zinoviev was at work the New Opposition succeeded by deceptive manoeuvres in gaining control of the Party organization for some time. Here the Opposition engaged in active factional work: it distributed oppositional literature, held meetings, etc. The *Leningrad Pravda* published by the Leningrad Party Committee was changed into a factional organ of the Opposition and waged a day-to-day struggle against the Party. At the Gubernia Conference in December 1925 the Opposition deceived the workers' delegates by concealing from them its difference of opinion with the Party. The Opposition smuggled its anti-Party views into the Conference under the guise of defending the line of the Central Committee. This accounts for the fact that the Opposition succeeded in carrying its adherents in the elections for the Provincial Party Committee and the Fourteenth Party Congress.

The Party sternly rebuffed the New Opposition. Quite a number of Party conferences which were held simultaneously with the Leningrad Conference, especially the Moscow Conference, sharply condemned the anti-Party actions of the New Opposition and rallied unanimously around the Leninist Central Committee.

Fourteenth Congress of the Party—The Congress of the Industrialization of the U.S.S.R.

The Fourteenth Party Congress met in December 1925. Comrade Stalin made the political report at the Congress. He drew a balance for the preceding period and laid down the further course of socialist construction. During the first five years of the N.E.P. the Party had achieved immense successes in restoring national economy. New tasks were now on the order of the day.

"If at that time, during the first period of the N.E.P., we had to begin with agriculture, inasmuch as the development of the whole of national economy came up against agriculture, it is now necessary to focus attention on industry for the purpose of continuing the building of the socialist foundation of our economy, for the purpose of moving forward our economy as a whole. Now agriculture itself cannot move forward if agricultural machines, tractors, manufactured goods, etc., are not supplied promptly."*

* Stalin, *The Economic Position of the Soviet Union*.

In his report at the Fourteenth Congress Comrade Stalin singled out the *struggle for the industrialization of the country* as the Party's central task. Our general line, he said, consists in converting the U.S.S.R. from a backward, agrarian country into an advanced industrial country with a highly developed technique.

The question of developing industry became at that time the most important task of socialist construction. Lenin had said repeatedly:

"Large-scale machine-operated industry, capable of reorganizing agriculture also, can be the only material basis of socialism." *

By relying solely upon powerful socialist industry the Party was able to bring about the socialist remoulding of the countryside, to supply it with tractors, combines and chemical fertilizers, to transform backward peasant husbandry into advanced, socialized agriculture equipped with high-grade technique. Lenin said that without a highly developed, large-scale industry there can be no talk of socialism altogether.

In explaining the gist of the policy of industrialization Comrade Stalin emphasized the fact that not every development of industry amounts to industrialization. The pivotal point in industrialization, its basis, consists in the development of *heavy* industry (fuel, metal, etc.), in the development of the production of means of production, in the development of the country's own machine building industry. It is the function of the industrialization of the country not only to enlarge the proportion of industry in the country's national economy, but to assure economic independence to the Soviet Union, surrounded as it is by imperialists, to safeguard it against being transformed into an appendage of world imperialism.

"From this it follows," said Comrade Stalin, "that the industrialization of our country cannot be satiated by developing any industry, by developing, let us say, light industry, though to us light industry and its development are absolutely necessary. From this it follows that industrialization must be taken to mean primarily the development of heavy industry in our country, especially the development of our machine building industry, this nerve centre of

* Lenin, "Third Congress of the Communist International," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXVI.

industry in general. Without this it is useless to talk of guaranteeing the economic independence of our country.”*

While serving as the base for building socialism, the industrialization of the country at the same time strengthened the military power of the U.S.S.R., enabling it to defend itself against the imperialists. The backward are beaten, said Comrade Stalin in one of his later works. Old Russia was constantly beaten because of its backwardness.

“Such is the law of exploiters—to beat the backward and the weak. The jungle law of capitalism. You are backward, you are weak, so you are wrong, hence you can be beaten and enslaved. You are mighty, so you are right, hence we must be wary of you. . . . But we do not want to be beaten. . . . That is why we must no longer be backward.”**

At the same time the economic strengthening of the Soviet Union was of great international revolutionary importance. The country’s economic successes exhibited to the world proletariat the advantages of socialist economy, enhanced the sympathy entertained by the world proletariat for the Soviet Union and communism and strengthened the cause of the world revolution.

“To transform our country from an agrarian into an industrial country capable of producing the requisite equipment with its own resources—this is the crux, the basis of our general line,” said Comrade Stalin at the Congress.

Such was the basic line laid down by the Fourteenth Congress which determined the whole future line of the Party. Therefore the Party calls the Fourteenth Congress the *Congress of Industrialization*.

The Party line encountered the fierce resistance of the opportunists. After the report of the Central Committee, delivered by Comrades Stalin and Molotov, the Leningrad delegation, the majority of which consisted of Zinoviev adherents, demanded that the floor be given to Zinoviev to make a co-report. This was an open declaration of war against the Party by the New Opposition.

In his co-report, Zinoviev made a vicious attack upon the Party and its leadership. On all basic questions he contrasted the line of the Central Committee with the anti-Party views of

* Stalin, *The Economic Position of the Soviet Union*.

** Stalin, “The Tasks of Business Managers,” *Leninism*, Vol. II, pp. 365-66.

the Opposition, and accused the Party of having degenerated and become opportunist. At the Congress the Opposition voted against the resolution which approved the line of the Central Committee and thus openly stressed the fact that it radically departed from the Party line. The Opposition had the effrontery to declare outright to the Congress that it would not submit to its decisions. This was a direct threat by the Opposition to split the Party, to form a second party. At the same time the Opposition at the Congress through Zinoviev's co-report supplied all former anti-Party groups, which had been broken up by the Party, with a battle slogan under which they could amalgamate to make common cause with the Opposition against the Leninist line of the Party.

The Congress took an absolutely unanimous stand against the opportunist line of the New Opposition and without one dissenting vote, (excepting of course the representatives of the Opposition) approved the line of the Central Committee. In stressing the necessity of struggling on two fronts, the Congress established the fact that the fire must be directed mainly against the "Left" danger, against the "Left" opportunists, inasmuch as they were impelling the Party toward a rift in the alliance with the middle peasants, toward a disruption of the whole of socialist construction. For this very reason the "Left," Trotskyist danger was the main danger at that stage.

Simultaneously the Congress sharply raised the question of the need to contend against the Right opportunists who were slurring over the growth of kulakdom, who refused to fight against the kulaks and had no desire to weld together the poor peasants and the agricultural labourers in a joint struggle against the kulaks.

The formation in 1922 of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics moved the Congress to adopt a decision to rename the Party, calling it the *Communist Party of the Soviet Union* instead of the Russian Communist Party, the name it took after the Seventh Party Congress.

Immediately after the close of the Congress, the Central Committee ordered a number of its members, Comrades Molotov, Voroshilov and Kalinin heading the list, to go to Leningrad and explain the decisions of the Congress to the Communists and

non-Party workers of Leningrad. At the meetings of the Party nuclei there, the deception which had been practised by the New Opposition was exposed. It was shown that the New Opposition had concealed its anti-Party line from the bulk of the Party members, had pretended that it was maintaining the line of the Central Committee in Leningrad and having thus won their credentials to the Congress had taken a stand there against the Party, shrouding itself in the authority vested in it by the Leningrad organization. The vast majority—more than 97 per cent of the Leningrad Bolsheviks—wholly approved the Party line.

The Leningrad district and Provincial Party conferences called in February 1926, a month after the Congress, endorsed the Leninist line of the Party without reserve and severely condemned the New Opposition and the former leadership of the Leningrad organization. Comrade Kirov, one of the most important Party workers, an old Bolshevik and staunch unflinching Leninist, was elected secretary of the Leningrad Committee. Thus the Party was able in very short order to expose the opposition in the Leningrad organization which the New Opposition wanted to make use of under false pretenses in its struggle against the Party.

"The historical significance of the Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union lies in that it was able to expose to the very roots the mistakes of the New Opposition, that it threw aside its lack of faith and snivelling, clearly and distinctly indicated the path of the further struggle for socialism, gave the Party prospects of victory and thereby armed the proletariat with invincible faith in the victory of socialist construction." *

The Party's Struggle for the Industrialization of the Country

After the Fourteenth Congress, the Party fought energetically for the practical application of its plan to industrialize the U.S.S.R. By the end of 1925 industry had reached its pre-war level. To develop it further, the old factories had to be re-equipped from the bottom up and new ones had to be built. The U.S.S.R. was unable to obtain the means required for this purpose, i.e., credits from abroad. They had to be secured within the country. Despite the extreme difficulty of this problem, the

* Stalin, "Problems of Leninism," *Leninism*, Vol. I, p. 319.

Party tackled it in the firm conviction that the singular features of the Soviet state afforded every opportunity of realizing the industrialization of the country with its own resources.

After the October Revolution, Soviet Russia refused to pay the tsarist debts. Owing to this circumstance hundreds of millions of rubles were saved each year to be used in national economy while formerly this huge sum would go to pay off these debts. Furthermore, as a result of the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, the Soviet state was able to appropriate for the purposes of industrialization the entire profit received from state industry and foreign trade. Formerly, these profits used to go into the pockets of the bourgeoisie. Again the savings banks and public loans were absorbing all the liquid funds of the toiling masses and rendering them available to the state. The peasantry moreover was contributing part of the fund for the industrialization of the country in the form of taxes. At the same time the Party carefully saw to it that the taxation of the rural population did not lead to a retrogression in agriculture or to a breach in the political alliance with the basic masses of the peasantry.

Thanks to the circumstance that the national economy of the U.S.S.R. is planned, the Soviet state can see to it that each kopek is expended to the greatest advantage. It was precisely in this period (1925-26) that control figures for national economy were set up for the first time. This was a unified plan of the economic work to be accomplished during that year. The plan co-ordinated the separate branches of national economy. This was a tremendous achievement which indicated that during the preceding years the Party had scored great progress in *planned* leadership of socialist construction.

Of equally great importance was the fight for the thrifty and prudent expenditure of state funds. We must establish a very strict, a "brutal regime of economy," said Comrade Stalin. In April 1926 the Central Committee issued a politically important manifesto on how to carry out this regime of economy. The Central Committee set the task of reducing expenditures for the state apparatus by from three hundred to four hundred million rubles a year. The Party and the broad masses of the workers were mobilized to effectuate this regime of economy. Much work was done along the line of reducing and improving the state ap-

paratus as a result of which the civil service personnel was reduced 20-40 per cent the very first year. At the various enterprises a struggle developed to cut the cost of production, raise labour productivity and rationalize production.

The Party's labours were very soon crowned with considerable success. During 1925-26 industry increased 42 per cent and agriculture—43 per cent in comparison with the preceding year. Capital investments more than doubled during this period. The wages of the workers rose 22 per cent. The proportionate share of the socialist sector in national economy increased while the share of private capital receded. During 1925-26 the proportion of private capital in industry fell from 20.8 per cent to 18.1 per cent, and in trade—from 27 per cent to 23.7 per cent.

The *Eighteenth Conference* of the C.P.S.U., which convened from October 26 to November 3, 1926, recorded the fact that the immense task of restoring national economy had in the main been completed.

The resolution of the Conference stated:

"In its general scope the period of restoration may be deemed completed. National economy is now entering upon a new period of development, the period of its reconstruction on the basis of a new, a higher technique."

In the period of *restoration* the proletariat's control of the key positions to the whole of national economy (socialist industry and transport, foreign trade, the banks) was made secure. In the main the pre-war level of industry, agriculture and transport was attained. In the sphere of trade the co-operative organizations and state trading organs gained preponderance. A stable currency was introduced and a credit system established. The mustering of the proletariat, which had scattered during the Civil War, was completed. Its material position improved, its organizations strengthened.

In its resolutions the Conference emphasized the fact that the special characteristics of the Soviet state guarantee a future rate of development many times in excess of the rate possible under a capitalist state. The Conference placed before the Party and the working class of the Soviet Union the great historical task of *overtaking and surpassing* in a relatively very short period of time the level of industrial development of the advanced capi-

talist countries. Even before the October Revolution, Lenin had said:

"Either perish, or overtake and surpass the most advanced countries also economically." *

For this purpose it was necessary to develop a real bolshevik tempo of socialist construction. The Party was outspoken in its admission that this would require the working class to strain every effort and that the results of the new construction (*i.e.*, the output of the new factories and mills) would be visible only after the lapse of several years.

The Party could accomplish the tasks which confronted it only by drawing the broad masses of workers and toiling peasants into the cause of socialist construction. To this end it was necessary to reconstruct and improve the work of such mass organizations as the trade unions and the soviets. The work of the trade unions was discussed at the Fourteenth Party Congress and at the Fifteenth Party Conference.

The Fourteenth Congress in its resolution noted the quantitative and qualitative growth of the proletariat, the rise in its activity and set the trade unions the important task of bringing the workers still closer to the problems of production. The Congress pointed out the necessity of widely developing trade union democracy, *i.e.*, the elective principle, accountability and production conferences. At the same time the Congress stressed the fact that the trade unions must tackle the day-to-day demands of the workers at closer range, must serve them better and put up a more determined fight against all manifestations of bureaucracy in the trade unions.

After the Congress the Party brought about a considerable revival in the work of the trade unions. A vast group of active trade union members grew up. By the autumn of 1926 about two million trade union members had been drawn into trade union work, the mass work of the trade unions had improved and the production conferences had been endowed with renewed animation. The trade unions developed a struggle to raise the productivity of labour, to inculcate socialist discipline among the workers, to carry out a regime of economy.

* Quoted by Stalin in *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 74.

In connection with the development of industry millions of new workers poured into the various industrial enterprises. Through the trade unions the Party trained these new sections of the workers and enlisted them in active participation in socialist construction.

The Party likewise devoted much attention to the activation of the soviets. After the Fourteenth Conference the work of these organizations gained much more life and their authority rose. The new elections to the soviets which took place in 1925-26 showed a great increase in political activity in both town and country. In the course of the elections bureaucratic abuses which still prevailed here and there were effectively abolished and a great number of non-Party workers and peasants were elected to the Soviets.

While the elections were being held a fierce class struggle was going on in the countryside. The kulaks, who themselves were barred from election to the soviets, tried in every way to secure the election of their henchmen to these bodies. A fierce class struggle for the middle peasant developed in the countryside. The election returns showed that the bulk of the poor and middle peasants supported the Party and the Soviet government without reserve.

The work which the Party had carried on among the poor peasants yielded noteworthy results during the preceding year and a half. These groups of poor peasants afforded the Party a firm support in the rural districts for carrying out its entire line. However, the activity of the village poor was still quite inadequate and fell far below the pace maintained by the middle peasants. Therefore the Plenum of the Central Committee held in July 1926 laid special stress on the importance of working among the poor peasants and the need of activating still more the groups of the village poor.

The Party's Struggle Against the Opposition Bloc

The Party carried out its line in the midst of a fierce class struggle, overcoming at the same time the desperate resistance of the opportunist elements, both the Rights and the "Lefts." Kulakdom which had noticeably revived during this period made

use of every opportunity to set the poor and middle peasant masses against the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet government, by taking advantage of the discontent which was called forth by the fact that industry, despite its rapid growth, did not succeed in satisfying the constantly growing demand of the rural districts for manufactured goods. These vacillations of the petty-bourgeois strata found reflection among the opportunist elements in the C.P.S.U. which intensified their struggle against the Party.

On the one hand, the Party was obliged to combat the Right opportunist elements. The Right opportunists denied the growth of kulakdom in the countryside, refused to fight the kulaks and neglected work among the poor peasants. They were altogether blind to the existence of kulaks in the rural districts. The Rights masked the capitalist essence of the kulaks in every way, depicting them as "efficient farmers."

In 1925 Bukharin in one of his articles tried to prove that the kulaks would gradually and peacefully, without any class struggle, grow into socialism through the co-operative system. In one of his speeches, he launched the slogan "Enrich Yourself," which was addressed to the peasantry as a whole, including the kulaks. This slogan which was pounced upon in the press by Bukharin's disciples (Slepkov and others) was an outright encouragement of the kulak to develop his exploiting economy. The Right opportunist elements in the Soviet apparatus even tried to undermine the foundations of the Soviet constitution and stretch the right of suffrage by granting electoral rights to some of the kulak elements. Under the influence of bourgeois specialists, individual Right opportunist elements in the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, the People's Commissariat of Finance and other People's Commissariats attempted to violate the basic principles of the Soviet constitution, to carry out measures which were conducive to the consolidation of the capitalist elements in town and country.

The Central Committee completely exposed this Right opportunist policy which worked in the interests of the kulaks. It immediately instructed Bukharin to withdraw his opportunist slogan "Enrich Yourself." In opposing the Leninist plan to industrialize the country, the Right opportunists (Shanin, Sokolnikov) insisted that the U.S.S.R. must remain an agricultural

country, exporting agricultural products and importing industrial commodities and equipment. This line would have led to a shrinkage of industry; it would have transformed the U.S.S.R. into an appendage of the capitalist system. As early as the Fourteenth Congress Comrade Stalin administered a decided rebuff to these Right opportunists who both before the Congress and at the Congress itself came out against the policy of industrializing the country.

On the other hand the Party continued the struggle against the Trotskyists and the New Opposition which at that time continued to be the main danger. The New Opposition which had been routed at the Fourteenth Congress did not only not surrender its arms and cease its anti-Party struggle, but even intensified its attacks against the Party. This struggle assumed an especially sharp form in the spring of 1926 after the Fourteenth Congress, when the New Opposition united with the Trotskyist group and formed a united oppositional *bloc*.

Kamenev and Zinoviev, who in 1923-24 had issued statements against Trotsky and in January 1925 even demanded that he be expelled from the Party, now took up Trotsky's position completely on all basic questions. At the July Plenum of the Central Committee of 1926 Zinoviev declared outright that he (Zinoviev) seconded Trotsky's position, thus justifying Trotsky's anti-Party work since 1923. Trotsky in turn avowed that he had been mistaken when he opposed Kamenev and Zinoviev at that time. Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev who now formed one *bloc* mutually amnestied each other, refrained from making mention of each other's mistakes in order to present a united front of struggle against the Party. This was an unprincipled union of opportunists who were held together by a common hatred for the Leninist line of the Party and its leadership, headed by Comrade Stalin.

This *bloc* reminded one very strongly of the unprincipled *August Bloc* which Trotsky had formed in 1912 to fight Lenin and the Bolsheviks. The oppositional *bloc* became the central point where all anti-Party and opportunist elements foregathered.

Chips of the Workers' Opposition (Shlyapnikov, Medvedyev, etc.) that had been routed by the Party once more made their appearance. They entered the lists against the Party with an

avowedly menshevik platform in which they demanded that the country's socialist industry be delivered into the hands of foreign capitalists in the form of concessions. They were opposed to the bond with the poor and middle peasants to whom they referred disparagingly as "rustics." In the international sphere they demanded what in substance amounted to a liquidation of the fraternal Communist Parties and entry into the Social-Democratic Parties. Wrapping themselves in "Left" phrases and representing themselves as defenders of the working class, the Workers' Opposition thus finally slid down to the level of counter-revolutionary menshevism.

Besides Shlyapnikov and Medvedyev, the oppositional *bloc* was joined by the remnants of the anti-Party group of Democratic Centralism (Sapronov, V. M. Smirnov and others). Their stand on basic questions closely resembled the Trotskyist platform of the oppositional *bloc*. The two-year period lying between the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Party Congresses (1926-27) was a period of exceptionally tense fighting against the opposition. During these two years the opportunists incessantly attacked the line of the Party and tried to destroy its unity and remove the Leninist leadership of the Party headed by Comrade Stalin. Therefore, during this entire period the Party had to devote much energy and attention to the struggle against the opposition. Had it not smashed the opportunists, the Party would have been unable successfully to carry out its tremendous tasks during all these years in the field of socialist construction.

On the fundamental question of the fate of the proletarian revolution in the Soviet Union the opposition *bloc* occupied a full-fledged menshevik position. Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev continued to dispute the Leninist doctrine of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country and emphatically denied the socialist character of the construction going on in the country. Like the Mensheviks, the Opposition rejected the possibility of building socialism in alliance with the basic masses of the peasantry. It considered every form of peasant husbandry capitalistic, thus making no distinction between the exploiting kulak on the one hand and the toiling peasant—the poor or middle peasant—on the other.

The Opposition asserted that under the dictatorship of the

proletariat the peasantry could develop only along capitalist lines, just as was the case in capitalist society. The Opposition believed it was impossible for peasant husbandry to develop along socialist lines under a proletarian dictatorship. At the same time the Opposition concealed its Trotskyist line behind a smoke-screen of "Left" phrases on the growing kulak danger.

In the domain of industry, Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev set up an opportunist program of *super-industrialization*. They proposed that the rate of industrial development be increased by the exploitation and direct ruin of the peasantry. In order to obtain the means necessary for the increased industrial construction, the Trotskyist Preobrazhensky proposed to take no less from the peasantry than tsarism had taken from it before the revolution. The Opposition (Trotsky, Preobrazhensky, Pyatakov, V. Smirnov, Smilga and others) suggested, first, that peasant taxes be increased and, second, that the price of manufactured goods be raised. Higher prices for manufactured goods would have led to a considerable disparity (the "scissors") between prices for agricultural products and prices for manufactured goods and would have set the toiling peasantry against the working class. The policy of raising prices would have led to lower real wages, would have made manufactured goods accessible only to the well-to-do sections and the kulak upper stratum of the countryside, would have impaired the stability of the chervonetz.

The Party proceeded from the Leninist standpoint that socialist economy can be built only by marching jointly with the peasant masses. While developing the industrialization of the country to the utmost, the Party likewise fought persistently for a further improvement in the husbandry of the poor and middle peasants. On the other hand, the Trotskyists and the New Opposition while taking shelter behind their "Left" phrasemongering about super-industrialization, impelled the Party to a direct rupture with the peasantry, to open combat with the rural districts.

The Opposition's proposals in the field of state trade and co-operation bore the same anti-Party character. The Party line aimed at a maximum development of state trade and co-operation coupled with the policy of pushing the private trader out of business. On the other hand, the Opposition (Pyatakov and the others) demanded that the state funds invested in trading

and co-operation be withdrawn on the plea that these funds were needed to develop industry. In actual practice, however, this anti-Party demand would have caused all trade in the country to fall into the hands of private traders.

Thus, despite the "Left" phrases about super-industrialization, all of the Opposition's demands essentially reflected the aspirations of the capitalist elements and would have led to a disruption of socialist construction.

In its struggle against the Leninist line of the Party, the Opposition denied the proletarian character of the Soviet state, asserting that in the Soviet Union power was passing more and more into the hands of the nepman, the kulak and the petty bourgeoisie.

The Opposition demanded the right to form factions in the C.P.S.U. Its representatives (Ossovsky, for instance) went as far as to demand that other political parties be given a free hand in the U.S.S.R. This was a palpably bourgeois platform. It reflected the ambition of the capitalist elements to be given political freedom for the purpose of fighting against the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Such was the line of the Opposition *bloc*. Obviously *liquidationism* lay concealed behind its "Left" phrases. The Party could not permit factions to exist freely because the Leninist Party is strong precisely because of its unity and coherence. In the same way the Party could not permit the formation of other parties, since under the dictatorship of the proletariat only one single and united party, the C.P.S.U., can be permitted to exist. The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot grant political freedom to the capitalist classes. These demands of the Opposition implied a complete renunciation of the bolshevik conception of the Party and the acceptance of the menshevik position; they would have led in substance to the liquidation of the proletarian dictatorship.

Speaking of the essence of the Trotskyist Opposition, Comrade Stalin said:

"Capitulation in practice as its *content*, 'Left' phrases and 'revolutionary' and adventurist gestures as the *form*, which masks and advertises the capitulationist content—this is the essence of Trotskyism.

"This duality of Trotskyism reflects the duality of the urban petty bourgeoisie as it sinks into ruin. Not able to tolerate 'the regime' of the proletarian dictatorship, it strives either to jump 'straight' into socialism, in order to climb out of its ruin (hence *adventurism* and *hysteria* in politics); or if that be impossible, it is ready to make any concessions to capitalism (hence *capitulation* in politics)." *

At the April and July Plenums of the Central Committee in 1926, the Party resolutely rejected the demands of the Opposition and laid bare to the roots its anti-Party essence. The Opposition found no response among the basic masses of the workers. None the less, in the beginning of October 1926 the Opposition once more proceeded to an open attack against the Party. Trotsky, Zinoviev and the rest tried to address several nuclei in Moscow (at the Aircraft Accessories Works, at the Ryazan-Urals Railway) and in Leningrad (at the Red Putilov), and tried to set these nuclei against the line of the Party. However, the Opposition suffered complete defeat here also. All nuclei without exception came out in solid support of the Leninist Central Committee, and against the attacks of the Opposition. In the Red Putilov Works the workers refused to let Zinoviev speak.

Seeing their defeat, the leaders of the Opposition (Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, Yevdokimov) on the eve of the Fifteenth Party Conference, on October 16, 1926, filed a statement in which they declared that they would abstain from further factional work. It subsequently appeared that this was a two-faced manoeuvre which the Opposition was anxious to execute in order to gain time until a more favourable opportunity would present itself and meanwhile to preserve its cadres.

The Fifteenth Party Conference posed the question of the Opposition in all its acuteness. In his report on the oppositional bloc (*The Social-Democratic Deviation in Our Party*) Comrade Stalin gave an exhaustive analysis of the opportunist essence of the oppositional bloc. He showed that the views of the Opposition on all the principal questions of theory and policy were inimical to the Leninist doctrine, that they were incompatible with Leninism and were "a direct approach to the views of

* Stalin, "Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.," *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 333.

Social-Democracy." The Opposition represented nothing more nor less than a *social-democratic deviation in the Party*.

Comrade Stalin emphasized the fact that the pessimistic defeatist line of Kamenev and Zinoviev and their acceptance of Trotsky's position were not accidental, and that it was a recurrence of the defeatist, strike-breaking position which they had occupied in October 1917.

The oppositional *bloc* became a *rendez-vous* for all bankrupt anti-Party currents not only in the C.P.S.U. but also in the Comintern, currents which had converged into one stream to fight against the Leninist line.

By masquerading in "Left" garb, the Opposition drew nearer and nearer to the camp of the Mensheviks.

It was no accident therefore that all the enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat—the whiteguards, the Cadets, the Socialist Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks and Social-Democrats of other countries—openly welcomed the struggle of the oppositional *bloc*, hoping that this struggle would lead to a split in the C.P.S.U. and to the collapse of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Conference sharply branded the attempts of Kamenev, Zinoviev and Trotsky to defend their anti-Party views and pointed out the necessity of energetic fighting also in future against the Opposition and of frustrating its attempts to renew factionalism. The Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (December 1926), acting on the report of Comrade Stalin (*Once More Concerning the Social-Democratic Deviation in Our Party*) fully ratified the decision of the Fifteenth Conference on the Opposition. The Plenum disclosed the factional work of the Opposition in the fraternal Parties and its attempts to patch together all factional groups for the purpose of engaging in a struggle against the Comintern in France, Germany and other countries. The Plenum emphasized the fact that by its struggle against the C.P.S.U. and the Comintern the Opposition was rendering direct aid to the enemies of the proletarian revolution and the traitors to communism.

*Menace of a New Intervention and Desertion of the
Opposition to the Anti-Soviet Camp*

In the beginning of 1927 the Opposition once more increased its anti-Party activities, this time making use of the complicated international situation in which the Soviet Union was compelled to struggle.

It was a period when all imperialist contradictions were becoming sharply accentuated. The contest between individual imperialist countries and groups of countries (between the U.S.A. and Great Britain, Great Britain and France, France and Germany, etc.) assumed an exceedingly acute form. In several countries the revolutionary movement likewise became more intense.

A decided upsurge in the revolutionary mood of the masses occurred in England. As early as 1925 the leaders of the English trade unions under pressure of the workers had been obliged to make advances to the Soviet trade unions and come to an agreement with them concerning a joint struggle against capital and against the threat of a new war. For this purpose the Anglo-Russian Trade Union Committee was formed. True enough, events soon showed that the leaders of the English trade unions completely sabotaged the agreement they had concluded by stubbornly refusing to engage in any struggle against the bourgeoisie.

In 1926 the heroic miners' strike, which lasted six months and was accompanied by a ten-day general strike, took place in England. These actions dealt a heavy blow to British imperialism and deeply stirred the revolutionary sentiments of the English working class.

In China the revolutionary struggle made whirlwind progress. The Shanghai general strike in May 1925 took in half a million workers. The general strike in the south of China—in Canton and Hongkong—lasted several months. In the summer of 1925 the revolutionary Canton government launched a campaign against the North. Early in 1927 the entire southern half of China was in the hands of the revolutionary government as a result of this campaign. A powerful workers' and peasants' movement developed in the country. The influence of the Chinese Communist Party grew rapidly among the masses. The

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struggle of the toiling peasants against imperialism assumed a very acute form. All this menaced the rule of the imperialists in China. At the same time the Chinese revolution exerted a very strong influence on the growth of the revolutionary movement in other colonial countries (Indo-China, Dutch East Indies, etc.)

In the summer of 1927 the Austrian workers in Vienna undertook an armed struggle against their government. This struggle was suppressed with the aid of the Social-Democrats.

Backed by the Social-Democratic parties, imperialism suppressed the growing revolutionary movement with unbelievable ferocity. The bourgeoisie adopted more and more openly the fascist methods of administration. In the summer of 1926 Pilsudski set up a fascist dictatorship in Poland by means of a *coup d'état*. In the spring of 1927 the imperialists prepared to intervene in China for the purpose of crushing the Chinese revolution. Great Britain severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and intensified its preparations for an anti-Soviet war. In all countries Social-Democracy waged a frenzied campaign against the U.S.S.R. and actively participated in preparing the new intervention. "The danger of a new World War was never as great as now," wrote the Executive Committee of the Comintern in its manifesto issued in the summer of 1927. The Eighth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International held in May 1927 devoted most of its attention to the problem of the war danger.

The C.P.S.U. at that time singled out the defence of the country, the energetic reinforcement of the Red Army and the formation of reserves in case of war as one of its most important problems.

The Opposition chose this moment, so difficult for the Soviet Union, to intensify its struggle against the Party and the Comintern. Instead of directing their energies against the imperialists who were inciting to war, they attacked the C.P.S.U. and the Comintern, declaring that "the Party regime constituted the greatest of dangers." Trotsky declared without any concealment that in case of a military attack upon the U.S.S.R. the Opposition would avail itself of the ensuing difficulties to overthrow the Soviet government and the Party leadership. The Party

severely condemned this stand of the Opposition as a stand for defeat of the Soviet Union (defeatism), claiming that it was impossible to uphold the Soviet Union and argue at the same time that the Soviet government was degenerating, was pursuing a kulak policy, etc. Moreover this line of the Opposition tended to weaken the feeling of solidarity entertained by the international proletariat for the Soviet Union, to diminish its readiness to come to the defence of the U.S.S.R.

As for the Red Army which the proletarians of the whole world proudly consider a bulwark of world proletarian revolution, the Opposition libellously asserted that it, too, was degenerating and becoming kulakized. The Opposition thus mis-spent its energies on attempts to weaken the fighting power of the Red Army. To this end it resorted to the crudest demagoguery, hoping to set the Red Army men against their commanders and the leading Party cadres in the army.

The Party and the Communist International also fought strenuously against the Trotskyist Opposition on the question of the Chinese revolution. Using the Trotskyist views as its point of departure, the Opposition denied the peasant character of the Chinese revolution and the revolutionary role of the Chinese peasantry. It denied the possibility of an alliance between the Chinese proletariat and the peasantry and urban poor; it rejected the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution. Trotsky also denied the immense revolutionary significance of the struggle against imperialism in China. He proposed that soviets be immediately established in China and that the national revolutionary government in existence at that time be overthrown, although the revolutionary masses of the people still supported it. The Opposition strove to sever the proletariat of China from the national revolutionary movement. The Opposition impelled the proletariat towards a rupture with the allies of the latter. Its policy threatened to leave the proletariat single-handed during the revolution. Under the leadership of Comrade Stalin the C.P.S.U. and the Comintern mercilessly exposed the pernicious character of the Trotskyist policy.

With reference to the Anglo-Russian Committee, the Opposition demanded an immediate break with the latter, demanded that the Russian trade unions withdraw from it on the ground

that the leaders of this Committee were opportunists. These proposals of the Opposition were flagrant distortions of the principles underlying the Leninist policy. The Soviet trade unions entered the Anglo-Russian Committee to engage in a joint struggle with the English worker masses and not with the leaders of these masses. Through participation in the Anglo-Russian Committee the Soviet trade unions had an opportunity of coming in contact with the British workers, of exerting influence upon the best and most revolutionary section of these masses, exposing at the same time the treachery of their leaders. The compromising leaders of the English trade unions had long been anxious to expel the Soviet trade unions from the Anglo-Russian Committee; however, they lacked the courage to do so inasmuch as the authority enjoyed by the U.S.S.R. among the masses was very great. The demand of the Opposition to leave the Anglo-Russian Committee rendered direct aid to the enemy who was eagerly awaiting this event.

The Opposition made increased efforts to rally to its banner all the opportunist elements in the Comintern (those in Germany, France and elsewhere). It formed *blocs* with anti-Party elements that had been expelled from the Communist Parties. It openly defamed fraternal Communist Parties—those of Poland, Austria, Great Britain and China. It tried to cause a split within these Parties and to undermine their authority in the eyes of the workers in the capitalist countries. Therefore, the Eighth Plenum of the Comintern pointed out in its resolution that the work of the Trotskyist Opposition directly aided the bourgeoisie and its agents in their struggle against the world proletarian revolution.

In 1927 the Opposition took definite shape as an underground party having its own Central Committee, its own local party committees, collecting its own party dues, etc. In the summer of 1927 the Opposition published a counter-revolutionary platform which in essence was the program of a new party. Despite its frenzied factional activities, the Opposition could muster only about 1,500 signatures in support of its platform. Moreover it soon came to light that a good half of the subscribers had actually never seen the platform.

Thus, in the course of its struggle against the Party, the

complete fiasco of the Opposition became apparent. This evidenced its lack of a following both in the Party and in the working class.

After suffering such a defeat, the Opposition filed a second statement with the Central Committee on August 8, 1927 in which it renounced all factional work. However, this second declaration by the Opposition was a manoeuvre that was marked by the same duplicity as the first, for despite all its promises, the Opposition only intensified its anti-Party work. It now stepped beyond the bounds of an intra-party controversy and began to engage in obviously anti-Soviet activities: it harangued against the Party and the Soviet government at non-Party meetings, etc.

In celebration of the Tenth Anniversary of the October Revolution the Soviet government issued a manifesto on the adoption of the *seven-hour working day*. This manifesto was of world-historic importance. It plainly showed to the whole world proletariat that the Soviet government was improving the condition of the working class. The Opposition opposed this manifesto and voted against it. After doing so, the Opposition staged an openly anti-Soviet demonstration at the Yaroslavsky railway station in Moscow (on the occasion of the departure of the Oppositionist Smilga).

On November 7, 1927, the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution, the Opposition tried once more to hold an obviously anti-Soviet demonstration on the streets of Moscow and Leningrad. The Opposition maintained underground printing shops with the assistance of direct enemies of the Soviet government. On organizing one of these printing shops the Opposition entered into a *bloc* with bourgeois intellectuals in contact with white-guards who were preparing a military plot against the Soviet government.

Thus the Opposition had made the final plunge and engaged in open combat against the proletarian dictatorship. Its anti-Soviet struggle within the U.S.S.R. and its dissemination of slanders against the U.S.S.R. abroad placed the Opposition on a par with the open enemies of the Land of Soviets. On this ground the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in November 1927 expelled Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party as

the prime movers of the Opposition. Kamenev, Smilga, Yevdokimov, Rakovsky, Muralov and others were removed from the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. The question of whether they should be expelled from the Party was left to be decided by the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.

*Fifteenth Congress of the Party—The Congress of
Collectivization*

The Fifteenth Party Congress took place in December 1927. Comrade Stalin who delivered the report of the Central Committee gave a detailed analysis of the international situation. He emphasized the crucial character of that period: Despite the fact that, in the main, world economy had at that time regained the pre-war level, the incessant aggravation of all capitalist contradictions led to a further accentuation and intensification of the general crisis of capitalism. The temporary ebbing of the international revolutionary movement began to give way to a new revolutionary flood tide. This was confirmed by the experience of the Vienna insurrection in 1927, by the revolutionary demonstrations in France and Germany, by the Leftward swing of the labour movement in England and by the universal growth of the influence of the Comintern. "Europe is obviously entering upon the period of new revolutionary upsurge," said Comrade Stalin at the Congress.

The successes of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. exercised a tremendous influence upon the whole international proletariat, as they undermined the stability of imperialism. The numerous labour delegations which came to the U.S.S.R. from abroad (they were especially numerous at the close of 1927 on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution), on acquainting themselves with the successes of socialist construction disseminated throughout the whole world the truth concerning the country of proletarian dictatorship. The reports of these non-Party delegates delivered in their respective home countries about what they had seen in the Soviet Union were the best argument for the proletarian revolution and the Soviet government.

"The U.S.S.R. is manifestly becoming the standard bearer of the working class of Europe and of the oppressed nations of the colonies," said Comrade Stalin.

In its decisions the Congress emphasized the fact that the correct policy of the Central Committee had ensured the consolidation of the international might of the U.S.S.R.

In summarizing the results of socialist construction on the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution, the Congress recorded the fact that both industry and agriculture had surpassed the pre-war level, that the number of workers employed had increased, that wages and the productivity of labour had risen.

Beginning with the Fourteenth Congress the Party scored immense progress in the industrialization of the country. The proportion of industry grew rapidly in the whole of the country's national economy. This applied primarily to the production of the means of production. The electrification of the country made particularly rapid strides and the foundation was laid for the establishment of new branches of industry (machine building, chemical manufacturing, etc.). During 1926-27 alone, about two billion rubles were invested in industry and transport. The construction of Dnieprostroy, the Turkestan-Siberian railway, Magnitogorsk and the Stalingrad tractor plant was commenced. The Party achieved a considerable reduction in the prices of manufactured goods, a certain rise in the productivity of labour and a lowering of the cost of production. State and co-operative trade pushed out private merchant capital more and more. The bond between town and country became considerably stronger and the supply of manufactured goods to the countryside improved. All this afforded ground for concluding that

*"our country is marching toward socialism with confidence and speed, relegating the capitalist elements to the rear and pushing them step by step out of the national economy." **

The Congress commissioned the Central Committee to continue the policy of socialist industrialization with unabated speed. It is necessary to maintain the tempo of development of social-

** Stalin, Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.*

ist industry already attained and to accelerate this tempo in the near future, said Comrade Stalin at the Congress.

The Congress considered the guiding lines of a *Five-Year Plan* of national economy.

The chief function of this Five-Year Plan was the realization of the Leninist idea of industrializing the country. Therefore the Congress centred attention upon the necessity of developing heavy industry and machine building, i.e., those branches of industry which would fortify the economic might and defence capacity of the U.S.S.R., would weaken the dependence of the country upon the capitalist world and promote the socialist transformation of agriculture.

The problems of agriculture occupied the most important place at the Fifteenth Party Congress. In 1926-27 the output of agriculture constituted 108.3 per cent of the pre-war output. The sown area was enlarged. Agricultural technique rose. However, despite the successes attained, the tempo of development in agriculture lagged considerably behind that of socialist industry.

There could be only one way out of this: to switch petty, fragmentary peasant husbandry to the track of large-scale collective farming, to adopt the system of tilling the soil collectively with the aid of highly developed technique. The Fifteenth Party Congress recognized the fact that the conditions for a mass collective farm movement had already matured.

"In the present period the task of amalgamating and transforming the petty individual farms into large-scale collective farms must be set down as the principal task of the Party in the countryside," stated the Congress in its resolution on the report of Comrade Molotov on *The Work in the Rural Districts*.

When the Fifteenth Congress met, industry had strengthened to such an extent that it could already render quite substantial aid to agriculture, equipping it with machinery, chemical fertilizers, etc. The consumers' co-operative organizations already handled more than half of all the goods supplied to the rural districts. The network of agricultural co-operative organizations transacted almost two-thirds of the marketing operations in agricultural products. The state farms gave practical assistance to the peasants, helping them to adopt the collective tilling of the

soil. The example of the Shevchenko state farm in the Ukraine, the first to organize a machine and tractor station, was of exceptionally great importance.

All this prepared the peasant masses for the change to collective farming, for it permitted their own practical experience to show them the advantages of large-scale farming over fragmentary small-scale farming.

"The new feature in the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress as compared with the Fourteenth Congress lies in the fact that the Fifteenth Congress defined the utmost development of the collective farm movement as one of the most important tasks of the present day." *

Therefore, the Party refers to the Fifteenth Congress as the Congress of collectivization. The Congress pointed out that it was the current task of the Party to strengthen the co-operative system in every way, to render maximum aid to the collective and state farms, to increase the aid given to the poor peasants, etc.

Great importance attached to the task stressed by the Congress of intensifying the struggle for the cultural improvement of the working class and toiling masses of the peasantry.

In its decisions the Fifteenth Congress made special note of the tremendous growth and consolidation of the Party. It counted one million two hundred thousand members and candidates at that time. Internal Party democracy had developed considerably, the work of the lower nuclei had been revived and the activity of the Party members had risen. The Congress pointed out that it was necessary to shift the centre of Party activity to the shop. The shop nuclei had become stronger and shop organizers were elected. Due to this, contact between the Party and the non-Party workers was strengthened and the political level of the Party members rose considerably.

The Congress laid the greatest stress upon the fact that the socialist offensive would necessarily be attended by an increase in the resistance of the enemy classes which were working hand in glove with the bureaucrats in the Soviet apparatus and here and there were trying to come out openly against the Party and

* Stalin, "The Industrialization of the Country and the Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U., *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 90.

the Soviet government. The Congress pointed out that it was necessary to attack the kulaks in the countryside with still greater determination and to display still greater energy in squeezing out private capital in the cities.

At the same time the Congress called upon the Party to intensify the struggle against every form of attack of the class enemy, to consolidate the proletarian dictatorship in every way, to raise the activity and initiative of the proletariat and the poor and middle peasant masses and to enhance the influence exercised by the proletariat over the broad strata of the Soviet intelligentsia.

After discussing the question of the Opposition, the Congress recorded the fact that the Opposition had been finally transformed into a weapon of the bourgeoisie within the U.S.S.R. and into a detachment of international Social-Democracy. The Congress submitted to the Opposition the categorical demand to disarm completely, to condemn its menshevik views and to assume the obligation of defending the Party line.

When the Opposition refused to accede to this demand, the Congress decided to expel from the Party seventy-five of the prime movers in the Opposition.* As for the rank-and-file members of the Trotskyist Opposition, the Congress instructed the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission to take measures to institute an extensive campaign of enlightenment while at the same time cleansing the Party of all obviously incorrigible elements of the Trotskyist Opposition. The Congress simultaneously expelled from the C.P.S.U. twenty-three participants in the Democratic Centralism group (V. M. Smirnov and others), which had fought against the C.P.S.U. jointly with the Trotskyist Opposition and by that time had been finally transformed into an anti-Soviet grouping.

In its struggle against the Opposition the Party rallied with complete unanimity to its Leninist Central Committee and to Comrade Stalin, the Party's leader. At the Fifteenth Congress a

* In addition to Trotsky and Zinoviev, who had been expelled at an earlier date, the Congress expelled the following from the Party: Kamenev, Radek, Rakovsky, Drobnis, Yevdokimov, Zalutsky, Lashevich, N. Muralov, Pyatakov, R. Rafail, Safarov, Smilga, Sosnovsky, L. Tarkhanov, I. N. Smirnov and others.—*Ed. Russian ed.*

final reckoning was held between the Party and Trotskyism's many years of anti-Party struggle. Trotskyism had completed its cycle of development.

"... Trotskyism was a faction of menshevism until the Trotskyists entered our Party; it temporarily became a faction of communism after it entered our Party; it once more became a faction of menshevism after the Trotskyists had been expelled from our Party. 'The dog had returned to its own vomit,'" wrote Comrade Stalin.*

Many of the Trotskyists, with Trotsky himself in the van, definitely became open counter-revolutionaries, became the advance detachment of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, which, at the present time, lines up with the social-fascists of all countries and wages a furious struggle against the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R. and against the C.P.S.U.

* Stalin, "Reply to Comrades Olekhnovich and Aristov," *Bolshevik*, No. 16, 1932.

CHAPTER XIV

THE PARTY IN THE RECONSTRUCTION PERIOD

The Party on the Road to the Socialist General Offensive

With the transition from the restoration to the reconstruction period new immense tasks arose and faced the Party.

The successes achieved during the restoration period now made it possible for the Party to set the task of the socialist reconstruction of the whole of national economy.

Explaining the essence of this task, Comrade Stalin stated:

"While in the restoration period we talked of fully employing our old factories and assisting agriculture on its old basis, today it is a question of radically rebuilding and reconstructing both industry and agriculture, changing their technical basis and equipping them with modern technique. It means that we are faced with the task of rebuilding the whole technical basis of national economy."*

The crux of the situation was that the reconstruction of national economy could not be confined to a reconstruction of its technical base, but demanded likewise the reconstruction of social and economic relations, especially in the countryside. This meant the creation of large-scale socialist economy in the rural districts to parallel that of the urban districts, the destruction of the capitalist elements and the establishment of such conditions as would make it impossible for these elements to rise and develop in the U.S.S.R.

In industry, which in the U.S.S.R. is unified and belongs to the proletarian state, a ready social and economic base for technical reconstruction was at hand. Here the task consists in reconstructing the entire industry on the basis of advanced modern technique and of completely squeezing out all capitalist elements.

* Stalin, "Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.," *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 293.

For the purpose of carrying out this reconstruction, it was necessary to increase the amount of state funds invested in national economy. It was likewise necessary to create new cadres to take charge of the enterprises and to master the new advanced modern technique.

The Party mobilized all its resources for the purpose of promoting the socialist reconstruction of industry at the greatest possible speed. In 1928-29, two billion, seven hundred million rubles were invested in construction in industry and transport, an increase of 20 per cent in comparison with the preceding year. This denoted a considerable acceleration in the country's rate of industrialization during the reconstruction period.

Especially huge were the tasks confronting the Party during the reconstruction period in the domain of agriculture, where small-scale, individual, backward peasant husbandry still prevailed. The socialist reconstruction of the countryside further meant the reconstruction of the technical base of agriculture and, simultaneously, the remaking of the individual toiling farmers' husbandry into large-scale collective farming. As long as private, small commodity peasant husbandry exists, the capitalist elements which are at war with socialism constantly and inevitably grow and develop. In order to remove the very possibility of capitalist elements arising and growing up, it was necessary to destroy the capitalist elements which still existed (the kulaks in the countryside) and to amalgamate the husbandry of the toiling peasants into large-scale collective farms. Such a policy alone could lead to the eradication of capitalism in agriculture.

The fragmentary backward peasant husbandry could only be refashioned by a maximum development of industry, including those branches which manufacture the equipment necessary for the reconstruction of agriculture (farming implements, tractors, etc.). Industry plays the leading part in the socialist reconstruction of the countryside and the Party therefore unswervingly carried out the policy of industrializing the country. The reconstruction of industry was inseparably bound up with the reconstruction of agriculture.

The transition to the reconstruction period was attended by an intense offensive launched by the Party against the capitalist

elements. This socialist offensive created the conditions necessary for the final liquidation of these elements in the Soviet Union.

This offensive also called forth the desperate resistance of the remnants of the capitalist classes and of all elements that were hostile to the proletarian dictatorship. Thus the class struggle in the country was greatly intensified.

The Party's Struggle on the Grain Front

The task of the socialist transformation of agriculture was rendered especially arduous by reason of the difficulties encountered in the grain collections. The grain collection campaigns in the autumn of 1927 and the winter of that year were not satisfactory as a result of which there was a drop of one hundred twenty-eight million poods in the grain receipts as compared with the preceding year.

What were the reasons for these difficulties on the grain front? Comrade Stalin in a number of addresses gave a clear-cut reply to this question and pointed out the correct way of overcoming this difficult situation.*

The principal cause of these grain difficulties was the great lag of grain production behind industrial development. The supply of marketable grain was trailing far behind the rising requirements.

During the restoration period, especially since the beginning of the reconstruction period, industry grew at a rapid pace. New enterprises had sprung up in the cities which attracted new cadres of workers. This situation gave rise to greatly increased bread requirements. But agriculture, especially grain growing, was still at a very low level of development. It was backward, broken up into small farms which continued to be sub-divided and consisted in the main of small strips of land. As against the sixteen million peasant homesteads of the pre-war period, there were twenty-five million of them in 1927-28. This led to a decrease in the amount of grain which the peasants brought to

* Report *On the Grain Front, The Results of the July Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.* in 1928, and speeches at the Plenums of the Central Committee in 1928-29. See *Leninism*, Vol. II.

the market, inasmuch as small-scale farming yields less marketable grain than large-scale farming.

Formerly, under tsarist Russia, the kulaks supplied half of the marketable grain, the landlords supplied a fourth and the remaining fourth was supplied by the poor and middle peasants. In the Soviet Union in 1926-27 the poor and middle peasants had become the principal grain producers. They supplied three-fourths of all the grain produced for the market while the kulaks supplied only one-fifth and the rest was grown by collective and state farms. Thus the principal grain producers were no longer the landlords and kulaks but the small peasants whose material position improved considerably. This was

"... the decisive gain which accrued to the great mass of the peasantry as a result of the October Revolution."*

The toiling peasants began to be better fed, increased their consumption of bread and therefore had less grain for sale. Thus the increased consumption of bread by the peasantry itself and the diminution in the size of peasant farms led to a state of affairs where in 1926-27 as much grain was grown in the country as before the war but only half as much was offered for sale. These were the main reasons why difficulties were encountered on the grain market.

The class enemy was sure to avail himself of this circumstance. The kulak elements in the countryside, although they did not possess the bulk of the grain, started a campaign against the state grain collections, inciting the peasantry against making grain deliveries to the state in their desire to handicap socialist construction thereby.

To these causes must be added the shortcomings in the work of the grain collection apparatus, the inadequate supply of manufactured goods to the rural districts, etc.

The grain collection difficulties in 1927-28 threatened all economy with serious consequences, but the Party found means of overcoming them. The failure to fulfil the grain collection plan would have interfered with the export of grain abroad, as a result of which it would have been impossible to purchase there the machines necessary for the industrialization of the

* Stalin, "On the Grain Front," *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 14.

country. The grain difficulties even menaced the bread supply of the cities and of the Red Army.

The Party was set the task of surmounting the grain difficulties in the shortest possible period of time. For this purpose it became necessary to seize the grain supplies in the country, those in the possession of the kulaks and the well-to-do peasants to be taken first.

In characterizing the situation in January 1928, Comrade Stalin said:

"We were, therefore, faced with the choice: either to make up lost ground and secure a normal rate of grain collection for the future, or to face the inevitability of a profound crisis in the whole of our national economy. What had to be done in order to make up lost ground? It was necessary, first of all, to strike hard at the kulaks and the speculators who were screwing up the price of grain and creating the danger of famine in the country. Secondly, it was necessary to pour the maximum amount of goods into the grain-producing regions. Finally, it was necessary to rouse all our Party organizations and bring about a decisive turn in the whole of our work on grain collections, by rooting out the practice of waiting for grain to come automatically. We were consequently obliged to resort to emergency measures. The measures adopted were effective, and by the end of March we had collected 275,000,000 poods * of grain." **

In this brief characterization he expounded the essence of the immense task which the Party had performed in the field of grain collections. To carry it out the Party organizations had mobilized their forces from top to bottom and had really put all Party organizations and Soviet bodies "on their mettle." A great number of urban workers had been assigned to collect grain and do general Party and Soviet work in the villages.

This period of struggle for grain showed with striking clarity that the class enemy in the countryside was not asleep, that in response to the offensive of the proletarian government he was organizing a frantic campaign of resistance and that he was anxious to starve out the government by holding on to the grain. The kulaks did not deliver up any grain at the government price

* One pood equals 36 English pounds.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

** Stalin, "The Results of the July Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.," *Leninism*, Vol. II, pp. 44-45.

and agitated among the peasantry, especially among those who were well-to-do, to sabotage the state grain collections. The kulaks engaged in grain speculation through dealers in the cities and tried to draw the bulk of the peasantry along the same path. The kulaks organized the assassination of grain collection representatives and other rural workers, set fire to grain stacks, etc.

The Party organizations mobilized the poor and middle peasant masses and thus broke up the campaign of sabotage waged by the kulaks.

For the purpose of ensuring the success of the entire grain collection campaign, the production and supply of manufactured goods to the villages were augmented. The work of the grain collection organizations was improved and the Soviet and co-operative apparatus was purged of such degenerate elements as had become imbued with the mercantile spirit and followed the lead of the kulaks.

To counteract the kulaks and hoarding speculators who were screwing up prices and disrupting the state grain collections, certain emergency measures were taken: these malefactors were brought to court on charges of speculation and their grain supplies were confiscated. Emergency measures, which were applied largely with the participation of the poor and middle peasants, played a great part in this struggle for grain.

By the end of March 1928 the Party secured an over-fulfilment of the grain collection plan due to the good work it performed.

While waging this struggle for the fulfilment of grain collections, the Party mapped out far-reaching measures that would finally solve the grain problem, and increased its activities on the socialist reconstruction of the whole of agricultural production. In a number of decisions (those of the April, July and November Plenums of 1928) the Central Committee evolved practical measures for the more extensive development of collectivization and the creation of state farms which in the course of four to five years would yield no less than one hundred million poods of grain annually to the state.

In addition to this the Party during the same period extended aid to the individual poor and middle peasants by raising the

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productivity of their farms, drawing the peasantry into the co-operative system, bringing them into the system of grain delivery contracts, etc.

This program served the Party organizations as their basis for tackling the grain problem—under the circumstances one of the most important problems of the economic policy. If the country had not been assured of its grain supply it would have been impossible to carry out the stupendous task of industrializing the country, it would have been impossible to fulfil the Five-Year Plan which was soon to be brought to the fore. The struggle for grain was thus a real struggle for the successful building of socialism.

While this fierce struggle for grain was going on in 1927-28, Party work in the countryside assumed much more life though a number of shortcomings and distortions of the Party line came to light at the same time. In some rural Party organizations open Right opportunists were revealed who had coalesced with kulak elements, had made common cause with them and had failed to wage any struggle for grain. On the other hand, "Left" excesses occurred as a result of which various localities applied the emergency measures also to middle peasants during the grain collection season.

The April and July Plenums of the Central Committee in 1928 strongly denounced these distortions of the Party line. On the basis of the decisions adopted by the Central Committee, the Party organizations intensified their struggle against the Right opportunist elements which were opposed to a further offensive against the kulaks. On the other hand, those guilty of "Left" excesses, who were anxious to see the temporary emergency measures become permanent and were overzealous in their treatment of the middle peasants, were likewise sternly called to task.

The Shakhty Trial and Its Lessons

During these grain difficulties the class struggle became more intense not only in the countryside but also on other sectors of socialist construction. In 1928 the organs of the State Political Administration (G.P.U.) uncovered a counter-revolutionary organization in the Shakhty coal region of the Donetz Basin. This

organization was formed by former mine owners and their officials, then in the employ of Soviet industry. It had set itself the task of disrupting the development of industry and the consolidation of the country's defence capacity by engaging in wrecking activities. The organization had close contacts with various capitalist governments and its wrecking activities were intended to facilitate the attack of the imperialists against the Soviet Republic. These wreckers flooded the best pits, at the same time developing mining sections that were unsuitable. They systematically deranged the mechanization of the coal industry, destroyed machinery, etc.

The Shakhty wreckers' trial disclosed the new methods of struggle (wrecking) employed by the bourgeois counter-revolution against the proletarian state during the reconstruction period. This trial represented one of the stages in the desperate class struggle which the remnants of the capitalist classes in the Soviet Union were unfolding against the proletarian dictatorship. In 1930 and 1931 large-scale wreckers' organizations were discovered and were exposed at public trials (that of the Industrial Party, etc.).

Incidental to the exposure of these wreckers' organizations the Party laid bare a number of shortcomings in the work of the economic, trade union and even some Party organizations: the loss of class vigilance with regard to bourgeois specialists, a bureaucratic attitude towards suggestions submitted by workers, insufficient enlistment of the workers into the management of industry, suppression of self-criticism, etc. After specially discussing the lessons to be derived from the Shakhty trial, the Party urgently pressed the issue of creating as quickly as possible a new technical intelligentsia to consist of working-class people. The question was taken up at the Plenums of the Central Committee held in July 1928 and November 1929, at which Comrades Molotov and Kaganovich delivered reports. The Central Committee pointed out that the task of creating new specialists "is a most important task which concerns the whole Party." To carry out this task the appropriations for the training of new specialists were increased, the entire system of preparing technical cadres was radically reorganized and improved, large groups of tested Communists and non-Party work-

ers ("Party thousands" and "trade union thousands") were sent to study.

The decisions of the Central Committee on the Shakhty trial served as the basis for much activity in drawing the masses of workers into the management of production and improving the material and cultural conditions of life of the Donetz Basin workers. The Party organizations increased their vigilance with regard to hostile elements, struck hard at bureaucracy and strove to have workers' democracy and self-criticism introduced on a broad scale in all phases of work.

The development of democracy and self-criticism within the Party, the drawing of the broad masses of the workers into socialist construction and the fight for the rooting out of all the shortcomings in their work became especially important in the conditions obtained during the reconstruction period. In the summer of 1928 the Central Committee appealed to all the organizations of the Party and the working class to develop self-criticism on a wide scale.

"Self-criticism is as necessary to us as air, as water," said Comrade Stalin. . . . "Let the Party, let the Bolsheviks, let all honest workers and toiling elements in our country lay bare the shortcomings in our work, the shortcomings of our construction; let them point out the way our shortcomings can be removed so that there may be no stagnation, no bog, no putrescence in our work or in our construction; so that our whole work, our whole construction may improve from day to day and pass from one success to another." *

This manifesto of the Central Committee on the development of self-criticism played a great part in eliminating the shortcomings and improving all phases of work.

The Party in the Struggle Against the Right Deviation as the Main Danger

With the transition to the reconstruction period the hostile classes that had outlived their day, primarily the kulaks, in reply to the socialist offensive of the proletariat intensified their resistance to the policy of the Soviet government.

This resistance was reflected in individual unstable elements

* Stalin, *Report to the Moscow Activists, April 1928.*

among the Party members. In this period the openly opportunist Right deviation became the principal manifestation of the opportunist vacillations. Three members of the Central Committee—Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky—became prominent as the leading group of the Right Opposition. The Rights waged a fierce struggle against the Leninist line of the Central Committee in their endeavour to steer the entire Party in the direction of the Right opportunist policy.

The Party was compelled to wage a hard battle against the Right deviation before it could defeat it, guarantee the prosecution of the correct Leninist policy and achieve the victory of socialism in the country.

During the course of the grain collections Right opportunism clearly came to light. The Right opportunist elements controverted the emergency measures, considered the policy of the Party incorrect and accused the Central Committee of exerting too much pressure against the kulak strata in the countryside. As early as the July Plenum of the Central Committee in 1928, Bukharin's Right opportunist vacillations on the question of the emergency measures, and the development of the collective farms made themselves felt.

The letters of Frumkin, then People's Vice Commissar of Finance, addressed to the Central Committee were a striking expression of the Right opportunist platform of that day. In the summer of 1928 Frumkin propagated a palpably kulak, anti-Party doctrine in which he asserted outright that the Party ought not to interfere with kulak farming, ought not to enlarge the state and collective farms as the Central Committee had decided but on the contrary ought to moderate the rates of development of Soviet industry. He made the slanderous assertion that the proletariat was becoming dissociated from the middle peasants, that agriculture was going through a period of decline, whereas in reality the poor and middle peasant masses were at that time increasing the area sown by them. He deemed it necessary to launch the slogan: "Back to the Fourteenth Congress."

In the autumn of 1928, on the eve of the first year of the Five-Year Plan, Bukharin published his article entitled *Notes of an Economist* in which he proposed to trim down the rates of

development for industry and tried to demonstrate that in the field of economic construction the Party must adjust its pace to the so-called "tight spots." This would have meant that the Party was not to mobilize its forces to overcome the difficulties encountered (for instance, in the grain collections, the shortage of building materials) but ought to reconcile itself to these shortcomings and curtail the development of socialist economy accordingly.

Bukharin assumed the role of chief theoretician of the Right deviation. His past opportunist errors (those he committed during the war period, during the period of "Left Communism," his slogan "Enrich Yourselves" launched in 1925, etc.) which he at the time had retracted under the pressure of the Party became particularly manifest in the reconstruction period. Now Bukharin was fighting stubbornly against the Party's Leninist line and advocating an entire system of Right opportunist views which were intimately connected with his former errors. Bukharin's un-Marxist, anti-Leninist theory of the extinction of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat and his theory that the kulak would grow into socialism supplied the theoretical foundation for this deviation.

Whereas Lenin taught that after the capture of power by the proletariat the class struggle would not only not cease but on the contrary would become more intense, Bukharin asserted that socialist construction would proceed peacefully, of its own accord, without any intensification of the class struggle. According to his theory the capitalist elements (the kulaks, the concessionaires, etc.) would grow into socialism and thus the destruction of the classes and the building of socialism would proceed smoothly, without a ripple. This theory of Bukharin's was a gross perversion of the doctrine of Marx and Lenin concerning the dictatorship of the proletariat and its acceptance would have led to the destruction of the proletarian state by the class forces hostile to it.

"The abolition of classes by means of the bitter class struggle of the proletariat—such is Lenin's formula," said Comrade Stalin.

"The abolition of classes by means of the dying down of the class struggle and the capitalists growing into socialism—such is Comrade Bukharin's formula.

"What can there be in common between these two formulas? It is obvious that there is not and cannot be anything in common between them." *

In their speeches and declarations to the Central Committee made in 1928-29, Bukharin and other Right opportunists warred against the industrialization of the country and the tempo of socialist construction applied by the Party. They grossly distorted Lenin's line with regard to the peasantry, and inveighed against the policy of the socialist reconstruction of the countryside which the Central Committee was carrying out. Bukharin tried to slur over the dual nature of the middle peasant and discountenanced Lenin's political appraisal of him.

"As a toiler, the peasant, preferring the dictatorship of the workers to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, is drawn to socialism. As a seller of grain, the peasant is drawn to the bourgeoisie, to free trade, i.e., back to the 'accustomed,' old 'time-honoured' capitalism." **

Individual, small commodity peasant husbandry steadily and inevitably gives rise to capitalism. Therefore, as long as this system of economy exists, said Lenin, the country offers a basis on which capitalism can develop. Only the socialist reconstruction of peasant husbandry can finally destroy capitalism.

"We have not pulled up the roots of capitalism and have not undermined the foundation, the basis of the internal foe," said Lenin at the beginning of the N.E.P. "The latter is sustained by small-scale farming and there is only one way to sap his strength—to provide the economy of the country, including agriculture, with a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern, large-scale production." ***

Comrade Bukharin decried these fundamental precepts of Lenin. The policy of alliance with the middle peasant was reduced by him to a policy of making uninterrupted concessions to the peasantry. This would have led to a renunciation of the leading role of the proletariat and the socialist reconstruction of the countryside. This was aimed directly against Lenin who taught that we do not need any and every alliance with the

* Stalin, "The Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.," *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 124.

** Lenin, "Greetings to the Hungarian Workers," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXIV.

*** Lenin, "Eighth All-Russian Congress," *Collected Works*, Vol. XXVI.

peasantry but only such an alliance with the basic masses of the middle peasants as is based on the struggle against the kulak elements, as guarantees the leading role of the proletariat, consolidates the proletarian state and leads to the destruction of classes.

Bukharin's line would have meant that complete freedom was to be granted to the development of small commodity and kulak economy. His line grossly distorted the essence and functions of the proletarian dictatorship. In fighting against the policy of collectivization Bukharin declared that the co-operative system (consumers' and marketing co-operatives), rather than the collective farms, represented the highroad to socialism. Thus he drew a contrast between collective farms and the co-operative system whereas in Lenin's co-operative plan these two ideas were inseparably intertwined; the collective farms, according to Lenin's idea, represented the highest form of co-operation.

With all these anti-Leninist views as their point of departure, the Rights launched upon a struggle against the Central Committee on all basic questions of Party policy.

In the summer and autumn of 1928 a group of workers of the Moscow Party organization headed by Uglanov, secretary of the Moscow Party Committee, came out in defence of the Right opportunist positions. The Uglanovists joined by Bukharin and Frumkin proposed to give free rein to the development of kulak economy in the countryside and to develop light instead of heavy industry. They demanded that the Party pursue a line of constant concessions to the peasantry and support all other Right opportunist propositions.

The Uglanovist leadership of the Moscow Committee (Uglanov, Kotov, Rutin and others) endeavoured to organize their Right opportunist group of activists in Moscow and made attempts to utilize the entire Moscow organization in the struggle against the general line of the Party, against the Central Committee and against Comrade Stalin, the leader of the Party. By their slanderous attacks against the Central Committee and Comrade Stalin in the present case, the Right opportunists as well as the Trotskyists were repeating the actions of the Mensheviks, who in their day calumniated Lenin in similarly frenzied fashion.

However, all these attempts of the Uglanovists came to nought. The Uglanovist group met with the merciless rebuff of the Moscow organization, which removed the Rights from their posts and replaced them by staunch defenders of the Leninist line of the Central Committee.

The manifesto of the Central Committee addressed to all the members of the Moscow organization and Comrade Stalin's speech delivered at the October Plenum of the Moscow committee in 1928 played a great part in the struggle against the Right opportunist leaders of the Moscow organization. Comrade Stalin revealed the departure of the Rights from the Leninist policy and their capitulation before the class enemy. All organizations of the Party unanimously approved of the rout of the Right opportunists in the Moscow organization.

In connection with the strengthening of the Right opportunist vacillations. Comrade Stalin concentrated the attention of the Party on the struggle against Right opportunism. At the November Plenum of the Central Committee in 1928 he exposed the kulak platform of the Right deviation which took shape about that time and demonstrated its utter harmfulness for the development of socialist construction.

At the same time, Comrade Stalin pointed out the necessity of an unabating struggle against the "Left" deviation which was a deviation toward Trotskyism. The representatives of this deviation defended the policy of super-industrialization, a policy which tended to cause a rupture between the working class and the middle peasants, which committed excesses against the middle peasants, etc. Both the Right and "Left" deviations would have led to a restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R. The "Left" deviation is the shadow of the Right deviation, said Comrade Stalin. What has been their visage and what has been the difference between them?

"The difference consists in the fact that their platforms are different, their demands are different and their approach and methods are different. If, for instance, the Rights say: *'It is a mistake to build Dnieprostroy,'* while the 'Lefts' on the contrary retort: *'What is the good of one Dnieprostroy? Give us a Dnieprostroy every year,'* it must be admitted that there obviously is some difference between them. If the Rights say *'do not interfere with the kulak, give him freedom to develop,'* while the 'Lefts,' on the contrary, retort,

'strike not only at the kulak, but also at the middle peasant, since he is just as much a private property owner as the kulak,' it must be admitted that there obviously is some difference between them. If the Rights say *'difficulties have set in, is it not time to quit?'* while the 'Lefts' on the contrary, say, *'what are difficulties to us: a fig for difficulties, let us dash ahead!'* it must be admitted that there obviously is some difference between them. . . . It is essential for us, Leninists, to conduct a fight on two fronts, against the Right deviation and against the 'Left' deviation."*

The Party laid the utmost stress upon the fact that the Right deviation was the main danger. It reflected the kulak danger which in the period of socialist reconstruction and the uprooting of capitalism was the principal danger in the country.

"Precisely because the Right deviation reflects the resistance of the principal elements of the dying classes, the Right deviation is the principal danger of the moment in our Party."**

The fact that the Right deviation then represented the main danger also followed from the circumstance that the Party had already defeated Trotskyism, which had been the main danger in the Party during the preceding stage.

The Party's intensified struggle against opportunism, which came out more or less openly, was paralleled by the Party's intensified struggle against the elements which were adopting a conciliatory attitude towards the manifestations of opportunism and which did not wage a struggle against them. Conciliators are concealed opportunists and serve as a nursery of opportunism. They weaken the struggle of the Party on two fronts and retard the defeat of the opportunists. Therefore, the struggle against conciliationism must be waged with the same irreconcilability and steadfastness as the struggle against the Rights and the "Lefts." The decisions of the November Plenum of the Central Committee mobilized all Party organizations for the struggle against opportunism.

Soon after the Plenum the Party engaged in a major combat with the Right deviation in the leadership of the trade unions.

* Stalin, "The Industrialization of the Country and the Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.," *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 95.

** Stalin, "Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.," *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 336.

This deviation had manifested itself with particular clarity at the time of the Eighth Trade Union Congress, in December 1928.

The higher trade union leaders, headed by Comrade Tomsky, stood squarely on the platform of the Right opportunists. They endeavoured to lead the trade unions along the path of opportunism and to use them as a rampart in the struggle against the Party. With their Right opportunist line as a starting point, the trade union opportunists attempted to draw a contrast between the trade unions and the Party.

The leaders of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions with all their might resisted the reorganization of the trade unions required by the changed conditions of the reconstruction period. Instead of mobilizing the masses to struggle for a high tempo of production, for the development of industry and the transformation of the countryside, they tried to keep the trade union organizations in the background, detached from these tasks. The fact that the trade union leaders had had no hand in the initiation of socialist competition and shock brigade work was a striking example of Right opportunism. The Rights made special efforts to keep the trade unions from participation in the collectivization of the rural districts.

The Party closely interlinked the work of the trade unions directed towards improving socialist economy with their day-to-day work of improving the material and living conditions of the trade union members. The Rights on the contrary held to the view that the task of the trade unions consisted merely in defending the material interests of the trade union masses. They counterpoised the "protective" functions of the trade unions to their production functions, thereby grossly distorting Lenin's precepts concerning the functions of the trade unions under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Right deviationists did not conduct the work of the trade unions so as to aid in the discharge of the basic tasks of the proletarian dictatorship, as Lenin had always demanded, but reduced this work to tackling cultural and social problems, to protecting the narrow craft interests of the trade union masses. By failing to mobilize the trade unions for the discharge of the duties imposed upon them by the reconstruction period, they

set the trade unions in opposition to the state and slipped down to menshevism.

At the Eighth Trade Union Congress the Right opportunist leadership developed a fierce struggle against the Leninist line of the Central Committee. They were especially stubborn in their fight to keep Comrade Kaganovich, secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., from becoming a member of the presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. The election of Comrade Kaganovich, an inveterate fighter against opportunism, to this post ensured the defeat of opportunism in the trade unions and the carrying out of the general line of the Party by these unions. This was the very reason why the trade union leaders had opposed his election, thus showing very clearly their Right opportunist essence and their opposition to the line of the Central Committee of the Party. Tomsky wanted to make use of the Eighth Congress for the purpose of there organizing his adherents and patching up a group to war against the Central Committee.

But despite all manoeuvres, the Rights in the trade unions suffered complete shipwreck. The Party organizations (communist fractions) in the trade unions under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party commenced an active campaign for the carrying out of the Party line in the trade union movement. They removed the Right opportunist leaders and put staunch exponents of the bolshevik line in their place.

However, the Rights did not cease their struggle against the Party. At the Plenum of the Central Committee held in April 1929 the entire trio of Right opposition leaders—Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky as well as Uglanov came out with a detailed Right opportunist platform in which they repeated their slanderous accusations. The Rights spoke like outright defenders of kulakdom. In their opinion there were no kulaks in the country altogether. Bukharin claimed that those whom the Party considered kulaks were not kulaks at all but paupers.

The Right group endeavoured to secure a radical change in the Party's policy. Instead of exerting pressure upon the kulak upper stratum of the rural districts, when collecting grain in the country, the Rights proposed to import grain from abroad.

This would have necessitated a retrenchment in the import of industrial equipment and put a stop to the industrialization of the country. The Rights explained their stand against the development of the collective and state farms by declaring that the state would not get any grain from these farms for at least five or ten years at best. Therefore, they insisted on developing individual farming. They came out against the new, the production forms of the bond between the proletariat and the peasantry (contractation,* the supply of tractors, farming implements and machinery, etc. to the peasants through co-operative organizations). They insisted on developing free trade and a *laissez-faire* policy on the markets, which would have led to a regime of speculation and to a development of capitalist elements. When the Five-Year plan was discussed at the Plenum, the Rights opposed it. Comrade Rykov trotted out his own opportunist two-year plan to countervail the Five-Year Plan. In substance it simmered down to a policy of retrenchment in appropriations for industry, to slackening down the rates of industrialization in the country and to steering a course headed toward the development of individual farming, including kulak farming, instead of the development of collectivization as projected by the Five-Year Plan.

The entire theory and practice of the Rights clearly attested the fact that in essence they were tumbling down so low as to deny the possibility of building socialism in the Soviet Union, so low as to become a kulak agency within the Party.

The Right opportunists were dealt a crushing blow by the Plenum of the Central Committee and all the organizations of the Party. In his speech at the Plenum, Comrade Stalin, after exposing the theoretical and political essence of the position of the Right deviation, showed that the Party and the Opposition pursued two different political lines. One line was the revolutionary, Leninist line of the whole Party. The second line was the line of Bukharin's group which embodied the substance of the Right deviation, said Comrade Stalin.

* The system by which the peasants conclude contracts with the state to grow and deliver to the state certain quantities of certain crops at a given price in compensation for credits and agro-technical assistance rendered by the state.—Ed. Eng. ed.

"The fight against the Right deviation is not a secondary duty of our Party. . . . Does Comrade Bukharin's group understand that to refuse to fight the Right deviation is to *betray* the working class, to *betray* the revolution? Does Comrade Bukharin's group understand that unless we overcome the Right deviation and conciliationism it will be impossible to overcome the difficulties facing us, and that unless we overcome these difficulties it will be impossible to achieve decisive successes in socialist construction?" *

Comrade Stalin's concise formulation of the essence of Right opportunism helped the Party quickly to find its bearings in the anti-Leninist, capitulatory position of the Rights and promptly to mobilize the Party organizations. All the work of the Party throughout this period was conducted under the slogan of struggle against opportunism on two fronts, against the Right deviation as the main danger and against a conciliatory attitude toward opportunism.

As the struggle against the Rights proceeded, their factional work came to the light of day. To their factionalism disclosed in the trade unions, the Moscow Party organization and elsewhere, the Rights now added a new anti-Party manoeuvre—the policy of resigning. They sabotaged the work entrusted to them. Without prior sanction, Tomskey left his work in the trade unions and Bukharin discontinued his work in the Comintern without permission of the Party. Finally, Bukharin as early as July 1928 tried to forge an anti-Party *bloc* with Kamenev to fight the Central Committee. The Party discovered this factional work in time, made short shrift of it and pointed out to these factionalists that any further attempts on their part in this direction would lead to their expulsion from the Party.

In the course of the struggle against the opportunists an immense amount of political and educational work was done. The Party enlightened its members and the non-Party masses of the workers on the real Leninist views concerning the construction of socialism, and it achieved an improvement in the ideological bolshevik tempering and political equipment of the Party masses. In the fight against Trotskyism and the Right deviation new Party cadres grew up. They became steeled and gained in strength as they performed their tremendous constructive work

* Stalin, "The Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.," *Leninism*, Vol. II, pp. 162-63.

in the irreconcilable struggle for the Leninist line of the Party, and rallied around the Central Committee and Comrade Stalin, the leader of the Party.

Sixth Congress of the Comintern and Adoption of the Program of World Proletarian Revolution

In July and August 1928, the Sixth Congress of the Comintern met in Moscow. It was of tremendous importance in effecting the consolidation of the various Communist Parties and in mapping out the further struggle for the proletarian revolution.

The Congress met at a time when the elements of a new revolutionary upsurge were maturing in the countries of capitalism. The capitalist world, as the Sixth Congress pointed out, was entering upon the third period of the post-war general crisis of the capitalist system.

The *first* period (1918-23) had been a period of acute crisis for the capitalist system, a period when direct revolutionary actions of the proletariat against capitalism were in progress.

The *second* period (after the defeat of the German revolution in 1923) was a period of the partial stabilization of capitalism and the ebbing of the revolutionary wave, while on the other hand, this was a period when the Soviet Union achieved major successes in socialist construction.

In the *third* period capitalist production exceeded the pre-war level whereas the Soviet Union had by that time restored its devastated economy and had inaugurated its reconstruction period.

The principal characteristic of the third period is the circumstance that it accentuates the contradictions in the capitalist world: those between the workers and the capitalists, those between the capitalist countries themselves, those between the imperialist and the colonial countries, those between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist world. The third period is a period when capitalist stabilization is shaken and the general crisis of capitalism is sharply intensified.

The resolution of the Sixth Congress states:

"This third period, in which the contradiction between the growth of the productive forces and the contraction of markets become particularly accentuated, is inevitably giving rise to a fresh series of

imperialist wars among the imperialist states themselves, wars of the imperialist states against the U.S.S.R., wars of national liberation against imperialism and imperialist intervention, and to gigantic class battles." *

This appraisal of the new period served as the basis on which the Congress defined the principal tasks of the communist movement. The Communist Parties must organize the struggle against imperialist wars and for the defence of the Soviet Union, of the Chinese revolution and the colonial uprisings. They must develop the struggle against the offensive of capital and for the day-to-day needs of the working class, fighting indefatigably to win over the majority of the working class to the side of the Communist Parties and preparing the forces for the struggle to win the dictatorship of the proletariat. These tasks of the Communist Parties have made it necessary to intensify the struggle against Social-Democracy, primarily against its "Left" wing which by its phrasemongering deceives the workers and delays their withdrawal from Social-Democracy. Hence arose the task of intensifying the struggle against the Right deviation in the Communist Parties and of expelling the Right opportunists from the Party, of intensifying the struggle against conciliationism which screens Right opportunism and of strengthening Party discipline.

Noting that the Communist Parties were waging a successful struggle against the Trotskyist groupings which had begun to disintegrate after the defeat of the Trotskyist opposition in the C.P.S.U., the Congress centred attention on the intensified struggle against the Right deviation, which at that time became the main danger in the Comintern.

Comrade Stalin said in 1928:

*"Under capitalist conditions, the Right deviation in communism represents a tendency, an inclination, not yet formulated, it is true, and perhaps not even consciously realized, but nevertheless a tendency, on the part of a section of Communists to depart from the revolutionary line of Marxism in the direction of Social-Democracy. . . . The triumph of the Right deviation in the Communist Parties in capitalist countries favours the conditions necessary for the preservation of capitalism." ***

* *Sixth World Congress of the Communist International*, p. 1568.

** Stalin, "The Right Danger in the C.P.S.U.," *Leninism*, Vol. II, pp. 58-59.

The Sixth Congress instructed all parties to struggle not only against the Right deviation but also against all kinds of "Left" opportunists who denied the necessity of the united front tactics to win over the majority of workers for communism, who denied the importance of working in the trade unions, who did not want to carry on persistent systematic work to prepare the forces of the proletariat for the decisive struggles against capitalism.

The Program of the Comintern was the most important item on the agenda of the Sixth Congress. The adoption of such a program was of tremendous political importance for the whole international revolutionary movement.

Comrade Stalin said:

"The cardinal significance of the program of the Comintern is that it gives a scientific formulation of the fundamental problems of the communist movement, indicates the main paths of solution of these problems and thus gives the sections of the Comintern that clarity of aim and method without which a confident forward movement is impossible."*

The program was worked out under the direct *guidance* and *participation* of Comrade Stalin, thanks to which the international proletariat received a profound, clear and truly Leninist document. The Program of the Comintern was worked out on the granite foundation of the doctrines of Marx and Engels, of Lenin and Stalin.

In the program use was made of the further development of Leninism as contributed by Comrade Stalin after Lenin's death.

Here a number of questions were included in the elaboration of which Comrade Stalin had further developed the theory of Marxism-Leninism and raised it to a higher plane. In this further elaboration of the Leninist doctrine concerning the development of modern society, Comrade Stalin presented a profound analysis of the struggle between the two systems—that of the U.S.S.R. and that of the capitalist world. He demonstrated that the entire development of world history must now be determined by the struggle between these two opposing camps.

Comrade Stalin developed the doctrine of Marx, Engels and

* Stalin, "The Results of the July Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.," *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 43.

Lenin concerning the dictatorship of the proletariat and the transition period from capitalism to socialism. Comrade Stalin concretized and developed further the Leninist doctrine concerning the victory of socialism in one country. He developed the doctrine of Marx and Lenin concerning the national and colonial question as a component part of the general theory of international revolution. Comrade Stalin developed the Leninist doctrine concerning the Party and its tremendous role in the system of the proletarian dictatorship, and likewise developed the Leninist analysis of the social and ideological roots of opportunism. He disclosed and demonstrated also the peculiar features of its manifestations and the direction of the main blow against the various forms of opportunism at the various stages of the class struggle.

The working class came into possession of a program the theses of which are law for millions of organized proletarians of all races and nations in all parts of the world. It is a program of mortal combat with the bourgeoisie for the world dictatorship of the proletariat; it is a guide for the millions of oppressed in their struggle against their oppressors in every part of the globe.

In view of the specific conditions of the third period the Sixth Congress specially discussed the question of the war danger. It noted that the maturing of the contradictions in the camp of capitalism was leading to an aggravation of the war danger, primarily of war against the Soviet Union. This was precisely the point which the Right opportunists in the Comintern refused to recognize, as they denied the danger of a military attack against the U.S.S.R. and thus played into the hands of its enemies.

The Soviet Union, reads the Resolution of the Congress, has achieved tremendous successes in the cause of socialist construction. They inspire the international proletariat to struggle against capitalism and serve as a visible confirmation of the correctness of the general line of the C.P.S.U.

The *Tenth Plenum* of the Executive Committee of the Comintern which was convened a year later, in July 1929, noted that life had completely corroborated the appraisal given by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern. During this period the Com-

intern had fought intensely against the Right opportunists (particularly in the Communist Parties of the U.S.A., Germany and Czechoslovakia) who had not ceased their opposition to the Leninist line of the Communist International. The Plenum ruled that *upholding the Right deviation was incompatible with membership in the Communist Party*. This decision made it the duty of all Parties to cleanse their ranks of members who were propagating Right opportunist views.

On the eve of the Plenum Bukharin published an article in which he maintained that capitalism could eliminate competition within the capitalist countries and could alleviate the crises, that capitalism was now being transformed into "organized capitalism." He tried to bolster up his point by arguing that the technical base of capitalism was strengthening, thus sliding down to social-democratic positions. This opportunist theory of "organized capitalism," which had nothing in common with Leninism, showed that Bukharin not only failed to admit his Right opportunist mistakes but was continuing to aggravate these mistakes. The Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern decided to remove Bukharin from the Presidium of the Executive Committee.

Sixteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U. and Approval of the First Five-Year Plan

The Sixteenth Party Conference took place in April 1929. It approved the First Five-Year Plan. The adoption of this plan was of paramount importance for the U.S.S.R. and the whole international revolutionary movement.

It was the function of this Five-Year Plan, as Comrade Stalin stated, to transform the U.S.S.R. from a feeble agrarian country into an industrial and fully independent country. It was the task of the proletariat finally to squeeze out the capitalist elements, to expand socialist economy and create the economic basis for the destruction of classes and the building of socialist society in the U.S.S.R. The First Five-Year Plan set the task of switching small and fragmentary farming to the track of large-scale collective farming. This was to guarantee the economic base of socialism in the countryside and to preclude the possibility of a restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union.

For the purpose of carrying out these plans, it was necessary to transform the backward technique of the country to modern technique and to create such branches of industry as would be capable of equipping all industry and agriculture with new, mechanized means of production.

Finally, the First Five-Year Plan was assigned the task of raising the defence capacity of the country to the very highest plane.

The First Five-Year Plan contemplated an investment in national economy amounting to the tremendous sum of sixty-four and a half billion rubles, while during the preceding five years only twenty-six and a half billion rubles had been so invested. All construction had to be carried on with internal resources. The Soviet Union did not receive a single kopek as a loan from any foreign government.

During the course of the First Five-Year Plan the output of all industry was to rise 2.8-fold while the output of heavy industry was to rise 3.3-fold. Heavy industry and its core—machine building—represented the vital spot of the First Five-Year Plan.

In electrical engineering the plan envisaged the construction of forty-two electric power stations; the output of pig iron was to rise from three million tons to ten million tons a year; coal mining was to grow from thirty-five million tons to seventy-five million tons in the last year of the First Five-Year Plan. The Party projected the founding during the First Five-Year Plan period of quite a number of absolutely new branches of industry in formerly backward Russia—the manufacture of automobiles and tractors, chemicals, machinery, etc.

The plan contemplated the collectivization of 20 per cent of all peasant farms and an increase in the output of agriculture amounting to 50 per cent.

So grand and bold a plan of construction could only be advanced by a Bolshevik Party in the firm conviction that guided by the Leninist line it would fulfil its plan and overcome all opposition offered by the class enemies.

The Sixteenth Conference pointed out that the realization of the Five-Year Plan was attended by difficulties within and without the country which had to be surmounted.

These difficulties arose out of the strenuous provisions of the plan itself, and the strenuous provisions of the plan were in turn dictated by the fact that the U.S.S.R. was surrounded by capitalist countries. The difficult provisions of the plan were likewise dictated by the technical and economic backwardness of the country and the complexity of the task of the socialist transformation of the many millions of scattered peasant farms. The difficulties in carrying out the First Five-Year Plan were aggravated by the intensification of the class struggle and the resistance of the capitalist elements that were being squeezed out by the offensive of the proletariat.

On approving the First Five-Year Plan the Party, fully aware of all these factors, stressed the necessity of completely fulfilling this plan. The Party laid particular stress upon the need to develop the highest possible tempo in carrying out the Five-Year Plan. Early in 1931 when mobilizing the Party and the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. for the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan Comrade Stalin pointed out the immense historical significance of the struggle for tempo in socialist construction.

"It is sometimes asked whether it is not possible to slow down a bit in *tempo*, to retard the movement. No, comrades, this is impossible! It is impossible to reduce the *tempo*! On the contrary, it is necessary as far as possible to accelerate it. This necessity is dictated by our obligations to the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. This is dictated to us by our obligations to the working class of the whole world.

"To slacken the *tempo* means to fall behind. And the backward are always beaten. But we do not want to be beaten. . . . Do you want our socialist fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence? If you do not want this you must put an end to this backwardness as speedily as possible and develop genuine bolshevik speed in building up the socialist system of economy. There are no other ways." *

The Right opportunists who fought against the high tempo and opposed the whole Five-Year Plan proposed to concentrate attention on the development of light industry (manufacturing cotton goods, shoes, clothing) instead of on heavy industry which was to create the economic basis for socialism, thus re-

* Stalin, "The Tasks of Business Managers," *Leninism*, Vol. II, pp. 365-66.

nouncing the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union. Just as the Economists and other opportunists at the dawn of the labour movement in Russia had protected the "penny wage rise interests" of the workers and had refused to fight for the ultimate goal, the dictatorship of the proletariat, so now the Right opportunists, in protecting the consumers' interests of the day, refused at a most important stage of socialist construction—during the reconstruction period—to perform the task of proletarian dictatorship—to build socialism.

For the fulfilment of the tasks set by the First Five-Year Plan it was necessary to mobilize the millions of the working class and the toiling peasantry. The Sixteenth Conference adopted a manifesto concerning the advancement of socialist competition and called upon the working class to bend every effort toward the fulfilment of the gigantic tasks of the Five-Year Plan. Socialist competition and the Five-Year Plan are inseparably connected, said the manifesto of the Conference. Socialist competition is a powerful means of awakening and organizing the initiative of the masses for the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan, as well as of developing self-criticism from below.

Socialist competition was a new, communist method of work, on the basis of which the Party has been mobilizing the activity of the millions of toilers in a Herculean struggle for socialism.

The Conference further underscored the fact that for the fulfilment of the historical tasks of the Five-Year Plan an unflinching struggle against the opportunist elements was imperative.

On proceeding to the struggle for the realization of the First Five-Year Plan, the Party at its Sixteenth Conference decided to carry out a Party purging. The object of the purging was mercilessly to cast out of the Party all elements alien to it—incorrigible bureaucrats, persons who had come in under false colours, who were associated with the class enemy or who had become divorced from the Party, and to expose and expel concealed Trotskyists and adherents of other anti-Party groups.

The Sixteenth Conference also adopted a decision on combating bureaucracy and purging the Soviet apparatus. Bureaucrats and class-alien elements were cleaned out of the state apparatus so that the task of the First Five-Year plan might be fulfilled.

The Conference specially discussed the question of promoting agriculture and noted the development of new production forms in the bond with the peasantry. Soviet industry had by that time reached a stage where it became possible to render aid to the peasantry, not only to satisfy their personal requirements but to bring about a radical reorganization and upgrade movement in agricultural production. This enabled the Party to increase the number of machine and tractor stations and strengthen the supply of the poor and middle peasant masses in the countryside with machines and other agricultural implements, while it simultaneously united these sections of the peasantry in collective farms.

The Year of Great Change

All Party work after the Sixteenth Conference was directed toward the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan. In order to achieve this goal the Party reorganized the work of the Party organizations, using the slogan "face industry" as its keynote. The Party organizations at the various enterprises unfolded great activity. They rallied the working class around the general line of the Party, without for a moment relaxing their warfare against petty-bourgeois sentiments. The struggle for the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan in each branch of industry and at each plant became the basic political task of the Party organizations.

For the purpose of fulfilling this task, each Party nucleus had to march in the van of the workers of the respective enterprise in order to lead in all important questions concerning production. Just as in the period of the Civil War the Communists had marched in the front ranks and had focused the attention of the working class on the principal questions of the armed struggle, so in the period of reconstruction the Communists took their stand at the critical sectors in the struggle for the First Five-Year Plan. They mobilized the forces of the working class for the consummation of the Five-Year Plan.

The Central Committee of the Party systematically, day by day, directed the reorganization of the work of all Party organizations from the regional and "district committees down to the

nuclei at the shops, in the villages and in the soviet apparatus. It strove to reorganize all their work to fit the tasks set by the Five-Year Plan. The Central Committee defined in detail the concrete tasks of the Party organizations in all branches of socialist construction—in the production of metal and coal, the construction of new industrial centres, in the lumber and oil industries, on the state farms, in the struggle for collectivization, for grain, etc.

This tremendous amount of work carried out by the Party produced results in a very short period of time. These results were manifest in the first place in the great labour enthusiasm and fervid activity of the working class directed towards the solution of the tasks of the First Five-Year Plan.

Socialist competition, which had made its appearance even before the Sixteenth Party Conference, embraced increasingly broad strata of the working class. The Young Communist League played a great part in the development of socialist competition. It was the first to respond to the appeal of the Party and the Party press which in January 1929 had republished an article by Lenin entitled *How to Organize Competition*. At the initiative of its Young Communist League nucleus, the Leningrad Red Putilov Works challenged the metallurgical works of the south and the Urals to a competition, and organized such a competition within the works to determine which was the best shop. In March 1929 the workers of the Red Viborgian Plant challenged all the enterprises of the Soviet Union to socialist competition. This challenge met with eager response among the broad strata of the working class and after the lapse of a month sixty thousand proletarians employed at the biggest enterprises of the country were already engaged in socialist competition and shock brigade work.

By the end of the year the work carried on by the Party organizations had resulted in enlisting 29 per cent of all the workers in the U.S.S.R. in socialist competition and shock brigade work. On March 1, 1930, the anniversary of the challenge issued by the Red Viborgian Plant, every second worker was a shock brigader.

Thus new forms of socialist labour arose in the struggle for the Five-Year Plan and these forms afterwards became part and

parcel of the life of the country. Millions of workers declared themselves shock brigaders, formed shock brigades to fight for a better and more rapid fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan. The shock brigade workers voluntarily proposed higher rates of work or correspondingly lower piece work rates to benefit production. This labour enthusiasm of the shock brigaders imbued the bulk of the workers with the desire to emulate their example and guided their steps forward.

Soon the workers of the Leningrad factories suggested the idea of counter-plans to expedite the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan. On the initiative of the Donetz Basin miners, "social tow" was introduced. Under this system the foremost enterprises "took in tow" the lagging enterprises, rendering them the aid necessary to transform them from lagging into advanced enterprises. This general upswing in the activity of the working class lent great impetus to the efforts made to raise the productivity of labour and to bring about a change in the attitude towards work.

"It [socialist competition] transforms labour from a disgraceful and painful burden as it was reckoned before, into a matter of honour, a matter of glory, a matter of valour and heroism."*

In the countryside the work of the Party organizations was directed toward organizing the socialist reconstruction of peasant husbandry. The tasks of collectivization advanced by the Fifteenth Congress and the Sixteenth Conference determined the basic content of Party work in the countryside at that time. The struggle for collectivization was conducted by the Party organizations in close connection with the prosecution of the main campaigns in the villages (grain collections, sowing campaigns).

In the period following the Fifteenth Congress and Sixteenth Conference the Party performed a tremendous amount of work in the rural districts. The Party organizations, rallying the poor and middle peasants to the general line of the Party, waged a more and more determined offensive against the kulaks and headed the movement of the masses for the collectivization of agriculture. The Communists who were engaged in agriculture

* Stalin, "Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Party Congress of the C.P.S.U., *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 303.

in the rural districts set personal examples by promptly joining the collective farms.

During the same period about half a million persons were sent to work in the villages. The industrial centres sent numerous brigades of workers for the grain collection and sowing campaigns (about one hundred thousand all told). The Party and soviet organizations likewise sent no less than one hundred thousand persons. During this period "the organizational role of the proletariat with reference to the countryside was enhanced and gained maturity."* The abolition of the *okrugs*** carried out in the summer of 1930 upon the initiative of Comrade Stalin was of great importance in strengthening the proletarian leadership in the rural districts. As a result of this change many soviet and Party workers were transferred to rural districts and the state apparatus was brought in still closer contact with the peasant masses.

The development of self-criticism in the Party, in the trade unions and the soviets as well as the general Party purging in 1929 assisted the struggle of all the Party organizations for the successful fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan. With the aid of the non-Party workers and the toiling peasantry the Party tested each Communist from the point of view of his class stamina and his efforts to fulfil the Five-Year Plan. The broad masses of proletarians and the toiling strata of the countryside, who saw how energetically the Party worked to create the socialist order, were drawn into the purging of the Party and rallied still more closely around their bolshevik vanguard. In the process of the purging, the Party cast out 10 per cent of its members who either were unfit or represented elements that had become degenerate. Thus the Party emerged from the purging more steeled and more solidly welded than ever before.

The tremendous amount of work performed by the Party in carrying out the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress and the Sixteenth Conference yielded great successes in the socialist development of the U.S.S.R.

Comrade Stalin characterized the year 1929 as the *year of*

* Kaganovich, *Organizational Report of the Central Committee at the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.*

** Administrative area.—Ed. Eng. ed.

great change on all the fronts of socialist construction. This change was effected under the banner of a resolute offensive launched by socialism against the capitalist elements in town and country. The outstanding feature of this offensive was the fact that it produced a number of decisive successes in the principal fields of the socialist reconstruction of national economy. The great change that was brought about may be reduced to three main heads: in the sphere of the productivity of labour, of industrial development and of agricultural development.

With reference to the sphere of *productivity of labour*, the change found expression in the powerful development of the creative initiative and labour enthusiasm of the millions of workers who formed shock brigades, promoted socialist competition, etc.

Socialist forms of work became part of everyday life and embraced increasingly great masses of workers, spreading even to the collective farms.

In the sphere of *industrial development* the Party in the main solved the problem of accumulating means of developing heavy industry, adopted accelerated rates of speed and created the preconditions for changing the Soviet Union into a country of metals. During that year capital investments in industry amounted to three billion, four hundred million rubles, while during the preceding year only one billion, six hundred million had been invested. The plan of the first year of the First Five-Year Plan was overfulfilled by a number of important industries. The output of heavy industry rose 30 per cent instead of the 25 per cent projected by the plan for that year. The output of all large-scale industry rose 29 per cent instead of the 21 per cent projected by the plan.

In the sphere of *agricultural development*, the Party succeeded in diverting the basic masses of the peasantry in a number of districts from the old capitalist path of development to the new socialist path of development. Collective farm fields occupied an increasingly large area throughout the land. In 1928 they constituted one million, three hundred ninety thousand hectares, in 1929 they already totalled four million, two hundred sixty thousand hectares. The number of households that had joined collective farms rose from four hundred forty-five thous-

and to one million by the end of 1929. The principal and basic feature of the change that went on in the countryside during this year consisted in the fact that the middle peasants entered the collective farms in great numbers.

The Party successfully carried out the grain collection campaign. It rejected the proposals of the Rights to import grain from abroad and instead provided the country with grain from internal resources.

The results of the very first year of the First Five-Year Plan showed that this plan could not only be fulfilled but even overfulfilled. The shock brigade workers, always in the lead, groups of workers acting collectively and various enterprises advanced the idea that on the basis of their successes in 1928-29 the First Five-Year Plan ought to be fulfilled in four years. The Plenum of the Central Committee, which met in November 1929, in summarizing the results of the first year of the Five-Year Plan fixed still higher rates of speed for economic construction during the following year. It was decided to appropriate greater sums for capital investment and to raise the schedule of output to be received beyond that specified for 1930 by the Five-Year Plan. During this period the Party had to work in the midst of an unswerving day-to-day struggle on two fronts.

The Party did much work to expose the Right opportunist theories originating mainly with Bukharin and his disciples (Slepko, Eichenwald, Maretsky, etc.). At the same time the Party likewise brought to light some cases of Right deviation practices. The Astrakhan and Saratov cases uncovered in 1930 presented very striking manifestations of Right opportunism.

In Astrakhan a group of soviet workers openly pursued a policy which directly aimed to develop private capital in the fish industry. This served as the basis for an outright coalescence with capitalist elements and cases of social degeneration occurred.

In the Saratov okrug a group of responsible workers who were in the leading strings of Right opportunist elements pursued an incorrect policy in the collection of grain. They refused to attack the kulaks and sabotaged collective and state farm construction. Even before this, in 1928, Right opportunist ulcers had been discovered in the Artem, Smolensk, Vologda and several other provinces.

The Central Committee pitilessly eradicated all manifestation of Right opportunism, stimulated the alertness of the Party by dint of these object lessons, showed by concrete examples the kulak essence of Right opportunism and the necessity of granting it no quarter.

The struggle against Right opportunism was paralleled by the rebuff given to the "Leftist" elements which came out against the Party line towards the close of 1928 and during 1929. "Leftists" like Sten, Shatskin and Lominadze, who represented nothing more nor less than off-shoots of Trotskyism, had in substance descended to the political and organizational positions of Trotskyism. Their principal theses repeated the various planks of the Trotskyist platform. Acting under the guise of an irreconcilable struggle against the Right deviation, the "Leftists" repeated the Trotskyist accusation that the Party was occupying a "centrist" position. They referred to the basic mass of Communists who had fought staunchly in theory and in practice for the general line of the Party as "the marsh" and as Party philistines against whom the heaviest guns should be drawn up. The "Leftist" leaders (Sten) advanced the slogan that every Communist and Young Communist League member must test the correctness of the Party line by his personal experience. This slogan of "doubting everything" was a direct appeal to distrust the Party leaders and the basic Party cadres.

The "Leftists" resurrected the old Trotskyist idea of forming a league of the peasant poor. At a time when the Party was organizing groups of the village poor which were attached to the soviets and was thus reinforcing the proletarian leadership over the peasantry, the "Leftists" proposed the formation of a special league of peasant poor with elective organs from top to bottom. This league was not to be attached to the soviets as the groups of the village poor were, but was to be an independent organization. A special peasant organization like the proposed league would have been counterposed to the soviets as organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They would have occasioned a weakening of the soviets and would, as a matter of fact, have led to a strengthening of the kulak influence in the countryside. Thus, the theses of the "Leftists" were actually directed against the alliance between the working class and the peas-

antry. In substance they tumbled down to a defence of the kulak slogan of forming a separate peasant league.

The Party organizations resolutely opposed the "Leftist" elements. This compelled the latter to admit their mistakes. However, future events showed that the admissions made by a number of "Leftists" (for instance Shatskin and Sten) were only intended to deceive the Party.

The achievements recorded during the year of great change and the unmitigated struggle against the opportunists caused also some of the Rights—Mikhailov, Kotov and others—to admit their errors at the Plenum of the Central Committee held in November 1929 and to declare that they condemned the line of the Right Opposition. However, the leaders of the Rights—Bukharin, Tomsky and Rykov—did not want to admit their mistakes but tried to maintain their positions with the intention of resuming their struggle against the Party at a more difficult juncture which they expected would come.

The Central Committee decided to remove Bukharin, the ideologist of the Right Opposition, from the Political Bureau and give the rest a warning. At the same time the Plenum handed down a decision that propagating the views of the Right opportunists and adopting a conciliatory attitude towards Right opportunism were incompatible with membership in the C.P.S.U.

This historic decision laid down the rule that anyone who came out in support of the line of the Right Opposition or who adopted a conciliatory attitude towards it must be expelled from the Party. The Party could not tolerate in its ranks people who slid down to opportunism and hindered the struggle for socialist construction. To permit the propagation of views of the Right deviation or a conciliatory attitude towards the latter would have been tantamount to disarming the Party at a moment of intense class struggle.

Some time after the Plenum the leaders of the Right Opposition filed a statement in which they admitted their mistakes and recognized the correctness of the general line of the Party. This admission of their mistakes by the Right opportunist leaders did not by any means denote that the Party was to cease its struggle against the Right deviation. Despite the great achievements of socialist construction up to that time, the class struggle in the

country could not come to a lull; the remnants of the classes that had formerly been privileged and were now routed could not reconcile themselves to the Soviet government and therefore continued their struggle for the restoration of capitalist relationships. Therefore the Right deviation continued to be the chief danger in the Party. The Party organizations continued their struggle against it both in theory and in practice, especially in view of the circumstance that even after the leaders of the Rights had admitted their mistakes, they often failed to follow up their statements by supporting the Party line in practice.

CHAPTER XV

RECONSTRUCTION PERIOD (CONTINUED)

The Party in the Period of the Socialist Offensive Along the Entire Front

The work done by the Party during the period of the N.E.P. led to major achievements in socialist construction. Nineteen twenty-nine was the year of great change on every sector of this construction. This provided the basis on which Comrade Stalin set the task during the second half of that year of assuming the socialist offensive along the entire front. The Party was creating all prerequisite conditions for such an offensive.

The Party organizations mobilized the class vigilance and revolutionary activity of the masses against the capitalist elements in the country. The Party gave socialist competition and the labour enthusiasm of the masses organized form, spurred their initiative in the struggle against bureaucracy. It developed self-criticism on an extensive scale and reorganized the work of the soviets, the trade unions and other organizations to accord with the tasks imposed by the struggle for the First Five-Year Plan. It created a core of the most active and revolutionary workers in these organizations, drove the opportunist and bureaucratic elements from their midst and promoted new workers from the lower ranks.

The Party furthermore collected all possible resources and applied them to the development of industry and of the state and collective farms. It transferred its best forces to these sectors.

The whole Party was mobilized and its organizations were strengthened and purged of bureaucratic and degenerate elements. The Party waged a resolute struggle on two fronts: against the Right and "Left" opportunists. After defeating these deviators it brought the really staunch Leninists to the fore. All this work enabled the Party to announce that now the task

of the proletarian dictatorship consisted in passing from the offensive of socialism at individual sectors of the economic front to a general offensive along the entire front, including both industry and agriculture. This transition to the offensive along the entire front involved the problem of liquidating the kulaks as a class.

*Liquidation of the Kulaks as a Class on the Basis of Mass
Collectivization*

As early as the middle of 1929 the collectivization of agriculture which had taken on increasingly extensive forms began to embrace entire districts of the U.S.S.R. A number of regions producing mainly grain crops (the Northern Caucasus, the Ukrainian steppes, the lower Volga district, etc. made particularly great strides in the struggle against kulakdom and in their work of drawing the toiling masses of the countryside into the collective farms. After the November Plenum of the Central Committee in 1929, which noted the whirlwind growth of the collective farm movement, the Party raised the question of carrying out *mass collectivization* primarily in the above regions.

The collectivization of the peasantry which united the poor and the middle peasant masses of the rural districts denoted the socialization of the principal means of production (draught cattle, farming machinery) and thus undermined the very roots of kulak existence and the possibility of their exploiting the village poor. On seeing that the toiling masses of the peasantry were entering upon the socialist path of development, never to return to the old, the kulaks left no stone unturned in their endeavour to frustrate this turn of events. They agitated incessantly against the collective farms, set fire to collective farm property, murdered Communists and active collective farmers and finally when this did not yield the desired results the kulaks began to make their way into the collective farms for the purpose of boring from within and thus bringing about their ruin.

For the purpose of further developing collectivization, the Party organizations welded together the masses of the toiling peasants in the countryside, primarily the village poor, rousing them to active struggle against these brutal class enemies for the socialist reconstruction of the countryside. In order to come to

the aid of its organizations, the Party at that time sent a contingent of 25,000 working class volunteers to the villages. These volunteers played an immense part in the development of the collective farm movement.

In the heat of the struggle for the socialist reconstruction of the countryside, when the decision on this most important problem of the proletarian dictatorship hung in the balance, Comrade Stalin in his historic speech delivered at the Conference of Marxist Agrarians on December 27, 1929, launched the slogan of *liquidating the kulaks as a class on the basis of mass collectivization*.

This slogan played a decisive role in achieving the victory of the collective farm system. The liquidation of the kulaks as a class was to be accomplished by means of mass collectivization, a policy which assured the liquidation of the capitalist elements existing in the countryside. At the same time, in so far as the poor and middle peasants were included in mass collectivization, capitalist elements could no longer arise anew and develop in the countryside. Thus the eradication of capitalism in agriculture was assured and the collective farm system of production—a production socialist in type—was established.

On January 5, 1930 the Central Committee of the Party adopted the historic decision to liquidate the kulaks as a class on the basis of mass collectivization. The Central Committee decided that the collectivization of the countryside was to be completed by the end of the First Five-Year Plan period. In fixing this time limit for collectivization, the Central Committee bore in mind the special features of the various districts of the U.S.S.R. and prescribed a number of practical measures governing the execution of this decision.

The Central Committee emphasized the fact that collectivization must be carried out with the free consent of those taken into the collective farms.

It also pointed out that the *artel* form was the basic form of collective farm construction at the present period. In the collective farm *artel*, according to the rules approved by the Central Committee of the Party, only the principal means of production are to be socialized, such as labour, use of the land, machinery and other implements, draught animals, farm buildings, etc. The

individual garden plots, dwellings, cattle producing milk not intended for the market and small stock, poultry, etc., are not to be socialized. They remain the personal property of the respective individual collective farmers. This individual husbandry is supplemental to the main collective farm assets. The artel is the principal link in the collective farm movement, said Comrade Stalin; the strength of the agricultural artel consists in the fact that it is more congenial to the mentality of the broad peasant masses.

The slogan of liquidating the kulaks meant a turn toward a new policy. The policy of limiting and crowding out the kulak element was now being supplanted by the policy of *liquidating the kulaks as a class*.

Before this period the Party had fought the kulaks by a policy of limiting the development of kulak husbandry and their exploiting tendencies by imposing special taxes and similar measures directed against them. The only possible result of this policy was the restriction and crowding out of individual kulaks but it could not destroy them as a class. The kulaks retained possession of the agricultural machinery, draught animals and other means of production; they hired labour power and rented land. Lastly, dekulakization had been prohibited. However, when the new policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class was adopted, all the above rights that had been enjoyed by the kulaks fell by the board. The Soviet government repealed the law permitting the hiring of labour power on peasant enterprises; also the law authorizing the leasing of land. It empowered the regional executive committees to confiscate the property of kulaks and to exile them from districts of mass collectivization.

Henceforth a firm and irrevocable policy of liquidating the most numerous class of capitalists, the most brutal exploiters, as Lenin called the kulaks, was established. The realization of this policy depended upon the progress made in mass collectivization and in collective farming. The Party organizations carried on a tremendous amount of work to bring about this progress.

The countryside had not witnessed such a turbulent period of acute class struggle since 1917-18. Wide strata of poor and middle peasants were set in motion. These peasants, inspired

by the examples of labour enthusiasm set by the working class, displayed great activity. The winter of 1929-30 was a period in the history of collective farm construction marked by acute class struggle. During this period the Party was able to secure and consolidate the very important historical advance made by the peasantry along the road to socialism.

The confiscation of the land from the landlords in 1917 was the first step of the October Revolution in the countryside. The transition to collective farms was the second and decisive step which determined a very important stage in the cause of building socialism in the U.S.S.R.

This turn by the poor and middle peasant masses and the rapid successes achieved by collectivization had been prepared by the entire policy of the Party during the preceding stages of development and were the result of a steadfast prosecution of the Leninist line. The Party achieved a powerful development of industry, particularly the manufacture of agricultural machinery. Having accomplished tremendous progress in its material and cultural level, it now became possible for the proletarian state to render corresponding aid to the socialist reconstruction of the countryside. The collective and state farms and the machine and tractor stations which had been organized during the preceding years showed the peasantry the advantages of collective farming based on advanced technique (tractors and other agricultural machines) over backward individual farming. The Party consistently carried out the Leninist policy of training the masses; it activated the rural co-operative organizations which accustomed the peasant to acting collectively. During three years of grain collections while the resolute struggle against the kulaks was going on the Party organizations welded together the basic masses of the poor and middle peasants and exposed the kulaks as their worst enemies.

By this time the proletarian dictatorship had a sufficient material basis for liquidating the kulak as a class and replacing his output by the products of the collective and state farms. The toiling peasants were convinced that the socialist path would open for them the possibility of emerging from poverty, kulak bondage and backwardness to a new life under the socialist system of society.

The Struggle of the Party Against Excesses in Collective Farm Building

The resolution of the Central Committee dated January 5, 1930 pointed out that in regions where collectivization had been better prepared (the Northern Caucasus, central and lower Volga districts) it would be possible to complete mass collectivization in the spring of 1931. For a number of other regions (including the Ukraine, the Central Black Soil region, the Urals, Siberia and Kazakstan) the time limit was set for the spring of 1932, and finally, for a number of national and other districts of the U.S.S.R. the completion of collectivization was scheduled to take place at the end of the First Five-Year Plan, i.e., 1933.

However, a number of local organizations, influenced largely by the tremendous successes achieved by the collective farm movement, instead of consolidating the successes attained decided to realize collectivization "in a trice" and inaugurated a drive for high percentages of collectivization. These organizations violated the principle that entry into a collective farm must be voluntary. They began to set up collective farms by compulsory means and to carry out collectivization without taking into account the peculiar conditions prevailing in the various districts of the U.S.S.R. Districts which were less prepared for collectivization, such as Central Asia, Transcaucasia, the Moscow region and the Central Black Soil region, decided, in direct violation of the decision of the Central Committee, not to run behind the better prepared districts and to finish collectivization in the spring of 1930. Despite the direct instructions of the Central Committee that the artels must be consolidated, several local organizations began to set up at once not only *communes* but even giant collective farms which took in several villages. In a number of places, small stock, poultry, garden patches, vegetable farms, etc., were socialized. In the drive for high rates of collectivization several organizations resorted to purely administrative measures without carrying on any preliminary political work among the peasantry. They decided "to press" for dekulakization and committed excesses in this respect, dekulakizing even middle peasants here and there.

These "Left" excesses committed by some of the Party organ-

izations greatly jeopardized the collective farm movement, led to an estrangement with the middle peasant and undermined the dictatorship of the proletariat. These errors committed by local organizations were immediately taken advantage of by the class enemy. The kulaks who fought the Soviet government tooth and nail agitated particularly in favour of the peasants killing off their cattle before entering the collective farms. To this end they spread rumours among applicants entering collective farms that their cattle would be taken away anyhow once they were in the collective farms.

Besides, the kulaks and their coterie came out with the proposal to set up communes and "giant" collective farms. They argued that one hundred per cent collectivization was absolutely essential, thus seeking to stir up discontent among the peasants and impair the collective farm movement. As a result of this provocative kulak activity and the manifestation of the proprietary inclinations of the individual peasants, an enormous number of cattle was slaughtered during this period. In a number of localities, this led to a serious set-back to cattle raising, which had an unfavourable effect on the further development of peasant husbandry and on the supply of cattle products to the cities. In a number of districts in the U.S.S.R. counter-revolutionary, anti-Soviet moves were attempted which were directed against the entire policy of the Party and the Soviet state. Still more numerous were the moves prepared by the class enemies who were trying to take advantage of the mistakes made by the local organs for the purpose of organizing the peasantry against the proletarian dictatorship.

At this highly critical moment in the life of the proletarian state, Comrade Stalin published his article entitled *Dizzy With Success* (March 2, 1930), followed by *Reply to Comrades on the Collective Farms* (April 3, 1930). Comrade Stalin's articles and the decision of the Central Committee of the Party adopted on March 15, 1930 chastised the hot-heads with all bolshevik decisiveness and sternness and showed the over-zealous collectivizers their proper place. These directives pointed out the great political harm caused by excesses to collective farm construction as they revive the Trotskyist attitude towards the middle peasantry.

The Central Committee resolutely corrected the excesses com-

mitted and changed the leaders of several regional Party organizations (Moscow region, Transcaucasus) which had been guilty of political mistakes.

In April 1930 Comrade L. M. Kaganovich, secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and very close comrade-in-arms of Comrade Stalin, was elected secretary of the Moscow Party Committee.

After admitting their mistakes in collective farm construction, the local organizations worked hard to carry into effect the instructions received from Comrade Stalin and the Central Committee. All these measures ensured a decided change in the mood of those sections of the middle peasantry which had been affected by the incorrect policy of the various Party organizations and brought about almost twice as great an increase in collectivization as scheduled in the First Five-Year Plan. The Party thus was able to mobilize forces for the execution of the current tasks of socialist construction in 1930.

Sixteenth Congress of the Party—The Congress of the General Socialist Offensive Along the Entire Front

When the Sixteenth Congress convened (June 26 to July 13, 1930) the Party had a powerful membership consisting of almost two million (1,261,000 Party members and 712,000 Party candidates). Nearly 50 per cent of the membership consisted of workers from the bench. This unprecedented growth of the Party evidenced the great confidence in its policy entertained by the working class and the toiling masses of the peasantry.

Comrade Stalin in the political report of the Central Committee painted the picture of growing socialism in the Soviet Union on the one hand and the decaying capitalist world on the other. The period between the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Congresses had been a crucial period. It had wrought a great change in the U.S.S.R. as well as in the capitalist countries of the whole world.

"But there is a radical difference between these two turns. While the turn for the U.S.S.R. meant a turn towards a new and more important economic *advance*, for the capitalist countries it meant a turn towards economic *decline*. Here, in the U.S.S.R. there is

increasing progress in socialist construction, both in industry and in agriculture. In the capitalist countries there is a *growing* economic crisis both in industry and in agriculture." *

At the time of the Sixteenth Congress the capitalist world was seized by an economic crisis unprecedented in history, which constantly continued to intensify. In the capitalist countries production declined sharply in all branches of industry except the war industry. There was no outlet for the enormous stocks of merchandise. In their endeavour to emerge from the crisis and raise the prices of commodities, the capitalists destroyed immense quantities of products: they dumped millions of bags of coffee into the ocean, heated steam engines with corn and used rye and wheat to feed pigs. On the other hand twenty-five million workers were out of work, were doomed to poverty, starvation and extinction.

This mounting crisis shook the very pillars of capitalism and accentuated all its contradictions. Under the influence of the crisis the war danger became still more acute, particularly the danger of war against the Soviet Union, as the capitalists strove to crush the U.S.S.R. and thus find a way out of the crisis. Such was the situation in the capitalist world.

By way of contrast, Comrade Stalin at the Sixteenth Congress pointed to the latest achievements of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. Several branches of industry—the machinery, oil and electro-technical industries—were about to fulfil their Five-Year Plan in two and half to three years. The output of all industry in 1928-29 constituted 142 per cent of the pre-war output, while in 1929-30 it was to constitute 180 per cent of pre-war output. Heavy industry showed a particularly great increase. Socialist industry planned by the Supreme Council of National Economy and embracing all the principal branches of industry, including the whole of heavy industry, managed to increase more than two-fold in the course of three years. It could not be denied that no country in the world had ever experienced such a whirlwind tempo of development of its large-scale industry, said Comrade Stalin.

Private capital was practically crowded out of large-scale

* Stalin, "Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.," *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 247.

industry, representing only an insignificant 0.7 per cent in 1929-30. This meant that the capitalist elements had been finally defeated in the Soviet Union, that consequently Lenin's question of who would defeat whom, *i.e.*, whether the socialist or the capitalist elements would be victorious, had been decided in industry finally and irrevocably in favour of socialism.

As a result of the development of socialist industry the U.S.S.R. was about to be transformed from an agrarian into an industrial country. In 1929-30 the output of industry constituted no less than 53 per cent while the output of agriculture constituted 47 per cent of the entire output of the national economy of the U.S.S.R.

In the field of agriculture the Party also had achieved great historical successes during the interval between the Fifteenth and the Sixteenth Congresses. The construction of state and collective farms had been crowned with success within a very short period of time. The state farms fulfilled the Five-Year Plan with regard to grain crops in three years. The grain grown by the collective farms multiplied fifty-fold. During the last three years the sown area of the collective farms had multiplied more than forty times, *i.e.*, the vast bulk of the peasantry had entered the collective farms.

On May 1, 1930, 40-50 per cent of peasant farms had been collectivized in the principal grain-growing districts.

Thus the First Five-Year Plan was more than fulfilled by the collective farm sector in the course of two years. In 1930 the state received from the collective farms more than half of all the grain sold by the peasants. Comrade Stalin said that the Party had now reached a point where "the fate of agriculture and its principal problems will henceforth be determined by the collective and state farms and not by the individual peasant farms." The grain problem had been solved in the main. In 1930 the area sown to grain crops for the first time exceeded the pre-war area. Industrial crops (cotton, flax, sugar beets, etc.) were double the amount grown before the war.

The successes in collectivization brought with them a radical change in favour of socialism.

"The question of who is the support of the Soviet government in the countryside is now raised in a new way," states the resolution

of the Congress. "Henceforth the countryside is divided into two main sections in the principal grain districts of the Soviet Union: the collective farmers who are the real and firm support of the Soviet government, and the non-collective farmers from among the poor and middle peasants who do not as yet want to join the collective farms, but who in a comparatively short period of time will undoubtedly be convinced by the mass experience of the collective farms that it is necessary to enter upon the road to collectivization."

In the collective farm the peasant socializes the principal means of production (farming implements, draught animals) and tills land which belongs to the state. On the collective farm he is no longer a representative of small commodity production from which capitalism is spontaneously and daily engendered.

Thus, the entry of the peasantry into the collective farms undermined the basis on which capitalism could develop and tore up all its roots so that it could never again be resurrected. This is precisely the reason why collectivization of the countryside placed the masses of the toiling peasantry on the road to socialism.

On the basis of all these achievements the Party attained an improvement in the material and cultural position of the workers and peasants. At the time of the Sixteenth Congress unemployment had declined by seven hundred thousand persons in comparison with the preceding year, and the Party was quickly leading the country towards the *complete* abolition of unemployment. The real wages of the workers, inclusive of social insurance benefits and deductions paid into funds used to improve living conditions, rose as much as 167 per cent as compared with the pre-war level. The seven-hour working day was in effect for eight hundred thirty thousand workers. During the last three years the state had appropriated four billion rubles to aid the peasantry through a credit system and state grants. With the growth of the socialist sector the importance of the exploiting classes in the country steadily diminished.

All these victories were gained by the Party while a furious class struggle was raging and the difficulties of socialist construction had to be surmounted. These difficulties were the result of the peculiar circumstances attending the reconstruction period when the working class not only rebuilt the technical basis of

the whole of Soviet economy but in agriculture radically changed also social and economic relationships by uprooting all the remnants of the capitalist classes. This work performed by the Party called forth the furious resistance of the class enemies—the kulaks, the upper strata of the bourgeois intelligentsia which took to wrecking activities, the bureaucratic elements in the apparatus and finally of the capitalist encirclement where all these counter-revolutionary elements received support.

All this meant that the difficulties of the Soviet Union were difficulties of the class struggle, that the class enemies of the proletariat were behind these difficulties. Yet at the same time these difficulties, as Comrade Stalin stated, were *difficulties of growth* and not of decline. When one speaks in the U.S.S.R. about specific difficulties, this means that the Party aspires to progress, to turn out more industrial and agricultural products, to build factories and mills *faster*, to improve the conditions of the working class and of the peasantry *sooner*, etc. The very nature of these difficulties implies that they contain within themselves the possibilities of being overcome.

The task consisted in mobilizing all the forces of the proletarian state for a further attack along the entire front. There was no other way of overcoming these difficulties and there could be no other way. The achievements already attained denoted that the proletarian state possessed all the necessary conditions for realizing the tasks contemplated for the reconstruction period if every effort were bent to this task. The Congress called upon the whole Party to struggle for the fulfilment of the new and stupendous task, the task of *completing the Five-Year Plan in four years*. This slogan became the principal watchword for the immediate future of all organizations of the C.P.S.U. and of the working class of the U.S.S.R.

On the question of Party work in the rural districts the Congress pointed out that the consolidation of the collective farms in every respect, and the attraction of the poor and middle peasant farms into the collective farms were the principal tasks during the forthcoming period. The agricultural *artel* is the principal form of collective farm, states the decision of the Congress.

The entire experience of the socialist reconstruction of the countryside which developed on the basis of these decisions cor-

roborated the thesis that the artel is the sole correct form of the collective farm movement at the present stage of development. The artel correctly combines the personal everyday interests of the collective farmers and their social interests; the artel aptly suits the personal interests to the social interests, thereby facilitating the training of yesterday's individual farmers in the spirit of collectivism.

The Congress laid special stress on the fact that while strengthening the artel, the principal form of the collective farm movement at the present stage, it must not be forgotten that the socialist re-education of the collective farm does not end but merely begins in the collective farm and that, therefore, it is necessary to wage a systematic struggle to overcome the petty-bourgeois vacillations within the collective farms. The Congress emphasized the fact that to idealize the collective farmer was absolutely impermissible. Kulakdom which was tied by a thousand threads to the small peasants was not yet defeated and was furiously resisting the consolidation of the collective farm system. It was trying to take advantage of all the private property notions surviving in the minds of the collective farmer, and to dispose the collective farmer in favour of grabbing as much as possible from the collective farm and from the state, while giving it as little as possible.

The Congress mapped out a number of measures for the successful development of agriculture and indicated that in addition to developing grain and industrial crops it was necessary to ensure the urgent development of livestock raising which had suffered with particular severity due to the struggle of the kulaks against collectivization.

There was only one way to solve all the problems of agriculture—the further development of large-scale economy, socialist in type (state and collective farms). At the same time the Congress underscored the fact that at the present stage it was impermissible to underrate the importance of the individual poor and middle farms.

In the decisions on the work of the trade unions the Congress confronted these unions with the task of engaging in mass work to mobilize all the forces of the working class for the fulfilment of the projected tasks of socialist construction. The new trade

union leadership was to make certain that all trade union organizations at every enterprise really turn still more effectively to production problems. It was to ensure the extensive development of socialist competition and shock brigade work, to stir up the initiative of the masses to overfulfil the Five-Year Plan and to engage in the work of political education. All these tasks were to be closely interconnected with the day-to-day work done to improve the material and cultural condition of the working class.

The Congress discussed Comrade Molotov's report on the work of the C.P.S.U. delegation in the Comintern. Fully approving the activities of the delegation it noted that the appraisal of the condition of capitalism made by the Comintern and the C.P.S.U. had been fully confirmed. Capitalism was experiencing a crisis which roused broad strata of the proletarian and the toiling masses with increasing force to revolutionary struggle. During the period which had elapsed the fraternal Communist Parties abroad had become stronger and had increased their influence in the revolutionary movement. They achieved this by steadfastly struggling, above all, against the Right opportunist elements within the Comintern.

The Sixteenth Congress was the first congress after the death of Lenin at which no crystallized opposition was present to counterpose its political line to that of the Party.

Two leaders of the Rights, Comrades Rykov and Tomsky, admitted their errors in their speeches and declared the general line of the Party to be correct. However, these verbal statements could not satisfy the Congress inasmuch as the Rights had not kept the promises which they had made at the November Plenum of the Central Committee in 1929 and had waged no struggle against the Right deviation. The Congress pointed out that the sincerity with which they recognized their mistakes must be proved in practice by an active struggle for the carrying out of the Party line.

The "Leftist" elements which, reacting to the stern attitude adopted by the Party organizations, had recognized their mistakes even before the Congress likewise capitulated before the Party.

As for Trotskyism, which had become the vanguard of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie after the expulsion of its

adherents from the Party—it now championed the struggle waged against the Soviet Union. About the time of the Sixteenth Congress Trotsky asserted in the columns of the foreign bourgeois press that the Five-Year Plan had failed, that it was impossible to carry out the rate of industrialization described by the Party. He decried collectivization and showed himself in every respect to be an open counter-revolutionary who had taken his stand in the camp of the mortal enemies of the working class.

Having noted the defeat of the opportunist elements and the solidarity of the Party on the basis of this general line, the Congress laid every stress on the fact that the struggle against opportunism must not be relaxed under any circumstances.

In his report at the Congress Comrade Stalin made a profound analysis of the essence of the opportunist deviations and laid every emphasis on the task of persistently struggling against opportunism on two fronts and against the Right deviation as the main danger. Comrade Stalin said:

“The resistance of the disappearing classes is reflected by the various deviations from the line of Leninism which occur in the ranks of the Party.

“Can we carry on a successful struggle against our class enemies without fighting deviations in our Party at the same time, and overcoming those deviations? No, it is impossible. It is impossible because we cannot develop a real struggle against our class foes while we have in our rear their reflection in the Party, while we leave in our rear people who do not believe in our cause and try in every way to hinder our progress.

“Hence, our irreconcilable struggle with deviations from the Leninist line as the next task of our Party.

“Why is the Right deviation at present the principal danger in the Party? Because it reflects the kulak danger, while the kulak danger at the present time, at the time of our general offensive and our uprooting of capitalism, is the main danger in the country.”*

Comrade Stalin likewise made note of the necessity of focusing the attention of the Party on the struggle against deviations in the national question inasmuch as these deviations were experiencing a revival due to the accentuation of the class struggle in the country.

At the given stage the deviation in the direction of Great-

* Stalin, “Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.,” *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 331.

Power chauvinism represented the chief danger. The advocates of this deviation have endeavoured to distort the Leninist national policy of the Party and have contended against the consolidation of the national Soviet republics and the development of national culture. In complete and sharp contradiction to the views of Lenin who had asserted that the national distinctions would disappear only after a long period of development when socialism would triumph on a world scale, the representatives of this deviation evolved a most pernicious anti-Leninist theory which taught that by reason of the successes of socialist construction it had already become necessary to fuse all nations of the U.S.S.R. into one nation with Russian as the dominant tongue. With reference to these views of the deviators, Comrade Stalin stated at the Sixteenth Congress:

"Those who deviate in the direction of Great-Russian chauvinism are completely mistaken if they think that the period of the construction of socialism in the U.S.S.R. is the period of decay and liquidation of national cultures. Matters are exactly the other way round. In reality, the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. is the period in which national culture, socialist in content and national in form, flourishes."*

The representatives of Great-Power chauvinism proposed to abolish also the national republics and regions and to abstain from developing the national culture of the formerly oppressed peoples.

Those who deviate in the direction of Great-Power chauvinism strive to impair the principle of the equality of nations in the U.S.S.R. and wage war against the Party's policy to nationalize the state apparatus, schools and other public organizations. This deviation really did and still does express the ambition of the capitalist elements of the formerly dominant Great-Russian nation to restore its rule.

On the other hand the deviation toward local nationalism, which relies on the capitalist elements of the local nationalities, also experienced a revival. Those who deviate in the direction of local nationalism strive to stifle the class contradictions within their own nation. They do not want to see what is bringing the

* Stalin, "Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.," *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 341.

toiling masses of the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. more closely together, what is uniting them but only stress that which could separate them from one another. The representatives of this deviation pursued a policy of cutting up the U.S.S.R. into fragments, formed contacts with counter-revolutionary elements abroad, played into the hands of the hostile states who were getting ready for war.

"The Party must strengthen its fight against both deviations in the national question and against a conciliatory attitude toward them, at the same time paying greater attention to the practical application of the Leninist national policy, the elimination of the elements of national inequality and the broad development of the national cultures of the peoples of the Soviet Union." *

The Congress emphasized the fact that the Right danger continued to be the main danger and the struggle against it as well as against the "Leftist" distortions of the Party line must be the principal task of all Party organizations. Party vigilance was especially necessary since opportunists of various hues now had recourse to a new manoeuvre in their struggle against the Party. For they no longer risked coming out openly against the Party line, but on the contrary declared that they were in agreement with it while in practice carrying on a concealed struggle against the Party, preparing forces for new moves against it. The Congress pointed out that the devotion of every Party member was to be tested not only by his declaration that the general line of the Party was correct, but also by his active defence of this line and his struggle to carry it out in his day-to-day work.

By the time the Sixteenth Congress met, the Party had ensured the defeat of the opportunist elements. The Congress was a striking demonstration of bolshevik unity and of tremendous victories in the cause of socialist construction.

In the period after the Fifteenth Congress, as we have seen, the party performed much work in the reconstruction of the whole of national economy. During this period the Party changed from its offensive on individual sectors of the economic front to an offensive along the entire front, both in the sphere of industry and the sphere of agriculture. While carrying out the

* "Resolution on the Report of the Central Committee," *The Sixteenth Party Congress*, p. 222.

reconstruction of national economy, it organized the offensive of socialism against the capitalist elements of town and country.

When the Sixteenth Congress met a most important historical stage had been passed inasmuch as a tremendous growth in industry had been attained and the policy of mass collectivization and the liquidation of the kulaks was being successfully realized. By that time, the Party had achieved tremendous successes in the offensive of socialism along the entire front, having overcome great difficulties in socialist construction and eradicated the excesses that had cropped up in the collective farm movement and which were jeopardizing the dictatorship of the proletariat. Whereas the Fourteenth Party Congress was the congress of industrialization and the Fifteenth Congress that of collectivization, the Sixteenth Congress *"was the congress of the general offensive of socialism along the entire front, of the liquidation of the kulaks as a class and the materialization of mass collectivization."* (Stalin).

When the Sixteenth Congress convened the Party, by dint of the work it had conducted, had been successful in ushering in *the period of socialism in the U.S.S.R.*

On the basis of his profound analysis of the successes scored by the U.S.S.R., Comrade Stalin recorded this fact and proclaimed this gigantic victory of the proletariat from the tribune of the Sixteenth Congress.

"It is clear that we have already passed out of the transitional period in the old sense and have entered the period of the direct and full-fledged building of socialism all along the line. It is clear that we have already entered the period of socialism, because the socialist sector now controls all the economic levers of the whole of national economy, although we are still a long way from the completion of socialist society and the abolition of class differences." *

This achievement of the Party was of immense importance. It was gained by pursuing the path of the New Economic Policy introduced under Lenin's direct leadership. By continuing this policy after his death the Party secured an immense victory without precedent in the history of mankind, secured it in the first land of proletarian dictatorship. This showed to the whole

* Stalin, "Speech in Reply to the Debate on the Political Report to the Sixteenth Congress," *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 349.

international proletariat that after Lenin's death the Party possessed a truly Leninist staff headed by his best comrade-in-arms and disciple, Comrade Stalin. By carrying on during all these years a tremendous struggle against the opportunist distortions of Leninism, Comrade Stalin was able to weld together the entire Party and to mobilize the working class for the building of socialism. Like the other great leaders of the proletariat—Marx, Engels, Lenin—Comrade Stalin has evinced in his activities a splendid combination of revolutionary theory and practice. He unites the practical leadership in the struggle for socialism with the further development of the doctrine of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Comrade Stalin developed further the theory of Marxism-Leninism. Therefore the name of Comrade Stalin ranks as high as the names of these other great theoreticians and leaders of the working class.

In guiding the work of the Party Comrade Stalin developed the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the proletarian dictatorship by elaborating the problems of the forms of the class struggle of the proletariat at the various stages of socialist construction as well as the problems of the ways and means of destroying the capitalist elements and classes in general. By developing the Leninist doctrine of the possibility of building socialism in one country, Comrade Stalin developed the general plan of socialism's offensive along the entire front, concretized the methods, forms and ways of building classless, socialist society. Comrade Stalin developed the Leninist doctrine of industrialization and collectivization as a condition upon which the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. depended. He worked out the problem of the concrete ways which the socialist remolding of the peasantry under the leadership of the proletariat is to follow, the problem of the production bond,* of the conditions and methods of col-

* From the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1921 to the beginning of the Five-Year Plan period the principal form of intercourse between town and country was the link (*smychka*) based on trade, when in exchange for agricultural produce the industries supplied the peasants with goods mainly for the satisfaction of their personal needs (cloth, boots, kerosene, sugar, etc.), and when this alliance developed by increasing the interchange of commodities between industry and agriculture and expanding co-operative trade.

At the beginning of the Five-Year Plan period the main form of intercourse between town and country became the link based on production,

lectivizing agriculture, the problem of liquidating the kulaks as a class on the basis of mass collectivization, and other problems.

Development of the Struggle for the First Five-Year Plan and Resistance of the Class Enemies of the Proletariat

The decisions of the Sixteenth Congress gave the Party a militant working program for the further development of socialist construction. The work of the Party organizations at the enterprises, in the countryside, in the soviets, in the trade unions, etc., centred largely around the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan in four years.

The offensive along the entire front, which was being carried out by the proletarian dictatorship, gave rise to constantly mounting resistance on the part of the remnants of the capitalist classes. Each day of Party work brought new proof of the profound harmfulness and complete untenability of the Right opportunist theory that the class struggle was simmering down in the transition period.

The wrecking activities of the counter-revolutionary organizations which were detected by the O.G.P.U. in 1930-31 were particularly striking examples of the accentuation of the class struggle.

Three major counter-revolutionary organizations were discovered during this period: the Industrial Party, the Toiling Peasants' Party, and the Union Bureau of the Mensheviks.

The Industrial Party united the leaders of the old bourgeois technical intelligentsia and engaged in wrecking activities, especially in industry. This organization of wreckers which set itself

which means that, in addition to increasing the interchange of agricultural produce for the articles of personal consumption produced by the urban industries, the working class directs its efforts in production towards serving the production requirements of the countryside (agricultural machinery, tractors, improved seeds, fertilizers, etc.), which are the fundamental things required for the reconstruction of agriculture on a new technical basis.

The most important new forms of the link are: the organization and improvement of the work of state farms, the organization of new and the development of existing collective farms, the organization of a wide network of machine and tractor stations, carrying out measures for improving the yield of the harvest, etc.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

the task of overthrowing the Soviet government aimed primarily at disrupting the Five-Year Plan. The members of this organization who were in the employ of various Soviet institutions ruined individual sectors of industry by drawing up their plans in such a way that at the decisive moment essential details proved to have been overlooked. They intentionally neglected the exploitation of the best mines and pits, retarded and impaired the development of the metallurgical industry, the machine building industry, etc. The Industrial Party maintained contact with foreign capitalist countries which were preparing to attack the Soviet republic. They set a definite time for the war to start, at first fixing the date for the summer of 1930, later on for the summer of 1931. The Industrial Party engaged in espionage and made preparations to cripple, at the decisive moment, the biggest enterprises, especially those working for military defence, to destroy the railways and thereby ensure the victory of the enemies of the Soviet republic.

Another organization of wreckers was that of the so-called Toiling Peasants' Party whose activities extended primarily to the sphere of agriculture. This organization likewise set itself the task of destroying the Soviet system. The Toiling Peasants' Party maintained a course headed in the direction of converting the Soviet Union into an agricultural country. This would have turned the Soviet Union into a colony, an appendage of the capitalist countries.

In agriculture this party pursued the course of permitting the kulak to develop, as he represented the class basis of the Toiling Peasants' Party. The development of kulak husbandry in the countryside was to lead to the rule of capitalism in the countryside and was to spread from there to the whole of national economy.

The Toiling Peasants' Party, like the Industrial Party, counted on overthrowing the Soviet government with the aid of the capitalist countries. The growing collectivization of the rural districts and the liquidation of the kulaks as a class aroused the bitter hatred of this party. It therefore was particularly active in its counter-revolutionary campaign of undermining collectivization. It made use of every means to impair the mechanization of agriculture, the establishment of state and col-

lective farms, etc. When the Toiling Peasants' Party was exposed a highly significant fact came to light—its leaders declared outright that they had calculated on the victory of the Right deviation in the Party, whose policy in their opinion was bound to bring about a strengthening of the capitalist elements first in the countryside and later on in the whole country, and was bound to aid in restoring the capitalist system in the U.S.S.R.

Taking advantage of the class blindness of the Right opportunists (*e.g.*, A. P. Smirnov, former People's Commissar of Agriculture), the representatives of the Toiling Peasants' Party wormed their way into the Soviet organs and on finding that the Right opportunists were exponents of their views, they tried to carry the kulak policy into effect through them.

A menshevik organization constituted the third counter-revolutionary group. It acted under the name of Union Bureau of the R.S.D.L.P. The public trial of the Mensheviks showed the proletariat how low this party which constituted part of the Second International had sunk and how great their treachery was.

The Mensheviks strove to have the industrial enterprises returned to their former owners and to have the nationalization of the land rescinded. They advocated complete freedom of private trade and the abolition of the foreign trade monopoly. Their policy headed in the direction of the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the establishment of bourgeois rule. This menshevik organization was in touch with the Industrial Party wreckers and jointly they organized war against the U.S.S.R.

The trial of the Union Bureau of the R.S.D.L.P. was a trial of the whole of Russian menshevism as well as of the Second International. This menshevik organization was bone of the bone and flesh of the flesh of international Social-Democracy which had knowledge of and encouraged the wrecking activities of the Mensheviks. The trial of the Union Bureau capped the entire history of the Menshevik Party which, after commencing its struggle against Lenin at the Second Party Congress, finished its disgraceful course by engaging in wrecking activities, by struggling against the building of socialism, for which the millions of workers and toiling peasants in the U.S.S.R. were fighting with might and main.

The activities of these counter-revolutionary organizations showed the whole panorama of the struggle of the remnants of capitalism against the proletarian dictatorship during the N.E.P. period and laid bare the new methods of their struggle at the given stage. When the N.E.P. was introduced, these class enemies calculated that the proletarian dictatorship would degenerate along the path of the New Economic Policy. They assumed that if the development of the capitalist elements was given some elbow room, the Soviet government would take a downhill course: that the capitalist elements would develop more and more in all the branches of economy and would finally compel the dictatorship of the proletariat to surrender. Starting with these premises, many inveterate enemies of the working class entered the service of the Soviet government in its apparatus to entrench themselves there and tried to steer the development of economy into capitalist channels.

However, when the working class, having gained strength during the first stages of the N.E.P., assumed the offensive, these elements saw that their calculations had miscarried and therefore began to organize all the class enemies of the Soviet government. The frustration of their hopes to see the proletarian state degenerate became quite clear to them when in the reconstruction period the Bolshevik Party assumed the offensive along the entire front and proclaimed the slogan of liquidating the kulaks as a class. The whole pack of class enemies offered furious resistance to this offensive by engaging in wrecking activities and promoting intervention, by collecting forces to disrupt the Five-Year Plan and overthrow the Soviet government.

All the counter-revolutionary organizations were attuned to a split in the Party, for in such an event their task would be greatly facilitated. They therefore welcomed the struggle of the Trotskyists against the Party and hoped that the Right deviation would be victorious, as this would have opened up the road to capitalism.

All these calculations of the class enemies were upset. Their struggle came to naught and their organizations were smashed by the proletarian dictatorship. The wrecking activities which

had been exposed plainly showed to every worker and toiling peasant that the construction of socialism was attended by a furious class struggle and that it was necessary to mobilize all forces to defeat the enemies of the Soviet republic.

Thus, in reply to this wrecking activity, the toiling masses rallied still more closely around the Party to fulfil the First Five-Year Plan in four years.

Rout of the Right-"Leftist" Bloc

The increased resistance of the class enemies and the difficulties incident thereto revived the opportunist elements in the Party. The representatives of the Right deviation as well as some "Leftist" elements tried to attack the Party. At the end of 1930 the Right opportunists Slepko, Maretsky and Rutin came out anew against the Party line, thereby disclosing that all their admissions of error had been hypocritical and insincere. All manifestations of opportunism immediately encountered the unanimous rebuff of all Party organizations which saw to it vigilantly that the resolutions of the Sixteenth Congress were carried out.

After the Sixteenth Congress, in December 1930, the Party brought to light and defeated the opportunist organization represented by the Right-"Leftist" bloc of Syrtsov and Lominadze.* Syrtsov organized an underground anti-Party group into which he enlisted his adherents. Lominadze headed a factional group of "Leftists" which existed for a considerable period of time.

These underground factional groups which had come to an understanding among themselves organized a Right-"Leftist" bloc at the head of which were Syrtsov and Lominadze.

Duplicity was the characteristic feature of this bloc, which was divorced from the Party masses and represented an insignificant group of intellectuals running amuck. As they did not dare to come out openly against the Party, the representatives of the Right-"Leftist" bloc verbally admitted the cor-

* Syrtsov was President of the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. Lominadze was Secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Party Committee.—Ed. Russian ed.

rectness of the Party line, while actually carrying on a concealed factional struggle and organizing its adherents for an attack against the Party.

The Right-"Leftist" *bloc* which represented an unprincipled amalgamation of Right opportunist elements and of "Leftists," occupied the position of Right opportunism on all the main political issues. Syrtsov and Lominadze with their group demanded "a radical change in the Party line," an immediate drop in the rate of industrialization. They fought against the plans of the Five-Year period, against the policy of collectivization, re-echoing Trotsky's statement that collective farms could not be established by simply socializing peasant means of production.

At a time when vast masses of workers and collective farmers were really evincing unprecedented examples of labour heroism, the representatives of this *bloc* made the slanderous assertion that the country "lacked creative initiative," and that "a certain ebb in its energy was in evidence" (Syrtsov). The Right-"Leftist" *bloc* rejected the Party's appraisal that the U.S.S.R. had entered the period of socialism. All the views of these double-dealers bore out the fact that they were panic-stricken, were in retreat before the class enemy, were actually descending to the counter-revolutionary theory that it was impossible to build socialism in the Soviet Union.

To justify their opportunist platform the leaders of the *bloc* had recourse to grossly slanderous methods of fighting against the Party, declaring that the reports of successes on socialist construction were merely designed to throw dust into people's eyes.

The Central Committee and the Central Control Commission expelled Syrtsov and Lominadze, the leaders of this group, from the Central Committee of the Party and Shatskin from the Central Control Commission; other participants in the group were expelled from the Party. The discovery of the Right-"Leftist" *bloc* once more proved to the Party the absolute correctness of the decisions of the Sixteenth Congress dealing with the need to wage incessant warfare against opportunism and pointing out the fact that opportunism adopts new methods of struggle against the Party—duplicity.

*The Party in the Struggle for the Third, Decisive Year
of the First Five-Year Plan Period*

The second year of the First Five-Year Plan period (the fiscal year of 1929-30) was a year of new great achievements by the Party in the cause of socialist construction. The tasks set by the Five-Year Plan for this year were more than fulfilled in all the principal branches of economy.

During this year large-scale industry showed a 25 per cent increase in output. The whole of the factory and mill output that year was doubled as compared with the pre-war period.

In the sphere of agriculture the Party during this year achieved an extension of the sown area from 118,000,000 to 127,000,000 hectares; the gross amount of grain harvested in 1930 was 87,400,000 tons as against 71,700,000 tons the preceding year; the amount of cotton and sugar beets harvested almost doubled during this one year.

These successes in the sphere of agriculture were a direct result of the establishment of state farms, of the carrying out of mass collectivization and of liquidating the kulaks as a class.

One of the most important achievements of this year was the *complete abolition of unemployment* in the Soviet Union. While a tremendous army of unemployed, twenty-five million strong was plaguing the capitalist countries, not knowing where to get their livelihood on the morrow, unemployment was definitely banished from the U.S.S.R.

On the basis of these successes the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on December 1930 specified still higher rates of socialist construction for the third year of the First Five-Year Plan period. The Central Committee emphasized the fact that 1931 was the *decisive year* for the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan in four years.

At the December Plenum of the Central Committee, the leaders of the Rights (Comrades Bukharin and Rykov) in their speeches admitted, though with great delay, the tremendous successes of the Party, but in their practical work they did not carry on a real struggle for the general line of the Party, for the realization of the Five-Year Plan. The Plenum of the Central Committee decided to remove Comrade Rykov from the

Political Bureau and from his post of president of the Council of People's Commissars. For the latter post the Central Committee designated Comrade Molotov, a staunch Leninist, who had been working for ten years as secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. under Comrade Stalin's direct leadership.

In the third year of the First Five-Year Plan period socialist construction assumed unprecedented dimensions. In 1931 the Party decided to complete the construction of more than a thousand enterprises and of one thousand and forty machine and tractor stations, which would play a tremendous part in the socialist transformation of the countryside. This list of enterprises included technical giants now of world renown: the automobile plants at Moscow and Gorky, the Kharkov Tractor Plant, the Saratov Combine Works, the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk metallurgical works, which are laying down the foundation for a second Soviet coal and metallurgical base in the Ural-Kuznetsk region; also a number of large pits and mines in the Donetz Basin, etc. Seventeen billion rubles, a tremendous sum, was invested in industry and agriculture, whereas only ten billion rubles had been invested in 1930.

To realize this plan it was necessary to develop the highest rates of speed at work.

"The reality of our plan consists in live people, you and me, our will and our labour, our readiness to work in the new way, our determination to carry out the plan."*

In accordance with this policy all Party organizations performed a tremendous amount of work. The Central Committee adopted a number of very important decisions concerning Party work in order to carry through the mobilization of the forces of the working class and collective farmers.**

Each nucleus worked primarily for the fulfilment of the industrial and financial plan of this third year of the First

* Stalin, "New Conditions—New Tasks," *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 390.

** Decision of the Central Committee on Party and mass work at the shop and in brigades, manifesto of the Central Committee and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions concerning the struggle for the plan of the third year of the First Five-Year Plan period.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

Five-Year Plan period. The Party succeeded in enhancing the role of the Communists as the vanguard in production. On the basis of the directives issued by the Central Committee, the Party organizations centred attention largely on securing the participation of all Communists and Y.C.L. members in shock brigades and in socialist competition. The Central Committee paid particular attention to making Party leadership concrete and operative so as to shift the main emphasis in work to the lower production and Party links (the shop brigade, Party group). It must be emphasized, said Comrade Kaganovich, that at the present time concrete leadership represents the main and decisive condition on which the successful realization of the control figures depends. The Party organizations must be posted on the technique, the economics and finances of the factory, mill or mine; they must know in detail the entire course of production and on the basis of this knowledge be able to give concrete leadership.

The brigade became the principal nucleus of the shock brigade movement—the basic production unit upon the functioning of which the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan depended. Therefore the attention of the Party organizations centred primarily on the work of this lower link.

In the course of struggle for the Five-Year Plan, the Party organizations at the same time engaged in systematically imparting class training to the masses of the proletariat and in rallying them around the Party line. This work was so much the more necessary because a vast number of new members had poured into the ranks of the proletariat during the First Five-Year Plan period. In 1930 seven hundred and fifty thousand new workers were taken on in production; in 1931 another two million were drawn into this work. The Party developed its work in such a way as to bring its bolshevik influence to bear on these new cadres of workers and resolutely repelled all class-alien elements that tried to penetrate into the enterprises.

This work presented a particularly acute problem at the numerous new construction sites—at the new enterprises where new centres of industry and Party work were being established. During the First Five-Year Plan period new cities com-

prising hundreds of thousands of workers and their families were rising around the giants of industry under construction. In two or three years industrial titans like Magnitogorsk, Kuznetsk, Berezniki, Bobriki, Karaganda arose and cities cropped up around the Dnieprostroy, Stalingrad and Kharkov tractor plants, etc. Here, while construction was going on, the Party established, first of all, strong, bolshevik organizations which stood at the head of the many thousands of workers employed and guaranteed the development of a shock brigade tempo of work and the correct political training of new cadres.

Because of the strenuous work they had performed the Party organizations were able to ensure the mobilization of the widest strata of the working class for the fulfilment of the tasks of the third, decisive year of the First Five-Year Plan period. As early as 1930 the Party organized a Leninist recruitment of shock brigade workers. This recruitment yielded one million shock brigaders, which greatly facilitated the successful fulfilment of the Plan. In the beginning of 1931 the manifesto issued by the Central Committee, dated September 3, 1930, served as the basis for a new recruitment of workers into "shock brigades of the third year of the Five-Year Plan period." As a result, 65 per cent of all workers in the Soviet Union participated in shock brigade work to fulfil the First Five-Year Plan in four years.

The September Manifesto of the Central Committee played an important part in organizing the workers to struggle for the plan for 1931. The Central Committee pointed out that the Party was setting stupendous tasks before industry and agriculture. The increase alone in output for that fiscal year would equal the entire pre-war industrial output. No less than half of the peasant farms in the U.S.S.R. were to be collectivized. In its decision on the struggle for the third, decisive year, the Central Committee gave all Party organizations absolutely clear and concrete directions on the development of Party work and the measures which would have to be carried out to mobilize the forces of the working class. The Central Committee sent twenty-five brigades, each headed by one of its representatives, to the various localities to explain its manifesto and outline the concrete plan of work. The Regional Party

Committees despatched similar brigades to the corresponding districts.

Labour heroism and the development of socialist forms of labour assumed unprecedented proportions that year. Numerous important branches of industry (construction work, installation of equipment at the newly rising enterprises, renovation of old enterprises, etc.) scored world records for speed at work with quality of work higher than had ever been witnessed before. By the middle of 1931 several of the biggest enterprises (the Moscow Electrical Works, the Leningrad Engineering Works) and even entire branches of industry (the oil industry, the electrical industry, etc.) had fulfilled the First Five-Year Plan in two and a half years. During the first half of this decisive year, one hundred and sixty-six new factories, mines and mills were put in operation.

The record labour indices attained in the process of socialist competition were eagerly emulated by millions of workers in the U.S.S.R. This labour heroism exemplified the brave struggle waged by the Soviet proletariat for socialism, and paralleled the gallant deeds performed in the period of the Civil War by the heroic Red Army.

During the third year of the First Five-Year Plan period the rural Party organizations fought splendidly for the fulfilment of the decisions of the December Plenum of the Central Committee which had set the task of collectivizing:

80 per cent of the peasant farms in the steppe belt of the Ukraine, in the Trans-Volga sector of the lower Volga region and in North Caucasus;

50 per cent in the Central Black Soil region, in the Urals, Siberia and several districts of Kazakstan and the Ukraine;

20 per cent in the grain growing districts located in the consumers' belt (Moscow, Leningrad, Ivanovo and other regions).

This work which the rural Party organizations carried on to further develop collectivization was interlinked with the campaign for a successful second bolshevik spring followed by harvesting and grain collection campaigns. The organizational and economic consolidation of the collective farms was the most important task which confronted the Party in the countryside during this period.

The Central Committee of the Party in its decision dated August 2, 1931, entitled, *The Tempo of Further Collectivization and the Tasks of Consolidating the Collective Farms*, pointed out that the Party organizations must pay chief attention to the organizational and economic consolidation of the collective farms in their present artel stage of development. The organization of labour, the institution of accounting, the carrying out of piece work, the struggle for quality work, the organization of highly productive collective dairy farms, the creation of cadres—all these problems were designated as urgent Party tasks in the countryside. By the summer of 1931, a number of the larger districts of the U.S.S.R. including the North Caucasus, the Lower Volga, the left bank of the Middle Volga, the greater part of the Ukraine and of the Crimea had in the main already completed their collectivization, as collectivization there embraced more than 80 per cent of the peasant enterprises. Most of the other districts including the Central Black Soil region, Western Siberia and the cotton districts of Central Asia were on their way to completing mass collectivization. Thus, the task of attracting the poor and middle peasant masses into the collective farms was successfully discharged on the basis of the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class and of mass collectivization.

Under these conditions, it became especially important for the Party to stress the consolidation of the achievements already secured, the strengthening of the collective farms that had been created. The Central Committee pointed out in its decisions that inasmuch as the first stage in the organization of the collective farms had been completed with the inclusion of more than two-thirds of the poor and middle peasants, attention must now be concentrated on the organizational and economic consolidation of the collective farms. The Party work in the countryside must develop around these problems, since the future offensive of socialism in the countryside would now depend largely on the success accompanying *collective farm production*.

On the basis of the directives of the June Plenum and of the instructions issued by the Central Committee in 1931, the Party organizations worked strenuously to correctly organize labour on the collective farms, correctly distribute the income of the

collective farms according to the number of workdays* and not according to the number of members in the family, to introduce the piece work system and discourage labour fluctuation by ensuring the steady employment of workers at one job, especially tractor drivers, stablemen and the like. By these measures the Party sought to secure the consolidation of the new collective farm system in the countryside and improved production on the collective and state farms by eliminating on these farms the kulak principle of equal wages and lack of personal responsibility for work and equipment entrusted.

Six Conditions of Comrade Stalin

In the struggle to fulfil the First Five-Year Plan while construction operations unprecedented for their immensity were going on, the quality of work acquired tremendous importance. The whole system and method of work under the new conditions had to be reconsidered now that a tremendous growth in the socialist sector had been achieved and the U.S.S.R had inaugurated the period of socialism.

Though lately the conditions of development of the Soviet Union had undergone a considerable change and a new situation had arisen requiring new methods of work, a number of leading economic managers, who did not appreciate the change in the situation, continued to work in the old way.

At the very beginning of the third, decisive year of the First Five-Year Plan period, in his speeches delivered in February and June 1931, Comrade Stalin disclosed the chief shortcomings in the methods of work and launched a clear program of reorganization to govern the future course of socialist construction.

Comrade Stalin placed every emphasis on the necessity of struggling for a rapid tempo of socialist construction.

* Workday—the unit of accounting for the labour spent by members of collective farms which is calculated according to the character, quantity and quality of the work performed. The income of the collective farm is distributed among its members according to the number of workdays put in by each member.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

"We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We must cover this distance in ten years. Either we do this or they will crush us." *

After bringing this tremendous historical task to the fore, Comrade Stalin indicated how one ought to work, on what fundamental questions the attention of the Party and the proletarian government must concentrate attention.

The mastery of the technique of production was the foremost problem that confronted the country in all its acuteness. In order to be able to exercise economic leadership in the various branches of economy, all Communists, all Party organizations, wherever they work or function, must master the technique of the production processes involved, for without this mastery leadership becomes merely a perfunctory signing of papers.

At the First All-Union Conference of Managers of Soviet Industry held on February 4, 1931, Comrade Stalin launched the slogan of "mastering technique." This played an important part in socialist reconstruction and became the working program of the Party organs and the organizations of the working class. Comrade Stalin stated that it was imperative

"... to study the technique of becoming masters of the business ourselves. This alone provides a guarantee that our plan will be carried out in full. . . . The Bolsheviks must master technique. It is time for the Bolsheviks themselves to become specialists. During the period of reconstruction technique decides everything." **

Subsequently, in his speech at the Conference of Leaders of Industry held on June 23, 1931, Comrade Stalin mapped out the program of the further reconstruction of work. He pointed to the special dangers involved in the equalization of wages, and in depersonalization—the lack of personal responsibility for one's work, machine, etc.—defects which were widespread in industry.

The "Leftist" elements defended the above equalitarianism on principle, being of the opinion that at the present stage the differentiation between skilled and unskilled labour and the difference in pay between them ought to be abolished.

The fluctuation of labour power was a great evil in the

* Stalin, "The Tasks of Business Managers," *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 366.

** *Ibid.*, pp. 365 and 367.

operation of industry. The reason for this fluctuation was the incorrect organization of wages, the incorrect system of wage schedules, the "Leftist" equalization of wages. While the equalization of wages led to excessive fluctuation of labour power, it failed to stimulate the workers to raise their skill.

Depersonalization in the organization of labour at the enterprises, which also found support among the "Leftist" elements, was another great evil to be coped with. This depersonalization led to the abolition of responsibility for work received or machinery and other implements of production which had been entrusted.

After pointing out all these shortcomings in the organization of labour and the failure to take the new conditions into account, Comrade Stalin in the same speech put forward his program for the reconstruction of work. It consisted of *six points* which constituted a single integral system and embraced all the basic problems of leadership in the economics of the country.

With reference to the procurement of additional *labour power*, the task now was, not to rely on an "automatic influx," on the expectation that the workers would come of themselves from the villages to the various enterprises, but to institute the organized enlistment and training of workers for industry. Formerly unemployment, poverty and starvation in the villages drove people to the towns. Today unemployment has been abolished in the Soviet Union, differentiation in the countryside and kulak exploitation have been cut to the root and the collective farms afford the peasants an opportunity to live and work like human beings.

Hence arises the necessity, first, of enlisting the workers in an organized manner by concluding agreements with the collective farms and collective farmers; and, secondly, of immediately adopting the mechanization of the more laborious kinds of work (loading and unloading, construction operations, etc.).

With reference to *wages*, the task consisted in abolishing the principle of equal pay and establishing a wage policy which would make certain that the workers be permanently attached to the enterprises, and which would draw a clear line between

the pay of skilled and unskilled labour. Skilled labour must be paid at a higher rate to stimulate the aspiration to improve one's skill. It was also necessary to strive systematically for an improvement in the material and cultural standards of the workers.

With reference to the *organization of labour*, the problem was to abolish the absence of personal responsibility for work, machinery or tools entrusted. It was necessary to make every worker fully responsible for his work and any equipment entrusted to him. It was further necessary to place the available forces properly, to organize labour at each enterprise and on this basis to achieve a systematic rise in labour productivity and an improvement in the quality of output.

The country's demand for executive and technical personnel had increased ten-fold. It consequently became necessary for the Soviet Union to get a working class executive and technical intelligentsia of its own. To accomplish this it was necessary to prepare these forces on the one hand in educational institutions, and on the other by training advanced, educated shock brigaders working at the bench.

The old technical intelligentsia, even those which formerly sympathized with the wreckers, had by the beginning of the third year of the First Five-Year Plan period shown definite signs of a change of heart in favour of the Soviet government. The defeat and exposure of the wrecking organizations, the collapse of the attempts at armed warfare against the Soviet Union and the successes of socialist construction had ensured this change of heart. The attitude towards the old engineering and technical forces had to be changed accordingly; more attention and solicitude was to be displayed for their needs and they had to be drawn into the work with greater assurance.

With reference to *cost accounting*, the task consisted in securing within heavy industry itself the accumulations necessary for further construction. The old accumulations which were derived from light industry, agriculture and the Soviet budget no longer sufficed for the stupendous tasks which were specified in the First Five-Year Plan. Additional accumulations were required which heavy industry itself had to supply. To this end it became necessary to introduce strict cost accounting

at all enterprises. This meant the elimination of mismanagement, the systematic lowering of the cost of production, the mobilization of the internal resources of industry.

The six conditions of Comrade Stalin were epoch-making. They defined the very essence, laid down the system of work by which all branches of national economy were to be guided; they defined the position, the rights and the duties of each worker with reference to the state enterprise where he worked. They stressed the exceptional importance of the principle of one-man management.

A number of shortcomings in the work of industry were evidence of the fact that there was a lack of ability to take advantage of all the tremendous possibilities of the Soviet Union, that there was a lack of ability to exercise correct leadership over the factories, mills and other enterprises. In order to institute leadership in a new way, it was necessary, above all, to understand the new situation, the new conditions of work in industry and to reconstruct one's work in accordance with the requirements of this new situation.

Further on in the same speech, Comrade Stalin said:

"It is necessary, further, that our combines should replace management-by-collegium with individual management. The position at present is that in the collegium of a combine there are ten or fifteen men, all writing papers, all carrying on discussions. To continue to manage in this way, comrades, will not do. We must put a stop to paper leadership and adopt genuine, business-like, bolshevik methods of work."*

The six conditions of Comrade Stalin are a concrete program of action; they indicate how one must work in a new way under the new conditions, how one must lead in a new way in order to fulfil the stupendous tasks of the successive five-year plans and realize the construction of socialism.

Thus, when the tasks of socialist construction were formulated, the ways and means of realizing them were indicated at the same time.

The six conditions of Comrade Stalin have represented a highly important program of work to be put in practice by all Party organizations down to the present moment. The Party

* Stalin, "New Conditions—New Tasks," *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 389.

organizations throughout the whole land—at the factories, the offices, the collective farms, etc.—worked hard to carry the six conditions of Comrade Stalin into effect. They persistently strove to have these conditions carried out in all branches of national economy, in all sectors of the vast organism of the Soviet state. The Party also made enormous exertions to impart technical instruction on the mastery of the technique of production throughout the whole country. It created an immense network of technical schools, circles to study the technique of production, etc.

Struggle for the Reconstruction of Transport, Municipal Services and the Development of Collective Farm Trade

Having solved the grain problem and ensured the country's grain supply even during the early years of the First Five-Year Plan period, the Party now focused attention upon the solution of the remaining problems of supply. These problems were specially discussed at various plenums of the Central Committee.

In October 1931, the Plenum of the Central Committee mapped out a vast program for the development of Soviet trade. The Central Committee noted that the growth of light industry and the increasing opportunities for procuring agricultural products ensured the projected development of Soviet trade. To realize this task it was necessary to wage a most determined struggle against the congestion of commodities, to increase the number of stores and stands throughout the whole trading system and to achieve a radical improvement in the work of the trading and co-operative apparatus.

The Plenum pointed out that the main cause retarding the development of Soviet trade was the inability of a considerable number of workers in the trading and co-operative apparatus to change from the mechanical distribution of commodities to Soviet trade. Not only had the nepman spirit not been driven out of this apparatus, as the Central Committee noted, but of late this spirit had even become stronger. This nepman spirit manifested itself in the lack of real solicitude for the consumer, in crass violations of the price policy, in the hunt for high profits. The Party organizations were confronted with the particularly urgent tasks of eliminating all these factors which hindered the development of Soviet trade.

The Central Committee at that time stressed the fact that the rapid further improvement in supplying the workers and toilers of the rural districts with industrial commodities and agricultural products could be guaranteed only if the commodity turnover was greatly accelerated. Somewhat later the Party pointed out that if the projected measures in the field of commodity circulation are carried out, the growth of socialist economy already achieved will make it possible to abolish commodity rationing and replace centralized distribution by Soviet trading on a much vaster scale. This development of Soviet trade was to be accompanied by a steadfast struggle against every kind of speculation and was to be grounded on the strict execution of the Soviet price policy.

In setting all these tasks the Party struck hard at those "Leftist" elements which, in contrast to the Party line in favour of developing commodity circulation, advanced the theory of the "dying out of money" and of the transition to the "exchange of products," even at the present state of socialist construction.

The Party organizations worked hard to improve the food supply of the workers in the shortest possible period of time. A firm base was set up to accomplish this purpose. It consisted of the state farms, suburban farms owned by the workers' co-operatives attached to the respective factories, works, etc.

The October 1931 Plenum of the Central Committee raised the question of developing collective farm trade on a wide scale.

On introducing collective farm trade the Party and the government started with the assumption that the peasant must be given a new incentive to improve the work of the collective farms, that the collective farmers must be given a supplemental source of income and their economic position must be strengthened. Besides, the products sold by collective farms on the market after delivering to the state organs the quantities due proved a new and important source for the further improvement of workers' supply and the supply of the peasants with urban manufactures.

On establishing collective farm trade the Central Committee took into account not only its favourable but also its unfavourable aspects. When it was announced that collective farm

trade would be allowed and higher market prices for grain were fixed, the peasants began to display a certain reluctance to deliver grain to the state. Taking this into account, the Central Committee of the Party and the government issued direct instructions that collective farm trade in grain be allowed only after the plan for grain collections and the setting aside of seed grain had been carried out in full.

When the questions of supply had been dealt with, the Party tackled the question of municipal services and the improvement in the living conditions of the working class. At the June 1931 Plenum of the Central Committee, after hearing Comrade Kaganovich's special report, the Central Committee mapped out a vast program for the socialist reorganization of the municipal services. The decisions of the June Plenum marked a turning point in creating socialist municipal services. They served as the basis on which the Party performed its great tasks in this sphere.

The socialist reconstruction of such populous proletarian centres as Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov and Sverdlovsk, and the proper laying out the new cities created during the First Five-Year Plan period assumed great proportions at that time. During the course of the First Five-Year Plan, 27,000,000 square metres of dwelling space costing more than four billion rubles were built. In Moscow 3,100 houses containing 2,100,000 square metres of dwelling space were put up; in Leningrad—1,350,000 square metres; in the Donetz Basin—2,500,000 square metres, etc.

The Moscow Party organization did particularly splendid work along the line of improving municipal service. Moscow's Bolsheviks are rapidly transforming Moscow, the squalid city of merchants inherited from the old regime, into a model capital of the proletarian state. And it is their aspiration to continue systematic improvement of municipal services.

In the third year of the First Five-Year Plan period the Party sharply raised the issue of the socialist reconstruction of transport and of improving its work. In the course of 1931 this question was twice raised at plenums of the Central Committee.

After noting the considerable increase in railway transport during the years of the N.E.P., the Central Committee in its resolution pointed out however that this rise did not keep pace

with construction in the country. As a result of this, transport had become a "tight spot" in national economy.

"The lag in the technical re-equipment of railway transport, the considerably worn out condition of its fixed capital, the wrecking activities which were widespread during the preceding years on the one hand, and the great organizational defects in the management of the transport system, particularly the system carried out without the requisite technical basis, the changing-crew system,* and the penetration of depersonalization into other departments of transportation, on the other hand, have led to a deterioration of the locomotives, a drastic decline in labour discipline, lower productivity of labour and in general a considerable worsening in the transport service during the second half of 1930 and the first quarter of 1931.

"The Central Committee of the Party has promptly focused the attention of the whole Party on the transport problem and has mapped out the measures indispensable for the recovery of rail-roading."

The plenums of the Central Committee outlined an extensive program for the reorganization of transport in connection with the general task of the reconstruction period, laying particular stress upon the necessity of applying cost accounting to transport and of arranging all work on the basis of Comrade Stalin's six conditions. The Central Committee transferred the necessary Party forces to railway transport in order that the great tasks confronting it might be realized.

Comrade Stalin's Letter Entitled "Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism"

The accentuation of the class struggle during the reconstruction period and the intensification of the resistance offered by the class enemies of the proletariat found reflection on the theoretical front also. The enemies of the Party, now defeated in open battle, attempted to smuggle in their pernicious ideas by hoisting the flag of Marxian theory. The Party had smashed counter-revolutionary Trotskyism and Right opportunism. The Party had also exposed the theories in political economy that were hostile to Leninism (those propounded by Rubin, a men-

* The failure to attach fixed crews to each engine. This is now replaced by the two-crew system under which two fixed crews are attached to each engine and are alternately responsible for its condition.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

shevik wrecker); in philosophy (those propounded by Deborin's group). Then there was the exposure of the anti-Party activity of Ryazanov who helped the Mensheviks in their counter-revolutionary work, etc.

At the end of 1931 Comrade Stalin addressed a letter to the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolyutsia* (*Proletarian Revolution*) entitled *Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism*. This letter was of great importance to the C.P.S.U. and the entire Communist International on questions of the theory and history of bolshevism.

In his letter Comrade Stalin exposed the Trotskyist contraband which was being smuggled into literature on Party history. Trotskyist contrabandists were smuggling in vile and slanderous statements against Lenin and the Party in which they denied the international character and importance of bolshevism. They slanderously attempted to depict Lenin as a Centrist or semi-Centrist, whereas Lenin's entire life was exemplary for its irreconcilable struggle against opportunism and centrism in both the R.S.D.L.P. and the Second International. Every step in Lenin's struggle against the opportunists in Russia simultaneously inflicted a severe blow upon opportunism in the Second International. Lenin's line for a split with the opportunist Mensheviks in Russia was an example of how genuine revolutionaries must act in the Second International.

These contrabandists smuggled in menshevik and Trotskyist slander concerning the position of the Bolsheviks in the revolutions of 1905 and 1917. These contrabandists denied that the Bolsheviks, headed by Lenin, even before 1905 had propounded the theory that the bourgeois-democratic revolution would grow into a socialist revolution and that they had carried out this theory in practice at the time of the revolutions of 1905 and 1917.

In his letter Comrade Stalin stated that for the present these "historians" endeavoured to carry on their contrabandist work along two lines:

"First of all, they are trying to prove that Lenin in the period before the war underestimated the danger of centrism, while leaving the inexperienced reader to surmise that Lenin was not at that time a real revolutionary but became one only after the war,

after he had been 're-equipped' with Trotsky's help. Slutski may be regarded as a typical representative of such a type of smuggler. . . .

"Secondly, they try to prove that Lenin in the pre-war period did not understand the necessity for the bourgeois-democratic revolution growing over to the socialist revolution, while leaving the inexperienced reader to surmise that Lenin was not at that time a real Bolshevik, that he grasped the necessity for such a development only after the war, after he had been 're-equipped' with Trotsky's help. We may regard Volosevich, author of the *Course of History of the C.P.S.U.* as a typical representative of this sort of smuggler." *

Comrade Stalin exposed all these slanderous theories of Slutski, Volosevich and their ilk. His letter squarely raised the question of increasing Party vigilance and of struggling mercilessly against the Trotskyists and all other distorters of the history of the Bolshevik Party.

Having uncovered the essence of the Trotskyist contraband, Comrade Stalin likewise exposed and demonstrated the utter perniciousness of rotten liberalism which had gained some following among the Bolsheviks. Comrade Stalin said that this rotten liberalism was responsible for the Trotskyist contrabandists having been able to smuggle in their anti-Party slander against Lenin and the Bolshevik Party. Therefore,

"liberalism towards Trotskyism, even though the latter is shattered and concealed, is stupidity bordering on crime, bordering on treason to the working class" **

Comrade Stalin's letter served the Party organizations as the basis for carrying on much work, in the course of which all kinds of opportunist distortions in the literature concerning the history and theory of bolshevism came to light. In the progress of this work the Party explained extensively the true Leninist views on the basic questions of bolshevism.

Comrade Stalin's letter played a tremendous part in sharpening Party vigilance on the theoretical front as well as on all sectors of socialist construction.

In his letter Comrade Stalin stressed the task of placing

* Stalin, "Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism," *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 404.

** *Ibid.*

the study of the history of the Party on a scientific, bolshevik basis.

The history of the Bolshevik Party is of vast importance down to the present day. The study of the experience of the bolshevik struggle for socialism which is of world-historic importance equips the working class to struggle for the final victory of socialism.

Seventeenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.

At the Seventeenth Conference which took place in February 1932 the Party summarized its tremendous work during the third, decisive year of the First Five-Year Plan period and projected a plan to cover the last year of the First Five-Year period. At the same time the conference approved directives of tremendous political importance for drawing up the plan of the Second Five-Year period.

The Seventeenth Conference was chiefly significant for the fact that it brought to the fore the task, to be realized during the Second Five-Year Plan period, of finally liquidating the capitalist elements and classes in general, and of destroying the causes which give rise to class distinctions and to exploitation.

"The Seventeenth Conference of the C.P.S.U. holds that the vast natural wealth of the country, the bolshevik rate of socialist construction, the growing activity of the masses of workers and collective farmers, and the correct line of the Party fully guarantee such development of the productive forces of socialist economy in the Second Five-Year period as will serve as the basis for the complete extermination of the capitalist elements in the U.S.S.R. The Conference holds that the chief political task of the Second Five-Year Plan is the final liquidation of the capitalist elements and of classes in general; fully to destroy the causes which give rise to class distinction and exploitation; to overcome the survivals of capitalism in economics and in the consciousness of people; to transform the whole working population of the country into conscious, active builders of classless, socialist society." *

These immense historical tasks of building classless, socialist society during the Second Five-Year Plan period could be ad-

* "Resolution on V. M. Molotov's Report to the Seventeenth Party Conference," *The Second Five-Year Plan*, pp. 71-72.

vanced by the Party by reason of the successful realization of the First Five-Year Plan.

It was necessary to carry into practice the slogan advanced by the Party of realizing the First Five-Year Plan in four years. The Seventeenth Conference therefore discussed the results of the work done in industry in 1931 and the tasks to be set for 1932.

As the Conference noted, 1931 closed with new great victories to record. The output of industry increased 20 per cent during that year. At the same time heavy industry had a 28 per cent increase in output, a fact which is particularly significant. During 1931 a number of industrial branches fulfilled and even overfulfilled the quotas set by the First Five-Year Plan in the record time of two and a half to three years. These branches included machine building, fish canning, oil and the electrical industry. In the course of that same year the construction of a number of big industrial giants was completed and operations were started. These included the Moscow and the Gorky Automobile Works, the Kharkov Tractor Plant, the Saratov Combine Works, the Ural Copper Smelting Works, the first section of the Ural Machine Building Works, the Berezniki, the Voskressensky and the Nevsky Combined Chemical Works. Seventy-nine new pits and a number of electric power stations (the Zuyevka, Shterovka, Kuznetsk, Magnitogorsk, etc.) were put in operation. The Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station, the greatest in the world, was made ready for operation. An immense amount of work was done to create a second coal and metallurgical base—an eastern base—and to put the first section of the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk works into operation.

In the third, decisive year of the Plan enterprises representing the enormous sum of three and a half billion rubles in fixed capital started operations. Thus the value of construction put to use during this one year was as great as during the preceding two and three-quarter years.

In 1931 two million workers were added to the payrolls while wages increased 16 per cent.

It was the heroic work of the Party and of the working class that ensured the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan in four years.

As for agriculture, the collective farm movement secured a decisive victory in 1931 in most districts of the U.S.S.R. In the principal grain districts collectivization was completed. In the most important cotton and sugar beet districts more than 50 per cent of the farms were collectivized. The liquidation of the kulaks as a class was in the main accomplished in the grain growing and the raw material producing districts of the U.S.S.R.

As a result of the work of the Party the collective farm peasantry became the central figure in agriculture, while the collective farms became the principal producers not only of grain but also of the most important agricultural raw materials. From a country of small and even minute agriculture the Soviet Union became a country practising agriculture on the largest scale in the world based on collectivization, the development of the state farms and the extensive application of machine-operated technique (*cf.*, decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee held in July 1931 and of the Seventeenth Party Conference). This victory of socialism, which solved the most important and most difficult problems of the proletarian revolution, was of world historic importance.

It is an achievement of the Party that in the third, decisive year of the First Five-Year Plan the *construction of the foundation of socialist economy in the U.S.S.R. was completed*. The question of "who will defeat whom" put by Lenin on introducing the N.E.P. was completely and irrevocably decided in favour of socialism both in town and country.

After noting all the achievements of the Party indicated above, the Seventeenth Party Conference took occasion to point out that the class struggle was continuing and that in future it would inevitably become aggravated at certain moments and at certain sectors of socialist construction; that the working class could attain still greater successes only by strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat through irreconcilable combat with the remnants of capitalism, and persistent work for the socialist re-education of the toiling masses, and by further consolidating the U.S.S.R. as the basis of international socialism.

The fourth year of the First Five-Year Plan period began under circumstances that held out a direct threat of war to the Soviet Union. That year Japanese imperialists seized Manchuria

which borders on the Soviet Union. It was established that Japan had worked out detailed plans for attacking the Soviet republic and was only waiting for an opportune moment to start war.

The C.P.S.U. was thus confronted with the task of mobilizing all the necessary forces so as to be ready at any moment to repulse the enemy. To this end some industrial plants were reorganized to manufacture means of defence instead of their regular output (agricultural machines, presses, etc.).

The achievements of industry during the First Five-Year Plan period enabled the Soviet republic quickly to mobilize the necessary means of defence and to put them in fighting trim. This successful mobilization of the armed forces which could now rely on a powerful industry compelled the imperialists to refrain from putting their plans of attack against the Soviet Union into practice in 1932.

As early as 1929, on the occasion of the Far Eastern clash, the imperialists became fully convinced that the Soviet Union carefully guarded its frontiers and was able to deal sternly with anyone who might attempt to wage war against it.

In the summer of 1929 Chinese generals tried to seize the Chinese Eastern Railway which belonged to the Soviet Union to be followed by the seizure of the Soviet Far East. They were anxious to involve the Soviet Union in war and thus frustrate the construction of the socialist state. At that time the Soviet government formed the Special Far Eastern Army, dealt a crushing blow to the imperialists and showed that it would not permit anyone to encroach upon the Soviet republic unpunished.

On the strength of the working program for 1932 as mapped out by the Seventeenth Conference, the Party organizations performed the work required to complete the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan in four years. New funds amounting to twelve billion rubles were released to develop industry. The number of workers rose by one million two hundred thousand persons, wages rose 11 per cent. The Party organizations fought hard to have industry complete the tasks of the last year of the five-year period—to turn out products valued at thirty-four billion rubles.

The Conference, after pointing out the shortcomings in the

work of industry in 1931, laid particular emphasis on the need to raise the productivity of labour (22 per cent in comparison with 1931) and to lower production costs (by 7 per cent). In 1931 industry had not fulfilled its plan in these particulars: the allotted sum for wages was exceeded and the tasks set for lowering production costs were not fulfilled. Therefore it was necessary in 1932 to make every effort to comply with all these specifications applying to industry.

In 1932 the Party organizations strove hard to put an end to the lack of personal responsibility and wage levelling, firmly to establish cost accounting and secure the application of Comrade Stalin's six conditions to all branches of work. In the struggle to fulfil the plan of the *fourth, concluding year* of the Five-Year Plan the Party organizations concentrated their attention first and foremost on fulfilling the plans of the iron and steel, the coal mining and machine building industries.

In the sphere of agriculture the Party organizations during this year fought for the maximum consolidation of the successes already achieved, primarily those of collectivization. Kulakdom was not yet finally destroyed throughout the land and still offered furious resistance to the general offensive of the proletariat.

Of great political importance was the work performed by the Party organizations to guarantee that the collective and state farms promptly and correctly discharge their obligations to the state with reference to deliveries in kind—of grain, meat, milk, etc. The kulaks fought desperately against the delivery of grain to the state organs. They strove to disrupt all measures taken by the Party to consolidate the collective farms organizationally and economically. The kulak elements organized the sabotage of the state collections speculating on the proprietary sentiments still surviving among the collective farmers. They made their way into the collective farms, engaged in wrecking activities there, committed thefts of collective farm harvests and other socialized property, tried to disintegrate the collective farms from within and organize them against the proletarian state. This kulak sabotage was especially virulent in those regions of the Soviet Union where the kulak stratum was particularly influential before the revolution, as, for instance, in the

districts of the North Caucasus with their kulak Cossack population.

In the course of the struggle of the last year of the First Five-Year Plan, the Party smashed the anti-Party, counter-revolutionary group of the remnants of the Trotskyist and the Right Opposition. In October 1932 it was established that Rutin, Galkin, Slepkov, Maretsky, Kayurov, Ivanov and others, who formerly belonged to the Trotskyist and the Right Opposition, tried to form an underground organization to fight against the Party and the proletarian dictatorship. This counter-revolutionary group in its documents developed a program of restoring kulakdom and capitalism in general. It advanced the demand to disband the state and collective farms and to transfer the enterprises of Soviet industry to capitalists in the form of concessions. These counter-revolutionary elements directed the sharp edge of their struggle against the Leninist leadership of the Party and its Central Committee.

The activity of this group clearly showed to all workers whither the defence of opportunism and the failure to submit to the decisions of the Party lead.

This group included people like Rutin who had been expelled from the Party as well as people like Slepkov and Maretsky who were still in the Party and were doublefacedly deceiving it. The members of this group acted like overt counter-revolutionaries, like enemies of the working class and the Soviet government, for in substance their aim was to bring all the gains of the latter to naught.

Besides these participants in the group, the Party exposed its backers—people who knew about the existence of this counter-revolutionary group, read its documents but failed to inform the Party, deceived the Party, and secretly supported and furthered the work of the Rutin and Galkin group. These sponsors included such “veteran” opportunists as Zinoviev, Kamenev, Uglanov and Sten.

The Central Control Commission expelled all the members of the group and its sponsors from the Party and called upon the Party organizations to exercise still greater vigilance and wage an unmitigated struggle against opportunism.

Soon after this, in December 1932, still another factional,

anti-Party grouping was discovered and exposed. It consisted of hangovers of Right opportunism—the group of Smirnov, Tolmachov and Eismont. The representatives of this group carried on counter-revolutionary work directed against the leadership of the Party and against its general line. After exposing these activities of the Smirnov and Eismont group, the Party completely smashed it, expelling a number of its members.

At the same time the Central Committee put on record that Comrades Rykov and Tomsky, members of the Central Committee, and Comrade Schmidt, an alternate member of the Central Committee, had maintained contact with Smirnov and Eismont and had thereby encouraged their anti-Party work. Their conduct had encouraged these anti-Party elements to expect support from the former leaders of the Right Opposition.

The Central Committee demanded that Comrades Rykov, Tomsky and Schmidt radically change their conduct, that they develop a struggle against the anti-Party elements and warned them that if they persisted in their misconduct, the Party would punish them severely.

The activities of both of these groups have shown that the new methods of the class enemies, who now strive to undermine socialist construction by “quiet sapping,” were being copied by the degenerate elements within the Party who have taken to the course of clandestine, disintegrating counter-revolutionary work. Opportunists thus become counter-revolutionaries from the very start.

In 1932 Party organizations were very active in every sphere, both in town and country, to ensure the fulfilment of the tasks set for the last year of the First Five-Year Plan period. The Party still further strengthened its prestige among the masses of the proletariat and collective farmers.

“Our Party organization has become still more compact, has made still closer contact with the masses of workers on the basis of the struggle to carry out the general line of the Party, to fulfil the Five-Year Plan in four years,” said Comrade Kaganovich in May 1932.

These Party activities ensured the fulfilment of the plan for the fourth, concluding year as well as the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan as a whole in four years.

*End of the Stabilization of Capitalism and Transition to a
New Series of Revolutions and Wars*

While immense construction was going on in the U.S.S.R. a profound and unprecedented economic crisis was raging in the capitalist world.

The Eleventh Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, which convened at the close of 1931, noted that the growing contradictions between the two systems—that of the country building socialism on the one hand and the whole capitalist world on the other—was the principal feature characterizing the state of the entire world at the given moment. As a result of the constantly spreading crisis, an increasing number of factories, mills, mines and other enterprises were closing down in all capitalist countries, throwing millions of workers into the streets to swell the ranks of the unemployed. The impoverishment of the working class grew constantly, yet the bourgeoisie tried to saddle the whole burden of the crisis on the shoulders of the working class by reducing wages, raising taxes, cutting down social insurance, etc.

Under the influence of the crisis the rural districts witnessed the growing ruination of peasant husbandry, while the poverty and mortality of the population were on the increase. The bourgeois states, caught in the clutches of the crisis, sought a way out by increasing taxes, rents and various other imposts levied in the countryside, which led to the further impoverishment of the peasantry.

The Eleventh Plenum recorded the fact that as a result of the crisis all the contradictions of the capitalist world were becoming accentuated, especially the contradictions between the capitalist countries and the U.S.S.R. The Communist Parties in a number of countries, as the Plenum noted, had scored a number of successes during the period which had elapsed since the Tenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. They had gained in their political influence among the working class and to some extent also among the peasantry. During this period the Communist Parties intensified their work in leading the economic battles of the proletariat and here achieved a number of successes (Germany, Poland). In a num-

ber of countries they developed revolutionary trade union movements independently of the reformist trade unions and likewise achieved organizational growth. During this period the Communist Party of China scored great successes. It established soviets and organized a Red Army which constantly enlarged the sphere of their activity.

All these achievements were attained by the Communist Parties first and foremost because of the unswerving struggle against the opportunist elements in their ranks. Carrying out the instructions of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, the Parties concentrated their fire against the Right deviation as the main danger.

The main task confronting all the Communist Parties, as the Plenum pointed out, consisted in winning over the majority of the working class to join the decisive battle for the dictatorship of the proletariat. The struggle to win this majority was to be waged by the Communist Parties at the given stage along three main lines:

1. The fight against the capitalist offensive and the organization of a broad counter-offensive of the proletariat: against wage cuts, for wage increases, for aid to the unemployed, for the seven-hour working day, against mass dismissals, etc.;

2. The fight against the bourgeois dictatorship in all its forms: against the terror of the employers and the police, for the liberty of the revolutionary workers' organizations, for the immediate dissolution of the fascist organizations and the arming of the workers, etc.;

3. The fight against capitalist war and military intervention against the U.S.S.R.

This struggle of the Communist Parties must be accompanied by a persistent exposure of the Social-Democrats so as to liberate the working masses from their influence, for otherwise it will be impossible to free the proletariat from the chains of capitalism. After dwelling in detail on the historic role of Social-Democracy, the Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern pointed out that Social-Democracy was the *main social support of the bourgeoisie*. Therefore the struggle against Social-Democracy, its exposure in the eyes of the masses, is a condition on which the mobilization of the proletariat

masses for the struggle to overthrow capitalism necessarily depends.

The Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International placed on record that "the danger of armed intervention against the U.S.S.R. has become a direct danger for the whole of the world proletariat." All the bustling activity in the imperialist states indicates that they are daily preparing an armed attack against the Soviet Union.

If, in spite of all these preparations, war has not yet broken out, this may be explained, first, by the contradictions between the separate imperialist countries; second, by the growing preparedness of the proletarian masses in the countries of capitalism to support the proletarian dictatorship in the Soviet Union; and, third, by the consistent peace policy pursued by the Soviet government.

The Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern called upon the Communists, the workers and toilers of the whole world, to struggle against the war danger and come to the defence of the first country of proletarian dictatorship.

The period which has elapsed since the Eleventh Plenum has completely confirmed the characterization of the development of the capitalist countries given by the Communist International.

While the U.S.S.R. was completing its First Five-Year Plan with tremendous success, the economic crisis in the capitalist world continued to rage and intensify. Production in the capitalist countries was curtailed to such an extent that more than half of the workers were out of work. The impoverishment of the peasantry assumed unheard-of proportions.

At the same time a revolutionary upsurge was ripening in the imperialist countries as well as in the colonies. In 1932 stubborn, turbulent strikes, revolutionary demonstrations, bitter clashes between workers and the police and fascists, militant actions by the peasant masses, etc., were developing.

In the course of 1931-32 the contradictions between the imperialist states themselves likewise became aggravated. Japan was waging war against China and seized Manchuria. The relations between Japan and America, between Germany and France and between Germany and Poland became more strained.

The preparations for counter-revolutionary war against the U.S.S.R. were being accelerated.

The *Twelfth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern*, which met in September 1932, taking all these facts into consideration, put on record that "the end of capitalist stabilization has come." This showed that the general crisis of capitalism was rising to a new plane and that the transition to a new round of revolutions and wars was taking place. The first such round, which had begun with the world imperialist war in 1914, led to revolutions in a number of countries, and in Russia it swept away the capitalist system and established the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Twelfth Plenum noted that now the capitalist world was entering upon a new round of revolutions and wars.

The advent of capitalist stabilization was characterized by three principal factors:

First, production and international trade of the capitalist countries attained the pre-war level and here and there even exceeded it.

Secondly, the imperialists of France, Great Britain and the United States of America at that time came to an understanding with reference to the pillage of Germany and set up the Dawes and Young Plans. The imperialists of Japan, Great Britain and the United States of America came to an understanding on the division of their spheres of influence in the various sections of China. The biggest imperialist countries likewise reached an agreement among themselves on the division of the colonies.

Finally, capitalist stabilization became possible at that time solely due to the fact that the bourgeoisie had succeeded for the time being in suppressing the revolution in Europe, primarily in Germany. The capitalists had likewise succeeded in repelling the offensive of the proletariat which had developed in all the other capitalist countries after the war.

Now, however, all these three factors have been undergoing radical changes. This is the reason why capitalist stabilization has come to an end.

First, world production and world trade in the capitalist countries dropped to a very low level as the result of the ravaging crisis which has lasted for more than four years.

Secondly, deep rifts have been forming in the agreements reached between the imperialists. The Dawes and Young Plans have been torn to shreds. Japan's seizure of part of China which it transformed into its own colony broke up the international arrangement made with regard to China. The capitalist states, including Germany, have started to gird themselves for a new struggle to redivide the colonies.

Thirdly, while the abatement of the revolutionary movement was the most significant feature of the stabilization of capitalism, the world is now witnessing an upsurge of the revolutionary wave. The international labour movement is approaching a cycle of new revolutions.

Finally, the gigantic successes of the Soviet Union are a decisive factor in undermining capitalist stabilization.

The Twelfth Plenum thus marked a very important historical boundary line in the development of the world proletarian movement. It noted a number of practical tasks in preparing the Communist Parties for the coming battles against capitalism. The Plenum of the Comintern focused attention on three principal tasks which apply to all sections of the Communist International: the struggle against the offensive of capital, against fascism and reaction, against the approaching imperialist war and war against the Soviet Union.

Results of the First Five-Year Plan Period

Under the leadership of the Party the working class of the U.S.S.R. successfully completed the Five-Year Plan in four years. As a result of this victory the U.S.S.R. was transformed from an agrarian country into a country of advanced industry.

A new powerful metallurgical industry has been created. Whereas formerly the metallurgical industry was concentrated mainly in the south, now a second coal and metallurgical centre has been created in the east of the Soviet Union—the Ural-Kuznetsk Basin, where the rich coal and ore deposits of the Urals and Siberia are being exploited. Enormous ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgical works have sprung up in that region: Magnitogorsk, Kuznetsk and the Combined Ural Copper Works.

Many other metallurgical works were built in the various regions of the U.S.S.R., so that the Soviet Union was now in a position to manufacture its own automobiles, tractors, means of defence, powerful turbines and various tools made of metal produced in the Soviet Union. This made it possible to realize during the Five-Year Plan period the enormous construction program assigned to machine building. The output of the Soviet machine building industry multiplied ten-fold in comparison with 1913. Almost half of the presses working at the machine building enterprises were installed during the First Five-Year Plan period. Owing to this circumstance the technique of the Soviet machine building industry rose to so high a plane that now the various works in the Soviet Union can manufacture any machine or lathe. The starting of operations in 1933 of the Urals and Kramatorsk heavy machine building works was of special importance to the whole of national economy. These works have no peer in any capitalist country in point of capacity or technical equipment.

The output of farming machinery during the First Five-Year Plan period increased more than five and a half times. Hundreds of thousands of the most complicated farming machines, tractors, combines and automobiles can now be manufactured in the U.S.S.R. The Stalingrad and Kharkov Tractor Works, the largest in the world, were built during the First Five-Year Plan period and are capable of producing a hundred thousand tractors a year. The Chelyabinsk Works, when working at full capacity, can yield forty thousand big caterpillar tractors a year. Other big plants built were the Saratov Combine Works, The Rostov Agricultural Machinery Plant, the Gorky Automobile Plant, the greatest in Europe, and hundreds of other works equipped with complicated modern machinery.

The powerful network of new electric power stations increased the generation of electric current to 6.7 times the 1913 volume and 2.6 times the 1928 volume. These new sources of electric current include the Lenin Hydro-Electric Power Station on the Dnieper, the greatest in the world.

During the First Five-Year Plan period new big-sized coal mines were sunk and old mines mechanized in the Donetz and Kuznetsk Basins, and the great oil-fields of the Caucasus were

newly equipped. Coal and oil mining grew more than three-fold as compared with pre-war times.

The Turkestan and Siberian Railway which was laid across impassable mountains and steppes unites the cotton growing districts of Central Asia and the grain growing districts of Siberia. One of the greatest canals in the world was built to connect the White and the Baltic seas. Tens of thousands of kilometers of new railway tracks were laid, which connect the central districts with the more remote regions of the country.

The backward national districts of tsarist Russia which tsarism had cruelly exploited and oppressed were transformed into important industrial centres with fair-sized proletarian cadres composed of the native population.

During the First Five-Year Plan period the total output of industry in the U.S.S.R. grew more than three-fold as compared with pre-war production and more than two-fold as compared with 1928 production. In this sphere the most important victory consisted in the fact that the country succeeded in establishing new branches of industry which in size surpass those of the economically advanced capitalist countries.

At the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission held in January 1933, Comrade Stalin in summarizing the results of the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan in four years, said:

"Formerly, we did not have an iron and steel industry, the basis of the industrialization of the country! Now we have such an industry.

"We did not have a tractor industry. Now we have one.

"We did not have an automobile industry. Now we have one.

"We did not have an engineering industry. Now we have one.

"We did not have a big and modern chemical industry. Now we have one.

"We did not have a real, solid industry for the production of modern agricultural machinery. Now we have one.

"We did not have an aviation industry. Now we have one." *

The above successes strengthened the economic independence of the Soviet Union inasmuch as it was enabled to produce the bulk of the machinery it needed at its own enterprises.

* J. Stalin, "The Results of the First Five-Year Plan," *Symposium—From the First to the Second Five-Year Plan*, p. 21.

These successes definitely consolidated the dictatorship of the proletariat, the most advanced political power in the world. There is no stronger, no more stable power on earth than the power of the Soviets in the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union has become so influential and powerful that all capitalist countries in the world must reckon with it. In fulfilling the First Five-Year Plan, the working class rendered the Land of the Soviets powerful also 'in military matters, since the U.S.S.R. was enabled to produce on a mass scale all modern weapons of defence necessary to supply the Red Army in case of an attack upon its borders. As a result of the First Five-Year Plan, the U.S.S.R. forged to the very forefront of economically developed countries, at the very time when the whole capitalist world was being devastated by an unprecedented economic crisis.

The U.S.S.R. took first place in the world in the production of tractors, combines, agricultural machinery and peat.

In 1928, before the First Five-Year Plan period commenced, the U.S.S.R. occupied sixth place in the world in iron smelting and fifth place in steel smelting. In 1932 the U.S.S.R. took second place in the world and first place in Europe in iron and steel production.

The total output of the machine building industry in the U.S.S.R. advanced from fourth place to second place in the world and to first place in Europe.

In the output of oil the U.S.S.R. has changed from third place in the world to second in the world and to first in Europe. In the manufacture of chemicals the U.S.S.R. has moved up from eighth place in the world, which it held in 1928, to third place in the world in 1932. In coal output it moved from sixth to fourth place.

In the generation of electric current it moved from eighth place in the world in 1928 to fifth place in 1932.

In this fashion the working class of the U.S.S.R. under the leadership of the C.P.S.U. fulfilled the main task of the First Five Year Plan in the field of industry. It created its own advanced technical base for the socialist reconstruction of the whole of national economy and achieved decisive successes in the fulfilment of the historical task set by Lenin—to overtake and

surpass the advanced capitalist countries both technically and economically.

As a result of the successes achieved in the field of industrialization, agriculture was provided with 1,600,000,000 rubles' worth of farming machinery. This more than doubled the volume of machinery supplied to agriculture. Whereas formerly agriculture had no tractors whatever, during the First Five-Year Plan period it received more than 153,000 new tractors, over 94,000 of which were Soviet-made. For the first time machine and tractor stations were organized—2,446 in number. Owing to these stations the bulk of the peasantry was able, on the basis of collectivization, to raise agriculture to a level never yet attained.

As Lenin had said, all this ensured the solution of the most important and most difficult problem of the proletarian revolution: the U.S.S.R. was transformed from a country of backward, fragmentary agriculture into a country practising agriculture on the largest scale in the world.

In carrying out Lenin's policy of industrializing and collectivizing agriculture, the Party had organized two hundred thousand collective farms and five thousand state farms in the course of three years. The collective farms united more than 60 per cent of the peasant farms and embraced more than 70 per cent of all peasant land. Thus in the field of agriculture the First Five-Year Plan was fulfilled three times over.

As a result of collectivization the country succeeded in augmenting the sown area by twenty-one million hectares as compared with the sown area of 1928. This advance in agriculture permitted the Party to raise the quota of grain to be collected by the Soviet government from the former five to six hundred million poods to as much as one billion, four hundred million poods. Thus the successful fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan in four years in the field of agriculture created a very solid economic rural base for the Soviet government, the base of collective farming.

The decisive successes scored in the field of the socialist reconstruction of both industry and agriculture led to a radical improvement in the material condition of the toilers. Whereas

in the capitalist countries unemployment attained unprecedented dimensions (according to data supplied by the capitalists themselves about fifty million persons were set down as unemployed in 1932), whereas in the capitalist countries the rapid impoverishment of the workers and the ruination of the toiling peasantry were proceeding apace, unemployment was completely abolished in the U.S.S.R. and the improvement in the material well-being of the broad toiling masses in town and country continued to progress.

At the beginning of 1932 the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. had doubled in number as compared with 1913. During the First Five-Year Plan period the number of workers and office employees in the U.S.S.R. had doubled, rising from 11,600,000 to 22,800,000. At the same time the vast majority of workers were granted the seven-hour working day. Thus, in the Soviet Union the shortest working day in the whole world has come to be a fact. The national income, including the income of the workers and peasants, during the First Five-Year Plan period rose 85 per cent as compared with 1928. The average annual wages of workers and office employees in heavy industry increased 67 per cent. The fund set aside for social insurance almost trebled, rising to more than four billion rubles a year.

The improvement in the material well-being of the toilers likewise found expression:

a) in the growth of public catering, by which more than 70 per cent of the workers in the key industries benefited;

b) in the development of housing construction which made it possible for hundreds of thousands of workers to move into better houses and apartments;

c) in the increased number of children's homes and nurseries;

d) in the extensive measures taken for proper municipal planning and the construction of new socialist cities.

The collective farm road of development of agriculture freed the poor and middle peasant masses from kulak bondage and exploitation and raised the poor peasants in the collective farms to the station of people living in a position of security.

Thus the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan in four years abolished unemployment, destroyed the uncertainty of the

morning among the workers, ended the impoverishment and ruination in the countryside and raised the poor peasants in the collective farms to the level of middle peasants.

The increased demands of the workers and peasants and the immense rise in industrial and agricultural output led to a revival and extension of commodity circulation between town and country. This found expression in the increased output of light industry—187 per cent of the 1928 output; in the rising retail trade of the state and co-operative organizations—175 per cent of the 1928 output; in the increased number of state and co-operative controlled stores, and finally in the development of collective farm trade.

Thus the fulfilment in four years of the First Five-Year Plan regarding commodity circulation between town and country effected the complete elimination of private traders in this field and made it possible for Soviet trade to expand without capitalists on the basis of developed state industry as well as state and collective farms.

The economic progress of the country occasioned a rapid rise in its culture. The U.S.S.R. was transformed from a country having a high percentage of illiterates into a country of mass literacy. The number of literates rose from 33 per cent in 1913 to 90 per cent in 1932. By the end of the First Five-Year Plan period universal compulsory elementary education was in force. The press and the number of clubs, schools, reading huts and libraries had grown immensely. While scientific and technical cadres in the capitalist countries were on the decline, in the Soviet Union a rapid growth of the proletarian intelligentsia could be noted. The number of engineers and technicians almost trebled during the First Five-Year Plan period.

In the formerly backward national districts, where tsarism used to stifle national culture (e.g. the Ukraine, White Russia, Kazakstan, the Tatar Republic and Turkestan) culture *national in form and socialist in content* began to blossom forth as never before. The steadfast adherents to the Leninist national policy strengthened the fraternal relations among the toilers of all nationalities in the single Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

As a result of the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan in four years in the field of industry, agriculture and trade, social-

ism was victorious finally and irrevocably. The last remnants of the moribund classes were cast out of these branches of national economy. Through mass collectivization the roots of capitalism in the countryside were finally cut and the kulaks smashed though not yet finally defeated. The collective farm peasantry became the firm support of the Soviet government in the countryside.

Thus the question of "who will defeat whom" has been finally decided in favour of socialism, and the U.S.S.R. has finally settled down to the socialist course of development in both town and country.

The fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan in four years is of world-historic importance. For this Five-Year Plan period transformed the U.S.S.R. into an impregnable fortress of world proletarian revolution. The fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan was of vast international importance.

"There cannot be any doubt that the international revolutionary significance of the Five-Year Plan is really immeasurable," * said Comrade Stalin.

The Five-Year Plan period has shown to the working class and the toilers of every land that for them there neither is nor can be any way out of the capitalist crisis, there can be no road leading to the liberation of the toilers, except the road of proletarian revolution.

"The successes of the Five-Year Plan mobilize the revolutionary forces of the working class of all countries against capitalism—such is the indisputable fact." **

The fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan in four years shattered the hopes of the enemies of the U.S.S.R. that the said Plan would prove unfeasible. The working class of the U.S.S.R. has shown in practice that under the leadership of the C.P.S.U. it was able not only to overthrow the capitalist order but also to build and complete the construction of the new, socialist society.

The triumph of the First Five-Year Plan smashed to bits the bourgeois theory of the Social-Democrats and counter-

* *Ibid.*, p. 13.

** *Ibid.*

revolutionary Trotskyists that it was impossible to build socialism in one country. The triumph of the First Five-Year Plan smashed to bits all the policies of the Right opportunists who harped on the unfeasibility of the Five-Year Plan, on the impracticability of the bolshevik tempo and who pulled the Party and the working class toward the restoration of capitalism. The results of the First Five-Year Plan period proved that it is fully possible to build in one country the socialist society whose economic foundation has already been laid in the U.S.S.R. The results of the First Five-Year Plan period have shown to the whole world the superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist system which has outlived its day and must be replaced by a new system, the socialist system.

"Finally, the results of the Five-Year Plan have shown that the Party is invincible *if* it knows its goal and how to lead to it, and if it is not afraid of difficulties." *

Leading the struggle for the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan the Party ensured the whirlwind growth of the political activity and class consciousness of the working class and of the entire mass of the toilers in the U.S.S.R. In the struggle for the Five-Year Plan a new type of socialist worker was forged—the shock brigade worker, a self-sacrificing fighter who is whole-heartedly devoted to socialism, for whom labour has become a matter of honour, valour and heroism. These splendid shock brigade workers entered the Party in such great numbers that in a short period of time its ranks swelled to over three million members and candidates. Besides, more than five million members are included in the Leninist Young Communist League.

In the struggle for the general line the Party achieved greater solidarity and fighting capacity than ever before. Having defeated counter-revolutionary Trotskyism and exposed Right opportunism as the main danger, while carrying on a pitiless struggle against the "Leftist" extremists and all other anti-Party and counter-revolutionary groups, the Party led the working class to socialism victorious.

The struggle for the building of socialism rallied the entire

* *Ibid.*, p. 59.

Party and the working class still more closely around Comrade Stalin, its leader and teacher, the organizer of the tremendous victories of socialism. The Party proved *invincible* and the working class was able to achieve its great victory of fulfilling the First Five-Year Plan in four years only because the entire struggle was directed by the C.P.S.U. and its Leninist Central Committee, only because the Party and the working class and the struggle for the Five-Year Plan were headed by Comrade *Stalin*.

CHAPTER XVI

THE PARTY IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN

January Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission (1933)

The reports of Comrades Stalin, Molotov and Kuibyshev on the results of the First Five-Year Plan and on the plan for the first year of the Second Five-Year Plan period, Comrade Stalin's speech on work in the rural districts, Comrade Kaganovich's report on the establishment of political departments in the machine and tractor stations and state farms and the resolutions on these questions placed the Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission held in January 1933 among the most important events of the Party, ranking with that of a Party Congress.

The January Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission in summarizing the historical victories of the First Five-Year Plan brought to the fore the principal political tasks for the forthcoming period.

The First Five-Year Plan period was a period of the construction of new enterprises in industry and agriculture. Its characteristic feature was the enthusiasm, the fervour of construction. Parallel with the further development of construction, the Second Five-Year Plan period will primarily be a period of mastering the new enterprises and of the organizational consolidation of the collective and state farms. The enthusiasm for new construction which the Party engendered during the First Five-Year Plan period must now be supplemented, as Comrade Stalin says, by

“...enthusiasm and fervour for mastering the new factories and the new technique, for seriously increasing the productivity of labour, for seriously reducing cost of production.

“This is the main thing now.” *

* Stalin, “The Results of the First Five-Year Plan,” *Symposium—From the First to the Second Five-Year Plan*, p. 29.

During the First Five-Year Plan period the Party had to pursue the policy of developing the country at the highest possible rates of speed, i.e., it was necessary to establish in short order an advanced industry to supply agriculture with tractors and farming machinery, so that the country might not go without bread and the capitalist elements might not carry off the victory. It was likewise necessary to forge modern means of defence without which it would have been impossible to protect the country against the imperialists. If the Party had not accelerated the pace of the U.S.S.R., Comrade Stalin said:

"We would have had military intervention, not pacts of non-aggression but war, dangerous and fatal war, sanguinary and unequal war; or in that war we would have been almost unarmed in the face of the enemy who has all the modern means of attack at his disposal." *

Now, at the beginning of the Second Five-Year Plan, when modern technique has been set up as the basis of Soviet industry, transport and agriculture, and when the defence capacity of the country has been raised enormously, there is no longer any need to drive the country on at top speed. Besides, the factories and mills which have already been built must be properly mastered. But mastering them requires more time and presents more difficulties than the operation of the old enterprises. Proceeding from this point of view, Comrade Stalin proposed that for the Second Five-Year Plan period less accelerated rates of speed be set for the growth of industrial output.

At the Plenum of the Central Committee Comrade Stalin placed every emphasis on the necessity of improving the work of the Party in the countryside, at the same time pointing out with bolshevik straightforwardness what the principal shortcomings during the last period were.

The chief defect consisted in the fact that in 1932 grain collections were attended with greater difficulties than in 1931. At the same time the poor progress shown by these grain collections could not be explained by a bad harvest for the harvest was better than during the preceding year. The causes of this shortcoming were rooted in the following facts:

* *Ibid.*, p. 25.

First, the rural workers in the state and Party apparatus failed to take into consideration the new situation created in the rural districts by the institution of collective farm trade in grain. With the introduction of collective farm trade the peasant received an opportunity of selling his grain at the market price, which was higher than the price fixed by the government. This circumstance gave rise to a certain reluctance on the part of the peasant to give up his grain to the state. In this new situation the Party organizations should, from the very first days of the harvest, have accelerated and speeded up grain deliveries if the quota set by the state was to be filled. However, instead of rushing the grain collections, many Party organizations began to encourage the creation of all kinds of funds on the collective farms (insurance funds, public catering funds, funds for cattle raising, etc.), and to augment the existing funds to two or three times their required size. The directors of the state farms committed the same mistake. They withheld the grain that ought to have been delivered to the state and sold it on the side. Thus the grain collection plans were not fulfilled for the reason stated.

Second, these shortcomings were caused by the fact that many Communists did not understand that the situation in the rural districts had changed due to the completion of collectivization there. They failed to understand that the transition to collective farming did not diminish but rather increased the concern of the Party for agriculture, enhanced its leading role in the development of agriculture. Now the leader of the collective farm was responsible for the management of the collective enterprise, whereas before each individual owner had seen to his own individual farm.

When individual farming was predominant in the countryside, the individual farmer would himself take care of his farm, would rely on his own resources and would himself bear the responsibility for its development. Under these conditions, the Party could confine itself to giving sporadic aid and advice to individual farmers. Now, with the transition to collective farming, the Party must assume the leadership of the collective farms, must help the collective farmers manage their enterprises on the basis of science and technique.

The collective farm is a large-scale enterprise and such an enterprise cannot be conducted without a plan. Nor can such an enterprise be left to develop at random, for it must be assured of the leadership of trained people, capable of managing the collective farm according to a definite plan and system.

Thus, the prevalence of collective farming in the countryside increased the care of and responsibility for agriculture imposed upon the Party and the Soviet government. Therefore, the Party organizations must have a thorough knowledge of collective farm life, must enter into all the fine points of collective farm life and collective farm leadership. But as a matter of fact quite a number of district and regional Party organizations were divorced from the life of the collective farms and were not posted on their requirements. After attaining a high percentage of collectivization, these organizations subsided and left things to take care of themselves.

Third, these shortcomings were caused by the fact that many comrades overrated the collective farms as a new form of economy. They decided that since these collective farms represented a socialist form of economy, this in itself guaranteed that they would be correctly managed and transformed into model socialist enterprises. These comrades failed to understand that a collective farm by itself, though it be a socialist *form* of economy, is not secure against dangers nor against the penetration of counter-revolutionary elements which, under certain conditions, might make use of the collective farms in their own interests. The crux therefore lies in the *contents* that are poured into this collective farm *form*, i.e., it depends upon who stands at the head of the collective farm, who leads this farm. Therefore, collective farms can strengthen and develop along the socialist path only if they are headed by real Bolsheviks. Vice versa, it is possible to make use of collective farms for a certain period to further counter-revolutionary aims, if these farms are headed by class enemies.

The *fourth* cause of the deficiencies in the work in the rural districts was the fact that quite a number of Communists failed to understand the change in tactics of the rural class enemy. They failed to understand that of late the face of the class enemy had changed and that it had become neces-

sary to change the tactics of the Party accordingly. The class enemies, who have come to appreciate the strength of the collective farm system, have changed from open opposition against the collective farms to the work of "quiet sapping." The kulaks no longer come out with weapons in their hands and no longer agitate openly against the collective farms; they are now trying to worm their way into the collective farms, occupy such posts there as warehouse men, business managers, secretaries, etc., and thus carry on their wrecking activities. The kulaks have been defeated, but they have not yet been crushed. Therefore all tranquillity on the supposition that the kulaks have ceased to wage their struggle and have given up the idea of cutting the throat of the Soviet government would be amiss.

The conditions of the class struggle in the country demand increased revolutionary vigilance so that the mask of the class enemies may be torn off and their true counter-revolutionary face revealed.

The *fifth* cause of these shortcomings consisted in the underestimation of the role and responsibility of the Communists in the matter of collective farm construction and grain collections. Not the peasants but the Communists are to blame for the difficulties accompanying the grain collections, said Comrade Stalin. The Party and the Soviet government now enjoyed immense authority. If things went wrong on the collective farms, particularly with reference to grain collections, the explanation was to be found in the defects pointed out. In order that these defects might be remedied, it was necessary to concentrate all the forces of the Party so that the decisive achievements which the Party could already record in the countryside might be consolidated and the remnants of the class enemy be completely crushed.

The whole situation in the countryside demanded a radical improvement in the leadership supplied to agriculture, to the work of the collective farms. It was necessary to place the socialist education of the collective peasantry on a properly high level and to correct the mistakes made by the rural Party organizations.

Experience had shown that the local Party organizations would find it extremely difficult to cope unaided with these tasks.

Taking into account the whole situation in the countryside and the tremendous tasks facing the Party in the matter of consolidating the collective farm system, Comrade Stalin stressed the formation of an organization that would be able to guarantee the fulfilment of all these tasks. He said:

"The political departments of the machine and tractor stations and of the state farms represent one of the decisive means by which these defects can be removed in the shortest time." *

After hearing the report of Comrade Kaganovich on the role and the tasks of the political departments, the Plenum of the Central Committee adopted a decision to establish political departments and to make it the duty of the Party organizations to appoint strong, tested Bolsheviks to these organizations.

The January Plenum of the Central Committee clearly demonstrated that the working class can fulfil the great historical task of building classless, socialist society only in a fierce class struggle against the remnants of capitalism. The growing might of the Soviet state intensifies the resistance of the remnants of the dying classes. They change the form of their struggle. Masking themselves they strive to worm their way into the collective farms and factories for the purpose of causing from within all kinds of damage and disruption to socialist construction. The theft and misappropriation of public property has become one of the forms of class struggle of the enemy. Therefore the Party has developed a relentless struggle for the preservation of socialist property, sacred and inviolate, against kulaks, rogues, money hogs and rowdies.

Lenin taught:

"The rich and the rogues are two sides of the same medal, the two main categories of *parasites* fostered by capitalism; they are the principal enemies of socialism. The entire population must take them under special surveillance; they must be taken ruthlessly to task for the slightest infraction of the regulations and laws of socialist society. Any sign of weakness, hesitancy or sentimentality in this respect would be the greatest crime against socialism." **

To rout the class enemies, protect the country against attack

* *Ibid.*, p. 81.

** Lenin, "How to Organize Competition," *Lenin and Stalin on Socialist Competition*, pp. 11-12.

from without and build communism requires the *mighty* and *powerful* dictatorship of the proletariat, as Comrade Stalin pointed out. Therefore during the Second Five-Year Plan period the Party is confronted with the task of fortifying the proletarian dictatorship, of entrenching revolutionary law and heightening class vigilance.

"Revolutionary vigilance and preparedness to crush the class enemy must be the basic commandment of each Communist and the main precondition to further progress." *

Thus in the conditions of the continuing offensive of socialism along the entire front, an intensification of the class struggle in individual spheres, especially on individual sectors of socialist construction, will be inevitable also in future. In this connection class influence alien to the proletariat will unavoidably and for a long time to come penetrate the environment of the workers and even the Party. The Seventeenth Party Conference and the January Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission emphasized in the strongest terms the need for the *further development of the relentless struggle against opportunism*.

In contending against the Party the opportunists of every shade, like the class enemies, began to resort to camouflage, duplicity, verbally backing the Party line while actually trying to disrupt the prosecution of this line. Therefore, the Party pointed out that in the struggle against opportunism it is necessary to raise Party vigilance and militancy in theory as well as in practice. Every concealment, aid or conciliationism, however slight, towards Trotskyism and Right opportunism is under such conditions a betrayal of the cause of the working class and is incompatible with membership in the Party of Lenin. Every Party member must actually wage a real struggle for the general line of the Party, for the practical realization of the policy of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.

In 1933 the Party was particularly active in the countryside in consequence of the decisions of the January Plenum of the Party. In a very short period of time more than 18,000 firm, tested and qualified Party workers were transferred from the

* From the First to the Second Five-Year Plan, p. 442.

central districts of the country to the political departments of the machine and tractor stations and state farms.

The Central Committee specially created an agricultural department which arranged its work according to a new principle, the production principle. This department was given jurisdiction over all questions concerning the development of the Soviet countryside: rural production, cadres, Party and Soviet work, cultural work, etc. The Central Committee placed Comrade L. M. Kaganovich, the closest comrade-in-arms of Comrade Stalin, in charge of this department.

The First All-Union Congress of Collective Farm Shock Brigade Workers played a very great part in consolidating the collective farm system and improving collective farming. At this congress, which was attended by rank-and-file collective farmers who hailed from every quarter of the Soviet Union, Comrade Stalin and other leading Party and government functionaries such as Comrades Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and Kalinin, explained the policy of the Party on the socialist reconstruction of the countryside.

Comrade Stalin launched the slogan of *making all collective farmers well-to-do and of making the collective farms bolshevik*.

If all collective farmers will work honestly, said Comrade Stalin, will work for themselves, for their collective farms, they will in a very short time have ample products and be able to lead a fully cultural life.

This slogan played a tremendous, historic role in raising collective farm production.

Parallel with this Comrade Stalin called upon the collective farmers to pay more attention to the individual farmers, to learn to understand the current changes in their sentiments concerning the collective farm movement. While far from objecting to discrimination in the admission of individual farmers to collective farms, Comrade Stalin strenuously objected to indiscriminately barring the road into the collective farms to any individual farmer. He considered it particularly important to draw the women into these farms.

The congress of collective farmers was remarkable also for the fact that it showed the exceptional skill of the Party leadership in elucidating the most complicated questions of socialist

construction in the simplest manner, making them intelligible to the millions of the peasantry. Each speech at the Congress showed this combination of profound political content and simple, intelligible form of exposition.

The political departments developed much energetic and self-sacrificing work in the countryside, instilling their political influence into all the main phases of life in the collective farm villages. In the first place much work was done to make plain Comrade Stalin's slogan which spoke of a well-to-do life. This slogan became the acquisition of each collective farmer, became a standard to which millions of people rallied. The political departments were instrumental in cleansing the collective farms and Soviet apparatus in the countryside of whiteguards, kulaks and other class-alien elements. The political departments paid close attention to all questions relating to collective farm production. They explained how to get the machines and tractors ready for use and how to exploit them correctly; how to prepare the seeds for sowing, how labour should be organized on the collective farms, how to establish a system of accounting that would accurately record the number of workdays; they fought against slovenliness and loafing, against the pilfering of collective farm and government property. They organized the chief agricultural campaigns (sowing, harvesting, etc.). All these problems received the close attention of the political department. In order to carry out these tasks much work was done among the masses and all active collective farmers were drawn into this work by the political departments.

Taking into account the important part played by the political department in the transformation of the countryside, the Central Committee adopted a resolution in June 1933 to reconstruct the rural Party organizations. Hitherto these Party organizations had been largely organized on the territorial principle. As a result of this, contact was quite bad between the collective farms and the rural nuclei consisting in the main of Communists working in the various rural institutions (village soviets, village co-operatives, militia, courts, etc.). The rural nuclei bothered little about production on these collective farms. The district committees of the Party, which in their work relied upon these nuclei and did not have any direct contact with the

Communists working on the collective farms, were, in most cases, divorced from the collective farm masses, from the active workers and exercised no direct leadership over the collective farms.

By decision of the Central Committee, collective farm industrial nuclei were established alongside of the territorial nuclei of the rural institutions. These industrial nuclei work under the leadership of the political departments and carry out their directions. This reconstruction of the Party organizations on the industrial principle guaranteed that the Party leadership would be brought nearer to the masses of the collective farm peasants and that their influence among the latter would be increased. This reconstruction makes it possible to give direct leadership to each collective farm and to strengthen the organizational and leading role of the Communists in collective farming.

Owing to the reconstruction which was carried out, the position of the political departments was strengthened still further and favourable conditions were created for carrying out their historical role which had been defined by the decision of the January Plenum as that of

"finally paralysing the influence of the class enemy on the collective and state farms so as to attain the upper hand over the petty-bourgeois survivals and private property tendencies of the individual farmer and private property holder of yesterday, the collective farmer of today." *

An entire epoch in the development of the Soviet rural districts is now linked up with the name of the political departments. Through the political departments the Party brought under its influence not only the cultural and social but also all the other phases of the collective farmer's life—the various processes of collective farming, the preparation of cadres, primarily cadres of new agricultural workers, such as tractor and combine drivers. Thanks to this innovation the influence of the Party was able to penetrate far into the peasantry, to vitally affect their work and ideology. This influence exerted by the Party over each individual collective farmer and his family creates all the conditions necessary to transform the collective

* "Resolutions of the Joint Plenum," *Symposium—From the First to the Second Five-Year Plan*, p. 462.

farm peasantry into workers of classless, socialist society. The political departments enjoy great authority among the peasantry. This they acquired by dint of their practical work.

"We hear the powerful voice coming from the innermost heart-strings of tens of millions of peasants who literally extol the executives of the political departments as bolshevik organizers, as the people who have united the collective farm masses in the struggle to render the collective farms bolshevik, to secure a well-to-do life and the amenities of culture for the collective farms." (*Kaganovich.*)

The work carried on by the Party in the rural districts in 1933 produced palpable results. For in that year the Soviet Union garnered the greatest crop on record, exceeding not only that of the preceding years but even that of 1913. Five billion seven hundred and forty-seven million poods of grain were harvested, one billion two hundred million poods in excess of 1932. The collective farm harvest showed the greatest increase, the total grain harvested by them having increased 40 per cent.

Owing to the political work done by the Party in the countryside, the obligations to the state were discharged accurately and promptly in 1933, better than ever before. The collective farms fulfilled their grain collection plans and settled with the machine and tractor stations for their services ahead of time. They set aside seed grain for themselves two to three months earlier than heretofore and were in a position to allot to the collective farmers considerably more grain per workday than the previous year. Quite a number of collective farmers became well-to-do. A number of districts in the Soviet Union which had been backward advanced to the front rank.

The radical change for the better secured in the work of the collective farms was an exceptionally important achievement of the year 1933. Whereas in former years on many collective farms slovenliness, mismanagement, and outrageous treatment of collective farm property reigned supreme and fields were left unharvested, in 1933 things took a decided turn for the better. The organization of labour improved considerably, though shortcomings still remained. The vast majority of collective farmers now adopted a different attitude towards their work.

This found particularly striking expression in the growth of socialist competition and shock brigade work on the collec-

tive farms. These socialist forms of work grew deep roots and became widespread on the collective farms. During the last few years the collective farmers have become convinced from their own experience that their standard of life depended on their work. In 1931-32 when the work on the farms was bad, the collective farmers received correspondingly less grain and other products and thus learned the lesson that if they do a bad job they themselves will be the first to suffer. And, vice versa, the improvement in their labour discipline and in the organization of collective farming achieved as a result of the work of the Party and the consequent consolidation of the collective farms led to a decided rise in the standard of living of the collective farmers.

All the successes scored in the sphere of improving agriculture were considered by the Party as only a start in the wide diffusion of that well-to-do life of cultural refinement which the collective farm system brings in its wake. To attain this goal, the Party must still more intensify its work in the rural districts.

During 1933, the first year of the Second Five-Year Plan period, the watchword "Improve Quality" was dominant in all branches of national economy.

During that year the Party organizations at the various enterprises centred attention on mastering the technique of the enterprises that had been built, on improving the quality of work in all departments of industrial life. Party mass work set as its goal the fulfilment of plans not only quantitatively but also qualitatively (higher productivity of labour, lower production costs, improved quality of output, etc.).

The Party work during that year effected a decided change in the mastery of technique. A number of industries scored substantial successes in reorganizing on a more efficient basis, in training permanent cadres of workers and tightening labour discipline. Industries like coal mining in the Donetz Basin, which had not fulfilled their plans for a number of years, began to do so in 1933 owing to the day-to-day concrete leadership of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. The work carried on by the Party organizations resulted in 71 per cent of the workers in industry being engaged in socialist competition toward the close of 1933.

There were more than five million shock brigade workers in industry and transport. The directive of the Central Committee that every single Communist be a shock brigade worker was carried out.

These achievements were the basis which enabled labour productivity in the whole of industry to rise 10.9 per cent in 1933 though its plan was still not fulfilled. But this figure showed that considerable progress had been made as labour productivity had registered a rise of only 2.6 per cent in 1932.

In 1933 production costs in industry as a whole fell 1.75 to 2 per cent while in 1932 they had risen 14.6 per cent. Industry under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry lowered its production costs 4.5 per cent which almost equalled the figure specified in its plan. A number of major enterprises built during the First Five-Year Plan period which had suffered from "infantile disorders" managed to work at full scheduled capacity in 1933.

The automobile and tractor plants and a number of other works, which had been set up wholly within the First Five-Year Plan period and showed important defects in the mastery of their technique, exceeded their planned quota in 1933.

Thus the hopes of the class enemies of the U.S.S.R. that the working class would be unable to cope with the task of operating the factories it had built and would prove too incompetent to make efficient use of enterprises equipped with complicated modern machinery largely imported from abroad, were dashed once more.

Seventeenth Congress of the Party—the Congress of the Construction of Classless, Socialist Society

The Seventeenth Party Congress convened from January 26 to February 10, 1934. At that time the Party had 1,872,000 members and 935,000 candidates.

The Seventeenth Congress drew up a balance sheet of the mighty historical victories won since the Sixteenth Party Congress. During this period Party work had been characterized by tremendous achievements in all the principal spheres of domestic and international policy and in the internal life of the Party.

During the past period decisive successes have been scored by socialist construction.

"During this period, the U.S.S.R. has become radically transformed; it has discarded the features of backwardness and mediaevalism. From an agrarian country it has become transformed into an industrial country. From a land of small individual agriculture it has become a land of collective, large-scale, mechanized agriculture. From an ignorant, illiterate and uncultured country it has become—or rather it is becoming—a literate and cultured country covered with a network of higher, middle and elementary schools operating in the languages of the nationalities of the U.S.S.R.

"New branches of industry have been created, viz., machine tools, automobile, tractor, chemical, motor construction, aeroplane construction, combine-harvesters, powerful turbines and generators, high-grade steel, ferro-alloys, synthetic rubber, nitrates, artificial fibres, etc., etc.

"During this period thousands of new up-to-date industrial enterprises have been built and started. Giants like the Dnieprostroy, Magnitostroy, Kuznetskstroy, Chelyabstroy, Bobriki, Uralmashstroy and Krammashstroy have been built. Thousands of old enterprises have been reconstructed on the basis of modern technique. New enterprises have been built and industrial centres have been created in the national republics and in the border regions of the U.S.S.R.: in White Russia, in the Ukraine, in the North Caucasus, in Transcaucasia, in Central Asia, in Kazakstan, in Buryat Mongolia, in the Tatar Republic, in Bashkiria, in the Urals, in East and West Siberia, in the Far East, etc.

"More than 200,000 collective farms and 5,000 state farms have been organized with new district centres and industrial centres serving them.

"New large towns with large populations have sprung up in what were formerly almost vacant spaces. The old towns and industrial centres have grown enormously." *

The improvement which the Party had achieved when the Seventeenth Congress met effected essential alterations in the structure of the Soviet Union and radically changed the face of the land.

Comrade Stalin, in characterizing the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R., noted that of the five social-economic systems that

* Stalin, "Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Seventeenth Party Congress," *Socialism Victorious*, pp. 24-25.

had existed in the Soviet republic when the New Economic Policy was introduced, patriarchal, private capitalist and state capitalist economy no longer existed. There remain: the socialist system and the system of small commodity production. But now the latter

"... has been forced back to a secondary position while the ... socialist system now has unchallenged predominance and is the sole commanding force in the whole of national economy."*

The socialist system of economy now constitutes 99 per cent of industry and 84.5 per cent of agriculture. The socialist system has become the sole dominant force in all national economy.

In the field of agriculture the successes of the Party were characterized by the complete victory of the collective farm system. At the time the Seventeenth Congress met, the socialist sector in agriculture (the state and collective farms) included 84.5 per cent of the whole area sown to grain in the U.S.S.R. while 65 per cent of peasant households were collectivized.

The entire proceedings of the Seventeenth Party Congress were splendid proof of the triumph of Leninism and evidence of the victories won under the leadership of Comrade Stalin, the brilliant leader of the Party and the proletariat. The Seventeenth Congress has gone down in the history of the Party as the congress of the victors. It was held in an atmosphere of great elation and enthusiasm. It demonstrated the extremely great attachment of the Party membership, based on the Leninist general line, to the Central Committee of the Party and to Comrade Stalin.

After summarizing the achievements of socialist construction, the Congress mapped out a new grand program, the program of the construction of classless, socialist society during the Second Five-Year Plan period.

The Second Five-Year Plan contemplates the development of gigantic construction arising out of the three main political objectives:

First objective, set forth as early as the Seventeenth Party Conference:

* *Ibid.*, p. 27.

"The final liquidation of the capitalist elements and of classes in general; fully to destroy the causes which give rise to class distinction and exploitation; to overcome the survivals of capitalism in economics and in the consciousness of people, to transform the whole working population of the country into conscious, active builders of classless, socialist society." *

Second objective—a further improvement in the well-being of the worker and collective farm masses and a two-and-a-half to three-fold rise in the level of the consumption of the toilers.

Third objective—the completion of the technical reconstruction of the whole of national economy—industry, transport and agriculture.

Comrade Stalin drew up a scheme for developing the general line of the Party.

The Fourteenth Congress, as Comrade Stalin had said, was primarily the congress of industrialization.

The Fifteenth Congress was primarily the congress of collectivization.

The Sixteenth Congress was the congress of the general offensive of socialism along the entire front, of the liquidation of the kulaks as a class and the materialization of mass collectivization.

The Seventeenth Congress was the congress of the victors, the congress of the construction of classless, socialist society.

The Seventeenth Party Congress splendidly exhibited the absolute triumph of the general line of the Party and its leadership headed by Comrade Stalin. The Congress had demonstrated the well-cemented, bolshevik unity of the Party, its loyalty to its leader, Comrade Stalin, and the readiness of the Party masses to do everything in their power to promote the struggle for the building of classless, socialist society.

The great victories of construction rallied the broad masses of workers, collective farmers and toilers of the U.S.S.R. still more closely around Comrade Stalin and the Bolshevik Party, the organizers of victories unprecedented in the history of mankind.

The triumph of the general line and the coherence of the Party have also induced the leaders of yesterday's oppositions, who for a long period of time after Lenin's death had fought

* "Resolutions on the Report of Comrade Molotov," *The Second Five-Year Plan*, pp. 71-72.

against the Party line, to admit their mistakes at the Seventeenth Congress. One after the other, their heads bent low with guilt, they stepped upon the tribune of the Congress, offered their repentance, and conceded the absolute correctness of the general line and the policy of the Party leadership headed by Comrade Stalin. These former oppositionists declared that their political line would have led to the defeat of the revolution and the victory of capitalism in the U.S.S.R.* They admitted that it was only the truly bolshevik irreconcilability and brilliant leadership of Comrade Stalin and the Central Committee which guaranteed the gigantic successes of socialism demonstrated at the Seventeenth Congress.

"At the Fifteenth Party Congress it was still necessary to prove that the Party line was right and to wage a struggle against certain anti-Leninist groups; and at the Sixteenth Party Congress the last adherents of these groups had to be despatched. At this Congress, however, there is nothing to prove and perhaps, no one to beat. Everyone now sees that the line of the Party has conquered....

"It must be admitted that the Party today is as united as it never has been before." **

* At the Congress Zinoviev and Kamenev took the floor swearing allegiance to the Party and assuring the Congress of their loyalty to it, while at the same time denouncing their own platform. But actual life has shown that all their statements were the vilest duplicity. These statements aimed at screening their base, treacherous activities which they conducted against the Party, against the dictatorship of the proletariat.

By their counter-revolutionary policy of double-dealing which they set up as the principal commandment to govern their relations with the Party, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Yevdokimov nurtured and trained the most despicable enemies of the Party and the Soviet government. On December 1, 1934 occurred the assassination of Comrade Kirov, Secretary of the Central Committee and of the Leningrad Committee of the C.P.S.U., one of the most prominent leaders of the Party and a very close companion-in-arms of Comrade Stalin. The murder was organized and carried out by participants in the former Zinovievist Opposition. They had been inspired to this deed by the so-called "Moscow Centre" which consisted of Zinoviev, Yevdokimov, Zalutsky, Kamenev and other participants in the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc who fell so low as to engage in terrorist counter-revolutionary struggle against the Party and the Soviet government.

The organizers and principals of this most desecrable, most abominable crime were tried and shot by order of the Soviet court, while their inspirers—Zinoviev, Kamenev and others—were sentenced to imprisonment.—*Ed. Russian ed.*

** Stalin, "Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Seventeenth Party Congress," *Socialism Victorious*, pp. 61-62.

The Congress showed complete singleness of purpose on all questions of Party policy. It unanimously gave full and unstinted approval to the political line and the practical work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. It approved Comrade Stalin's report and instructed all Party organizations to be guided in their work by the theses and tasks assigned in this report, which by virtue of the decision of the Congress became Party law.

However, these numerous achievements of the Party did not denote that the struggle was over, that henceforth there need be no further offensive of socialism or deviations in the Party. New victories will not come of themselves; they must be organized and won by dint of incessant bolshevik struggle. The same is true of the struggle against opportunism. The Party has smashed the opportunists of every shade but remnants of their ideology are still alive in the minds of individual Party members.

Survivals of capitalism still persist in the economics and minds of the people. And since the Party lives and works in its environment, unsound sentiments frequently percolate into it from without. The inadequate theoretical training of most of the Party members, the poor ideological work carried on by the various Party organs and the great pressure of practical work on Party workers make it easy for the remnants of anti-Leninist ideology to revive. Therefore the struggle against the Right and the "Left" opportunist elements constitutes a most important task of the Party.

In recent years the "Lefts" definitely slid down to the position of the Rights so that all essential differences between them vanished. Therefore, it is absolutely impermissible to weaken the struggle against the "Left" deviation while fighting the Right deviation. Both the Right and the "Left" opportunists and opportunist digressions must be pitilessly opposed by all Party organizations.

The political and organizational work of the Party and its leader, Comrade Stalin, secured the magnificent victories of socialism made evident to the entire world by the Seventeenth Congress. Herein lies the guarantee that the stupendous plan of building classless, socialist society during the Second Five-Year Plan period will be fulfilled.

"Our victories were due to the fact that at the head of our Party stands a man who was able to mobilize the masses with the determination and indomitableness that Lenin displayed, who was able to safeguard the purity of the doctrines of Marx and Lenin, who was able still further to enrich these doctrines, who was able to hold aloft the banner in the struggle for socialism, to discern the agents of the class enemy in our Party, to ignite the flame of enthusiasm in the Party, in the working class and among the toiling peasantry, and to lead this great army of labour to storm the last stronghold of capitalism in our country, to the building of victorious socialist society.

"Our Congress has drawn upon itself the attention of millions and tens of millions, not only in our country, but all over the world. And our Seventeenth Party Congress can confidently declare to these millions of workers and peasants that under the unfurled banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, our great Communist Party, which is ideologically united, hardened and tested in battles for socialism, will continue under the direct fighting leadership of our foremost great organizer and teacher, Stalin, to lead the millions to further great victories for socialism!"*

* L. M. Kaganovich, "Report on the Organizational Problems of Party and Soviet Construction to the Seventeenth Party Congress," *Socialism Victorious*, pp. 245-46.

APPENDIX

CHRONOLOGY OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE C.P.S.U.*

1861
Fall of serfdom in Russia.

1864
First International founded by Marx and Engels.

1870
April 20—V. I. Lenin (Ulyanov) born at Simbirsk.

1871
March 18 to May 28—Paris Commune.

1875
The South-Russian Workers' League led by Zaslavsky formed at Odessa.

1878
The North-Russian Workers' League organized at St. Petersburg (Stepan Khalaturin, Victor Obnorsky).

1879
J. V. Stalin born in the town of Gori, Tiflis province.

1881
Alexander II killed by decision of the Executive Committee of the *Narodnaya Volya* (the People's Will Party).

1883
Emancipation of Labour group formed.

1884
Blagoyev's circle (Russian Social-Democratic Party) organized in St. Petersburg.

1885
Morozov strike at Orekhovo-Zuyevo.

1887
May 20—A. I. Ulyanov executed in the Schlüsselburg Fortress.

December 17—Lenin and forty other students arrested.

December 19—Lenin expelled from Kazan University and exiled from Kazan to the village of Kokushkino (four versts from Kazan).

1889
July 27 to August 3—First Congress of the Second International.

1891
First organized May Day celebration by Russian workers (St. Petersburg).

1893
Workers' rebellions in St. Petersburg, Kharkov, Rostov-on-Don. Lenin participates in the Marxist circle in Samara.

1894
Lenin writes his *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight Against the Social-Democrats*.

1895
Lenin organizes the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class.
Lenin, Babushkin and other leaders of the League of Struggle arrested.

1897
Stalin works in the Marxist circles in Tiflis.
Lenin is exiled to the village of Shushenskoye, Yenissei province, Siberia.

1898
March 13 to 15—First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in Minsk.
Stalin joins the Tiflis organization of the R.S.D.L.P.

* Dates are recorded according to Gregorian calendar, except dates in parenthesis which are those of the Julian calendar. See footnote, p. 173.

1899

Lenin's *Development of Capitalism in Russia* is published.

1900

Lenin returns from exile.

December 24—First issue of the *Iskra*.

1901

Stalin goes into hiding to escape the police and begins his underground life.

1902

Lenin's *What Is To Be Done* appears in Stuttgart. Stalin is arrested in Batum and exiled to Eastern Siberia.

March to May—Peasant uprisings in Kharkov and Poltava provinces.

1903

General strike in the South of Russia (Ukraine, Rostov, Transcaucasia).

July 30 to August 23—Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Brussels and London). Split into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Socialism takes organizational form.

1904

January—Stalin escapes from exile to Tiflis and becomes the head of the Transcaucasian Bolsheviks (Transcaucasian Allied Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.).

February 9, 1904 to September 5, 1905—Russo-Japanese war. Publication of Lenin's pamphlet *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*.

1905

January 4—First issue of the bolshevik newspaper *Vperyod*.

January 22 (9—Bloody Sunday—beginning of the revolution in Russia.

April 25 to May 10—Third Bolshevik Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

May 27—First issue of the bolshevik newspaper *Proletary*.

June 27—Mutiny on the battleship *Potemkin*.

June—Lenin's pamphlet *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* appears.

Comrade Stalin in charge of the Transcaucasian illegal bolshevik newspaper *Struggle of the Proletariat*.

Comrade Stalin's pamphlet *Ament the Differences of Opinion in the Party* appears in Tiflis.

October—October general strike.

October 26—First session of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies.

November—Lenin returns to Russia from abroad.

December 20 to 30—Armed uprising in Moscow under the leadership of the Moscow Committee of the Bolsheviks.

December 25 to 30—First Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. at Tammerfors under the chairmanship of Lenin. Stalin attends the Conference as a delegate from the Transcaucasian Bolsheviks.

1906

April 2 to May 8—Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., Stockholm.

July 30 to August 2—Mutiny of the sailors and soldiers at Sveaborg and Kronstadt.

November 16 to 20—Second Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. at Tammerfors.

November 29 to December 5—First Conference of Military and Fighting Organizations of the R.S.D.L.P. at Tammerfors.

1907

May 13 to June 1—Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. at London.

June 16 (3)—Dissolution of the Second State Duma. Arrest of the social-democratic fraction of the Duma.

August 3 to 5—Third Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Second All-Russian Conference) held in Helsingfors.

August 18 to 24—Stuttgart Congress of the Second International. Lenin takes part in the Congress and organizes a conference of the Lefts in the International to counterbalance its opportunist elements.

November 18 to 25—Fourth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.

Comrade Stalin heads the illegal bolshevik organization in Baku and the newspaper *The Baku Worker*.

December—Lenin is compelled a second time to escape abroad from the persecutions of the police.

1908

January 3 to 9—Fifth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.

February—First issue of the central organ, the *Sotsial-Demokrat*.

March—Stalin's arrest and exile to Solvychegodsk.

September 6 to 7—Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in Geneva.

September—Lenin finishes his book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*.

1909

July 4 to 13—Council of the Enlarged Editorial Board of the *Proletary* in Paris.

Stalin escapes from exile to Baku to do illegal work.

1910

January 15 to February 5—Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in Paris.

March to April—Russian Collegium of the Central Committee consisting of Stalin, Dubrovinsky, Nogin and others is formed and begins to function.

August 28 to September 3—Congress of the Second International in Copenhagen.

Lenin takes the floor on the question of co-operative organizations and organizes a private conference of the Lefts to struggle against opportunism and centrism in the Second International.

December 29—First issue of the bolshevik newspaper *Zvezda*.

1911

December—Publication of the bolshevik magazine *Prosveshchenie* under Lenin's leadership.

After a new escape from exile, Stalin engages in leading underground work in St. Petersburg on instructions from the Central Committee.

1912

January 18 to 30—Sixth (Prague) General Party Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.

The Conference elects a Bolshevik Central Committee headed by Lenin.

Stalin becomes a member of the Central Committee.

April 17—The Lena shooting.

April 22—The bolshevik newspaper *Pravda* appears.

October to November—Bolshevik victory in the elections to the workers' curiae for the Fourth State Duma.

Publication of Stalin's pamphlet *The National Question and Marxism*.

1913

April 10 to 14—February Conference of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. held jointly with the Party workers in Cracow under Lenin's leadership.

May 1—May Day strikes and demonstrations in a number of cities.

October 5 to 14—August Council of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. held jointly with the Party workers in Poronino under Lenin's leadership.

November 11—Formation of an independent Bolshevik Social-Democratic Fraction (the "Six") in the Fourth State Duma.

Stalin is exiled by the tsarist government to the Turukhansk region.

1914

July—Strikes and barricades in St. Petersburg.

August 1—Beginning of the imperialist war.

August 8—Lenin is arrested by the Austrian authorities.

November 1—Manifesto of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. on the Imperialist War.

November 16 to 17—Arrest of the bolshevik fraction in the State Duma.

1915

February 27 to March 4—Conference of the Sections of the R.S.D.L.P. Abroad in Berne.

August 5—First International Socialist Conference in Zimmerwald. Lenin forms the "Zimmerwald Left" at the Conference.

October—Victory of the Bolsheviks: boycott of the elections to the War Industrial Committees in Petrograd and Moscow.

1916

April 24 to 30—Second International Socialist Conference in Kienthal, Lenin leads the Left wing at the Conference.

July 2—Lenin finishes his pamphlet *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*.

1917

March 11 to 12—General strike in Petrograd.

March 11—Manifesto of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. with an appeal to form a provisional revolutionary government.

March 12 (February 27)—February Revolution.

Stalin returns from exile to Petrograd.

March 18—The *Pravda* appears.

April 16—Lenin's arrival at Petrograd and his first speech at the Finland Railway station.

April 17—Lenin announces his *April Theses*.

May 7 to 12—The April (Seventh) All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) in Petrograd.

May—The Central Committee elects its Political Bureau which includes Lenin and Stalin.

June 4—Lenin's speech at the All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies.

June 17—Lenin's speech at the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

June 29 to July 6—Conference of the military organizations of the R.S.D.L.P. of the front and the rear held in Petrograd. Reports by Lenin, Stalin and others.

July 1—Grand demonstration in Petrograd under bolshevik slogans.

July 16 to 18—"July days" in Petrograd. Warrant issued by Provisional Government for Lenin's arrest.

July 19—Lenin goes underground.

August 8 to 16—Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks). Stalin delivers the political report of the Central Committee, reports on current events and leads the Congress, carrying out the Leninist line.

August to September—Lenin writes his book *State and Revolution*.

September 7 to 12—General Kornilov's counter-revolutionary action.

September 27—Lenin while in hiding writes the booklets *The Bolsheviks Must Seize Power* and *Marxism and Insurrection*.

October 20—Opening of the Pre-Parliament. Declaration and withdrawal of the Bolsheviks from the Pre-Parliament.

October 23—Historical session of the Central Committee in which Lenin participates. It decides in favour of an insurrection, Kamenev and Zinoviev casting the only opposing votes.

October 29—Enlarged session of the Central Committee in which Lenin and representatives of the Party organizations participate. Lenin's draft resolution concerning more intense preparations for an armed uprising is adopted. An organizational centre consisting of Stalin, Sverdlov, Dzierzynski and Bubnov is elected to lead the uprising.

November 1—Lenin writes his *Letter to the Central Committee* demanding the expulsion of Zinoviev and Kamenev from the Party.

November 6—Late at night, Lenin in disguise arrives at the Smolny Institute and takes direct charge of the uprising.

November 7 (October 25)—October Revolution. Power in Petrograd passes into the hands of the soviets. The Winter Palace, the railway stations, the main telegraph building and other public buildings are occupied by the troops of the Revolutionary Military Committee. Kerensky flees to Gatchina. The Provisional Government is arrested. The Second Congress of Soviets opens.

November 8—Lenin's report on peace and land delivered at the Second Congress of Soviets. The Congress adopts the decrees on peace and land and decides to form a workers' and peasants' government. Lenin is elected President of the Council of People's Commissars. Stalin is elected People's Commissar of Nationalities.

November 12—Publication of the decree on the eight-hour working day.

November 18—The Central Committee endorses the manifesto written by Lenin and addressed: *To All Members of the Party and to all the Toiling Masses of Russia* on the occasion of the withdrawal of Kamenev, Zinoviev, Nogin, Rykov and Milyutin from the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars.

November 22—Lenin orders General Dukhonin immediately to start peace negotiations with all belligerent countries. In view of Dukhonin's refusal Lenin orders him removed and appoints N. V. Krylenko commander-in-chief.

December 3—The headquarters of the counter-revolutionary commander-in-chief are liquidated. General Dukhonin is killed by sailors.

December 8—Armed uprising of Cossacks against the Soviet government in Orenburg (the Dutov episode).

December 20—Formation of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (Cheka) presided over by Felix Dzierzynski.

1918

January 7 to 10—Lenin writes his article *How to Organize Competition*.

January 14—Lenin's speech on current events addressed to the departing first detachments of the socialist army. On his return from the meeting Lenin's automobile is shot at by counter-revolutionary terrorists.

January 19—The Council of People's Commissars adopts the theses proposed by Lenin of the decree on the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. Decree of the Council of People's Commissars on the organization of the Red Army on the principle of voluntary enlistment.

February 18—Lenin speaks at the session of the Central Committee in favour of immediately accepting the conditions of peace offered by the German government.

February 25 to 27—Lenin writes his article *Strange and Monstrous* directed against the "Left Communists."

March 1—Lenin sends his telegram addressed *To All, All, All* on preparing to resist the possible offensive of the Germans and on defending Petrograd.

March 6 to 8—Seventh Congress of the Party. Lenin delivers reports on war and peace, on the revision of the Party program and the renaming of the Party. The R.S.D.L.P. (B) is renamed the Russian Communist Party.

March 10 to 11—The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars move from Petrograd to Moscow.

March 15—Fourth (Special) Congress of Soviets acting on Lenin's report ratifies the peace treaty with Germany.

May 25—First clashes between the Soviet government and the Czechoslovaks near Omsk.

June 10—Lenin draws up an appeal on the occasion of the Czechoslovak insurrection.

July 4 to 10—Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Adoption of the constitution. Expulsion of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.

July 6—Insurrection of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Whiteguard revolt at Yaroslavl.

July 16—Nikolai Romanov is shot.

Middle of August—Lenin writes the manifesto addressed *Comrades, Workers! Let Us March to the Final Combat*.

August 30—On leaving what was formerly the Michelson factory Lenin is severely wounded by Fanny Kaplan, a Socialist-Revolutionary.

Uritsky assassinated in Petrograd.

September 2—The All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopts a resolution to institute mass Red terror and establish the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

September 16—Lenin for the first time after his illness takes part in the sessions of the Central Committee.

November 9—The Sixth Congress of Soviets adopts a resolution to disband the Committees of the Village Poor.

November 18—Lenin sends a telegram to all soviets announcing the victory of the revolution in Germany.

November 23—Lenin finishes his pamphlet *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*.

1919

January 15—Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg assassinated in Germany.

February to March—Lenin writes the draft program of the Party.

March 2 to 6—First Congress of the Third (Communist) International under Lenin's leadership. Lenin's report at the Congress on bourgeois democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

March 16—Y. M. Sverdlov dies.

March 18 to 23—Eighth Party Congress. Lenin delivers the report of the Central Committee and reports on the Party program and work in the countryside.

April 3—Lenin writes a letter to Stalin with notes on the decree to re-organize state control.

May 10—First communist *subbotnik* on the Moscow-Kazan Railway.

June 28—Publication of Lenin's booklet *The Great Initiative*, referring to communist *subbotniks*.

July 9—Letter from the Central Committee to the Party entitled *All to the Struggle Against Denikin*.

December 2 to 4—Eighth All-Russian Conference of the Russian Communist Party. Lenin's report on the political activities of the Central Committee. His speech on the tasks of the Soviet government in the Ukraine.

1920

February 21—Creation of the State Commission for the electrification of Russia headed by Krzhizhanovsky.

March 15—Lenin's speech at the Conference of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions against Tomskey, Ryazanov and Lozovsky and in support of one-man management of economic enterprises.

March 29 to April 5—Ninth Congress of the Russian Communist Party. Lenin reports on the work of the Central Committee, speaks on economic construction, supporting the principle of one-man management and on co-operation.

April 23—Lenin's fiftieth birthday.

April 26—Polish troops invade Ukrainian territory.

April 27—Lenin finishes his book "*Left-Wing*" *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*.

July 15—Organization of the Red International of Labour Unions (Profintern).

July 19 to August 7—Second Congress of the Comintern. Lenin reports on the international situation and the principal tasks of the Communist International. Speeches on the role of the Communist Party and on the conditions of admission to the Comintern.

September 22 to 25—Ninth All-Russian Conference of the Russian Communist Party. Lenin speaks on the war with Poland and the prospects of peace.

December 30—Lenin takes the floor at the Communist Party fraction of the delegates to the Eighth Trade Union Congress, speaking on the trade unions, on current events and on Trotsky's mistakes.

1921

January 18—Publication in the *Pravda* of the draft resolutions of the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party on the trade unions (*Platform of the Ten*).

January 19—Lenin's article *The Crisis in the Party*.

January 26—Publication of Lenin's pamphlet *Once More About the Trade Unions, Current Events and the Mistakes of Comrades Trotsky and Bukharin*.

February 28 to March 18—Kronstadt Mutiny.

March 8 to 16—Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party. Lenin reports on the political activities of the Central Committee, speaks on the trade unions and reports on the tax in kind. Stalin reports on the national question.

March 13—Three hundred members of the Tenth Congress are despatched to Kronstadt to participate in the suppression of the mutiny.

April 21—Lenin finishes his pamphlet *The Tax in Kind*.

May 26 to 28—Tenth All-Russian Conference of the Russian Communist Party. Lenin reports on the tax in kind.

June 22 to July 12—Third Congress of the Comintern. Lenin is elected honorary chairman. Lenin speaks on the Italian question and in support of the tactics of the Comintern. He also reports on the tactics of the Russian Communist Party.

August 2—Manifesto by Lenin to the international proletariat on giving aid to the starving in Soviet Russia.

September 20—Lenin's article *The Party Purging* is published.

September 27—Lenin's letter to Stalin on *The Tasks of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, How They Ought To Be Understood and Carried Out*.

December 19 to 22—Eleventh All-Russian Conference of the Russian Communist Party.

1922

February 21 to March 4—First (Enlarged) Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

February 27—Decision of the Central Committee on the statement submitted by the group of "Twenty-two" (Shlyapnikov, Kollontai and others) to the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

March 27 to April 2—Eleventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party. Lenin delivers the political report of the Central Committee.

Stalin is elected General Secretary of the Central Committee.

April 2 to 6—Conference of the three Internationals in Berlin.

May 20—Lenin in the town of Gorky dictates a letter to Stalin for the Political Bureau on the subject of the public prosecutor's office.

June 7 to 11—Second (Enlarged) Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

August 4 to 7—Twelfth All-Russian Conference of the Russian Communist Party.

August 5—Lenin authorizes Stalin to express his gratitude to the All-Russian Conference of the Russian Communist Party in reply to its greetings, and ex-

presses the hope that in the near future he will be able to return to work.

November 5 to December 5—Fourth Congress of the Comintern. Lenin speaks on the New Economic Policy and the prospects of the world revolution.

December 13—Lenin's letter to Stalin on the foreign trade monopoly for the Plenum of the Central Committee.

December 30—Opening of the First Union Congress of Soviets. Adoption of the Articles of Confederation.

1923

January 2—Lenin dictates to his secretary his *Notes from a Diary*.

January 4 and 6—Lenin dictates his article *On Co-operation*.

January 16 to 17—Lenin dictates his article *Our Revolution* (in connection with N. Sukhanov's notes).

February 2 to 9—Lenin dictates his article *Better Fewer But Better*.

April 17 to 25—Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party—the First Congress without Lenin. Stalin delivers the organizational report of the Central Committee and a report on the national factors in Party and state construction.

June 9 to 12—Consultation of the Central Committee with the responsible workers of the National Republics and Regions. Comrade Stalin's report on the *Practical Measures for Carrying out the Resolutions of the Twelfth Party Congress on the National Question*.

June 12 to 23—Third (Enlarged) Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

October 25 to 27—Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission together with the representatives of ten Party organizations of proletarian districts. A resolution is carried on the situation within the Party and on workers' democracy in connection with Trotsky's letter and the statement of the "Forty-six."

December—Party discussion. Majority of the Party nuclei comes out against the platform of the Opposition (Trotsky, Preobrazhensky, Sapronov and others).

December 2—Comrade Stalin's report on *The Tasks of the Party* at the enlarged meeting of the Krassnaya Pressnaya District Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

1924

January 14 and 15—Plenum of the Central Committee on the results of the Party discussion.

January 16 to 18—Thirteenth Conference of the Russian Communist Party. Stalin's report on the *Current Tasks of Party Construction*.

January 21, 6:50 P.M.—Lenin dies.

January 23—Publication of the Manifesto of the Central Committee addressed *To the Party, To All Toilers* in connection with Lenin's death.

Beginning of April—Comrade Stalin delivers his lectures entitled *Foundations of Leninism* at the Sverdlov University.

May 23 to 31—Thirteenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party. Comrade Stalin delivers the organizational report of the Central Committee.

June 7 to July 8—Fifth Congress of the Comintern.

July 12 to 13—Fourth (Enlarged) Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

November 19—Comrade Stalin's speech *Trotskyism or Leninism* at the communist fraction of the Plenum of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions.

December 17—Publication of Stalin's work *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists* (preface to the book entitled *On the Way to October*).

1925

January 1—Central Executive Committee appoints Comrade Frunze president of the Revolutionary Military Council.

March 21 to April 6—Fifth (Enlarged) Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

April 27 to 29—Fourteenth Conference of the Russian Communist Party.

December 1 to 31—Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. Comrade Stalin delivers

the political report of the Central Committee.

The Russian Communist Party is renamed Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

1926

January 25—Publication of Stalin's work *Problems of Leninism* (Preface to the symposium *Leninism*).

February 12—Special Leningrad Party Conference condemns the Leningrad Opposition and fully endorses the decisions of the Fourteenth Congress.

February 17 to March 15—Sixth (Enlarged) Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

April 25—Publication of the Manifesto of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission on the struggle for a regime of economy.

July 12—Cornerstone of the first tractor works in the U.S.S.R. laid in Stalin-grad.

July 14 to 23—Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission.

July 15—Stalin delivers his speech on *The Anglo-Russian Committee*.

Lashevich is removed from the office of candidate-member of the Central Committee, and Zinoviev from the Political Bureau and from work in the Comintern.

October 8—Publication of the decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee dated October 4 and 5 concerning the violation of party unity (in connection with the schismatic speeches of Zinoviev and Trotsky at the Aviation Accessories works in Moscow and at the Putilov works in Leningrad).

October 17—Publication of 1) Notification by the Central Committee on the situation within the Party (in connection with the factional work of the Trotskyists); 2) Statement by Zinoviev, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, Trotsky and Yevdokimov (on their discontinuance of factional work).

October 26 to November 3—Fifteenth All-Union Party Conference. Comrade Stalin reports on *The Social-Democratic Deviation in Our Party*.

November 22 to December 16—Seventh (Enlarged) Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Stalin's report *Once More Concerning the Social-Democratic Deviation in Our Party*.

1927

May 18 to 30—Eighth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

May 24—Comrade Stalin's speech on *The Revolution in China and the Tasks of the Comintern* delivered in the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

July 29 to August 6—Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission.

The resolution adopted by the Plenum to expel Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party is commuted, after their statement of August 8, to a strict reprimand with a warning.

August 1—Comrade Stalin delivers a speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission on *The International Situation and the Defence of the U.S.S.R.*

September 9—Comrade Stalin's interview with the first American labour delegation.

September 26 to 28—Decision of the Presidium of the Moscow Control Commission of the C.P.S.U. on the illegal anti-Party printing shop of the Trotskyist Opposition. Publication of the decision of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission on September 29 on the same matter.

September 27—Comrade Stalin delivers a speech at the joint session of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U. on *The Political Physiognomy of the Russian Opposition*.

October 10—Announcement of the removal of Trotsky and Vuyovich from the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

October 21 to 23—Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission. The Plenum removes Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee. On October 23 Comrade Stalin delivers his speech at the Plenum en-

titled *The Trotskyist Opposition Before and Now*.

November 5—Talk between Comrade Stalin and foreign labour delegations.

November 15—Publication of the decision of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission on the anti-Party moves of the leaders of the Opposition.

December 12 to 19—Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. Comrade Stalin delivers the political report of the Central Committee.

1928

February 9 to 25—Ninth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

April 6 to 11—Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission. Decisions on the grain collections, on the Shakhty case and on other matters.

May 18 to July 5—Trial of the Shakhty wreckers.

May 28—On the Grain Front—talk by Comrade Stalin to the students of the Institute of Red Professors.

June 3—Publication of the manifesto of the Central Committee on self-criticism.

July 4 to 12—Plenum of the Central Committee. Decision on the policy governing grain collections, on organizing new (grain) state farms, etc.

August 17 to September 1—Sixth Congress of the Comintern. Program of the Comintern is adopted.

October 19—Comrade Stalin's speech on *The Right Danger* delivered at the Plenum of the Moscow Committee and Moscow Control Commission.

November 16 to 24—Plenum of the Central Committee. Decisions taken on the control figures for 1928-29, the first results and the future enforcement of the seven-hour working day, the recruiting of workers, the regulation of the growth of the Party, etc.

November 19—Comrade Stalin's speech on *The Industrialization of the Country and the Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.* delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee.

1929

April 16 to 23—Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission. Examination of internal Party problems, the Party purging, etc. Plenum condemns the Right-opportunist factional activities of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy.

April 23 to 29—Sixteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U. Appeal to develop socialist competition and 'shock brigade work.

April 29—Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. Stalin's speech on *The Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.* Uglanov is dismissed as secretary of the Central Committee.

May 9—The Central Committee adopts a decision on socialist competition at factories and mills.

July 3—Tenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Bukharin is removed from all work in the Comintern.

August 1—First International Red Anti-War Day.

August 13—Attack of the Chinese troops and whiteguard detachments on the eastern borderlands of the U.S.S.R. Voroshilov, People's Commissar of the Army and Navy, issues order to organize the Special Far Eastern Army.

November—Stalin writes his article entitled *A Year of Great Change* on the Twelfth Anniversary of the October Revolution.

November 10 to 17—Plenum of the Central Committee. Decision on the control figures for 1929-30. Plenum removes Bukharin from Political Bureau and gives warning to the other leaders of the Right deviation. Statement of Kotov, Mikhailov, Uglanov and Kulikov, members of the Central Committee, that they have broken with the Right deviationists.

November 17—Units of the Special Far Eastern Army repulse the attack of the Chinese troops and pursue them on Chinese territory.

December 21—Comrade Stalin's fiftieth birthday.

December 27—Comrade Stalin delivers a speech at the Conference of Marxist Agrarians on *Questions of Agrarian Policy in the Soviet Union*.

1930

January 6—Publication of the decision of the Central Committee on *The Tempo of Collectivization and the Measures of State Aid to Collective Farm Construction*.

March 2—Comrade Stalin's article on *Dizzy with Success* is printed.

March 15—Publication of the decision of the Central Committee on *The Struggle Against the Distortion of the Party Line in the Collective Farm Movement*.

April 2—The Central Committee adopts decision on privileges for collective farms.

April 3—Comrade Stalin's *Reply to Comrades on the Collective Farms* printed.

June 16—Stalingrad Tractor Plant put in operation.

June 26 to July 14—Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. Comrade Stalin delivers the political report of the Central Committee.

July 1—The Communard Works at Zaporozhye puts out the first ten combines.

July 2—Foundation stone is laid of the first blast furnace at Magnitostroy.

July 15—The Central Committee decides to abolish the *okrugs*.

November 20—Bukharin's statement to the Central Committee admitting his mistakes is printed. The Central Committee deems this statement to be satisfactory in the main.

November 25 to December 7—Industrial Party trial.

December 1—The Central Committee and the Central Control Commission adopt a decision on the factional work of Syrtsov, Lominadze and others.

December 17 to 21—Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission. Decisions are adopted on the national economic plan for 1931, on the meat and vegetable supply, etc. The Plenum dismisses Rykov from his position of member of the Political Bureau and

President of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.

December 19—Decree of the Presidium and the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. appointing Molotov President of the Council of People's Commissars.

1931

January 1—Turkestan-Siberian railway starts operations.

March 1 to 9—Trial of the Mensheviks' counter-revolutionary organization of wreckers.

Beginning of April—Eleventh Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

June 11 to 15—Plenum of the Central Committee. Decisions on the preliminary results of the sowing and the tasks of the harvesting campaign, on railway transport and on the development of municipal services.

July 5—Publication of Comrade Stalin's speech, *New Conditions—New Tasks*, delivered on June 23 at a conference of leaders of industry, at which Stalin's six conditions were laid down.

September 25—Construction of the Kharkov Tractor Plant completed.

October 28 to 31—Plenum of the Central Committee. Decisions on railway transport, development of Soviet trade and improvement in the supply of the workers.

November—Stalin's letter to the editors of the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolyutsia*

on *Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism*.

1932

January 30 to February 4—Seventeenth Conference of the C.P.S.U. Highly important decisions on the work of industry during the concluding year of the First Five-Year Plan and on the plan of the Second Five-Year Period.

September 28 to October 2—Plenum of the Central Committee. Questions concerning the development of Soviet trade, the manufacture of commodities of general consumption and the development of ferrous metallurgy examined.

September to October—Twelfth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Manifesto dated October 21 issued by the Plenum of the Central Committee to the toilers of the U.S.S.R.

1933

January 7 to 12—Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission. Stalin's report on *The Results of the First Five-Year Plan*. Stalin's speech on *Work in the Villages*. Decision on Kaganovich's report to establish political departments of machine and tractor stations and state farms.

Decision on the anti-Party grouping of Eismont, Tolmachev, A. P. Smirnov and others.

1934

January 26 to February 10—Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. Comrade Stalin delivers the Political Report of the Central Committee.

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